INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

ETHNICITY, LEGITIMACY, AND STATE ALIGNMENT IN THE

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: BRIDGING THE COMPARATIVE

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELDS

by

Cindy R. Jebb

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date: Apv. / 25, 1997

Approved:

Ole R. Holsti, Supervisor

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

1997

UMI Number: 9727364

Copyright 1997 by
Jebb, Cindy R.

UMI Microform 9727364
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Copyright by
Cindy R. Jebb
1997

ABSTRACT

ETHNICITY, LEGITIMACY, AND STATE ALIGNMENT IN THE

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: BRIDGING THE COMPARATIVE

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELDS

by

Cindy R. Jebb

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date:_ April 25, 1997

Approved:

_____
Ole R. Holsti, Supervisor

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

1997

ABSTRACT

Abstract: Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and State Alignment in the International System:
Bridging the International Relations and Comparative Politics Fields

This dissertation uses the literature of comparative politics to answer an

international relations question: what causes state alignment? It assesses the

significance of ethnic divisiveness, as well as the international system, as states engage

in omnibalancing. The thesis focuses on the presupposition that an ethnically divided

state suffers from a low level of state legitimacy, causing it to be more unstable than a

homogeneous state. This instability threatens the regime, and leaders of such regimes

must view this internal threat as carefully as external threats posed by other states. This

dissertation examines state alignment behavior of an ethnically divided state versus that

of an ethnically homogeneous state and measures this behavior using Steven M. Walt's

terms of balancing and bandwagoning.

The dissertation uses two Cold War era cases and two post-Cold War era cases:

Egypt's decision to realign with the United States in the late 1970s, Syria's decision to

sign the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and both

Egypt and Syria's Persian Gulf War alignments. The author modifies Ole R. Holsti and

James D. Sullivan's model to assess the significance of ethnic divisiveness, as a

motivation and/or constraint for a particular alignment decision. The research includes

scholarly opinion, speeches, polls, FBIS reports, government documents, journals, and

trade yearbooks .

The dissertation reveals that an ethnically divided state will have different

alignment behavior than that of an ethnically homgeneous state. Second, it appears that

the post-Cold War era promotes bandwagoning with internal enemies because there is a

degree of uncertainty in the international system, concerning a superpower's support.

iv

Finally, in this post-Cold War era, it appears that the region has become more significant than in the Cold War era. Theoretically, this dissertation supports Randall L. Schweller's critique of Steven Walt's alignment theory, that is that balancing and bandwagoning behaviors are not polar opposites; bandwagoning is for profit, while balancing is for security purposes. This project reveals that the absence vice presence of internal bandwagoning/balancing determines bold, purposive state alignment behavior and cautious, incremental alignment behavior, respectively.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have completed this project without the tremendous support from family, friends, colleagues, and faculty. I dedicate this dissertation to my husband Joel, who not only provided moral support, encouragement, and love, but who spent one whole year raising our children, while I was attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Additionally, he took care of our small children on many weekends, which allowed me to continue to work on this project. I also dedicate this project to my children, Ben, Alex, and Olivia, who provided me with love, cheer, and happiness throughout this whole process of "Mommy's book." My parents and family have been instrumental in this process through their love and support. They have been a pillar of strength for me.

My committee, Drs. Ole R. Holsti, Timothy Lomperis, Alex Roland, Al Eldridge, and Dan Johns provided patient guidance throughout this project. I am most indebted to Dr. Timothy Lomperis, who was extremely patient and guided me through this whole process. He is a scholar, coach, mentor, and a superb human being. All students should have such a role model to mentor them.

I have been truly blessed to have so many people who provided great support. To Dr. Mahmud Faksh, who provided me with key insights that proved invaluable to this project. To Ginny Navaro, who helped me with the research, while I was at Ft.

vi

Leavenworth. To the faculty at the Department of Social Sciences, who patiently listened to and provided advice on my developing ideas, most notably, Dr. Ruth Beitler. To the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), who encouraged me, most notably LTC Carey for his expertise and connections. To Fred Huxley at the U.S. Information Agency, who provided critical information and friendly support. To my staff group and their spouses at CGSC, who proofread and discussed the development of this project, namely Melissa Sorenson. To my friends at CGSC, who provided moral support while I was away from my family, namely Sue Sowers, Karen Hellmeyer, Annie and Peter Baker, Deb Reisweber, Chris and Charlie Pate, Tom Schneider, Scott Sorenson, Joe and Heidi Zachs, Bruce Jones, my staff group - Paul, Joe, Sharon, Rick, Rolf, Al, Don (the Air Force guy), Brian, Dave, Scott, Michael, Jeff (the Navy guy and desk mate), Kirk, and Jay, and many others who were so supportive.

I am extremely grateful for the administrative and computer support from Jo May and Chris Deitrick at West Point. I am most indebted to Charlie Keller for his computer expertise and his family members for their patience. Thanks also to the administrative staff at Duke University, especially Jesamine Jones and Mary Moore.

While I may have survived this process, it could not have been done without everyone listed above. I share with them the success of this project, and I am grateful for their assistance and friendship; however, I, alone, accept the blame for any errors.

To Joel,

Ben, Alex, and Olivia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

x

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War requires students of international security to alter some

theoretical premises and research approaches. Specifically, I believe that we need to

modify some of the assumptions of realism which underline Stephen M. Walt's theory on

state alignment and reassess the Cold War's focus on the systems level approach.

Systems-level theory and NeoRealism, in particular, failed to predict the change in the

international system, i.e., the change from the Cold War to post Cold War eras. (I will

develop this failure in the next section) Consequently, scholars of international relations

realize that systems theory alone does not fully explain state behavior. For this reason,

we must explore other approaches to more fully understand this behavior. While we

need to rethink how best to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War, we cannot

completely discard the basic tenets of realism which have formed the basis of some of

the Cold War era theories. We are still operating in an international system, albeit a

different one; therefore, we still must consider the effects of the international system on

state behavior in the current context of the post-Cold War era. However, we cannot

ignore the effect of the numerous examples of regime instability on the international

system. The republics of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and

Rwanda are only a few examples of regime instability at work today. This instability not

1

only incites regime failure, but it also greatly impacts on the international system.
Consequently, scholars must simultaneously analyze the effects of regime instability on
the international system, as well as the international system on the regime.

Walt explains state behavior, specifically state alignment, based on the qualities
of the international system. These qualities determine whether a state will balance
against a threat or bandwagon with a threat. Walt's use of the term "threat" refers only to
external threats, that is other states in the international system. According to Walt, state
alignment in terms of bandwagoning or balancing depends on the qualities of the
international system, specifically the nature of external threats. Steven R. David
introduces the notion of omnibalancing as a more appropriate tool for analyzing how
states align. In other words, scholars must analyze internal as well as external threats in
order to understand state alignment. My dissertation will explore omnibalancing and
analyze state alignment based on external and internal threats. I will examine external
threats and internal threats in the contexts of the Cold War and post Cold War eras.

Ethnicity as a Determinant for International Behavior

I chose ethnicity as the focus of my discussion for defining the internal threat
because, as Donald L. Horowitz claims, ethnicity is more prominent in the new states of
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and the Caribbean, than the comparatively older states of
Europe and North America.[1] Additionally, Horowitz states that "Ethnicity is at the
center of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenges to the cohesion

2

of states and of international tension....Ethnicity has fought and bled its way into public

and scholarly consciousness."[2]

There is a real-world urgency driving my focus on ethnicity as a key variable of

international behavior. This urgency is based on four reasons. First, it is a world-wide

phenomenon, not limited to any one region. Second, ethnic conflict can cause great

levels of pain and suffering to combatants and non-combatants, alike. Third, the

international community is at a loss as to how best to deal with such conflict. The United

States, as other nations, has deployed troops as a means to alleviate ethnic tensions.

Finally, I believe that ethnicity can affect international behavior.

There is no doubt that ethnicity is a recognized variable for conflict. According

to Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink,

> Of the 31 major armed conflicts that raged in the world in 1994, all were internal in
> origin (though some, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia-Herzogovina have had
> interstate implications). And in the five years following the end of Desert Storm, the
> U.S. military conducted 27 overseas operations stemming from ethnic wars or state
> collapse, ranging in scale from a non-combat evacuation in Sierra Leone in May 1992
> to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in September 1994. President Clinton's
> decision in 1995 to send 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia is merely the latest such
> engagement.[3]

In the former Soviet Union, ethnicity is a key factor in the undeclared war

between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Georgia, the government is facing challenges from

---

[1]Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),
6.

[2]Ibid., xi.

[3]Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive
Model," Parameters, 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 19-20.

3

ethnically- based movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Moldavia, the

government has faced challenges from the Dniester region, comprising a concentrated

Russian minority population. Tajikistan, too, contends with internal ethnic conflict.[4]

Finally, Chechnya's fight for independence is affecting both its own people and Russian

stability.

Ethnic conflict is not limited to any one area or region. According to Chaim

Kaufman, in the Spring of 1996

> Ethnic civil wars are burning in Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan,
> Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Myanmar, and Sri
> Lanka, and are threatening to break out in dozens of other places throughout the
> world. Many of these conflicts are so violent, with so much violence directed against
> unarmed civilians, and are apparently intractable, that they have provoked calls for
> military intervention to stop them. As yet, however, the international community has
> done little and achieved less.[5]

Sabrina Ramet claims that Central and Eastern Europe has approximately nine

zones or regions afflicted with ethnic hatred or intolerance, the most serious areas being

Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by southern Slovakia and Romanian Transylvania.[6]

Contrary to what recent headlines indicate, the effects of ethnicity is not a new

phenomenon. The Soviet leadership in 1982 understood the significance of its multi-

nationality nature and believed that "the successful construction of communism will

depend to a significant degree on a correct policy in the realm of national relations." In

---

[4]Mark Webber, "Coping With Anarchy: Ethnic Conflict and International Organizations in the Former Soviet Union," International Relations, 18, no. 1 (April 1996): 1-2.

[5]Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136.

1969, the All-Union Council for the Study of Nationality Problems was established in an effort to alleviate potential nationality-driven problems, and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's concern for such problems seemed to be reflected by his expansion of the activities of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow.[7] While ethnicity has always been a factor in politics, we cannot turn from the fact that the "revolutions" of 1989 and the end to the Cold War era precipitated ethnic conflict. Iftikhar H. Malik claims that 1989 gave way to "intensified competition between nationalism and ethno-regional/centrifugal forces. Geared to a variety of political, economic and cultural forces, ethnicity is the major challenge to a given state, especially in heterogeneous countries of South and Southwest Asia."[8] While I will analyze ethnicity in the states of Egypt and Syria, I believe that my findings will provide at least a starting point for understanding ethnicity as a factor for international behavior. For as Charles F. Furtado Jr. asks, "What is it about ethnic nationalism... that worries observers concerned with the preservation of

---

[6]Sabrina Ramet, "Eastern Europe's Painful Transition," Current History, 95, no. 599 (March 1996): 100.

[7]Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case," World Politics, 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 556-557 and the quote is cited on p. 556 from P. Paskar', "The Soviet People - A New Social and International Community of People," Kommunist Moldavii, no. 12 (December 1982): 82.

[8]Iftikhar H. Malik, "World Politics and South Asia: Beginning of an End?" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 19, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 43 and Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele MacIver, Daniel Abele, and David B. Nolle, "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria," Social Forces, 73, no. 3 (March 1995): 940.

international security? [It is] the likely external consequences of policies of internal ethnic exclusion."[9]

My review of the ethnicity literature will begin with a brief review of some of the comparative politics literature. I will then focus on ethnicity relying heavily on Joseph Rothschild's theoretical framework for ethnicity. Consequently, I will define and use ethnicity as a significant variable when analyzing the weak states of Syria and Egypt. I will demonstrate the relationship between ethnicity and state legitimacy and show that states which suffer from a lack of legitimacy act differently in the international system then states which enjoy a high level of legitimacy. My thesis focuses on the presupposition that an ethnically cleavaged state suffers from a low level of state legitimacy, causing it to be more unstable than a homogeneous state. This instability threatens the regime, and leaders of such regimes must view this internal threat as carefully as external threats posed by other states. As leaders engage in omnibalancing to determine state alignment, we will see different behaviors, or at the very least different reasons for similar behavior, from those states which are ethnically divided than those states which are homogenous. I will measure this behavior using Walt's terms of balancing and bandwagoning to describe state alignment. In other words, a state's ethnic divisiveness will lower state legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy, which causes regime instability, will affect state alignment behavior in terms of balancing versus bandwagoning, as well as help explain the reasons for that behavior.

---

[9]Charles F. Furtado Jr., "Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine," Political Science Quarterly, 109, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 90.

6

I chose this project for two reasons. First, I wanted to contribute both to the international relations and comparative politics fields. While many international relations scholars have called for the analysis of weak states and their effect on the international system, they have not examined such states with the regional or comparative politics literature. Additionally, many comparativists talk about the effects a lack of legitimacy has on the stability of a regime, but they do not explore such a regime's effect on the international system. I use the comparative politics literature, namely the ethnicity literature, to answer the international relations question of why states behave as they do. A residual effect of my work may be a better understanding of this variable we call ethnicity.

Second, I wanted to add to the literature concerning state behavior in the Cold War versus the post-Cold War eras, as well as exploring the relative significance of regionally - versus internationally - based threats on that behavior. Testing cases in the context of a systemic transition offers an opportunity for exciting theoretical findings.

Hypotheses and Definitions

David's hypotheses and definitions are the basis for mine because, together, they link systems, state, and regime analyses.

My definitions are the following:

1. If a weak state balances, then we will observe the state aligning against the threat.

7

2. If a weak state bandwagons, then we will observe the state aligning with the threat.[10]

My hypotheses are:

3. If a state omnibalances, then we will observe it bandwagoning with the threatening superpower so as to balance against the internal threat.

4. If we are examining alignment during the Cold War era, then we should see external threats taking on more significance than internal threats.

5. If we are examining alignment during the post-Cold War era, then we should see internal threats taking on more significance than external threats.

6. If the external threat is regionally based, then the state will align differently than if the external threat is from the international system, that is the threat being a superpower.

7. If a state is ethnically divided, whereby group loyalties do not coincide with state loyalties, then that state will suffer a loss of legitimacy. Such a state will act differently towards the international system than a homogeneous state, in which group and state loyalties do coincide, thereby strengthening state legitimacy. I will measure this state behavior in terms of balancing and bandwagoning.

My primary hypothesis is highlighted above (#7), but as I address it, I simultaneously address some interesting systemic issues. Consequently, I consider hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 as my working hypotheses. These hypotheses are theoretically exciting on two accounts. First, I realized as I began this project that if I did find a

---

[10]Please note that David uses these definitions as hypotheses for his test. He focuses on Third World state alignment with or against the threatening superpower in Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 6-8.

8

difference concerning the significance of external and internal threats due to a change in the international system, then that finding would be significant. It would demonstrate a possible effect on state behavior due to a systemic transition. Perhaps, we would also be able to detect a change in balancing versus bandwagoning behavior because of this transition. However, if I did not find a difference concerning the significance of external and internal threats due to a change in the international system, that, too, is interesting. No change in a state's calculation of threats even with a systemic transition may cause us to reevaluate systems theory in general.

Second, my finding on the effect of regionally - versus internationally - based threats on state behavior is also interesting, I believe, for the same reason. Whether or not state behavior changes due to regionally - versus internationally - based threats is, again, significant because no change in behavior is just as interesting as a change in behavior. Additionally, my work looks at regionally - and internationally - based threats in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The test of omnibalancing in both eras sheds some light on this issue. Again, any finding are significant as we explore the effect of regionally - versus internationally - based threats on state alignment behavior, especially in the context of systemic transition.

Significant Findings

Here, I will briefly present some of my findings, so that I may whet the reader's appetite for the chapters that follow. My Cold War era case studies are Egypt's decision to realign with the United States in the late 1970s and Syria's decision to sign the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. My post-Cold War cases

9

are Egypt's alignment with the West during the Persian Gulf War and Syria's alignment with the West during this same war. I selected these cases for the following reasons: first, they are other-than-the usual great power cases we find in the international relations literature. Second, they allow me to hold many, not all, variables constant, such as the region, time period, and the proximity to the threat. I concede that I cannot possibly hold all variables constant, which is an inherent problem with the case study method. Third, the Cold War and post-Cold War cases provide some insight on the effects of the international system on state alignment. Finally, these cases allow us to look at the internal variable of ethnic homogeneity (Egypt) and ethnic divisiveness (Syria).

I have found that these case studies seem to support the idea that a wealth of legitimacy based on ethnic homogeneity provides the leader with more maneuver space in devising foreign policy. The leaders of both Egypt and Syria seemed cognizant of the nature and strength of their respective internal support. Consequently, the quality of Egypt's aligning behavior tended to be strong, intense, and purposeful. The nature of Syria's aligning behavior, however, was cautious, tentative, and weak. Second, it appears that a wealth of legitimacy allows a state to put its national interests to the fore. Egypt realigned in order to address its declining economic situation. Syria was unable to put primacy on its economy because it had to address internal, as well as external, security concerns. Asad's careful balancing of interests prevented and still prevents him from making bold policy moves. He had to align with the Soviet Union in 1980 because he had already demonized Egypt and its new partners, the United States and Israel. The

10

Soviet Union gave him the tools to repress or balance against his internal enemy, i.e., the Hama massacre. He could rely on external support to prop up his regime (hypothesis #7).

What is interesting to me and what gives us an indication of alignment behavior is when we compare Syria's alignment with its internal enemies in the post-Cold war era versus in the Cold War era. In the post-Cold war era, regarding the Sunnis, Asad chose to bandwagon, as opposed to his balancing behavior in the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era, he bandwagoned with the Sunnis in order to build the economy and make in-roads to western technology, while bolstering Syrian diplomatic clout on the regional and international stages. One may also argue that he also bandwagoned to broaden the support of his regime. In fact, it appears that he must convince his own circle of fellow Alawis to accept the peace process. There is cause for optimism in the post-Cold War era, if this is indeed a trend. Perhaps Syria found itself without the certainty of superpower support, so it felt it needed to develop some self-reliance not only in the economic realm, but also in terms of regime support. Consequently, Asad felt he had to look within for such self-reliance and support (hypotheses #3, #4, and #5).

This point leads to the next point concerning behavioral similarities for both Egypt and Syria. Both countries chose to leave the Arab fold during the Cold War for their respective alignment decisions. However, in the post-Cold War era, both countries made deliberate efforts to renew their regional ties and gain regional status. During the Cold War era, I believe that Egypt's national sentiment combined with the status it gained in the international arena via its ties with the United States compensated for any lost regional status. For Syria, its ties with the Soviet Union served to compensate for

11

any regional loss of status. Additionally, its ties with the Soviets allowed it to gain the necessary military hardware to deal with any domestic unrest, so in Asad's view, he was able to use coercion to gain internal support. The nature of this internal support is debatable, however (peripherally addresses hypotheses #4, #5 and #6).

Why did both states choose to turn their focus to the region in the post-Cold war era? This observation support's Waltz's view that there seems to be a degree of more uncertainty in the other-than-bipolar world. During the Cold War era, as discussed in chapter 2, both countries manipulated the Cold War rivalry for their own purposes. The rivalry ensured aid in some form or another. In the post-Cold war era, assistance and even alliances are not so certain. Now countries are looking to their own neighborhood for future economic, security, and cultural arrangements. While Egypt already had ties with the United States, there was some uncertainty concerning future U.S. aid. The Syrians lost their superpower patron altogether. It was necessary for Asad to look regionally for assistance.(peripherally addresses hypotheses #4, #5, and #6)

This discussion leads to the next point concerning domestic variables. With the uncertainty of the international system, states must look inward. Syria has resorted to carrots (i.e., bandwagoning) in the form of a gradual economic opening in order to improve its economy (hypothesis #3). Consequently, it has had to share economic power with the Sunnis. It will be interesting to see how long this economic power sharing arrangement will continue without spilling over into the political realm. Egypt, too, has continued its gradual economic liberalization and to some extent, political liberalization. The question for Egypt, is whether economically it is doing too little too late. Will it be

12

able to continue economic reform without causing too much hardship on its people? Will such hardship, then, spill into the political realm? The good news is that perhaps the post-Cold war era, with all its uncertainties, is forcing regimes to fix themselves from within. These fixes may be easier for ethnically homogeneous states because it provides an easier context in which to deal with opposition groups. For example, currently, the Muslim Brotherhood is a greater threat in Syria because of its ability to exploit ethnic divisions, than in Egypt where such divisions are non-existent. Additionally, fixes which come from within will perhaps have long-term effects, as compared to band-aid fixes imposed by the international arena.

What have we learned about foreign policy trends or alignment behavior? First, it appears that ethnic homogeneity does have an impact on foreign policy (hypothesis #7). It provides a wealth of legitimacy, thereby, allowing that state's leader more maneuver room in foreign policy. Consequently, that leader is able to take risks, which leaders of ethnically divided states are unable to do. Such boldness enables leaders to make strong, purposeful alignments, as opposed to tentative, cautious alignments. In other words, the ability to make bold foreign policy causes the nature of alignments, whether they are balancing or bandwagoning type alignments, to be different from those alignments stemming from a cautious, tentative foreign policy. It is this legitimacy based on ethnic homogeneity that enables leaders to make bold policy and subsequently, strong alignments.

Second, it appears that the post-Cold war era promotes bandwagoning with internal enemies because there is a degree of uncertainty in the international system

13

concerning a superpower's support (hypotheses #3, #4, and # 5). The state cannot count

on support from the international system. The imperative now is to find fixes from

within, which may in the long-term cause a state to address better its real concerns, such

as the economy. This point is responsible for what observers call pragmatism in policy-

making. Perhaps this bodes well for transitioning regimes on the road to democracy, a

topic for further study. Third, in this post-Cold War era, it appears that the region has

become more significant than in the Cold War era (peripherally addresses hypothesis #6).

This may provide added prestige and functionality to regional organizations, which I

offer as a topic for further research.

I did find that this study did make some theoretical contributions to the

international relations and comparative politics literature. Generally, I believe that this

study contributes to the literature that bridges both these disciplines. I will, in the

concluding chapter, discuss in more detail my contributions to theory, both in the

international relations and comparative politics realms, as well as present a more

systematic discussion of my findings as they relate to my hypotheses.

Paper Outline: Definitions, Assumptions, and Research Questions

Chapter 1 - Introduction: The introduction justifies the importance of the dissertation

topic and presents the research design for the dissertation.

Chapter 2 - Theory: This chapter explains the theoretical foundation of my project, based

on a literature review. Additionally, I discuss the following assumptions and definitions:

1. There has been a change in the international system, specifically a change from the

Cold War era to the post-Cold War era.

14

2. Ethnicity is an imprecise and ambiguous term. For purposes of this study, I define

ethnicity in terms of kinship, religion, and language (I explain each term in chapter 2).

These categories are best for describing group identification and cohesion. These

categories do, however, pose some analytical problems because they do overlap and are

not without their own ambiguities. I feel they are suited for this study because:

a. They are the terms most used by the peoples of the Middle East to describe

group identification and cohesion.

b. They offer a best solution between the all-inclusive and all-exclusive

definitions, as described in chapter 2.

c. The Alawis and Sunnis in Syria each represent an ethnic group.

As I focus my research to address my primary hypothesis, I ask the following

questions and explore the following propositions for each of my cases:

Chapter 3 - The Political Development of Egypt and Syria:

Thematic Questions and Propositions:

1. What is the historical setting for state formation?

a. Proposition 1: Artificial state formation tends to influence national identity,

negatively. As discussed earlier, a weak national identity degrades state legitimacy.

b. Proposition 2: A state based on historical precedence and continuity tends to

positively influence national identity. In such cases, a strong national identity will help

to strengthen state legitimacy.

2. What role did ethnicity play in the political development of the modern state?

15

The answer to this question will establish the degree of the state's ethnic divisiveness. Horowitz claims that severely ethnically divided states occur when ethnicity permeates all sectors of society. This is especially true when ethnicity permeates the political system.

a. Proposition 1: Political systems created along ethnic lines reflect an ethnically divided society.

b. Proposition 2: Ethnic divisiveness critically degrades the legitimacy of a state because as noted earlier, a critical component of state legitimacy is society's political identity, loyalty, and sense of political community towards the state. A state which has an ethnically divided society suffers from a loss of legitimacy because its society's loyalties, political identity, and sense of political community do not coincide with the state.

c. Proposition 3: States which suffer a loss of legitimacy based on this ethnic divisiveness are in danger of regime instability, as discussed earlier.

Chapters 4 and 5 - Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Policy during the Cold War Era and
Chapters 6 and 7 - Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Policy during the Post - Cold War Era:

3. How does this loss of legitimacy based on ethnic divisiveness affect foreign policy decisions? I will examine the impact of four indicators - elite attitudes, foreign aid, trade, and treaties and agreements - on five issues - security, territory, status, human resources, and nonhuman resources (see table 1).

16

a. Proposition 1: My research of these indicators will help determine the importance of internal or domestic security concerns versus external security concerns. It will also help determine the identity of the intended recipients of both human and nonhuman resources. These data, then, should help us understand some of the domestic issues, namely ethnic divisiveness, driving foreign policy decisions. Specifically, I hope to be able to determine the significance of a state's loss of legitimacy based on ethnic divisiveness on foreign policy decisions.

<u>Chapter 8 - Conclusion:</u> I will conclude by asking the following questions based on the data collected for my cases:

4. When do the external threats of the international system overide internal threats?

5. When do the external threats of the region take precedence over external threats of the international system, as well as over internal threats?

6. When do internal threats override external threats, both regionally and internationally? During the Cold War era vs. post-Cold War era?

7. Does the existence of internal threats based on ethnic divisiveness suggest a pattern of state alignment decisions, such as balancing or bandwagoning? If I cannot distinguish balancing and bandwagoning behavior, I will look for some pattern of foreign policy decisions based on a loss of legitimacy. As noted earlier, no pattern will be an interesting finding too. Clearly, there are many variables which affect foreign policy. I hope to shed some light on the significance of ethnicity as a variable for foreign policy.

17

Research Design

Students of security must reevaluate deductive reasoning, as well as case studies

that only represent a certain type of state. For further research, I propose the following

broad guidelines: The case study approach is the appropriate research technique, but we

must be careful not to choose unique cases or only certain types of cases. The approach

should be to increase the number and variety of cases to analyze so as to eliminate bias

and error as much as possible. Additionally, we must approach our study with an

emphasis on level II.[11] The nature of the state does matter, and if we are to understand

balancing behavior we must also modify realism's assumption that the state is a unitary

rational actor. Research must also be done by area experts and security experts together

so as to try to eliminate great power bias in the study. The more varied and numerous

our cases, the more valid our theory. I propose that we focus our efforts regionally,

which can then lead to the development of more general theory.

For this study, I use the Middle East for several reasons. First, it is the region

Walt used in his study, and David used a Middle East case. My use of this region allows

me to enhance both Walt and David's conclusions regarding state alignment. Second, the

Middle East is a region greatly affected by the superpower rivalry during the Cold War

era; it offers a look into state alignment on a regional level, and finally, it involves states

with ethnopolitical groups which provide us with an opportunity to analyze the affects of

---

[11]Levels I, II, and II parallel Kenneth N. Waltz'z first, second, and third images, which describe approaches to the study on the causes of war. Level I refers to the study of the nature and behavior of man as a primary cause; level II refers to the study of the nature of the state, and level III refers to the study of the international system. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

18

internal threats on state alignment. The region also offers a look at state alignment in the post-Cold War era, as I analyze state alignment during the Persian Gulf War.

I have adopted David's methodology, that is using the case study approach and asking similar questions of each case. The case study approach allows me the ability to give a rich portrayal of each country's political development and test my hypotheses. I will rely on secondary sources, which will allow me to, as David says, "not so much...[unearth] previously undisclosed material but...[interpret] known events in an original way."[12] Additionally, my research has shown that it is extremely difficult to obtain primary sources because the type of information I would require from interviews and surveys would actually put respondents in danger. This point will become more evident in my subsequent chapters on Syria.

My first case, Egypt, is a more homogeneous society than Syria. Halim Barakat describes Egypt as relatively homogeneous, with a society that has a shared social identity and a strong consensus on issues involving national identity.[13] He cites Gamal Hamden, who claims that, "Egypt is the strongest force among Arab countries twice: once by its mere size, and once by its absolute homogeneity."[14] He also cites Hussein Fawzi, who notes that Egypt's homogeneity explains the continuity of successive civilization which has made Egypt "the most ancient of nations on the surface of the

---

[12]David, 27.

[13]Halim Barakat, The Arab World_: Society, Culture, and State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 16-17.

[14]Ibid., 16.

19

planet."[15] Consequently, ethnicity may not be as severe an internal threat as it is in

Syria. This difference may cause different state behavior; specifically we may see

omnibalancing at work, resulting in either balancing or bandwagoning behaviors.

My second case is Syria. During the Cold War, it will allow us to analyze its

alignment behavior in three simultaneous contexts: international, regional, and domestic.

I then look at Syria during the Persian Gulf War without the superpower rivalry

operating. Syria will allow us to examine the role of ethnicity in state alignment

behavior because of ethnicity's prominence in Syria's political development. I will

demonstrate its prominence and resultant societal divisiveness based on ethnicity's

pervasiveness. As mentioned earlier, I will measure the severity of ethnic divisiveness

based on Horowitz's indicators of severely ethnically divided societies. By choosing

Egypt and Syria, I can hold several variables constant. Both countries are from the same

region, I will be analyzing them during the same time periods, and they have similar

proximity to external threats. The key difference is their ethnic makeup: Syria is

severely ethnically divided, while Egypt is homogeneous.

Please note that a multiethnic state, for this study, is different than an ethnically

divided state. I am using Horowitz's criteria for establishing Syria as an ethnically

divided state, that is a state in which political development occurs along ethnic lines.

The significance of ethnic divisions for state legitimacy arises when group loyalties

conflict with state loyalties. Lebanon is an interesting case because, except for

---

[15]Ibid.

occasional upheavals, it was a stable multiethnic state for roughly thirty years. What is

interesting, however, is that it adopted a regime described by Arend Lijpart as a

consensual democracy. According to Lijpart,

> In plural societies, therefore, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife
> rather than democracy. What these societies need is a democratic regime that
> emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and
> that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a
> bare majority: consensus democracy.[16]

One way to achieve consensus is through power-sharing, so as to ensure minority

representation for certain posts. Another measure is balanced bicameralism, which

would ensure minority representation in the upper chamber.[17]

Enver M. Koury describes this consensual democracy as a confessional system.

He claims that Lebanon enjoyed stability because 1. the different groups respected one

another, 2. the groups benefitted from the regime, and 3. the groups feared alternative

regimes.[18] One of the problems that contributed to Lebanon's downfall was that the

changing population was not reflected in the regime. The 1975 crisis was an opportunity

for the Muslims, in their view, to correct this imbalance.[19] Outside factors, such as the

regional and global participation in Lebanon, exacerbated the problems of stability for

Lebanon. Finally, the regime became unresponsive to change and was unable to

---

[16]Arend Lijpart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 23.

[17]Lijpart, 23-25. There are other measures, which Lijpart explains in Lijpart, 23-30.

[18]Enver M. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), 17.

[19]Ibid., 25.

21

modernize and reform because of its over-emphasis on the political framework and inability to address substantive issues.[20] While Lebanon was able to mitigate the effects of a potentially ethnically divided state, it had to do this by engineering the regime. The constitution had to address society's heterogeneous composition. Ethnicity is a significant factor for a regime's stability, and Lebanon had to resort to the constitution in order to mitigate the potential for ethnic divisiveness - and it worked for awhile.

Indicators of Causality

Political scientists would like to develop theories which causally link independent variables with dependent variables. Due to the nature of the case study method, however, the best one can hope for is a correlation, accompanied by a good argument. With this point in mind and the nature of my cases, I will explain those indicators which will help us link the independent variables of ethnicity and legitimacy with foreign policy. I will show that leaders of ethnically divided states, that is those states which have strongly reinforced ethnic cleavages in all sectors of society and especially in the area of politics, have less independence in foreign policy decisions than leaders who do not suffer from such divisions. Once I have researched my cases, I will then evaluate the behaviors of balancing and bandwagoning. My cases will help us understand the motivations behind the foreign policy decisions. Once I know these motivations, I will be better able to analyze each state leader's threat perception, thereby providing me with the tools to assess balancing versus bandwagoning behaviors.

---

[20]See Ibid., 77-92 and Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (Washington,

22

First, let us understand how we can correlate the variables. James N. Rosenau

introduces linkage theory as a way to understand the relationship between the national

and international systems. "We wish to identify and analyze those recurrent sequences

of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems

and that become linked to phenomena on the other side...."[21] The key is empirically

establishing that link. William G. Fleming establishes that link in his investigation of

elite attitudes. "Social Science theory would specify, generally, that attitudes and

opinions precede behavior, though the two phenomena affect each other."[22] He

recognizes the challenge of giving empirical meaning to these elite attitudes. He uses

newspapers, legislative debates, and bulletins to assess elite attitudes.[23]

Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan also use this variable to help assess state and

alliance behavior. They suggest the link between regime stability and state behavior

concerning alliance policy: "It may be that only leaders relatively secure from internal

dissent are likely to undertake external policies which violate important bloc norms...."[24]

In order to assess the link between domestic politics and alliance policy, they look at

---

D.C.: Praeger Special Studies, 1985), 25.

[21]James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 44-45.

[22]William G. Fleming, "Sub-Saharan Africa: Case Studies of International Attitudes and Transactions of Ghana and Uganda" in Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 120.

[23]Ibid., 97,120.

[24]Ole R. Holsti and James D. Sullivan, "National - International Linkages: France and China As Nonconforming Alliance Members" in Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James Rosenau, 154.

23

several indicators to include elite attitudes, international trade, foreign aid, and treaties

and agreements.[25] They then analyze this data to determine its focus based on five issue

areas: territory, status (diplomatic recognition and relations, etc.), security, human

resources (education or training, etc.), and nonhuman resources (trade, aid, etc.).[26] The

authors determine elite attitudes based on documents, newspapers, press conferences, and

speeches. Government documents, journals, trade yearbooks, books, and newspapers

provided a significant amount of information on trade, foreign aid, and treaties and

agreements.

I intend to use the same indicators discussed above to determine the extent that

ethnic divisiveness and the legitimacy problems it causes affects foreign policy decisions.

Specifically, I will analyze its affects on alignment decisions. The indicators (a) will

help me determine the issues (b) involved with my cases. The analysis of the issues (b)

will help me understand the significance of ethnic divisiveness (c). For example, I will

examine the beneficiaries of the aid and trade (please see table 1 on page 26). Are aid

and trade going to a specific ethnic group? Is all of society benefiting? Who is receiving

education and training? Is Asad just building up his praetorian guard to ensure that he

may continue to repress the Sunni majority? Did Sadat ensure that the poverty-stricken

benefited from foreign aid? In sum, is the foreign aid used primarily as a domestic policy

---

[25]Holsti and Sullivan are also examining the intra-bloc environment as a variable linked to alliance policy. Another indicator is action data, which describes France and China's actions over a period of time towards other countries. More information on this point can be found on pp. 169-174.

[26]Holsti and Sullivan, 169. Also, the idea of using the table on p. 26 is from these authors, although I did make some modifications.

24

tool? Finally, did security from other countries play a major role in the decision process? If so, perhaps Walt's argument is strengthened.

Once I understand the motivations behind and constraints on the foreign policy decisions, then I will better understand each state leader's threat perception, both internally and externally. Understanding the threat perception will then allow me to assess balancing and bandwagoning behavior and, thus, address my hypotheses.

I want to assess the significance of ethnicity (c) because of its role in state legitimacy, especially for weak states, as discussed earlier. If I find ethnic divisiveness as an important factor in state alignment (d), then it will be interesting to see if a pattern of behavior emerges. If my project reveals the relative insignificance of ethnicity vis a vis other factors, such as security and poverty, on foreign policy, then that too is an important finding, especially in the midst of recent ethnic studies.

25

TABLE 1

INDICATORS AND ISSUES

Indicators					
		Elite Attitudes	Foreign Aid	Trade	Treaties & Agreements
Issues	Security	Is the concern internal or external security?	Is the concern internal or external security?	Is the concern internal or external security?	Is the concern internal or external security?
	Territory	Who is gaining territory?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?
	Status	Who is gaining international vs domestic status?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?
	Human Resources	Who is receiving training or education?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?
	Nonhuman Resources	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?	Who is benefiting?

1. a   →   b
    indicators   issues

2. b   →   c
    issues   significance of ethnic divisiveness

3. c   →   d
    significance of ethnic   foreign policy
    divisiveness

26

CHAPTER 2

THEORY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical underpinnings of my

dissertation. My discussion will show theoretically how I bridge the theories of

international relations and comparative politics to better understand state alignment. I

will begin with an overview of systems-level theory and its focus on the Cold War era. I

then briefly explore some theorists' attempts to modify Realism's assumptions, though

their focus is still the great powers. My next section is a review of the literature which

criticizes the great power or superpower bias and calls for studies on the nature of the

state. This section leads to my discussion of Steven R. David's theory of omnibalancing,

which requires a nature-of-the-state analysis. Specifically, it introduces the significance

of internal threats to state behavior. I take his theory one step forward by reviewing the

comparative literature and defining those internal threats by focusing on ethnicity. Next,

I discuss the relationship between ethnicity and the loss of legitimacy, which causes

regime instability, thus affecting state alignment behavior.

As I look to explore the notion of omnibalancing, I will necessarily be drawing

upon both the fields of comparative politics and international relations. The ability to

use theories from complementary fields is academically exciting. My discussion of

27

external threats will draw upon the systems theorists because Walt derives his theory of state alignment from NeoRealism. Consequently, my discussion will focus on Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Walt, as the premier Cold War era systems theorists. Next, I will present Jack Snyder's Myth's of Empires and Barry Posen's Sources of Military Doctrine because both works modify Realism's assumption that the state is a unitary, rational actor; however, these authors confine their cases to the great powers. Third, I will discuss K.J. Holsti, Eric J. Labs, Barry Buzan, Steven David, Paul Schroeder, and Randall L. Schweller as they provide some thoughts on how best to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War era. Specifically, their work calls for analyses of the nature of the state. These authors focus on weak states, rather than the great powers, and, thus, they challenge Realism's superpower bias. I will pay particular attention to David's work on omnibalancing.

My focus on weak, non-western states will lead to a brief review of some of the comparative literature before I focus my discussion on ethnicity as the basis for internal threats to a regime. Here, I expand on David's work because he stresses the importance of internal threats without ever defining those threats. I explore the definitions of ethnicity because it is an imprecise and ambiguous term. I clarify, for the purposes of this study, its definition. Finally, I end my theoretical discussion by demonstrating the relationship between ethnicity and state legitimacy.

Cold War Systems Theorists

As mentioned earlier, I will focus my discussion on Waltz, Gilpin, and Walt, as they form the basis of systems theory and state alignment. I will also review the

28

characteristics of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras because understanding these

contexts may help us determine the significance or relevance of systems theory vis a vis

nature of the state or comparative politics theories.

Before I begin this discussion, let us first define and describe the purpose of

theory. Although at first glance this process may seem elementary, it is really the key to

any further analysis. One must have a firm understanding of theory as an analytical tool

before any meaningful analysis can occur. I will draw heavily upon Kenneth Waltz for a

description of theory. According to Waltz, "theories explain laws."[1] Laws are "facts of

observation" and theories "...are speculative processes introduced to explain them....Laws

remain, theories come and go."[2] Waltz takes a Kantian approach, and claims that a

theory's explanatory power increases as the theory moves away from reality. "A theory,

though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remain distinct

from the world."[3] Finally, Waltz admits that theory does not explain everything, only

those things of the utmost importance.[4] Specifically, "within a system, a theory explains

continuities....not change."[5] As we shall see, Waltz's view of theory becomes his

strongest and weakest asset as we apply his systems theory to the post-Cold War era.

---

[1] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading,Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 6.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] Ibid., p. 10.

[5] Ibid., 69

29

To determine a theory's usefulness, I will use J. David Singer's requirements of

theory: that it provide description, explanation and prediction.[6] A theory's ability to

satisfy these theoretical requirements will vary based on many variables. I will

specifically look at systems theory's viability in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

Systems theory may help us understand state behavior without explaining the reason for

that behavior. Finally, we may find that in the context of the post-Cold War era, the

theories on the nature of the state may become more useful for description, explanation,

and prediction than the systems theory.

Cold War Era

Before we examine systems theory, let us review the characteristics of both the

Cold War and post Cold War eras, beginning with the Cold War era. John Lewis Gaddis'

article, "The Long Peace," provides a good description of this era.[7] Gaddis' description of

the Cold War era is from a superpower perspective. I recognize and appreciate the

arguments against such a perspective, especially concerning the "peacefulness" of this

era, but one cannot discount the tremendous influence the superpowers have had on

world affairs as compared to any other nations.[8] Regardless of one's perspective,

---

[6]J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 21-22.

[7]John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace," International Security, 10, no. 4 (1986): 99-142.

[8]See Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "International Crises and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace" in The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 85-104 and John A. Vasquez, "The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War," in The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 205-223.

however, there are still concrete facts that are indisputable. Gaddis points to the bipolar

nature of the era with the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers.

This bipolarity began after World War II and continued for the next four decades.

Nuclear weapons characterize this era as does the durable alliance system.[9]

Gaddis describes this period as stable. He cites Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer,

who describe stability "as the probability that the system retains all of its essential

characteristics: that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members

continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur."[10] The stabilizing factors

include nuclear weapons which deter war and allow the United States and the Soviet

Union to solve crises without going to war with each other. Gaddis coins the phrase,

"reconnaissance revolution"[11] to describe the ability of the superpowers to know each

other's capabilities. This knowledge also contributes to stability by making a surprise

attack almost unfeasible, and, therefore, highly unlikely. The superpowers adhere to the

"rules of the game"[12] which are implicitly acknowledged rules that encourage stability.

These rules include a respect for spheres of influence, avoidance of direct confrontation,

use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort, preference for "predictable anomaly over

---

[9]These points concerning bipolarity summarize Gaddis, 105-109.

[10]Gaddis cites Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer for this definition in Ibid., 103.

[11]Ibid., p. 123.

[12]Ibid., 132.

31

unpredictable rationality"[13] (examples of anomalies include the division of Germany and Korea), and the refusal to undermine each other's leadership.[14]

Gaddis also claims that the maintenance of the Cold War era system, bipolarity, was in the interest of both superpowers, so they encouraged those actions that fostered the status quo. Lastly, the superpowers were able to lay aside ideological differences in order to preserve order.[15] John J. Mearsheimer agrees with Gaddis concerning the stability of the Cold War era. He sees bipolarity, an equal balance of military power, and nuclear weapons as contributors to peace. Additionally, he cites the rigid alliance system and the lack of hypernationalism as essential factors to the maintenance of peace.[16] I will use these authors' views as a baseline, although I acknowledge the concerns of those scholars who challenge the assertion that the Cold War era was peaceful.

Post-Cold War Era

What is the post-Cold War era? It appears to be unsettled. We can say that bipolarity has diminished and we are entering either a unipolar world, with the United States as the major world power, or a multipolar world. We are seeing a change in the nature of the alliance system with the end of the Warsaw Pact. Eastern Europe is attempting to democratize itself, and the fate of the republics of the former Soviet Union is yet to be determined. We engaged in our first post-Cold War era war in the Persian

---

[13]Ibid., 132.

[14]This paragraph summarizes Ibid., 132-140.

[15]Ibid, 126-128.

32

Gulf, with that region still searching for some sort of stability. President Bush called for a new world order which has yet to be defined other than with vague notions of a peaceful family of nations providing a secure, peaceful world, and President Clinton is searching for a defining view of the world. How does theory help us predict state behavior?

Theoretical Considerations

Let us now turn to Waltz and see how his theory, the basis for NeoRealism, helps us understand state behavior. NeoRealism's three assumptions are that the international system is anarchic, the basic unit of analysis is the state and it is a unitary, rational actor, and power and survival are the over-riding concerns of these states. Specifically, Waltz defines international politics by its anarchical nature, the sameness of the states' functions, and the distribution of capabilities among the states. Let us look at each assumption. First, for Waltz, anarchy is not chaos, but rather that none of the units or states "...is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic."[17] There is no world government that enforces law and order. Waltz assumes that in this anarchical system states seek survival. "The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured...."[18] Waltz does not say that states act only to preserve their survival; instead,

---

[16]John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, 35-40.

[17]Waltz, 88.

[18]Ibid., 92.

33

they may prefer amalgamation with other states.[19] I feel this is a fair assumption because

as Waltz claims, "Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may

have."[20]

Part two of the definition concerns the function of states. The states that are the

units of international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions

they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that

implies their sameness. So, international anarchy causes the function of the states to be

the same. Waltz defends the use of the state as a unit of the international system because

it is its interaction that forms the structure of the international system. He recognizes the

existence of non-state actors, but asserts that the state, being the major actor, defines the

structure of the system. Non-state actors, such as transnational movements, are among

the processes that exist within the system; they do not constitute structure. The functions

of the states are the same; their capability to perform those functions is what varies.[21]

Finally, because states are functionally the same, we must look to their differing

capabilities as their mark of distinction. This systemic distribution of capabilities

determines the structure of the system as well as its behavior and outcomes. This

structure is Waltz's guiding principle. It is the core of Waltz's theory since it is the only

characteristic of the system that varies; anarchy and states' functions are not as vulnerable

---

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., 91.

[21]Ibid., 93, 95-97

34

to change.[22] From this point, Waltz goes on to discuss balance of power and polarity as the behavior and outcomes of the system because all states strive for power and survival.

According to Waltz, a balance of power occurs "...wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive."[23] Waltz's definition of the system fulfills these requirements, so the balance of power is an inevitable occurrence. This balance occurs differently in a bipolar world than in a multipolar world. The great powers in a bipolar system balance each other using internal methods: that is, relying on themselves. Great powers of multipolar systems rely on external methods of balancing, namely the realignment of coalitions. Self-reliance is a more reliable method of balancing than the external method which relies on others.[24] This notion coincides with Gaddis and Mearsheimer's views concerning the rigidity of the bipolar, Cold War alliance system. The alliance system of the Cold War was not fluid; nations did not cross over from one alliance to another. The rigidity of alliances, based on the superpowers' internal method of balancing, contributed to the stability of that era.

Waltz links the system's stability with the great powers of the system and claims that the bipolar system provides the most stability. Waltz's justification for this stability is similar to those reasons for stability cited above by Gaddis and Mearsheimer. Waltz claims that, "with only two great powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the

---

[22]Ibid., 97-99.

[23]Ibid., 121.

[24]Ibid., 168.

35

system."[25] It is easier to deal with just one other power than with many.[26] Each power knows its adversary; this knowledge is not evident in a multipolar world.[27] Waltz also claims that nuclear weapons do not alone set the great powers apart, rather, their "...ability to exploit military technology on a large scale and at the scientific frontiers" sets them apart.[28] Clearly, Waltz does not see nuclear weapons constituting a systems change. Certainty, rather than uncertainty, distinguishes the bipolar system from the multipolar system.

It is easy to see how Waltz's bipolar system reflects the Cold War era. How does it help us look at the post-Cold War era? Surely, there has been a redistribution of capabilities, with the United States seemingly more powerful than its former Cold War adversary. If we assume the continuing anarchical nature of the international system described by Waltz, then a world government cannot exist due to its inherent hierarchical nature. The end of the Persian Gulf crisis marked the rise of the United States as the sole world leader, but this temporary unipolar situation does not suggest the existence of world government. Surely, we have not reached that stage. In fact, it appears that the glimpse of unipolarity now will soon pass into multipolarity.[29] Perhaps the balance of power, which naturally occurs in an anarchical system, prevents the permanence of a

---

[25]Ibid., 204.

[26]Ibid., 193.

[27]Ibid., 170.

[28]Ibid., 181.

[29]The idea of the temporary condition of unipolarity and the eventuality of multipolarity is taken from Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 23.

unipolar world. The balance of power would ensure that no one nation would become too powerful. According to Waltz's argument, multipolarity characterizes the post-Cold War era. The United States faces competition, namely on the economic front, from Japan and Europe. Surely, they have the technology and are on the "scientific frontiers" to challenge the United States. Due to the temporal nature of unipolarity and the imminence of multipolarity, we will focus our discussion on multipolarity in the post-Cold War era.

What does a multipolar world hold for us? According to Waltz, it is an uncertain world and, therefore, an unstable world. Recent events support this claim of instability. The Persian Gulf War did not cause the usual bipolar opposing alignments of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's minimal involvement failed to temper Iraq's actions, which may have contributed to the United States' inability to anticipate Iraq's actions, correctly. The lack of "rules of the game" and uncertainty marked this conflict. The old bipolar alignments might have prevented this crisis, or at least, perhaps, its escalation. Both superpowers, adhering to the rules of the game, would have worked to keep their respective clients under control. It would have been in neither power's interest to provoke a situation that might escalate to either superpower confrontation or, as a worst case scenario, nuclear war.

A multipolar world suggests changing coalitions. Already we have seen the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. What is the future of NATO in light of the Pact's disappearance? We are witnessing fluid coalitions in the Middle East. The United States courted Syria, a notable past enemy, during the Gulf crisis. This new courtship is

especially unique since Syria was the Soviet Union's staunchest Middle Eastern ally during the Cold War era.[30] Will the United States be fighting Syria in the next Gulf crisis? The end of the Cold War perhaps facilitated the United States' flexibility to court Syria because either the Soviet Union did not feel threatened by this action or it could not respond to it. These changing coalitions, or reliance on external balancing, is less reliable than the internal balancing inherent in a bipolar world. This flexible alliance system is another element of uncertainty in the post-Cold War era.

Uncertainty also plagues the non-superpowers. Client nations of the Cold War era could count on their superpower's support. They could safely assume that nuclear weapons would not be used, as their non-use was one of the rules of the game. A superpower's involvement in a smaller nation's affairs would not escalate into a world war for fear of nuclear reprisals. Generally, the superpowers acknowledged each other's spheres of influence. This acknowledgment is not present in a multipolar world. Does this mean that escalation is more probable? Outcomes seem more unpredictable for non-superpowers as in the case with Iraq, discussed earlier.

Clearly, Waltz provides us with a suitable context in which to work, that context being the uncertainties of a multipolar world in the post Cold War era. It is as important, though, to understand what Waltz fails to provide. Just as Waltz's definition of theory may help to describe, explain, and predict events on a large scale (although he did not help us predict the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the Soviet Union), it fails, by

---

[30]Efraim Karsh, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Soviet Union and Asad's Syria," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 11, no. 4 (December 1989): 3.

38

its own definition, to describe, explain, and predict particular events. Additionally, also

through self-definition, it fails to describe, explain, and predict change, thus, perhaps,

failing to properly analyze events leading to the end of the Cold War.[31] Waltz claims that

theory needs to be removed from reality to best explain it. Although this break from

reality serves its purpose well on a grand scale and also benefits both scholars and

policymakers by contributing to his or her world view with its profound tenets of realism,

it fails to provide Singer's requirements on a small scale: it misses reality, that is specific

events that are impacting the international system. It is these particular events that

concern us because it these particular or "small" scale events that lives are lost, nations

destroyed, and tears shed. While it is important to understand the big picture, it is

equally important to understand the smaller picture because this smaller picture is

changing the big picture.

Waltz's NeoRealism fails on another account: it fails to provide policymakers

with manipulable variables.[32] While he does suggest change based on a change in the

system's distribution of capabilities, he does not provide us with a way of evaluating such

change. Waltz's theory is one of continuity, not change. The system constrains behavior;

---

[31]Please note that there is much debate concerning the static versus dynamic nature of systems theory. Waltz responds to his critics and claims that systems theory does account for change: "Changes in, and transformation of, systems originate not in the structure of a system but in its parts...through variation, unit-level forces contain the possibilities of systemic change." in Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." NeoRealism And Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 343. For more insight into systems change, see the *festschrift* for Robert C. North in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, ed., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).

[32]The idea of manipulable variables is taken from Jack Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Behavior Society and Nuclear War Volume I, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 279.

39

it does not offer a plan of action. We expect policymakers actively to pursue our nation's interests, not sit back and let the system determine state behavior. We need manipulable variables to make a positive impression on world events. Also, policymakers need to know how systems change. Waltz only explains why systems remain and continue. Policymakers of non-superpowers, who are unsatisfied with the status quo, want to specifically know how and what makes a system change. They need to know more than that a change in the distribution of capabilities occurred; they need to know how that change occurred.

Another systems theorist, Robert Gilpin, helps us understand why systems change, whereas Waltz only deals with system continuity. Gilpin, although a realist, does look to the internal workings of the state to determine system change. Gilpin sees the relationship between the public and private sector in a state as being crucial to the potential cause for international change. "If the growth and expansion of the state and the interests of powerful groups are complementary, then there exists a strong impetus for the state to expand and try to change the international system."[33] Secondly, a society might encourage individuals or groups to contribute to the state in such a way as to influence that state's tendency to expand its control in the international system. Also, the nature of the regime may determine the character of its citizenry; this character may influence a state's success in the international arena.[34]

---

[33]Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 97.

[34]Ibid., 97-100.

40

Gilpin, perhaps, helps better understand the change from the Cold War to post-Cold War eras by asking questions about the state. For example, as we search for answers about the Persian Gulf War, we might ask, did the interests of Iraq's elite complement that state's expansion? Perhaps they did, although Iraq was most likely seeking to change the region, not the international system. A post-Cold War era question might be, does Japan's competitiveness encourage its citizens to contribute to the state through their hard work, especially in business? Other incentives, such as nationalism, ideology, and religion, promise rewards for their adherents. For example, nationalism can persuade people to sacrifice their lives for the good of the state.[35] Additionally, a fanatically religious regime can promise martyrdom for those loyal subjects who die in battle. These domestic attributes may influence a state's growth and expansion and, perhaps even change in the international system.

Gilpin also describes domestic factors that cause political decline, thus influencing a system change. "...every society eventually declines following the erosion of its economic base."[36] The economy may decline due to the rising cost of the military. Public and private consumption may outpace the gross national product. The service sector may develop as the predominant sector of the economy, thus lowering the rate of productivity. We only needed to look at the Soviet economy to understand its problems, especially in the 1980s. The Soviet State Planning Committee, in 1990-91, predicted that the Soviet GNP would decline 11.6% in 1991; the previous year, the GNP fell by 3%.

---

[35]The discussion concerning other incentives is from Ibid., 98.

[36]Ibid., 161.

41

Additionally, the Committee predicted that industrial production would fall 15% and agricultural output by 5%.[37] Perhaps if we had better understood this economic decline, we would have been able to predict the decline of the Soviet state.

Gilpin views the loss of control of economic, political and social developments, and the inability of a superpower to play a balancing role, as destabilizing factors in the international system. He views the domestic stability of the superpowers as essential to a stable international system.[38] Clearly, the economic problems with which Gorbachev wrestled created difficult political problems for him. Nationalism was on the rise, and the Soviet Republics were demanding independence or at least a loosening of Kremlin control. Additionally, the United States' insistence on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) emphasized the relationship of technology and power. Technology, not just numbers of missiles, is a critical component of national power. The Soviets realized that, although they could quantitatively compete with the United States, they were unprepared to qualitatively compete on an entirely new, technological level.[39] These developments in the Soviet Union may have helped explain the system change or the end of bipolarity in the post-Cold War.

Our final systems theorist, Stephen Walt, expands upon Waltz's idea of balance of power in his book Origin of Alliances. Walt uses alliances in the Middle East to explain

---

[37]Bruce W. Nelan, "Boris vs. Mikhail," Time, 24 March 1991, 29.

[38]Gilpin, 237.

[39]This idea about technology and SDI is taken from Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience (New York: Random House, 1987), 277-278 and Gilpin, 182.

42

his theory. Key to Walt's theory on balancing versus bandwagoning is his definition of the threat. According to Walt, "By defining the basic hypotheses in terms of threats rather than power alone, we gain a more complete picture of the factors that statesmen will consider when making alliance choices."[40] Walt provides four factors that affect threat level: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.[41] Threat perception is a critical notion. Perhaps ethnicity affects a nation's predisposition in its threat assessment of another state. Threat assessment is critical for understanding balancing and bandwagoning behaviors. I will discuss this point in my Indicators of Causality section.

Through his case study analysis, Walt develops several hypotheses which help explain and predict a state's tendency to either balance against a threat or bandwagon with the threat. Walt claims that the conditions for balancing are the following:

1. Balancing is more common than bandwagoning.

2. The stronger the state, the greater its tendency to balance. Weak states will balance against other weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by great powers.

3. The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. When adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck-passing increases.

4. The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for others to balance against it.

---

[40]Steven M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 26.

[41]Ibid., 24.

43

5. In wartime, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency
    for others to bandwagon with it.[42]

The bottom line is that balancing occurs more often than bandwagoning, which of

course has many foreign policy implications, ie. if a country does not want others to

balance against them, then it will have a benevolent and restraining type of foreign

policy. If a country sees bandwagoning as the predominant form of alignment, then the

country will have an aggressive, competitive foreign policy.[43] As with Waltz, Walt has a

superpower bias which we must address.

Theories which examine the nature of the state may help fill the gaps left by

systems theory. Additionally, these theories may help us overcome the superpower bias

of the systems or NeoRealist theorists. Waltz provides an uncertain multipolar world as

the context for world politics. How do states behave in this multipolar system, and how

does state behavior affect that system? John Lewis Gaddis advocates the "consumerist"

approach; that is, to critically choose those theories that together help explain events.[44]

Other scholars are modifying Realism's assumptions to describe, explain, and perhaps

even predict state behavior better.

A Beginning Towards Modifying Realism's Assumptions

Both Jack Snyder and Barry Posen offer approaches to the study of state behavior

which modify Realism's assumption that the state is a unitary, rational actor. In Snyder's

---

[42]Ibid., 33.

[43]These points summarize Ibid., 27-33.

44

Myths of Empire, he attempts to explain why some great powers tend towards

overextension. He discusses the central myth of overexpansion, that is that expansion

enhances state security. This myth actually benefitted certain domestic coalitions. This

discovery of a domestic source as the basis for a policy of overextension, is Snyder's great

contribution to the international relations field. "These groups, including economic

sectors and state bureaucracies, logrolled their various imperialist or military interests,

using arguments about security through expansion to justify their self-serving policies in

terms of a broader public interest in national survival."[45]

Snyder explores this myth's underlying premises: gains and losses are cumulative,

the offense has the advantage, and others cooperate in the face of offensive threats.[46]

This third idea is similar to Walt's bandwagoning behavior.[47] What Snyder discovers is

that Realism does not explain this behavior, not logically or empirically.

> The logical difficulty that Realists themselves claim that states typically form
> balancing alliances to resist aggressors. Therefore, at least in the long run, the
> balance of power that arises out of international anarchy punishes aggression; it does
> not reward it. Consequently, strategies of security through expansion violate the
> basic principles of international politics that the Realists themselves have
> articulated.[48]

---

[44]John Lewis Gaddis,"Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International
System," in The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
1991), 26.

[45]Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 2.

[46]Ibid., 3.

[47]Ibid., 5

[48]Ibid., 11

Posen also challenges Realism's assumption that the state is a unitary, rational

actor. He tests organizational theory with balance of power theory in his analysis of

France, Britain, and Germany's military doctrine. While he finds that balance of power

theory has more explanatory power, both theories are useful. He argues that "...it is clear

that substantively the two theories provide complementary explanations of a complicated

and important aspect of state behavior."[49]

Posen explains that organizational theory's explanatory power is based on three

factors: purpose, people, and environment. Organizations exist for specific purposes.

They pursue those purposes with people, and the environment "spawns the organization;

it produces the purpose that calls the organization into being."[50] Additionally, Posen

describes people as ..."a great source of uncertainty....People seldom approach the perfect

rationality assumed in classical economics."[51] Clearly, Posen provides us with a

modification of Realism's assumption that the state is a unitary, rational actor, yet, he

confines his cases to the great powers.

Internal Threats and the Nature of the State: Challenging Systems Theory's Superpower Bias

Let us now turn to some possible alternative approaches to international relations

theory, which reveal the problems associated with systems theory's superpower bias. K.

J. Holsti in "International Theory and War in the Third World" attacks the superpower

---

[49]Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 9.

[50]The discussion about organizational theory and the quotation is from Ibid., 43.

[51]Ibid.

46

perspective of the Cold War systems theorists. He examines the Cold War period from a Third World perspective and reveals that "Most wars did not initially involve two or more regular armed forces of states," and they did not have the conventional features of Great Power war.[52] Most casualties during war in this period occurred in the Third World.[53] While the system theories of the Cold War focus on the great powers, they ignored the activities of the Third World which is where war mainly occurred. How can we call the Cold War period stable? Additionally, Holsti mentions that all the literature on the causes of war are primarily written by U.S. or European writers. In Jack Levy's survey of the literature, he cites 441 authors of whom only one was from the Third World.[54]

Holsti takes Gilpin to task, specifically his hegemonic view of state behavior and his sole use of western cases. According to Gilpin, hegemons provide stability by performing several functions in the international system. They provide public goods, long term finance, security, enforcement of rules, and crisis management. Without the hegemon, there would be no cooperation among states. Of course, the hegemon performs all these functions because it is in its own interest to do so. The bottom line here is that the hegemon is necessary to provide stability: without it there is chaos and

---

[52]K.J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992), 38.

[53]Ibid., 37.

[54]Ibid., 39.

47

war. The problem is that hegemons inevitably rise and fall in cycles, and it is the decline of the hegemon that causes war.[55]

Holsti argues that Third World nations do not behave as Gilpin's great powers have.[56] We have not seen hegemonic behavior in the Third World. This leads to the problems associated with the concept of a state. Statehood is a western notion, not a Third World notion. "...the basis of statehood for most European countries is a distinct nationality. [For] others, mostly the 'old' states, rest secure on historic (inheritance, war, and marriage) foundations."[57] The majority of new states in the Third World are made up of many different ethnicities and nationalities.[58] Statehood has a different meaning for these Third World states. Consequently, these states behave differently than western states. Deductive theories or theories based solely on western cases do not work for the states of the Third World. It is critical that we study the nature of the state to better understand its behavior. Third World states act differently than western states which I will address later. The point is that the universal laws designed by Gilpin, Waltz, and Walt are not appropriate for understanding the behavior of Third World states. Holsti calls for future collaboration between students of international relations and area experts.[59]

---

[55]Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 72-80.

[56]Holsti, 39.

[57]Ibid., 53.

[58]Ibid., 54.

[59]Ibid., 57-59. I added Walt to Holsti's examples of systems theorists.

48

Barry Buzan addresses the importance of examining the nature of the state in his

book, <u>People, States, and Fear</u>. Buzan's work takes elements from Waltz and shows the

importance of understanding level II. The importance of understanding the nature of the

state, as well as its groups and individuals of the state, stems from his discussion of weak

versus strong states. Weak states are fundamentally different from strong states. The

difference is so significant that the idea of national security takes on a whole new

meaning.[60] Weak states must calculate international relations based on internal as well

as external threats; whereas strong states primarily look at external threats.[61] Strong and

weak states function differently. Buzan claims that "...it is probably more appropriate to

view security in weak states in terms of the contending groups, organizations, and

individuals as the prime objects of security."[62]

Since weak states base behavior primarily on internal threats, it is important to

understand those threats. Buzan acknowledges the importance of understanding the

international system, but not in exclusion of understanding levels I (nature of man) and II

(nature of the state). With the end of the Cold War, Buzan's ideas strike a recognizable

chord. Regime instability is a threat to rulers among many states in the Third World, and

it undoubtedly drives foreign policy. Buzan makes the same call as Holsti does which is

---

[60]Barry Buzan, <u>People, States, and Fears: An Agenda For International Security Studies In The Post-Cold War Era</u> (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 97.

[61]Ibid., 100-101.

[62]Ibid., 101.

49

for the collaboration of comparative and security studies. Buzan awakens us to the need

to take the weak state perspective as we advance the security field.[63]

Steven R. David takes Walt to task by claiming that Walt does not understand

Third World alignment. Walt ignores other considerations that these states have when

assessing the threat. These nations must consider internal threats, and these threats then

become part of the equation as they determine alignments. His idea of omnibalancing

considers internal and external threats.[64] Eric Labs challenges Walt on the same point.

He found that weak states will choose sovereignty over security as they make their

alignment choices. In other words, weaker states will choose to fight for their territorial

or governance rights rather than surrender some of those rights in exchange for physical

well being.[65] Paul Schroeder criticizes Walt's use of history. Schroeder claims that

historically, bandwagoning is a more common behavior, not balancing as Walt claims.[66]

In fact, he criticizes NeoRealists in general for approaching history with a theoretical

bias.[67] Finally, Randall L. Schweller also criticizes Walt for his great - power

perspective. Schweller claims that security is not the only concern for states; there are

---

[63]Ibid., 360.

[64]Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 233.

[65]Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies, 1, no. 3 (1992): 407.

[66]Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs NeoRealsit Theory," International Security, 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994) takes Walt to task on p. 114 and makes his claim concerning bandwagoning on p. 117.

[67]Ibid., 147-148.

50

other reasons for alignment behavior.[68] "Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to

avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain."[69] Clearly, these scholars

challenge Walt's interpretation of his case studies, claiming that he analyzed them with a

superpower bias.

Omnibalancing

As mentioned earlier, Steven David presents the theory of omnibalancing. He

states that omnibalancing is a better theory for understanding Third World state behavior.

His theory calls for the assessment of external and internal threats, with respect to the

leader's political survival, not the state's survival.[70] David offers three significant

departures from systems theory. "First, rather than just balancing against threats or

power, leaders of states will appease secondary adversaries to focus their resources on

primary adversaries....It must align with one threat to address the other and it does."[71]

For weak states, the primary threat is often a domestic threat, and the secondary threat is

often another state. Second, for Third World states internal threats are more dangerous

than external threats. Finally, Third World leaders act in their own interests as opposed

to their states' interests.[72] In sum,

---

[68]Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 82 for the point on Walt, p. 86 on the point of security, and p. 7 for the point concerning different alignment behavior.

[69]Ibid., 7.

[70]Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), xi.

[71]Ibid., 6.

[72]Ibid., 6-7.

51

Omnibalancing incorporates both the need to appease secondary adversaries and the need of leaders to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power. It is conditional on regimes being weak and illegitimate, and on the stakes for domestic politics being very high.[73]

David tests balancing, bandwagoning, ideology, and omnibalancing between

Third World states and the superpowers. His hypotheses are: 1). If a state balances, then

we should observe that state aligning away from the threat or superpower. 2). If a state

bandwagons, then we should observe that state aligning with the superpower. 3) If

ideology determines alignment, then we should observe a change in the Third World

leader's ideology preceding the change in superpower alignment.[74] 4). Finally, David

states that the strongest test for omnibalancing would be "...if the leadership

bandwagoned with an external threat in order to balance against an internal threat. This

outcome would confirm the importance of internal threats (and), demonstrate the need to

appease some threats in order to deal with others."[75]

David justifies the Third World as an analytic category because all Third World

states have a combination of characteristics:

> their cumulative impact makes virtually all Third World leaders more vulnerable to overthrow - particularly from internal threats - than other leaders. Thus while the leaders of all states must be concerned about threats, in the Third World such concerns assume an urgency and priority that is rarely matched elsewhere.[76]

---

[73]Ibid., 7.

[74]Ibid., 7

[75]Ibid., 8.

[76]Ibid., 15

52

David limits his test to Third World state - superpower alignments, which necessarily limits him to the Cold War era. Additionally, he does not fully develop or explain internal threats.

Defining Internal Threats: Ethnicity

Theories of comparative politics may help us understand the nature of the state and its behavior. I will briefly discuss the modernization school, political culture, statist school, rational choice theory, and new institutionalism before my discussion of ethnicity and legitimacy. I quickly survey this literature because it provides some of the foundations for the ethnicity literature. Modernizationist scholars felt that as society modernized, tradition would decline and mass participation in governmental matters would increase.[77] Modernization, however, has not led to participation or reduced ethnic conflict.[78] This is evident in Syria. Although modernization has alleviated the plight of the Alawis, it does not explain why the Alawis, and not some other minority, gained power. Additionally, the urban Sunnis, who seem to be in a good power position, have yet to regain their dominance. Modernization theory only offers correlative, not causative, explanations. It does, however, bring to our attention the availability or unavailability of resources to political entrepreneurs and societal groups. Clearly, the

---

[77]See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 499 for a detailed discussion of modernization and social mobilization and their positive effects for mass participation.

[78]Saul Newman, "Does Modernization breed Ethnic Political Conflict?" World Politics, 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 451.

Alawis gained resources, albeit initially military resources, that helped propel them to power.

The literature on political culture provides useful insights for our study of Syria. Lucian Pye claims that political systems differ based on different societal cultures. He examines traditional and societal values as indicators of national goals. Specifically, he differentiates societies based on their bias towards trust versus distrust; hierarchy versus equality; liberty versus coercion, and loyalty.[79] Clearly, an examination of Syria's predominantly Muslim society will reveal that society's bias concerning the above values, thus helping us to understand the nature of its politics.

Sidney Verba claims that national identification is a critical element for social mobilization. Syria does not have a strong national identity.[80] Perhaps this weakness is a major cause for Asad's repressive regime. Verba also claims that

> in the absence of an established identity one is likely to engage in identity-creating acts - be these aggressions against other nations or other expressions of nationalism. And indeed wars and revolutions - if against the proper enemy and for the right cause - can be a major way of suddenly switching loyalties from parochial groups to the nation-state and of building political commitment in a hurry.[81]

Can Asad stir up nationalism without Israel? Will the Soviet Union's demise affect Syria's ability to obtain weapons, not only for aggression towards other nations, but also as means of repressing its own people? While Verba and Pye help us understand the

---

[79]Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 19-23.

[80]As the political development chapter on Syria will show, Syrian society consists of strong, reinforced ethnic cleavages. These reinforced cleavages create loyalties to ethnic groups which challenge loyalties to the state.

nature of Syrian society which provides us with insights regarding its political

development, they fail to explore the politics of development. How do leaders make

choices? Specifically, why does Asad sometimes choose repression, while other times he

chooses to compromise? Why do individuals join a group or offer support for it?

Specifically, why do Alawis act collectively as opposed to other groups in society?

Samuel Huntington offers some political explanations in his version of political

culture. He emphasizes the importance of strong institutions as a means of stabilizing

heterogeneous societies.[82] Without these institutions, corruption will occur because the

private interests of the ruling elite will subdue the public interest.[83] Huntington

accurately describes Syrian society under Asad.[84] Corruption, namely in the form of

patronage, is rampant in Syrian society. There are no clear institutions except for Asad's

family. While Huntington introduces institutions as a critical factor for political

development, he does not explain how political consciousness occurs. Why does the

individual become politically active or support a politically active group? Why do

certain groups form and others dissolve?

Theda Skocpol uses a statist approach as she examines the cause for social

revolution. She adopts a structural perspective, introducing the state as an autonomous

---

[81]Sidney Verba, "Conclusion," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 533.

[82]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 9-12.

[83]Ibid., 71.

[84]Note that Syria's regime is not a bureaucratic authoritarian regime because Asad does want mass support, not apathy, as his repeated calls for Arab nationalism indicate.

actor, and analyzes its actions in the international context. She argues that the state, faced with military competition from economically superior nations, will break down if it cannot gain the resources necessary to compete effectively in the international arena.[85] Skocpol provides some keen insights for our study of Syria. First, Syria may have difficulty gaining the resources necessary to compete with an economically and militarily superior foe now that aid from the defunct Soviet Union is nonexistent. Will Syria look elsewhere for resources, or will it try to make the necessary internal reforms so that it can compete? Second, Skocpol introduces an autonomous state with its own interests. An analysis of Syrian political development demands an analysis of the state, as its policies have a profound impact on its society.

While this view of the state as an autonomous actor is helpful, it also creates problems. By viewing the state as a unitary actor, Skocpol leaves out the politics. In Syria's case, the leadership style of Asad is critical in understanding policy and state actions. Another problem with Skocpol is her non-purposive perspective. While she insists upon the importance of state-building and mobilization, she never reveals how that mobilization and state building will occur.[86] Additionally, she only deals with class mobilization, rather than considering other groups in this light. I find this aspect of her argument lacking with respect to Syria. As asked earlier, why do individuals choose to mobilize? Why do certain groups mobilize, while others do not?

---

[85]Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1-42.

[86]Skocpol's emphasis on mobilization and state-building is taken from Ibid., 161-169.

56

Political economists or rational choice theorists analyze the state based on microfoundations. They view the individual as a profit maximizer who bases decisions on self-interest. Barry Ames provides a useful argument for our analysis of Asad. Ames argues that leaders make policies that will enhance or maintain their power. Specifically, leaders will build coalitions and fight political struggles in the budgeting process with the aim of their own political survival.[87] While this argument is useful, it is not clear to the observer which of Asad's policies are solely for survival and which are substantive policies. Asad has made policy that directly antagonized his regional allies and the Soviet Union. Some scholars believe that Asad makes seemingly bad policy just to demonstrate his independence and autonomy from the Soviet Union.[88] Rationality seems to be a relative concept. Perhaps we need to view rationality in the context of political culture.

Robert Bates links the rational actor perspective to ethnic competition. He argues

> that ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization - benefits which are desired but scarce.[89]

This argument implies that modernization does not lead to a decline of ethnic conflict, rather it increases ethnic conflict.[90] However, Bates claims that groups which are

---

[87]Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 1.

[88]Galia Golan and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Soviet Union and Syria: The Limits of Cooperation," in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979), 226.

[89]Robert H. Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 152.

urbanized, educated, and wealthy, tend to sustain power.[91] How did the Alawis gain

power from the powerful Sunnis? Why did the Sunnis lose power? Even though the

Alawis have gained power and achieved some modernization, the Alawis are still

sociologically and economically disadvantaged, yet they continue to hold power.

Perhaps we need to consider the ethnic factor on its own merits, separate from economic

ties, as we analyze Syrian society.

Before we examine the ethnicity literature, I want to briefly discuss the literature

of new institutionalism because it will useful in our next chapter when we examine the

extent ethnicity permeates politics in Egypt versus Syria. According to James G. March

and Johan P. Olsen,

> In recent years...a new institutionalism has appeared in political science. It is far
> from coherent or consistent; it is not completely legitimate; but neither can it be
> completely ignored. This resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative
> consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent
> commentary from observers of them. Social, political, and economic institutions
> have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie
> more important to collective life.[92]

Consequently, "new institutionalism insists on a more autonomous role for political

institutions." In essence, "the organization of political life matters."[93]

Peter J. Katzenstein explains that new institutionalism took two forms: thick and

thin. Thin institutionalism uses a rationalist approach to explain how institutions help

---

[90]Ibid., 165.

[91]Ibid., 159.

[92]James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review, 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 734.

[93]Ibid., 738, 747.

58

solve coordination problems. Thick institutionalism looks at both state and social structures and examines political institutions and coalitions; social sectors, and ideological constraints. Katzenstein explains that these two forms mutually reinforce each other. Thick institutionalism

> does a good job of illuminating a broad variety of political settings, but it is less successful at connecting what it has to say about states, social structures, political coalitions, and ideologies to individual decision makers....thin institutionalism tells us much about the microfoundations of individual policy choices and politics, but it is much weaker in generalizing from the specific to the general.[94]

He, too, sees some shortcomings with this approach, yet notes its value.

Similarly, Sven Steinmo, explains the shortcoming of new institutionalism as the ambiguity of the definition of institutions themselves, as well as the lack of accountability for the varying levels of autonomy by state actors. He cites Peter Hall's definition of institutions as

> the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms, but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as opposed to conventional standing.[95]

Steinmo believes that the importance of this approach is understanding the interactive role institutions have with the public policy they produce, as well as understanding that

---

[94]Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," World Politics, 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 12.

[95]Sven Steinmo, "Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain," World Politics, 41, no. 4 (July 1989): 502.

the decision-making authority across polities may differ, with respect to its loci in a

specific policy arena.[96]

Donald C. Williams explains the importance of the institutionalist approach in

examining weak states, namely third world states. This approach helps provide an

understanding of the relationship between state and society. "In order to reconcile the

untenable image of an autonomous state and the fragmented nature of society, the

patrimonial state model needs to be refined with an analytical tool that adequately

assesses the variable weight and influence of competing forms of authority." Williams

chooses to examine the crisis of the African state by examining the interaction of various

institutions. He explains that institutions

> are viewed as collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate or
> rational action in the larger context of norms and values.....In summary, state-society
> relations are really an encounter between a structural arrangement of rule-bearing
> institutions, of which the state is only one.[97]

This institutional approach will be useful for understanding ethnicity as a factor in the

political development of our cases, both of which are weak states. Before we do this, we

must first examine ethnicity and its link to legitimacy. Let us now turn to Joseph

Rothchild's ethnicity framework.

Rothschild combines some of the elements of the theories described above as he

explains the role of ethnicity in political development. He claims that

> the contemporary rise of ethnic individual identification and the trend toward ethnic
> group politicization do not mean that all other orientations, affiliations,

---

[96]Ibid., 503.

[97]Both quotations are from Donald C. Williams, "Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies," Comparative Politics, 28, no. 2 (January 1996): 208, 210.

60

differentiations, segmentations, or conflicts have been neutralized or eliminated. They interact with ethnicity - within individuals, within states, and across states. But the ethnic dimension has become increasingly salient in an increasing number of political conflict situations in modern and transitional societies. It refuses to be dissolved into another dimension, such as class, and demands to be faced on its own political plane.[98]

Ethnicity cannot always be politicized, but it is more likely to occur if there are structural inequalities within society, and if there is a leadership willing to direct ethnicity into the political arena. This process is more likely to occur in a modern or transitional society.[99]

Rothschild uses a cross-patterned reticulate model to represent society in which "...ethnic groups and social classes cross-populate each other - but the distribution is not random or symmetrical or egalitarian....a certain amount of overrepresentation and underrepresentation of ethnic groups within economic classes and political power clusters is possible...."[100] Rothschild examines the availability of resources to ethnic groups and the state as they fight their political battles. This balance can change, and Rothschild emphasizes this dynamic nature of his model and society. He highlights the fact that politics of ethnicity are a function of proportional resources and qualities.[101] Also, the model allows for individual choice, an element of rational choice theory. Individuals may join a politicized ethnic group if they feel that membership may be beneficial (not all ethnic groups are politicized, nor is ethnicity a factor in every aspect of

[98]Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 8.

[99]Ibid., 248.

[100]Ibid., 81-82.

[101]Ibid., 81-85.

societal life).[102] Rothschild recognizes ethnicity as a coping mechanism for individuals experiencing change, especially change wrought by the modernization process.[103] Perhaps individuals look at the spiritual, as well as the material benefits when deciding on membership. Overall, the cross-patterned reticulate model is a good tool for analyzing Syrian society.

Ethnic consciousness does not necessarily require primordial roots. Political entrepreneurs can create ethnicity to further a particular political agenda.[104] Political entrepreneurs may use "fault lines" or "hot issues" to help build ethnic consciousness by using "the most accessible and yielding fault line of potential cleavage available, given the historic circumstances and the prevailing stratification."[105] Is the Alawi leadership successful because it knows how to choose effective fault line? What about the Sunni leadership?

Rothschild provides a useful first step towards understanding how social mobilization occurs. He builds upon the existing comparative literature: he shows how modernization can provide mobilizational resources; the importance of understanding the history of ethnic conflict (political culture); the influence of the international system on state decisions (statist literature); and the importance of individual decision-making based on self-interest (rational choice). Rothschild's emphasis on political

---

[102]Ibid., 85-86.

[103]Ibid., 5.

[104]Ibid., 87-96.

[105]Ibid., 96.

entrepreneurship, substantive ethnic issues, and fault lines as part of a mobilization strategy helps us analyze social mobilization - a phenomenon that the other theories fail to explain.

The situation in Syria, however, demands further research and analysis concerning the nature of ethnicity and its role with influencing state behavior, but what is ethnicity? The rise of the Alawi under-class in Syria suggests that ethnicity be viewed separately from other classifications such as economic class. This notion contradicts the neo-Marxist notion of ethnicity. Richard Thompson examines Oliver Cox's and Michael Reich's arguments, and he claims that "both see the race problem as inextricably tied to the class system."[106] Thompson, himself, argues that the economic structure is the primary framework when studying ethnicity.[107] Further analysis of Syrian political development may undercut this neo-Marxist perspective. Walker Connor suggests that future literature on ethnicity reflect its psychological and emotional aspects.[108] Abdul Said also believes that ethnicity has a strong psychological character.

> Conflict is not necessarily irrational but the roots of cultural expression that produce conflict are psychosociological. Cultures and ethnic groups have an inner logic that determines behavior, values, and attitudes that confound objective description or absolutism.[109]

---

[106]Richard A. Thompson. "Neo-Marxian Explanations and a Reformulation," in Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Richard A. Thompson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 156.

[107]Ibid., 145-157.

[108]Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987), 218.

[109]Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmons, "The Ethnic Factor in World Politics," in Ethnicity in an International Context, ed. Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmons (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976), 21.

Nathan Glazer concurs that ethnicity is unique and constitutes more than an

interest; it is a tie. Furthermore, ethnicity is critical for mobilization.[110] Donald

Horowitz agrees that ethnicity can overwhelm rational and economic interests.[111]

According to these scholars, ethnicity needs to be studied as a stand-alone factor that

influences political development, a condition Syria offers.

Saul Newman argues that we should use religion to study political development,

based on his critique of Fouad Ajami's book, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and Shia

of Lebanon. Religious political movements have a tactical advantage over ethnic

political movements because their religious leadership and organization can be applied to

their mobilization efforts. Additionally, they have a ready-made ethical and moral code

that may help define a political agenda. The Alawi-Sunni conflict may warrant a

religious-based analysis. Perhaps we can apply this religious difference to Rothschild's

"fault-line" concept.

Abdul Said claims that, today, ethnicity overwhelms the importance of the nation-

state.[112] Will Syria's ethnic diversity challenge her continuing existence as a nation-

state? Ethnicity offers a challenge to the nation-state as a unit of analysis. Finally, Daniel

Bell discusses the role of hate and ethnicity. He claims that "cohesion derives not only

from some inner 'consciousness of kind,' but from some external definition of an

---

[110]Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, "Introduction," in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18-19.

[111]Newman cites Horowitz in Newman, 463-464.

[112]Said, 10.

adversary as well."[113] Will a peace with Israel diminish what is left of Syrian

nationalism?

Defining Ethnicity For This Study

How does one define ethnicity? As discussed earlier, there are many versions of

the definition. Does one use an inclusive or exclusive definition? Horowitz chooses an

inclusive definition for his study. Horowitz defines groups "...by ascriptive differences,

whether the indicium is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of

common origin, or some combination thereof. This is an inclusive conception of

ethnicity."[114] Rothschild also uses an inclusive definition because he claims that "After

all, if religious, linguistic, racial, and other primordial criteria and markers were to be

peeled off, it is difficult to see what precisely would be left to, or meant by, the residual

notion of ethnicity or ethnic groups."[115] Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr.

explain, however, that

> The broad inclusive approach raises questions about analytical precision. It seems so
> inclusive that it is difficult to conceive of what is not, or cannot be, an ethnic
> characteristic....Yet the more exclusive approach is not without its problems. When
> the concept is used restrictively, to denote distinctions between such concepts as
> racial and ethnic groups, then one is forced to overlook the fact that the boundaries
> between the distinctions noted above have been intellectually and historically fuzzy.
> Seldom does any example of an ethnic group possess a clear set of these traits,
> particularly given the fact that group distinctiveness is derived from its ascriptive
> qualities. The usual pattern is for a group to possess an overlapping set of traits, such
> as language, religion, and culture, while sharing others with the rest of the society,

---

[113]Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 174.

[114]Horowitz, 17-18.

[115]Rothschild, 9.

65

with group distinctiveness becoming manifest only in various forms of social, economic, and political interaction.[116]

I will base my definition of ethnicity, therefore, on these overlapping set of traits, thereby acknowledging this overlap, but also maintaining some analytical precision. Consequently, I will describe what ethnicity is and what it is not for purposes of this study. For my purposes, ethnicity is a group identity based on religion, language, and kinship. It will not include such attributes as class, ideology, and region. This definition will allow me to analyze ethnicity as a variable, as well as other domestic variables, such as class mentioned above. While Egypt may be divided along class lines, this variable may not serve to reinforce other societal cleavages; whereas in Syria, class and region, for example, serve to reinforce the ethnic cleavage between Alawis and Sunnis. However, the Alawai-Sunni cleavage is primarily based on religion and kinship.

Ethnicity: Language, Religion, and Kinship

Let us briefly examine these facets of ethnicity, while understanding that they provide only a guide because of their definitional ambiguity. I believe, however, that these terms are suitable for this study because they are the terms primarily used by the peoples of the Middle East to describe group identification and cohesion. Also, they offer a best solution between the all-inclusive and all-exclusive definitions, as described above. Don Peretz echoes this problem of ambiguity. "It is difficult, if not impossible, to divide them into precise, scientific categories. Terms such as race, nationality, and

---

[116]Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, "Ethnic Politics and Public Policy in Western Societies: A Framework For Comparative Analysis" in Ethnicity, Politics, and Development ed. Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1986), 27-28.

religion often have meanings in the Middle East that differ from those of the Western world."[117] It is easier to describe what an Arab is not. "Arab national leaders are more and more associating the term [Arab] with language, with culture, and with a vague, intangible emotional identification with 'the Arab cause'. This is not an incontestable definition."[118]

Language serves two purposes. It is a mode of communication, and it symbolizes group identity.[119] Peretz classifies the people of the Middle East as Semitic, Turkish, and Iranian linguistic groups.[120] E. A. Speiser uses language in his study of Middle Eastern peoples as a critical criterion for group identity.[121] Both Bernard Lewis and Michael Hudson use the factors of language, culture, and religion in their attempts to understand and define the Arabic people.[122] Additionally, Hudson claims that, "Ethnographers look upon language as a key defining characteristics of ethnic communities...."[123]

While I do not use culture as a variable of ethnicity, I do want to provide some views on what culture is because some scholars consider religion and culture intertwined.

---

[117]Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, 5th ed., (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 10.

[118]Ibid., 12.

[119]Rothschild, 89.

[120]Peretz, 10.

[121]E. A. Speiser, "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East," in Social Forces in the Middle East, ed. Sydney Nettleton Fisher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), 19.

[122]Bernard Lewis, "What is an Arab?" in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, ed. Ailon Shiloh (New York: Random House, 1969), 4 and Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search For Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 34. I chose not to include culture as a variable because of it is too inclusive and imprecise.

[123]Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search For Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 38.

Also, these views support my contention that culture is just too imprecise and all-inclusive a term to use as a variable for this study. According to Ronald Inglehart, culture describes the attitudes, values, and skills of a society.[124] Halim Barakat claims that culture in the social sciences encompasses three facets: it is the total way of life, artistic achievements, knowledge, thought, and the sciences. The distinctiveness of a people's culture is based on that people's uniqueness in social formations, living patterns, modes of production, socialization, and adaptations to the environment. "In other words, culture represents the complete design for living of a community of people inhabiting a particular environment."[125] David Easton defines culture as, "the body of customary beliefs, social forces, and material traits constituting the distinct traditions of ... a social group."[126]

As mentioned above, some scholars closely relate religion and culture. Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam discuss Islam as a cultural tradition. They claim that, "Islam remains the single most important source for the ethos that distinguishes the area and imparts to its bewildering complexity and variation a measure of unity and cultural identity."[127] Michael Hudson categorizes the people of the Middle East using religion as

---

[124]Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3.

[125]The quotation and the points made are from Barakat, 41.

[126]David Easton as quoted by Hudson, 33.

[127]Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983), 81.

68

a critical distinguisher.[128] Also, religion is intertwined with language. Albert Hourani

explains that the Aarbic language in written form was "...preserved by the Qur'an, the

book sent down in the Arabic language....The religion carried the language with it."[129]

Kinship describes common blood ties and ancestry of a people, as usually claimed

by tribes, clans, and even nations. If the kinship group coincides with a state's

population, the political system's legitimacy is strengthened. When kinship groups are

subunits of the state or are outside the boundaries of the state, then they may have a

disruptive effect on the regime.[130] Common ancestry is a critical component of

ethnicity.[131] According to Bates and Rassam, in order "...to understand Middle Eastern

society, even its higher level of political organization, one has to understand the nature of

the primary groupings into which the individual is born and how men and women

subsequently fashion and use 'primordial' ties and relationships [kinships] throughout

their lifetime."[132]

It is the reinforcement of ethnic cleavages, especially in the political arena, that

serves to pose legitimacy problems for the nation. In Egypt, divisions exist, but they are

not reinforcing. Consequently, Egypt enjoys a national identity that does not compete

with strong ethnic identities and loyalties. My political development chapter will clarify

---

[128]Michael Hudson's categories are 1. Arab and Shi'ite Muslims, 2. Arab and non-Muslim, 3. Muslim and non-Arab, and 4. Non-Arabs and non-Muslims in Hudson, 59.

[129]Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 48.

[130]Rothschild, 87.

[131]Barakat, 40.

[132]Bates and Rassam, 189.

this point. I will assess ethnic divisiveness based on Donald Horowitz's claims that

where ethnicity significantly permeates sectors of social life, we see deeply divided

societies.[133]

> In severely divided societies, ethnicity finds its way into a myriad of issues:
> developmental plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy,
> business policy, tax policy. Characteristically, issues that elsewhere would be
> relegated to the category of routine administration assume a central place on the
> political agenda of ethnically divided societies.[134]

Another indication of a deeply ethnically divided society is the organization of activities,

economically and politically, along ethnic lines.[135] "In divided societies, ethnic conflict

is at the center of politics. Ethnic divisions pose challenges to the cohesion of states and

sometimes to peaceful relations among states."[136] Here is where the institutionalist

approach will help me assess the extent of ethncity's permeation in the political

development of each of my cases; thus, the degree of permeation will, based on

Horowitz's view, establish whether or not my case, or state is ethnically divided.

I think with the analysis of ethnicity and its role with omnibalancing, we will find

a residual effect, that is that the study of Syrian and Egyptian political development can

only enhance ethnic studies by, at the very least, adding to the data base on ethnicity.

The rise of the Alawi under-class may serve to isolate ethnicity as a factor influencing

---

[133]Horowitz, 6-7.

[134]Ibid., 8.

[135]Ibid.

[136]Ibid., 12.

70

political development, particularly social mobilization, thereby allowing scholars to better analyze the nature of ethnicity itself.

Legitimacy

The next chapter will describe the link between ethnic homogeneity and legitimacy, as well as ethnic divisiveness and illegitimacy in the cases of Egypt and Syria, respectively. The idea of legitimacy directly affects a regime's stability, or as Timothy J. Lomperis claims, its ability to rule well.[137] Here, I explain that link through the theoretical literature. Before we examine that link, let us first turn to the concept of legitimacy, itself. While it is a concept that eludes measurement, it is worthy of study because of its centrality in the field of political science; therefore, it is critical that we still attempt to discover its significance on the polity and the international system. David Easton explains that "Given its long and venerable history as a central concept in political science, legitimacy has yet to receive the attention it merits in empirical research."[138] Lomperis cites Harry Eckstein's claim that "the issue of support and opposition, legitimacy and illegitimacy...stands at the crux of all political study."[139] It is for this reason that I pursue the links among ethnicity, legitimacy, and regime stability, at the very least by making a first cut at the centrality of these concepts and perhaps providing a start point for further study.

---

[137]Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 32.

[138]David Easton, "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science, 5, no. 4 (October 1975), 451.

[139]Lomperis, 31.

71

Simply put, legitimacy is the idea that the people believe that the regime is morally in the right. David Easton's definition of legitimacy for a regime is,

> That it is right and proper... to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere....it is not unreasonable to assume that, where we consider a state of affairs morally proper or right, we are likely to view it in highly favorable terms. This positive nature in the belief in legitimacy usually carries with it the implication that we have an obligation to accept the acts of those considered legitimate to be binding on us. The converse is equally probable. With regard to those considered to rule illegitimately, we are relieved of all obligation; support is considered to be totally withdrawn or to be withdrawable.[140]

Lomperis believes that a key component of the concept of legitimacy is that "there must be a normative or moral judgment in favor of the regime's right to rule... This central moral component to legitimacy, then, is something every government or regime needs to sustain its power and long-term ability to rule."[141] Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland define legitimacy as

> the extent that a polity is regarded by its members as worthy of support. This is not the same as citizens' compliance with laws and directives, but refers to a basic attitude that disposes them to comply in most circumstances... To the extent that legitimacy is low or nonexistent, people are likely to support and obey authorities only out of fear or convenience, which means that rulers must rely expensively on coercion or risk political collapse....No polity is likely to command the loyalty of all of its citizens all the time; what is crucial for high performance is that no large or vital segment of the population remain alienated for any length of time.[142]

---

[140]David Easton, "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support," 451.

[141] Lomperis, 32.

[142] Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, "Political Performance: A Twelve Nation Study," in Comparative Politics Series, ed. Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, vol 2, no. 01-018 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 30.

Ralf Dahrendorf explains legitimacy in the context of stability. He claims that

there are two keys to regime stability, effectiveness and legitimacy. He argues that for

governments to work

> ...two things have to be present: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness is a
> technical concept. It simply means that governments have to be able to do things
> which they claim they can do...they have to work. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a
> moral concept. It means that what governments do have to be right....A government
> is legitimate if what it does is right both in the sense of complying with certain
> fundamental principles, and in that of being in line with prevailing cultural values.[143]

Dahrendorf claims that there is a relationship between these two concepts, effectiveness

and legitimacy. That relationship is asymmetrical. Governments may be effective

without being legitimate. Totalitarian regimes are such an example.[144] However, "Over

time, ineffectiveness will probably erode legitimacy."[145] Dahrendorf is most concerned

about the erosion of legitimacy because for democracies "...there is a great danger that

the response to a crisis of legitimacy will be authoritarianism and illiberty."[146]

David Easton, in his article "The Analysis of Political Systems," stresses the

importance of legitimacy. According to Easton,

> When the basic political attachments become deeply rooted or institutionalized, we
> say that the system has become accepted as legitimate. Politicization therefore
> effectively sums up the way in which legitimacy is created and transmitted in a
> political system. And it is an empirical observation that in those instances where

---

[143]Ralf Dahrendorf, "On the Governability of Democracies," in <u>Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings</u>, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990), 285-286.

[144]Ibid., 286.

[145]Ibid.

[146]Ibid., 293.

73

political systems have survived the longest, support has been nourished by an ingrained belief in the legitimacy of the relevant governments and regimes.[147]

Philip Norton's book, The British Polity, supports the criticality of legitimacy for regime stability. His thesis is that the political culture of Great Britain has been so strong that it has allowed the regime to survive periods of ineffectiveness, thereby remaining stable for several hundred years.[148] Additionally, Max Weber tells us that, "If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?"[149] According to Weber, that inner justification is a state's legitimacy, which may be based on tradition, a leader's charisma, and legal statutes.[150]

Let us now further explore the link between ethnic divisiveness and state legitimacy, which affects regime stability. Again, I will rely on the comparative literature to establish this link. First, Augustus Richard Norton claims that the Third World will play a more significant role now that the Cold War era is over. "The disappearance of the bipolar superpower-dominated security system will foster a much more unruly international regime in which Third World players may be prone to try to

---

[147]David Easton, "The Analysis of Political Systems," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990), 58.

[148]Philip Norton, The British Polity (New York: Longman, 1991), 65. Norton does not use the term, "legitimacy" here. Instead he argues that culture has given Great Britain the "breathing space" to work on its economic and social problems. The British support for the regime is based on the British political culture. This argument implies that the political culture has positively influenced the legitimacy of the British regime.

[149]Max Weber, "Politics As A Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.

[150]Ibid., 78-79.

74

throw their weight around"[151] Clearly, understanding Third World state behavior has

taken on a critical urgency with the end of the Cold War era. Norton tells us, however,

that

> it is not that interstate war is a minor problem, but...it pales in significance alongside the potential for intrastate violence"....The central problem for developing and developed countries in the 1990s will be the growing inability of governments to meet the psychopolitical, cultural, and economic needs of their constituents. The legacy of the 1980s is the crisis of legitimacy and political coalescence that is going to shake, rattle, and roll around the globe.[152]

Norton claims that the most important element for state survival is legitimacy,

meaning "that authority which rests on the shared cultural identity of ruler and ruled."[153]

States base legitimacy on a "political formula" which justifies a leader's rule.

> As Gaetano Mosca notes, political formulas are not 'mere quakeries aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience....The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of moral principle, has...a practical and a real importance.[154]

Norton claims that "A political formula ceases to be compelling when the ruler or

rulers, through neglect, incompetence, design, malfeasance, or happenstance fail

consistently or spectacularly to meet the cultural or material needs of citizens."[155] When

---

[151]Augustus Richard Norton, "The Security Legacy of the 1980s in the Third World," in Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 20.

[152]Ibid., 23.

[153]Ibid., 24.

[154]Ibid.

[155]Ibid.

75

legitimacy dissolves, the regime is vulnerable to change.[156] According to Norton, modernization strengthens family, village, religious and ethnic ties. These ties become significant when they are politicized. The resultant conflicts "illustrate a major danger of the 1990s, the spreading of interethnic and intercommunal combat exacerbated by the unpredictable, but unavoidable process of modernization....the result is the breakdown of the state."[157]

Michael C. Hudson also links the idea of ethnicity with legitimacy. He states that "If the population within given political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class lines...then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order."[158] He claims that this

> legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community which does not conflict with other subnational or supranational communal identifications....there must as well be a strong authoritative vertical linkage between the governors and governed. Without authoritative political structures endowed with 'rightness' and efficacity, political life is certain to be violent and unpredictable.[159]

Hudson argues that the main problem for Arab states is their lack of legitimacy.[160] Hudson offers a mosaic model for understanding the challenges to legitimacy. His mosaic model describes a society based on primordial and parochial ties, and

---

[156]Ibid.

[157]Ibid., 30.

[158]Hudson, 389-390.

[159]Ibid., 4.

[160]Ibid., 2.

76

modernization strengthens these ties.[161] This model does not lend itself to legitimacy, "Because ethnicity is so deep-rooted, the possibilities for the integration of new polities along modern lines, let alone revolutionary transformation are remote."[162] Hudson ultimately argues that a social mobilization model is a more accurate tool for analyzing society. This model views modernization as a process that helps develop a tolerant and educated society.[163]

Perhaps my analysis will shed more light on Norton and Hudson's opposing views. Both scholars, however, view repressive regimes as illegitimate.[164] Melvin Richter concurs and states that "All governments know that force has no title. As long as they have no other foundation than violence, they are entirely destitute of right." Richter continues to cite Guizot and claims that political legitimacy requires governments "to disclaim violence as a source of authority, and to associate it with a moral notion...of justice, of right, of reason."[165] This view of repressive regimes proves significant for my analysis, especially for my case study on Syria.

Norton and Hudson explain the link between ethnicity and legitimacy, as do all the scholars mentioned above who express the importance of a political community for

---

[161]Ibid., 7.

[162]Ibid., 9-10.

[163]Ibid., 7.

[164]Norton, 24 and Hudson, 4.

[165]Melvin Richter, "Toward a Concept of Political Legitimacy: Bonapartist Dictatorship and Democratic Legitimacy," Political Theory, 10, no. 2 (May 1982), 198.

establishing legitimacy. Ethnic homogeneity helps establish this shared sense of values and community. As our review of the ethnicity literature showed, ethnic loyalty is a powerful force. Ethnicity is a significant variable affecting state legitimacy, thus challenging regime stability. As all these scholars claim, a loss of legitimacy for the state is a prescription for instability. Clearly, states which lack legitimacy are vulnerable to change. In sum, legitimacy is a key ingredient for regime stability, and when ethnic loyalties coincide with national loyalties, then that sense of a shared political community and values is a great commodity for the regime. Conversely, when these loyalties are in conflict, then the regime is in a dangerous position. A regime in such a position affects its leader's decisions, policies, and actions much differently than does a legitimate, stable regime. I will analyze these differences as they affect the international system.

I provided a comprehensive review of the literature that both directly and indirectly affects my project. The literature review on ethnicity and legitimacy helped to reveal the difficulty of using these terms, but at the same time revealed their importance, nevertheless. I believe that it is important to address these terms in our study of political science, even though they are a bit "messy." Further study will help refine these terms, and, I believe, generate a better understanding of state behavior. Additionally, I found that the institutional literature provided an analytical framework in which to discuss the centrality of ethnicity and legitimacy, as they pertained to the political development of my case studies.

The international relations literature of Waltz, Walt, Schweller, and David provided me with the tools to help understand my cases. Waltz provided me with a

78

systemic view, which helped me assess the impact of the international system change on my cases. Walt provided the basis of state alignment theory that caused such a great and interesting dialogue and critique of his theory. In fact, it was these critiques, by such scholars as Buzan and Schweller, that piqued my interest in this project. As my conclusion will show, my cases tend to support Schweller's critique of Walt. It was, however, David's idea of omnibalancing that provided the springboard for me. I not only wanted to examine his idea of omnibalancing, but I also used his case study approach. Holsti and Sullivan provided me with the analytical tool, which helped analyze the link between the domestic variables and state alignment behavior. For me, the preceding, comprehensive literature review helped me form the logic between the domestic variables and state behavior in the international system. Additionally, it helped me form the core of my approach, as discussed above.

79

CHAPTER 3

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPT AND SYRIA

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to determine the degree of ethnic pervasiveness in

society and politics, in particular. A multiethnic state does not necessarily mean that the

state suffers from ethnic divisiveness. What does indicate ethnic divisiveness is the

evidence of reinforcing cleavages which so strongly builds loyalties towards a particular

group that it diffuses loyalties to the state. How do we assess the existence of such

cleavages? As I noted earlier, I will use Horowitz's criteria to establish the existence of

these reinforcing cleavages and, thus, ethnic divisiveness, by examining the extent

ethnicity permeates society. My focus will be to assess the degree ethnicity permeates

political development because Horowitz concludes that ethnic divisions are sharpest

when ethnicity permeates the political arena.

Before I discuss political development, however, let us briefly remind ourselves

that the term 'ethnicity' is an ambiguous term on which no one agrees. My earlier

discussion on ethnicity reveals that determining ethnicity is not an exact science. My

guidelines or the characteristics I will use to help categorize an ethnic group are kinship,

religion, and language. While I will use these characteristics as guidelines, we must not

lose sight of two important points. First, as mentioned above the critical notion about

80

ethnicity is whether or not it creates reinforcing cleavages; does it permeate society and politics, and, therefore, undermine societal members' loyalties to the state? Second, ethnic identity is not necessarily static. It must be assessed in an historical context. Identities can change due to such phenomena as migrations, conquests, or political manipulation.[1]

I will begin this chapter with a brief discussion of the people of Egypt as a contributing factor to Egyptian homogeneity. Second, I will discuss the history of the modern state, which will reveal Egypt's historical continuity as a state and society. This continuity helped foster a national identity. Finally, my discussion on Egyptian political development will show that it did not revolve around ethnicity. We cannot ignore other divisions revealed in this discussion, because there are, notably today under Mubarak, ideological, and some would argue class, divisions. My argument, however, is that due to the lack of ethnic cleavages, there is still great loyalty to the state. Because of Egypt's ethnic homogeneity, loyalty to the state is strong and, therefore, lends legitimacy to the state. I will examine Syria in the same manner, thereby demonstrating its ethnic divisiveness and subsequent lack of loyalty to the state, leading to the state's illegitimacy.

I want to briefly review last chapter's discussion of new institutionalism because I will take an institutional approach as a means to determine the extent to which ethnicity

---

[1] This instrumentalist approach and the dynamic nature of ethnicity is found in Dale F. Eikelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), 209 when he cites Frederick Barth, "Introduction," in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, ed. Frederick Barth (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969), 10-15.

81

permeates politics in Egypt versus Syria. While there are many arguments for and against institutionalism's viability as an approach to the study of political science, it will help us understand the extent of ethnicity's permeation in each state's political development. As James G. March and Johan P. Olsen claim, an institutional approach cannot be ignored, especially as we examine political life in the context of society.

> This resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from observers of them. Social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life.[2]

Consequently, "the organization of political life matters."[3]

As mentioned earlier, Donald C. Williams explains the importance of the institutionalist approach in examining weak states, namely our case studies here. He explains that institutions

> are viewed as collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate or rational action in the larger context of norms and values.....In summary, state-society relations are really an encounter between a structural arrangement of rule-bearing institutions, of which the state is only one.[4]

This institutional approach will be useful for understanding ethnicity as a factor in the political development of our cases. As discussed earlier, legitimacy is a key ingredient for regime stability, and when ethnic loyalties coincide with national loyalties, then that

---

[2]James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review, 78, no. 3 (September 1984), 734.

[3]Ibid., 738, 747.

[4]Both quotations are from Donald C. Williams, "Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies," Comparative Politics, 28, no. 2 (January 1996), 208, 210.

82

sense of a shared political community and values is a great commodity for the regime. Conversely, when these loyalties are in conflict, then the regime is in a dangerous position. A regime in such a position affects its leader's decisions, policies, and actions much differently than does a legitimate, stable regime. In the chapters that follow, I will analyze these differences as they affect the international system. For now, we must establish the ethnic homogeneity versus ethnic divisiveness for each case.

March and Olsen remark that "It is interesting to suggest that political institutions and society are interdependent, but that statement needs to find a richer theoretical expression."[5] While my purpose here is to demonstrate ethnic homogeneity and ethnic divisiveness in my respective cases, perhaps I will help with the theoretical formulation of institutionalism, as with the concepts of legitimacy and ethnicity. As background, I will discuss the people and state formation. I will discuss the political development using a modified version of Macridis and Burg's institutional framework. This framework will help reveal the degree to which politics does or does not center around ethnicity.

People

The population of Egypt is 58 million. There are a small number of Bedouin Arabs, who live in the eastern and western deserts of the Sinai, and fifty thousand to one hundred thousand Nubians who live along the Nile River in upper Egypt.[6] Interestingly,

---

[5]March and Olsen, 742.

[6]Background Notes, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 5, no. 7 (August 1994): 1-2.

83

the State Department's <u>Background Notes</u> lists Egyptians as both a nationality and an

ethnic group. It lists the Nubians and Bedouin Arabs as Egypt's other ethnic groups.

Additionally, Arabic is the official language, and ninety percent of the people are Sunnis

and ten percent are Coptic Christians.[7] All Egyptians speak Arabic, with the Nubians

and isolated Berbers as the exceptions, and Islam is the state religion.[8] Why are

Egyptians listed as both a nationality and an ethnicity? Perhaps it has something to do

with the coincidental history of Egyptian society and state - the coincidental development

of language, culture, religion, and kinship, as well as state development.

Egypt has existed as a unified state for more than 5,000 years, and Egyptian

society dates back even further to the pharohs. Egypt in Arabic is Misr, which means

civilization or metropolis.[9] Egyptians, long ago, acquired the sense of being one people,

who established a unique social cohesiveness.[10] According to P.J. Vatikiotis, Egypt

represents one of the world's most ancient civilizations.[11] One of the themes discussed in

Vatikiotis' book is "...the continuity in Egyptian society from ancient times to this day."[12]

Vatikiotis calls Egypt a "geographical phenomenon." It is at the meeting point of two

---

[7]Ibid., 1.

[8]Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," <u>The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change</u> ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 159.

[9]<u>Background Notes</u>, 2.

[10]Dessouki, 159.

[11]P.J. Vatikiotis, <u>The Modern History of Egypt</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 3.

[12]Ibid., xiv.

84

continents, strongly attached to the Nile River. "To speak of the living Egypt, therefore,

is to speak of the 15,000 square miles upon which 98 per cent of Egyptians live, work,

procreate, and die - an area slightly less than five per cent of the total surface of

geographical Egypt."[13] He calls 'Egyptianity' a product of Egypt's conservatism,

isolationism, and well entrenched and traditional social structure. The basis of this

Egyptianity is Egypt's rural nation, whose existence has been regulated by the flow of the

Nile. Egyptians formed the first unified nation known to history.[14]

Vatikiotis links this Egyptianity to Egypt's unity and characteristic response to

foreign influences as having nothing to do with "...any speculative thought on their

[Egyptians] part. Rather these have been a reflection of the historical conditioning and

their style of life: their unity in suffering while clinging to the traditions and beliefs of

their society, to their arts and crafts. This constitutes perhaps the essence of the

continuity of their history."[15] Anwar Sadat echoed this sentiment. He described the

continuity of the Egyptian identity in his autobiography by stating that:

> our cultural roots are alive, as vigorous as ever after more than 7,000 years. Those
> who are surprised by what we do cannot simply understand this fact. They cannot
> grasp the real nature of a people who are working for a modern civilization
> comparable to the one they erected thousands of years ago in freedom and peace.[16]

---

[13]Both quotations are from Ibid, 3.

[14]Ibid., 10.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), 313.

Ali E. Hillal Dessouki provides a preview to my argument, which I will develop

in chapters five and six. He sums up the homogeneous nature of the Egyptian society:

> In contrast to the situation in most developing countries, the population in Egypt shows a high degree of social and national integration. Nassar, Sadat, and Mubarak spoke proudly of Egypt's national unity. There are no fundamental minority cleavages to constrain foreign policy - makers and limit their options. The one major area of anxiety is the Copts' concern about the implementing of Islamic law in Egypt and the status of Copts in an Islamic state. Sadat used to contrast Egypt's deep-seated unity with the sectarian, familial, and communal fragmentation of most Arab countries.[17]

Dessouki goes on to link this homogeneity with foreign policy as he claims that,

"According to Sadat, this unity allowed Egypt to pursue a purposeful foreign policy and

to make hard decisions (e.g. peace with Israel) impossible for most Arab countries

because of their domestic fragmentation."[18]

I will save the development of the link between domestic and foreign policy for

later. For now, it is important that we further establish Egypt's homogeneous nature.[19]

We cannot talk about the people of Egypt without discussing the development of the

Egyptian state. Historical precedence and continuity reinforced the development of

Egyptianity and sense of unity.

---

[17]Dessouki, 160.

[18]Ibid., 160.

[19]Joel Migdal in Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 37 describes Egypt's society as an "unusually homogeneous one."

86

Background to the Creation of the Modern State

I will not dwell on the history of the Ottoman Empire, because I cannot do it justice here, and it is beyond the scope of this paper. I only mention it as a means to help illuminate why the Middle East is such a diverse, complex region and to provide a context for the creation of Egypt as a modern state. In the years 1516-1517, the armies of Sultan Selim I captured Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. Ottoman Turkey reached its peak in 1683 when it stretched from Vienna to Iran and southern Russia, North Africa (as far West as Morroco), and the eastern Red Sea coast. The Ottoman Empire included a diversity of groups: Turks, Tartars, Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Berbers, Mamluks, Bosnians, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, South Slavs, Rumanians, Armenians, Copts, Georgians, and Jews. Ruling over these groups was the Ottoman hierarchy or Ruling Institution.[20] The sultan was the ruling head of this institution, and the whole government structure depended on him. "The sultan was the crown of the empire. What he did or failed to do influenced every group, not merely the governing hierarchy."[21]

There are three significant periods which greatly affected the development of modern Egypt. First, there was the Arabic-Islamic conquest in the seventh century. This conquest changed the predominantly Christian Egypt to Islam, as well as changing the language from Coptic and Greek to Arabic. Second, the non-Arab-Islamic conquest between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries (Ayyubids, Mamluks, and Ottomans) was

---

[20]Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, 5th ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 51.

87

significant because it was a time when Islam grew, and Egypt became the center of

Islamic power and civilization. Finally, the period of the European invasions beginning

with Napoleon in 1798 was an important influence. The significance of Napoleon was

that he discredited the ruling Mamluk Beys, and he introduced France's revolutionary

ideas.[22]

Additionally, the French presence was a catalyst for Muhammad Ali's impact on

Egypt. Ali, who ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1848, first came to Egypt as an officer in the

Albanian detachment of the Turkish expeditionary force, which fought the French.[23]

Muhammed Ali, according to Professor Henry Dodwell, "...brought Egyptians into closer

touch with Europe through his military, educational, economic and other measures, and

thus [laid] the foundation of a modern Egyptian state."[24] Muhammad Ali is credited for

having laid the foundations for the creation of Egypt as a modern state. He helped build

a society whose educated members wanted to emulate many aspects of European

civilization. They wanted to establish the basis of modern government, business, and an

education system that paved the way for instruction in the modern arts and sciences.[25]

According to Nubar Pasha, Muhammad Ali's key role for Egypt's statehood was his

---

[21]Ibid., 59.

[22]Vatikiotis, 10-16, 37.

[23]Ibid., 49.

[24]Ibid., 55.

[25]Ibid., 56.

88

ability to establish equality between Christians and Muslims.[26] "In short, Muhammad Ali gave Egypt the organizational basis and the human cadres for the emergence of the modern state."[27]

Egypt's growth as a nation-state continued as the opportunities for politics opened to the notables or agricultural middle class. This opening occurred in three stages. First, the notables entered the National Assembly beginning in 1866, as well as administrative positions outside the village. Experiences outside the village broadened their political aspirations and contacts. In my view, this broadening is critical as it helps foster a national, rather than a village based identity. Second, the expanding role of the state, especially during the British occupation, occurred through these notables. Finally,

---

[26]The point about establishing equality between Christians and Muslims is from F. Robert Hunter, "Self - Image and Historical Truth: Nubar Pasha and the Making of Modern Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (April 1990): 364. Please note that this point on establishing equality is debatable. Don Peretz quotes a Turkish official at the time, who sums up the religious divisions during the Ottoman Empire: "Once," said the Vali...'I was a very young man, and went [for] a ride with my old father. I was foolish then, and my head was stuffed with silly notions and liberal ideas...I told my father we ought to reform our constitution, systematize our administration, purify our family life, educate our women, introduce liberal ideas, and imitate Europeans. And my father answered never a word. So we rode on along the banks of the Bosphorus. At last we came to a Christian village, and round the Christian village were many pigs. Then my father said to me, 'My son, what seest thou?' I replied, 'Pigs, my father.' 'My son,' he said, 'are they similar in size and color, or do they differ? 'They differ, my father. There are big pigs and little pigs, white pigs and black pigs, brown pigs and mottled pigs.' 'But they are all of them swine, my son?' 'All, my father.' 'My son,' he said, 'it is with the Christians even as with the pigs. There are big Christians and little Christians, Russian Christians and English Christians, French Christians and German Christians; they are all of them swine, and he who wishes to imitate the Christians, wishes to wallow with swine in the mire.'...I was very young then, and my brain was full of nonsense - so I thought my father was a fool. But now that my own beard is getting grey - by God, I think the old gentlemen was right!" in Peretz, 74.

[27]Vatikiotis, 56.

89

notables became critical during competitive elections beginning with the 1923

Constitution for parties seeking mass support.[28]

Western Influence

Scholars cannot study the Middle East and the West separately because of their

reciprocal effects on each other. "The destinies of the Middle East and the Western

world have been interwoven throughout modern history. Relations among the Western

powers were often reflected in, or conditioned by, events in the Middle East, and the

region has been vital to European imperial expansion. Contact with Europe has

thoroughly transformed both East and West."[29] On the eve of World War I, the Middle

East was divided into four spheres: the Ottoman Empire was under German influence,

Egypt under British influence, southern and Persian Gulf coasts of the Arabian peninsula

under British rule, and Iran was divided between Russian and British spheres of

influence. At this time, Western ideas of nationalism began to take root.[30]

After the military failure of the Crusades against the Muslims, the European

powers established business relations in the Middle East. The Middle East was a source

of exotic fruits, silk, cotton, and spices. Enclaves of merchants, especially from Italy,

settled in the Middle East and established semiautonomous settlements. Other European

powers challenged Italy's Middle East trade monopoly. Portugal made its first challenge

---

[28]Nathan Brown, "Peasants and Notables in Egyptian Politics," Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. (2 April 1990): 148-149. Brown's argument is that the notables deliberately misrepresented the peasants to further their own interests.

[29]Peretz, 75.

90

in the fifteenth century. Portuguese explorers, Prince Henry the Navigator, Bartholomew

Diaz, and Vasco de Gama helped establish a new water route around the Cape of Good

Hope which propelled Portuguese trade and influence in the Middle East.

In the sixteenth century, France joined the fray and developed economic and

religious interests in the area. France became a dominant influence in the area and

established semipermanent settlements in the area. It worked closely with the Ottomans

to ensure that their respective subjects could easily pursue their trade interests. Where

France had difficulty establishing an economic foothold, the Church went to work. For

example, when the French East India Company failed to open up Iran, Cardinal Richelieu

encouraged several missions to the area. France became the protector of Lebanon's

Maronites. By the seventeenth century, Levantine trade with France was three-fold that

of British trade.[31]

British Influence

The British occupation of Egypt began in 1883. This time period is significant

because, "To appreciate the legitimizing potential of nationalism in Egypt today, it is

important to note the intensified and broadened sense of Egyptian identity that has

emerged since the 1880s."[32] From 1883-1914, Egypt enjoyed an efficient Egyptian

administration, very little corruption, and economic prosperity. Egypt also had a

---

[30]Ibid., 96.

[31]Ibid., 75-78.

[32]Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 237.

91

Legislative Assembly, which although it had limited powers, served as a forum for discussion among the elite of educated Egyptians. Secular reformists began to emerge, who called for political emancipation through a gradual process and negotiation with Britain. Among the leading reformists were Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid and Saad Zaghlul. Up until 1882, Egypt was an independent state ruled by the Muhammad Ali dynasty. It did provide the Sultan with a tribute payment, but it acted as an autonomous state. The British occupation ended all direct ties between Egypt and Turkey. While the British did not initially intend on a permanent occupation, increasing Anglo-German rivalry led to a less than temporary British presence in Egypt.[33]

On 18 December 1914, Britain declared the status of Egypt as a protectorate. As a result, Britain permanently severed Egypt from Turkey. During the war, the British placed great demands on Egypt and its people in order to support the increased military presence of British, Australian, and other Imperial troops. The peasants, lower classes, and unemployed were the hardest hit, as the prices of consumer goods rose and profiteers took advantage of the situation. The war caused nationalist feelings among a broader spectrum of the population than ever before as many people became disillusioned with the British. At the same time, Britain viewed Egypt as strategically increasing in value, especially after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.[34]

The new leaders of the independence movement viewed political independence as a means of attaining money and power. These new leaders were financiers, landowners,

_____

[33]Vatikiotis, 239-241.

92

entrepreneurs, etc., and their leader was Saad Zaghlul. He is the 'Father of Egyptians' and the founder of the Wafd Party, the best mass party in Egypt's history. The leaders of the Wafd saw the connection between economics and politics. After many frustrating negotiating attempts with the British, the Wafd by March of 1919 had secured country-wide support. The Wafd claimed to be the sole representative and spokesman for the Egyptians, especially amidst the resignation of Egypt's Prime Minister Rushdi. On 22 February, 1922, the British unilaterally issued the Declaration of the British Government to Egypt. The Declaration, while acknowledging Egypt's independence, contained four conditions. These conditions were that Britian still maintained influence over its communications in the area, the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, and the Sudan. The Wafd was opposed to these conditions.[35]

Post WWI

The Constitution of 1923 had the potential to liberalize Egypt. It established that two-thirds of the parliament could override the King's veto. However, neither the King nor the British were willing to abide by the Constitution. The King's reactions to forces opposing both him and the British were rigged elections, limited freedom of the press, assembly and speech, and bribery. This situation did not encourage party politics, however some of the parties were part of the problem. The first party was Mustafa

---

[34]Ibid., 243-248.

[35]Ibid., 248-265.

Kamil's National Party. It concentrated on a foreign issue, eliminating British control. The Party was not sensitive or interested in social problems. The elites came from well to do families and were not interested in the plight of the fellahin.

The Wafd Party was the first truly nationalist party in 1918, under the leadership of Saad Zaghul. Its leadership drew more broadly from society - professionals, landowners, industrialists, intelligentsia. Its focus, too, was on ending British control and limiting the powers of the King. The Wafd Party, after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 helped the party realize somewhat its first goal, divided into several factions. The factions split based on industrialist or landlord interests, and pro and anti-British sentiments. Other parliamentary parties that did not recruit broad support included the pro-British and pro-royalist Constitutional Liberal Party and the Union Party. There also existed several anti-parliamentary groups, the most notable being the Muslim Brotherhood.

The army coup of 1952 was designed to wipe away an ineffective and unrepresentative system. While the small group of officers headed by Gamal Abd al-Nassar, with General Mohammed Nagib as the intended figurehead, easily toppled the existing regime, the task of establishing a regime proved more difficult. The new regime's goal was to deal with Egypt's social problems, while being held accountable by the populace.

Initially, the Egyptian Revolutionary Council tried to build its support on those political parties closest in ideology. The Council developed ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the old parties were corrupt and the newer ones had their own

94

ambitions. As a result, Nassar organized his own political party, while banning all other parties. He founded the Liberation Rally in 1953. Its goal was to build support for the regime, "...mold a 'new' Egyptian individual and a united, proud, and productive Egyptian society, and mobilize the nation for raising its standard of living."[36].

This discussion of Egypt's historical setting for state formation shows that Egypt has had a history of tying the physical boundaries of the state to its national identity. This historical tie has led to a national identity that bolsters state legitimacy. Let's now see how ethnicity did or did not play a role in the development of the state by examining the political institutions of the state. First, I will describe the institutional framework, which will help us discern the extent or lack thereof of ethnicity's pervasiveness in politics.

The Institutional Framework

As mentioned earlier I will modify Macridis and Burg's approach in my analysis of Egypt and Syria's political development. Specifically, I will show the extent of ethnic permeation in each state's political institutions. Macridis and Burg break down the political regime and its institutions into four major categories: the organization of command, organization of consent, configuration of interests, and organization of rights. First, there is the organization of command, which includes the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Their relationship is described by a constitution. A necessary discussion

---

[36]Prior to the quotation is a summary from Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 304-309. The quotation is taken from p. 309.

of these institutions is required on the governing elite. What is this elite? According to

Gaetano Mosca, there is "a class that rules and a class that is ruled." The class that rules

is "always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and

enjoys the advantages that power brings." There are elite in every regime, but as

Macridis and Burg tell us,

> the study of the elite will almost always provide us with insight into perhaps the most
> important characteristic of the command structure: the distribution and the limits of
> power. Just how much influence elites have over the authoritative decision-making
> process in any given regime is generally reflected in the organization of consent, the
> configuration of interests, and the organization of rights; in short, in the relationship
> between state and society.[37]

Consequently, my examination will center on the elite.

Understanding the elite in our cases is critical for understanding the role of

ethnicity. We will examine the role of the elites in the organization of command

described above, as well as in the organization of consent, which describes how a regime

elicits support. To better understand this point, I will examine the institutions of

socialization, representation, participation, and mobilization. My discussion for this

examination will center on political parties, as well as on ideology in terms of each

leader's use of it to gain consensus and mobilize support. I will discuss the configuration

of interests, which deal with interests articulated through organizations within a political

regime. The organization most significant in my cases is the military. Finally, I will

briefly discuss the organization of rights in terms of individual, social, and political

---

[37]Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 5-9. The quotations are from pages 6 and 8, respectively.

96

rights.[38] While I refrain from making a value judgment on the type of regime found in each of my cases, I believe that I do provide a springboard for students of democratization.

Additionally, because each case involves one-man rule, it is difficult to discuss each political institution separately. It is necessary, instead to understand the relationship of each institution, i.e., the military, political party, rights, etc. to the leader. My discussion of Egypt is broken down in terms of Nassar, Sadat, and Mubarak because of each man's central role in all the other institutions and subsequent political development of his regime. Obviously, Asad is the central figure in my discussion of Syria's political development. My discussion of the political development of each regime is solely to discover the extent or lack thereof of ethnicity's permeation in the institutions of each case's political regime.

<u>Background to the Coup: Post-WWII</u>

Before we examine the political institutions of Egypt's political development since Nassar's take-over, it is important to understand the context of his coup, that is the discontent stemmed from the country's economic woes. The small, but growing middle class was increasingly discontent with the country's political and social conditions; it resented concentration of power in the few, namely landowners, which represented less than one percent of the population, and the King. Landowners owning more than 200 acres were most closely associated with the King. The policies of those in power

---

[38]Ibid., 8-14.

97

dissatisfied the nationalists who wanted complete British withdrawal. The loss in the 1948 war against Palestine only inflamed the nationalists. Domestically, the powerful upper class, who lived in the city, lost touch with eighty percent of the population, who lived in the rural areas. Additionally, King Farouk renowned for his blatantly opulent lifestyle, only served to highlight the have and have-not gap. Egypt's peasants were among the most poverty stricken in the world with per capita income of $55-$65.[39] Peretz cites Doreen Warriner, "To speak of housing conditions is to exaggerate....The fellaheen inhabit mud huts, built by making a framework of sticks, usually cotton sticks, and plastering it with mud. The hut is in a small enclosed yard, where the family and the buffalo live together, with a small inner room with a roof but no window and a sleeping roof where chickens, rabbits and goats are kept."[40] Disease was rampant. A major factor for this poverty was the tremendous population growth rate of more than one-half million a year.

By the end of the war, the leading political party, the Wafd, lost a great deal of popularity and strength. In an effort to regain it, it pushed a program focused on getting the British out. It regained some of its power, but it could not deal with the country's problems. The military was the only other group capable of action against the old regime.

Until 1936, the army commander- in- chief was British. The Egyptian army was British trained, and merit was not a criterion for promotion. The army attracted lower

---

[39]Summary of Peretz, 224-225.

class youths for its educational opportunities. The Military Academy, especially offered

great opportunities for these people. It was at this Academy that young officers first got

together to share ideas and resentments towards the British. Some of these officers who

graduated in 1938, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser began to plan strategy for

tackling the country's woes. The lost war in 1948 served to build support for what was

now known as the Free Officers Society. The lost war revealed the ineptitude of the

regime.[41]

In 1950, however, the Wafd returned to power in the first free election held in

eight years. The King had banished the Wafd Party in 1944, and in the interim eight

minority governments attempted to govern. The 1950 Wafd victory instilled some

optimism for parliamentary government, since many felt that a majority government

would be able to restore some stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, corruption,

intraparty feuding, a heavy-handed manner towards political opponents, and appeasement

towards the monarchy all served to heighten acceptance for nonconstitutional rule.[42]

In July 1951, the editor-in-chief, Ihsan Abd al-Quddus, of the prominent

independent weekly, Ruz al-Yusuf, proclaimed Egypt a

> "country of failure. We in Egypt believe in failure and worship those who fail," he
> wrote, pointing specifically to Nahhas [Wafd Party leader] and his chief ministers.
> "Woe to the man of talent who looks to matters with a serious eye and works with
> determination to succeed.... Woe to him, for the doors are shut in front and in back of

---

[40]Ibid., 225.

[41]All after last citation is a summary of Ibid., 225-230.

[42]Joel Gordon, "The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order" International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 21, no. 2 (May 1989): 193.

99

him, oppressive power pursues him wherever he settles and false charges follow him every day."[43]

Key members of the population were ready for an alternative, even if that alternative was military rule, because of the Wafd's speedy destruction of public trust and its cynicism towards politics.[44]

Gamal Abdel Nassar: The Integration of Elites, Political Parties and the Military in One Man

Nassar attempted to cure the country's woes by establishing himself as the focal point of all power. His primarily bloodless coup occurred on July 23, 1952. King Farouk was exiled, and the coup received great support from nearly all political groups to include the Wafd, the Liberal Constitutionalists, Nationalists, Socialists, Communists, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) allowed civil authorities to fill top governmental posts, but the RCC, which was the executive committee of the Free Officers Society, soon put its own members in these top positions.

In 1954, Nassar replaced Neguib as leader after much dispute concerning the direction of the nation. Neguib wanted to reform the existing political institutions and Nassar wanted to create a new political, economic and social structure for Egypt. Nassar banned all political parties, established censorship, liquidated all opposition, and

---

[43]Ibid., 210.

[44]Ibid.

100

centralized all power in the RCC. Additionally, he declared a three year transition period

to prepare for the eventual democratic institutions. In place of political parties, the RCC

established the Liberal Rally to organize and coordinate the efforts of the people. It

actually helped Nassar to control students, labor, and other groups.[45]

Under the monarchy, the nationalists had supported labor militancy because it

contributed to the struggle against foreign economic influence. After July 23, 1952,

however, the RCC took a different view towards labor militancy. The RCC viewed it as

unpatriotic and harmful to national economic development. Moreover, the RCC was

better able to put down strikes and other working class protests than the previous regime

because of its newly found popularity.[46]

The main goals of the new regime were securing national independence and

promoting economic construction. While the RCC did want to improve the lot of the

working class and other members of society, its vision for national economic prosperity

did not coincide with or complement many of the workers' demands, especially their

possible independent role in politics. Additionally, some members of the new regime

were blatantly antagonistic towards the interests of the working class.[47]

So why was Nassar popular? Perhaps the people, as already mentioned, were

ready for any alternative after King Farouk. Nassar brought with him his own brand of

---

[45]Peretz, 230-236.

[46]Joel Beinin, Labor, "Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952-1961," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 21, no. 1 (February 1989): 88.

[47]Ibid.

101

charisma. He was the first real Egyptian to rule Egypt in a thousand years; he came from a village, spoke the language, and lived as did the common people. "To Nasir went all the legitimacy which traditionally accrues to leaders victorious over the foreign enemy....Charisma and coercion combined to consolidate a remarkably stable regime possessing a tremendous fund of political capital. Thus Nasir won a free hand to transform Egypt from above."[48] But this achievement had its pitfalls. Namely, the Nassar regime did not feel compelled to create viable political institutions or eliminate its authoritarian rule for two reasons. First the civilians, who struggled with the Free Officers for some authority within the regime with the Free Officers harbored some distrust for the regime. Second, Nassar translated the tremendous initial popularity into a mandate.[49]

Nassar's regime consisted of an immense authoritarian-bureaucratic structure, headed by a powerful Presidency. Together, the power of the office and Nassar's tremendous drive, energy, intellect, and endurance combined to create an activist, intervening and innovative force. "Initiative and responsibility were thus highly concentrated in the Presidency at the expense of other political institutions."[50]

The elite surrounding Nassar as vice presidents, premiers or ministerial or party officials, primarily came from the military. The outer circle of elites consisted of

---

[48]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14.

[49]Ibid., 13-14.

[50]Ibid., 15.

102

apolitical civilian professionals and technocrats, who provided the inner circle of military elites with the information they needed to implement the regime's policies. The new inner elite represented a marked change from past elites. The King's elites came from the upper class and landlord-lawyers. The officers of the Free Officers came from modest social backgrounds, mostly from the middle class with roots in the villages and populist outlooks. The technocratic and civilian officials, while having roots in the upper class, were only promoted based on merit.

Participation in the policy process was not institutionalized; Nassar dominated the process. Nassar did work to get a consensus among his inner circle of Free Officers. There were divisions, however, among the inner circle based on personal and ideological grounds. Some officers favored conservative Islamic ideas, some favored technocratic approaches, and others took to left-wing approaches. There were differences regarding Pan-Arabic and Egypt -first philosophies. There were conflicts over bureaucratic jurisdictions. Finally, divisions occurred between the Free Officers and the civilian technocrats as some officers became distrustful of the civilian officials. With all these conflicts, Nassar still had the first and last word. He was able to maneuver through these conflicts and even managed to use them for his own benefit. Nassar centralized and personalized his power.[51]

The bureaucracy consisted of the armed forces, ministeries, and a huge public sector. The middle elite who managed these organizations expanded bureaucratic and

---

[51]Ibid., 16-17.

103

educational opportunities for the middle and lower classes, thereby democratizing

recruitment. While the new regime wanted to eliminate corruption and lethargy rampant

during the old regime, the expanding bureaucracy became its own worse enemy. It fell

victim to inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and unresponsiveness. The government became

the alternative employment, and officials soon exhibited laziness and a lack of work

ethics and motivation. The result was that the political elite did not trust to delegate

authority below them, and bureaucratic officials were not used to accepting

responsibility. With all these problems, the bureaucracy managed to handle some

projects, such as the management of the Suez canal and the building of the High Dam

rather well.[52]

Nassar did make an attempt to create institutions of participation. There was a

parliament, but the Presidency overwhelmed it. Nassar could legislate by decree, and his

cabinet was responsible to him, not to parliament. Parliament did not recruit elites or

serve to speak for the people. In 1962, Nassar built the Arab Socialist Union, but it never

performed party functions. Interest groups became part of the corporatist structure of the

state, and the state manipulated them. Finally, the media became Nassar's tool for

shaping public opinion. "The unchecked coercive powers of the regime, combined with

a multitude of structural controls and the great personal legitimacy of the leader put a

virtual end to pluralistic politics from 1954 onward."[53]

---

[52]Ibid., 17-18.

[53]Ibid., 20. The previous section came from Ibid., 18-20.

104

The ideology of Nassarism consisted of several aspects to help shape support

from the people. First, he used the language of Islam, even though he and his Free

Officers supported a more reformist version of Islam, which endorsed their program of

secularization and modernization. He appealed more to the idea of Arab nationalism and

unity.[54] "Arab unity had been accepted by previous governments of Egypt as an

important strand in foreign policy, but the separate historical development of Egypt and

the distinctive culture which had grown up in the Nile valley had kept it somewhat

distant in its feelings from its neighbors."[55] Nassar now wanted Egypt to be the leader of

the Arab world. Nassar viewed his leadership as being directed towards a social

revolution based on state ownership and the redistribution of income. Nassar called his

ideology, "Arab socialism" which he explained in his National Charter of 1962:

> Revolution is the way in which the Arab nation can free itself of its shackles, and rid
> itself of the dark heritage which has burdened it...[It] is the only way to overcome
> underdevelopment which has been forced on it by suppression and
> exploitation....Ages of suffering and hope have finally produced clear objectives for
> the Arab struggle. These objectives, which are true the true expression of Arab
> consciousness, are freedom, socialism, and unity...Freedom today means that of the
> country and of the citizen. Socialism has become both a means and an end:
> sufficiency and justice. The road to unity is the popular call for the restoration of a
> single nation.[56]

Nassar claimed that political democracy first required social democracy, which was

public ownership of industry, trade, and public services. He called for equality for all

---

[54] Albert Hourani, <u>A History of the Arab Peoples</u>, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1991), 405.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Hourani citing the National Charter in Ibid., 406.

105

men and women, classes, and Arab countries.[57] His regime stressed social rights over individual rights. It is important to note, however, that his call for equality was based on his concern for class or economic equality. His country's woes were economically based, and the gap between the rich and the poor emphasized his nation's economic plight. Because his plan called for reform from the top, he monopolized the regime's political power at the expense of all other political institutions, as mentioned above, which demonstrates his regime's lack of support for political rights.

Nassarism developed its strongest support from Egyptians and Arabs in general on the regional level. It was on this regional level that Nassar derived legitimacy that still survives him and continues to mobilize political movements in other Arab states.[58] Nassar exploited the ideas of Arabism, anti-Westernism, and nonalignment to foster Arab unity through diplomacy, propaganda, and insurgency aid throughout the Middle East.[59]

"The fact that Egypt has existed as a unified nation-state for so long resulted in greater agreement among Egyptians concerning their national identity."[60] While the goals of the Nassar regime were the end of feudalism, the end of monopolization and the dominance of capital over the government, the end of imperialism, the establishment of

---

[57]Ibid., 406-407.

[58]Hudson, 240.

[59]Ibid., 241.

[60]Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 166.

106

social justice, the establishment of a strong army, and the creation of democracy, the real

mark of Nassarism was its revival of national pride.[61]

Nassar achieved a great deal in spite of the regime's problems. He gained British

withdrawal and the seizure of the Suez Canal, which put him and Egypt as the leader of

the Arab world with reduced Western influence. As leader of the Arab world, Nassar

was able to secure assistance from both the East and the West. Although Nassar's Egypt

failed to become the "Prussia" of the Arab world, it did influence the relative

independence of the Middle Eastern states from overt Western control.[62]

Nassar shifted economic policies with his goal of economic modernization. His

capitalist strategy conflicted with his nationalist foreign policy, populist orientation, and

authoritarian rule. Consequently, he embarked on an economic policy called, 'Arab

Socialism'. This policy nationalized banks, foreign trade, domestic trade, and a great

deal of industry. Nassar established egalitarian policies aimed at opportunities to all

segments of society and narrowing class gaps. Private industry was still a player, but

these initiatives served to deeply entrench the state in the economy.[63]

The positive aspects of the Nassar regime also proved to be its downfall. The

new state bourgeoisie, the heart of the regime, had state power and control over the

production of national wealth. Additionally, members of this group did not embrace the

ideologies of Nassar. Even some of the Free Officers became 'embourgeoisied', rather

---

[61]Ibid., 166-167.

[62]Hinnebusch, 21-22.

[63]Ibid., 21-24.

than embracing Nassar's socialism. The regime also suffered from patrimonialization, which the lack of political institutions fostered. Perhaps the best way to view this patrimonialization is to realize that Nassar was able to use his

> authority as one means for running the country....it was, for most of the time, a function of this strangely personal relationship between the [leader] and the people, and not between the [leader], his ministers, bureaucrats and members of parliament, on the one hand, and the masses on the other.[64]

These two phenomenon - embourgeoisment and patrimonialization - undermined the regime. Nassar could not overcome the imbalance between resources and commitments. Egypt's poverty and the inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy prevented Nassar from accumulating the required resources for his commitments. Many of these commitments stemmed from his activist foreign policy and large army to support it. The final event which ensured the end of the regime was the 1967 defeat by Israel.[65]

Anwar el-Sadat: A Debatable Attempt at Breaking the Monopoly of Power

The political structure which evolved from 1952-1970 was marked by a lack of political competitiveness, centralization of power, priority of mobilization rather than participation, primacy of the executive over the legislature, and repression of political dissent. Output institutions (military, police, bureaucracy) were supreme over input institutions (interest groups and political organizations). Political leaders had free reign; the state attempted to penetrate many groups and organizations of society, which would

---

[64]The quotation only is from Anthony McDermott, Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 280. The rest of the ideas in this paragraph is noted below.

[65]Hinnebusch, 29-35.

otherwise make-up civil society.[66] Just how much Sadat changed this system is debatable. As I will discuss below, he attempted to liberalize the regime, but for a myriad of reasons, he was not always successful or that willing to establish these reforms.

Sadat inherited from Nassar a political system in crisis, a demoralized people, and a divided elite. The people had come to rely on the leadership of Nassar, and their grief displayed at his funeral showed how lost they felt without him. The devastating years after 1967, however, readied the Egyptian people for a change. Nassar did leave Sadat a means to cope; his charismatic legitimacy lent the regime enough authority to give it staying power in the face of crisis. The office of the President was well established, as were the habits of compliance borne from a bureaucratic state.[67]

The Presidency under Sadat remained a powerful force. The key to the power of the Presidency was its authority to dismiss and appoint the Prime Minister, the cabinet, and the chiefs of the armed forces. In a highly bureaucratized state, Presidential patronage included a much greater scope of positions in the public sector, media, judiciary, and party. The President could reshape institutions and change the conditions of political participation. These powers enabled the President to act without much restraint because the political infrastructure was incapable of checking his power.[68]

Sadat's first statements as President indicated that he was going to be a President for all the people. Sadat wanted to share responsibility, and he claimed that "the people

---

[66]Dessouki, 164.

[67]Hinnebusch, 38.

[68]Ibid., 78-79.

109

must not give their full confidence to just one person after Abdel Nasser."[69] Initially,

Sadat claimed that the only way to fill the vacuum left by Nasser was "by the rule of the

institution representing the unity of the popular forces."[70] He tried to broaden the scope

of rights. For example, while Sadat did not remove government control from the

universities, he did promise in 1971 to respect their independence. This environment

encouraged academic productivity, namely the proliferation of political development

research of Egypt itself.[71]

The 1970s under Sadat, however, brought two big changes. First, the Sadat

regime greatly increased the civilianization of the political elites. For the first time since

1952, civilians held positions of vice-president (Mahmoud Fawzi) and prime minister

(Aziz Sidky, Fawzi, Abdel - Aziz Hegazi, and Mustafa Khalil). Ismail Fahmy became

minister of foreign affairs from 1973-1977, before Boutros Boutros-Ghali held the post.

In the 1980s, Kamal Hassan Ali and Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid held the post. Second, the

regime experienced some gradual democratization. The multiparty system was

established in 1976-1977. In 1980, opposition political parties were Labor Socialist Party

(LSP), the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP), and the Liberal Socialist Party.

---

[69]Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 153.

[70]Ibid., 154.

[71]Thomas Mayer, The Changing Past: Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt, 1882-1983,(Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1988), 58-59.

110

Though the opposition only held 20 out of 390 parliamentary seats, they still had influence through the media.[72]

Regarding the first point concerning elites, Raymond A. Hinnebusch provides a basis for better understanding the elite change from Nassar to Sadat through his four categories of elites. First, there is the core elite, who comprised members of the inner circle and were closest to the President. The top elite were those officials, subject to rapid turnover, who were the non-political technicians or administrators. The middle elite consisted of high civil servants, senior military commanders, public sector managers, many newspaper editors, top religious and academic leaders, heads of syndicates and chambers of commerce, and parliamentary committee chairmen. Finally, the sub-elite consisted of local notables of village leaders, party leaders of local branches, and most members of parliament.

Sadat civilianized the core elite. There were still officers present, but not in the same strength as under Nassar. For example, under Nassar, the prime ministers were always officers, while under Sadat, they were all civilian. In place of the officers, Sadat advanced technocrats from the state bureaucracy and economic notables from the private sector. This group from the private sector served to dilute the statist character of the regime under Nassar.[73] "Under Sadat, in short, the inner core changed from a body of relatively like minded 'revolutionary comrades' of similar background into a much more

---

[72]Dessouki, 165.

[73]Hinnebusch, 91-100. Hinnebusch provides detailed statistics on the elite during the Nassar and Sadat periods.

111

occupationally differentiated and heterogeneous collection of personal confidantes, technicians, bureaucrats, politicians and economic notables."[74] Under Nassar, the criteria for getting to the top were a combination of military service with bureaucratic or political experience or great achievement in academics or technical skill. Under Sadat, the criteria changed to those with professional or academic degrees with bureaucratic or political experience.

Under Sadat, party leadership took on greater significance, and the party started to become a channel of recruitment. Governors under Sadat had party or parliamentary backgrounds, not only bureaucratic backgrounds as under Nassar. Finally, under Sadat, the elites tended to come from the upper-classes because of the movement of state elites into the private sector and private sector elites into the state. The cross fertilization among these groups tended to produce a unified and upper-class political elite.[75]

While Hinnebusch seems to stress the heterogeneous nature of the political elite under Sadat, it is important to note that Sadat still relied on kinship ties for his personal entourage.[76] Two key people (each had sons married to Sadat's daughters) in Sadat's inner circle were Osman Ahmad Osman, who was in charge of reconstructing the Canal cities, and Sayyid Marei, a wealthy landowner.[77] Whereas Nassar relied on his personal assistants to fill out his elites, Sadat encouraged family-based networks within the elite as

---

[74]Ibid., 100.

[75]Ibid., 100-109.

[76]Ibid., 80.

[77]Hudson, 247-248.

112

a means of controlling the political system, which he inherited from Nassar.[78] This may

not necessarily be problematic. Springborg suggests that in order to make and execute

policy, perhaps a small homogeneous inner circle is beneficial.[79] The problem of rapid

turn-over among the elites is what caused problems of political institutionalization at the

executive level for Sadat, and perhaps this was the greater challenge to the regime than

the existence of kinship ties at the personal entourage level.[80]

The second point concerning Sadat's gradual democratization is debatable, but he

did make some changes. Michael Hudson claims that the most significant aspect of

Sadat's strategy for winning support was his approach towards political participation. He

allowed the National Assembly more freedom in its discussions and debates. He gave

greater freedoms to the press. In 1975 and 1976, Sadat created forums under the

watchful eye of the Arab Socialist Union, which provided politicians an opportunity to

express some divergent views. These forums were a step towards the growth of political

parties. These forums represented the ideas as expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood at

one extreme and the Marxists on the other extreme. The middle represented the views of

the regime itself, and Mahmoud Abu Wafia, Sadat's brother-in-law led this forum.

"despite the skepticism expressed by both rightists and leftists, the possibility could not

---

[78]Robert Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," in Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 156-157.

[79]Robert Springborg in Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 32-33 suggests that Mubarak's regime, due to a lack of homogeneity of the inner circle, might be less effective.

[80]The point about rapid turn-over and institutionalization is found in Marc N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 151.

113

be excluded that President Sadat's cautious liberalization of organized political

participation might eventually enhance the structural legitimacy of the political

system."[81]

Sadat consistently chose right-wing, conservative, stabilizing, adaptive, pro-

Western courses of action, while maintaining a traditionalist character. This

traditionalism stemmed from his village past.

> His patriarchal style of rule seemed an extension of village headmanship to the
> national level....His view of Egypt as 'one big family' in which political strife was out
> of place and his nostalgic image of the village as a place of harmony where men were
> content with their lot, were artifacts of his village upbringing which in time gave to
> his outlook a conservative impatience with dissent and insensitivity to inequality.[82]

Sadat was different from Nassar. Sadat was a much more relaxed and tolerant

person. He genuinely disliked political repression, and under Sadat, there were hardly

any executions, mass imprisonments, and torture [this point is debatable as other scholars

discussed below differ on this point]. Sadat wanted peace through negotiation and

economic prosperity based on private property. While Sadat wanted democracy, he was

unwilling to relinquish any power.[83] Herein lies the problem Sadat faced. He made

attempts to liberalize and democratize, but the economic and political challenges he

faced caused him to proceed haltingly with some of his domestic initiatives.

In the October Paper, Sadat did recognize the significance of the 1952 revolution,

Nasser's agrarian reforms, and the Socialist Charter. He claimed that "the country was

---

[81]The quotation and the points above are from Hudson, 248.

[82]Hinnebusch, 80.

[83]Ibid., 81-86.

114

rescued from a violent class struggle, which many other countries have witnessed and are still witnessing. I would not be exaggerating if I say that the Revolution saved the country from civil war."[84] However, the <u>October Paper</u> also represented a break with Nassarism. It held that Nassar's socialism and Arabism needed to adapt to a new era. These ideas had to be institutionalized in a constitutional order to preserve their achievements, while correcting deviations. In 1978, Sadat introduced 'democratic socialism' as the middle ground between the excesses of liberal capitalism and totalitarianism.[85] Sadat moved away from state socialism. He opened the Egyptian economy to foreigners. The upper class applauded this move, as they saw opportunities for further enrichment. Luxury items were now available for those who could afford them. New buses were available to the poor and helped relieve city public transportation's unbearable congestion. Hudson refers to this prosperity as superficial.[86] This strategy, however, contributed to the widening gap between the classes, which, as I will discuss later, manifested itself in the political arena.[87]

While Sadat did not have Nassar's dynamic charisma, he achieved support in other ways. He was able to win support through his successful crossing of the Suez

---

[84]Ansari, 178.

[85]Hinnebusch, 112-113.

[86]Hudson, 248-249.

[87]Ansari, 208-209.

115

Canal in 1973 and the unprecedented military successes against Israel.[88] Sadat explained

the significance of the October War for the Egyptian people:

> ...I must put on record that the Egyptian people differ from many other peoples, even within the Arab world. We have recovered our pride and self-confidence after the October 1973 battle, just as our armed forces did. We are no more motivated by "complexes" - whether defeatist "inferiority" ones or those born out of suspicion and hate....With the fighting over, we harbored nothing but respect for one another [he is referring to Mrs. Meir]. Our civilized people know this; it is what induced 5 million citizens to come out to greet me on my return, and the armed forces to salute me in an impressive and quite unprecedented manner.[89]

Building on the support gained from October 1973, Sadat capitalized on a different

ideology from Nassar. Sadat's ideology was an "Egypt first" theme, and he challenged

the underlying Arab values by challenging Arab causes. He stressed the past sacrifices of

Egypt on behalf of the Arab world and its resultant ungratefulness. In fact, by the mid

1970s, middle class, educated businessmen expressed a desire to normalize relations with

Israel[90] The Arabic nationalist movement under Nassar, for Sadat, had outlived its

usefulness. Others agreed that pan-Arabism was not a reality. Khalid Kishtainy, in his

anthology of Arabic humor tells a story of a trumpeter sitting outside Cairo headquarters

of the Arab League.[91] The trumpeter says "This is my new job to wait for Arab unity and

then blow the trumpet to declare it to the world when it is achieved. I get 50 pounds a

month." His friend says, "That's a miserable salary." The trumpeter replies, "Yes, but it

---

[88]Hudson, 248.

[89]Sadat, 312.

[90]Hudson, 248.

[91]Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace, and the Mirage of Prosperity, (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 184.

116

is a lifetime job."[92] The total renunciation of pan-Arabism, however, did cause problems

with Egypt's relations with the other Arab states.[93] I will address this point in chapter 5.

Sadat consolidated his authority against his rivals by 'retraditionalizing'. He

condemned the repressive policies of the former regime. Anasari calls Sadat's strategy,

'retraditionalization behind the liberal mask'.[94] His rivals were urban-based, formed

around the New Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat faced both liberal and Islamic

challenges to his regime. Liberalization of the economy widened the gap between the

wealthy and the poor. Calls for political participation increased, and Sadat's response

was greater control over the state's institutions and a crackdown on his rivals.[95] Sadat in

1977 clarified his views on liberalization. He said that "politics have no place in our

universities" and that "democracy too can have teeth and fangs."[96] Meanwhile, class

divisions and gaps worsened.[97]

Exacerbating Sadat's challenges were the social and regional changes over the

past thirty years. The tremendous population growth in Cairo, if continued, will reach 20

million by the year two thousand. The rural population declined from 81 percent in 1960

to 56 percent in 1976. In 1978, 42 percent of the population was under the age of 15.

---

[92]Ibid.

[93]Ibid., 185.

[94]Ansari, 195.

[95]Ibid., 195, 208-209.

[96]James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), 224.

[97]Ibid., 222.

117

These circumstances combined with Egypt's economic woes manifested themselves in some measure through extremist groups. The psychological profile of the Islamic group, Jama'at, is one of alienation.[98] Religion becomes a means of consolation and comfort. Jama'at, however, was not united in purpose or strategy. The extremists justify rebellion against Muslim rulers who do not abide by Islamic law. Not all Jama'at are extremists. Sadat responded by arresting all urban dissidents. In the first week, 1536 were arrested. He arrested bishops, priests, imams, secular leaders, etc. These leaders did not represent an organized opposition; they were just all united in their disapproval of Sadat. When Sadat denounced sectarian violence to the People's Assembly, he received a standing ovation.[99]

Sadat faced many risks with his strategy. Egypt experienced tremendous economic and bureaucratic decay. Ideological cleavage between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Marxists posed challenges to Sadat. Finally, Sadat's turn-around on pan-Arabism and his alignment with the West caused doubt. In 1974, he violently put down a Muslim fundamentalist insurrection. The regime made widespread arrests due to riots spurred on by low wages and a 25 percent inflation rate. The regime blamed these riots on the Marxists. In 1977, the worst riots in 25 years occurred as thousands protested

---

[98]This alienation is a phenomenon called "anomie" as explained by Emile Durheim and Bernard Brown mentioned in chapter 2.

[99]Ansari, 212-213, 229-230.

118

the government's reduction in food subsidies. Eighty people were killed, and the regime arrested 1500 people.[100]

On 6 October 1981, just as Sadat was about to review the military parade celebrating Egyptian successes during the 1973 October War, religious fundamentalists assassinated him. The Egyptian people did not display nearly the amount of grief or sadness as expressed for Nassar's passing. This seeming indifference towards Sadat came as a surprise to the United States, where he had been recently proclaimed Time magazine's man of the year.[101]

While it is debatable the extent to which Sadat affected the political regime he inherited from Nassar, three points are clear. His country still faced tremendous economic woes, and unfortunately, the economic elites became the governing elites, which accentuated the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Second, his attempt to mobilize his people manifested itself in his Egypt-first ideology, a notable change from Nassar's ideology of pan-Arabism. Finally, he did make attempts to diffuse some of his power to other institutions. In the end, his country's economic plight was the catalyst for renewed repression.

Husni Mubarak: An Incremental and Moderate Attempt to Diffuse Power

Just as there are disagreements concerning Sadat's ability or willingness to democratize, there are differences of opinion as to how well the Mubarak regime is

---

[100]Hudson, 250.

[101]Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles For Egypt's Soul, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 1-2.

119

democratizing. Albert Hourani is optimistic and believes that under Husni Mubarak, the regime seems to be cautiously democratizing. He believes that Egypt has a chance to restore constitutional rule because of its "social and cultural unity."[102] Elections in 1984 occurred in an atmosphere of tolerance, and in a system which ensured a majority government. Even members of the opposition were elected.[103]

There are reasons for such optimism. Upon Mubarak's assumption of the Presidency, he vowed that there would be an end to repression. To illustrate this promise, he invited members of the opposition, who were imprisoned during the September 1981 Sadat crackdown, to the Presidential Palace.[104] Mubarak changed the electoral law to one of proportional representation, although parties had to achieve 8 percent to win seats. Opposition parties viewed this change optimistically. Mubarak allowed the reconstitution of the New Wafd Party and established ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, although he did not officially recognize the Muslim Brotherhood.[105]

The smooth transfer of power to Mubarak after Sadat's assassination was significant for the regime. In 1981, Mubarak, in a speech to the People's Assembly, outlined his regime's policy. He wanted to bring economic benefits to the poor and stop the profiteering by wealthy members of society. He wanted to continue the opening, or infitah, of the economy, but he wanted to open production, not consumption. He

---

[102]Hourani, 456.

[103]Ibid., 456-457.

[104]Ansari, 241.

[105]Ibid., 243-244.

120

recognized the role of the state to protect the poor. Food subsidies would not disappear.

He also began to economically and diplomatically open to the other Arab states as long

as they did not interfere with Egyptian affairs. Mubarak claimed that "Egypt is for all

society - not a privileged few or the chosen elite or the sectarian dictatorship."

Additionally, he called for the role of opposition parties in the regime, but they would

represent "differences not conflict, without creating confusion; it should be an exchange

of views not an exchange of accusations."[106]

Mubarak inherited both the Nassar and Sadat legacies. This situation is a mixed

blessing. On the one hand he has inherited an array of institutions, laws, and practices.

On the other hand, he has inherited policies that have caused problems for the regime.

He did inherit an extremely powerful office, the Presidency. Sadat added a paternalistic

flavor to the office, which connotes even more power.[107] The President is also the head

of the dominant party, which according to R.H. Dekmejian, by the end of Sadat's rule,

"Egypt had reverted to an institutionalized one-party system."[108]

Mubarak has chosen not to use the extensive powers of the presidency, and he has

not made any radical changes to the regime. Ayubi describes Mubarak's style of

leadership as "low-key" and "business-like". The Mubarak regime is known for its

honesty and reserved approach to issues. The significant problem facing the regime is

---

[106]Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990, (London: HarperCollins, 1991), 184. The quotations are from Mubarak's speech.

[107]Nazih N. Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), 226-227.

[108]Ibid., 227.

121

economic inequality among members of society. While Islamic extremism has not

extended a firm grip on the working class, military, or the lumpenproletariat, continued

economic woes might spur people to look for an alternative in these extremist groups,

especially if political participation does not continue to develop.[109] I will address this

point in more detail later.

Mubarak continued Sadat's civilianization of the elite. In 1986, only ten percent

of the fifty ministers serving in Mubarak's cabinet had military backgrounds.[110]

Additionally, Mubarak's elite are not powerful or homogeneous. Even his closest

advisors have much less power than those from the Nassar and Sadat regimes. Nassar

and Sadat, while establishing a heterogeneous elite in both composition and ideology, did

have a homogeneous inner circle. Members of Mubarak's inner circle do not share the

bonds of kinship or friendship, nor do they share similar political ideologies. They

gained their positions through the crossing of career paths and chance.[111] The

bureaucracy has continued to grow. By the mid 1980s, over 3 million people were

employed by the government, either in the local, central, or public sector. Also the

wages and salaries of these people increased from 19 percent of the nation's expenditures

in 1974/75 to 29 percent in 1984/85.[112]

---

[109]Ibid., 227-236.

[110]Nazih N. Ayubi, "Government and the State in Egypt Today," Egypt Under Mubarak, ed.
Charles Tripp and Roger Owen, (London: Routledge, 1990), 5.

[111]Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt:, 32-33.

[112]Nazih N. Ayubi, "Government and the State in Egypt Today," 7.

Mubarak has tried to take the best of Nassar and Sadat as he formulates his

policies. His regime allows five parties to function, not including the ruling party, the

National Democratic Party. The left wing is represented by the National Progressive

Union Party and the Socialist Labour Party. The Wafd is back. One religious party is

authorized, the Umma, but it is not an extremist party. Although the Marxists, Muslim

Brotherhood, and Nasserists are not officially represented, their views are represented in

various party factions. "At present Egypt has the most open political system of any Arab

state and a determined attempt is being made to foster a democratic society."[113]

Because the courts ruled that there were some irregularities during the 1984

elections, new elections were called for in 1987. The same parties were involved, but

some of their alliances changed. For example, the Wafd competed alone and not with the

Muslim Brotherhood as in 1984. The Muslim Brotherhood entered an Alliance with

socialists and liberals, even though the electoral laws banned religious parties. Also, 400

candidates ran as independents. Mubarak encouraged the secular parties as well as the

moderate Muslims, namely the Brotherhood. He was elected in 1987 for a six-year

term.[114]

Mubarak has been able to keep his opposition off balance. "Mubarak's political

style is akin to a military tactician. He identifies specific threats and tailors

countermeasures to confront them."[115] He has not provided the Islamic extremists with a

---

[113]The quotation and the above points are from Hopwood, 185.

[114]Ibid., 186-187.

[115]Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," 158.

123

discernible target. He adheres to a simple lifestyle. He has let the courts wrestle with the

Coptic extremists. He does allow, for example, the moderate Muslim Brotherhood to

function, while maintaining many extremists under detention. Finally, Mubarak has

provided many freedoms to political parties, which has provided him with support for his

regime.[116]

During the first five years of his presidency, Mubarak was able to counterbalance

the secular opposition with the Islamic political activists. The rise of the Wafd Party in

the 1984 elections revealed Mubarak's good relationship with this party leader of the

secular opposition, and his successful supression of the Islamic groups. Additionally,

Mubarak helped the moderate Islamic groups dominate the radical groups by establishing

a tolerant environment for moderate Islamic views. This tactic seemed to diffuse the

appeal of the radical Islamic groups.[117]

Mubarak's toleration for the Muslim Brotherhood seemed beneficial for his

regime. First the Brotherhood's political participation helps lend legitimacy to Mubarak's

attempt to create true democracy. Second, the Brotherhood serves to deflect the more

extremist groups. Third, the social welfare programs that the Brotherhood established is

a benefit to society, relieving some of the burden from the regime. Finally, Mubarak's

---

[116]Ibid., 159.

[117]Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, 186.

124

tolerance for the Brotherhood legitimizes him in light of the Islamic movements occurring in other Arab countries.[118]

By 1987, however, it appeared Mubarak's counterbalancing strategy was failing, and the Islamicists gained strength. Mubarak seemed to have shifted strategies from counterbalancing opposition parties to opening the political arena to the Islamicists. This strategy could perhaps expose their weaknesses, while also allowing Mubarak to keep a better eye on their activities.[119] It is apparent, however, that the Islamicists remain a potent enough force that Mubarak must still rely on his security forces. Will the effort expended on controlling the Islamicists impair the state's ability to manage its economy? Perhaps, the state, while managing organized threats, will have difficulty handling anomie violence, as opposition and the state alike fail to redress economic woes.[120]

The challenge facing Mubarak is the economy, namely the increasing gap between the rich and the poor. So far, religious groups have not been able to generate political support. The religious groups are split, and Stephen Pellitiere, in his monograph, calls for the United States to exploit this schism as it assesses the wisdom of forcing Mubarak to take measures that may only exacerbate the economic situation.[121] Other studies for regime stabilization exclude U.S. efforts and call upon Egypt to take

---

[118]Gregory L. Aftandilian, Egypt's Bid For Arab Leadership: Implications For U.S. Policy, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 57-58.

[119]Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, 184, 186.

[120]Ibid., 244-245.

[121]Stephen C. Pelletiere, Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Challenge in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, April 5, 1994), v.

125

economic and political measures. The economic measures needed are those that would

create jobs, and the political measures include anti-corruption and further

democratization measures.[122]

Mubarak has followed moderation in his foreign policy, as well as in his domestic

policy. He

> ...has established for Egypt a clear role as a champion of moderation....Mubarak has,
> in a relatively short time, converted many of Sadat's foreign policy liabilities into net
> assets. While he has not yet converted this foreign policy capital into a significant
> legitimizing factor at the domestic level, it seems likely that he will be able to do so
> in the not so distant future.[123]

We will assess this point in chapter six.

Conclusion

There have been a multitude of approaches taken for the study of Egypt. From

Pharonic interpretations, institutional, Weberian, social aggregate or the domination of

class, there is no doubt that Egypt is undergoing tremendous social change that will

challenge the regime. That the outcome is completely deterministic cannot be true, but,

at the same time, we must recognize that the leader is working under some constraints.

Husni Mubarak so far has shown tremendous skill in responding to the challenges he

faces.[124]

---

[122]Casandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," Middle East Journal, 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 26-27.

[123]Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," 159.

[124]For all the detailed interpretations of Egyptian politics, see Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," 137-159. The other ideas reference determinism and Mubarak are from Springborg, p. 158.

126

Institutionally, we have seen attempts to civilianize the elite, while allowing for more political participation both individually and in the form of political parties. Each leader, Nassar, Sadat, and Mubarak, devised his own ideology as a means to gain consensus or legitimacy. These attempts have not been always successful, especially in the midst of a crumbling economy. If any theme has emerged in this discussion of Egypt's political development is the constraint of a disastrous economy on the political regime.

Also, the above description of Egyptian political development reveals challenges at every stage, as well as the current challenge of Islamic extremism. However, it also reveals the homogeneous character of the Egyptian people. It is a people, who identify strongly with the state based on their shared ethnic and national identity. This commonality stems from a shared language and religion combined with the simultaneous, historical, and continuous development of the Egyptian nation-state. And while kinship seemed to play a role in the Sadat regime, it did not significantly impact on the commonality and shared identity of the Egyptian people.

The most divisive factor revealed is the widening gap between the rich and the poor. This gap does not reinforce any ethnic group since the population on a whole is Egyptian. Additionally, the radical Islamic groups represent an ideology calling for a government based on Islamic law. They do not seem to challenge the Egyptianity of the people. For the future, we must evaluate the political situation to see if it does develop along extremist lines, and, thereby, cause the loyalties of the people to shift from the state. More importantly, we must assess if the definition of being an Egyptian changes

127

and how that change would affect the legitimacy of the regime and its foreign policy. Such an examination is beyond the scope of this paper. For this paper, we have established, based on Donald Horowitz's criteria of ethnic divisiveness that Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s, the time-frame for my cases, was a homogeneous state. What the leaders discussed above have done "is to preserve through several wars and two unexpected changes of President - Nassar's fatal heart attack in 1970 and Sadat's assassination in 1981 - the fundamental stability of the country. Compared with other developing countries, this was a remarkable achievement."[125]

---

[125]McDermott, 274.

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SYRIA

Introduction

I will now extend Horowitz's criteria for ethnic divisiveness to Syria. In the last section, we established Egypt's "Egyptianity". Now, we will, in contrast to Egypt, establish Syria's lack of "Syrianess" because of strong, reinforcing group loyalties which do not coincide with the state. The basis for these group loyalties is ethnicity. As established earlier, the commonality of the characteristics of religion, kinship, and language is the basis of ethnicity.

In order to establish Syria as an ethnically divided state, I will begin this section with a discussion of its people. I will pay particular attention to the roots of the Sunni - Shi'a split to better understand the significance of the religious, cultural, and kinship differences that affect group identity among the Sunnis and Alawis (As I will explain later, Alawis are a Shi'a sect). Next, I will discuss the history of the modem state, because the artificial creation of this state does not foster, but rather weakens, a sense of national identity. Syria does not have the historical continuity of a shared society and state as we found in Egypt. Finally, my discussion of Syria's political development, using Macridis and Burg's framework, will show its basis in ethnicity. According to Horowitz, this is the key criterion for determining a state's ethnic divisiveness. My discussion of Syria's political development, as well as its people and state history, will show that the state of Syria has a weak national identity because of the competing and reinforced group

129

or ethnic loyalties. My argument is that because of Syria's ethnic divisiveness, loyalty to the state is weak and, therefore, undermines legitimacy to the state.

People

The population of Syria is 14.3 million. The nationality of Syria is Syrian, and the ethnic groups (based on the State Department's view of ethnicity, not mine) are Arabs (90 percent), Kurds (9 percent), Armenians, Circassians, Turkomans. The religions are Sunni Muslim (74 percent), Alawis (12 percent), Christians (10 percent), Druze (3 percent) and small percent of other Muslim sects, Jews, and Yazidis. The official language is Arabic. English and French are widely known, and a small percentage of the population speak Kurdish, Armenian, Aramic, or Circassian.[126]

There have been attempts to create a Syrian identity. The idea of a Syrian fatherland stems from the writings of Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883). He expressed Syria as a "well defined historical unit, with a distinctly Arab culture and in the process of adopting certain Western characteristics deemed essential for its survival."[127]

In 1863, Al-Bustani founded an all-boys school that taught European languages, history, math, and geography. This school established a close association with the Syrian Protestant College (later known as the American University in Beirut). From these

---

[126]Background Notes, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 5, no 13 (November 1994): 1.

[127]Y. Choueiri, "Two Histories of Syria and the Demise of Syrian Patriotism," Middle Eastern Studies, 23, no. 4 (October 1987): 496.

schools, Al-Bustani encouraged publications and writings on the topic of Syrian nationalism.[128]

Syrian national identity strengthened during the aftermath of the young Turkish revolt in 1908. This identity reached a peak after World War I when King Faisal, in 1920, became the ruler of the kingdom of Syria. However, French intervention broke the kingdom into smaller parts, creating Greater Lebanon and four other smaller states. King Faisal's compensation for the loss of Syria was that he became king of a new Iraqi state under British control. France's defeat of the Syrian revolt in 1925 effectively squelched the nationalist movement in Syria except for small areas in which lived minorities such as the Alawis. In the 1930s, Arab nationalism replaced Syrian "localism". Syrian identity seemed to only indicate a reactionary response encouraged by the British and anti-Arab parties.[129]

While Syrian identity seems weak and transitory, the ethnic identities seem enduring. Based on our definition of ethnicity, this enduring quality is a result of the reinforcing characteristics of primarily religion and kinship.

> For many groups, religion is not a matter of faith but a given, an integral part of their identity, and for some an inextricable component of their sense of peoplehood....For groups like the Syrian Alawi, descendants of mountain dwellers who blended Shiite doctrine with nature worship, religion and ethnicity is coterminous.[130]

---

[128]Ibid., 498-501.

[129]Ibid., 508.

[130]Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 50-51.

131

Additionally, kinship helped cement this identity. An observer of Syria in the

1850s described the lack of patriotism as follows:

> Patriotism is unknown....there is not a man in the country whether Turk or Arab,
> Mohammedan or Christian who would give a para (penny) to save the Empire from
> ruin. The Patriotism of the Syrian is confined to the four walls of his own house;
> anything beyond them does not concern him.[131]

"In Syria, as in Lebanon and Iraq, ethnic politics is defined in confessional terms. Ethnic

groups are heavily demarcated by religion, religion that denotes not just a certain stream

of belief but a certain version of peoplehood."[132]

Syrian society, as a result of its heterogeneous character, contains numerous

divisive forces. Loyalties to religious sects, social classes, tribal groups, agro-cities, and

families replace those loyalties one may expect towards a nation.[133] While under French

rule, these divisions were encouraged as part of the French's divide and rule practice.[134]

In the midst of all the different group loyalties which compete with state loyalties, Syria

has further detracted from national loyalty when it emphasizes Arab nationalism rather

than Syrian nationalism.[135] How does one reconcile all the different loyalties?

According to Alasdair Drysdale:

---

[131]Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria," in Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 13.

[132]Horowitz, 492.

[133]Joseph Pincus, "Syria: A Captive Economy," Middle East Review, 12, no. 1 (Fall 1979): 49.

[134]R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes (New YorK: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 239.

[135]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 241.

132

A Syrian officer may act like an officer in a restaurant if he feels this will get him quicker service; he may be very conscious of his kin group in choosing a marriage partner; he may act as a member of a particular Alawi tribe during an intra-Alawi dispute within the armed services; he may act as an Alawi, villager, peripheral non-Sunni or Ba'thi-or all five- during a coup d'etat, as a socialist during regime economic policy formation and as a Syrian during a war with Israel.[136]

To understand better the strong identities of Syria's ethnic groups, primarily the Sunnis and Alawis, we must first understand the formative roots of these groups. Consequently, it is important to understand the most significant schismatic movement in Islam, that is Shi'ism.[137] There are five pillars of Islam, to which most Muslims adhere: declaration of faith, the five daily prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.[138] Sunnism is "...the belief in a unity which includes differences in legal opinion, and in the importance of the Qur'an and the practice (sunna) of the Prophet as the bases of it...."[139] Sunnis believe that all Muslims should live peacefully and unified, and accept the past. Sunnis accept the legitimacy of the first four caliphs. While the later caliphs might not have always acted justly, they are still regarded as legitimate because they did not violate God's basic commandments. There are some indications that some of the Umayyad (Sunni) caliphs claimed to expand their community leadership role to successors of the prophet and even vice-regents of God on earth, who interpret God's law.

---

[136] Yahya M. Sadowski, "Ba'thist Ethics and the Spirit of State Capitalism: Patronage and the Party in Contemporary Syria," in Ideology and Power in the Middle East, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 163.

[137] Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983), 60.

[138] Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 266.

[139] Hourani, 37.

133

Sunnism in its developed form, however, does not believe the caliph to be a prophet nor an infallible interpreter of the faith, but rather a community leader who ensures peace and justice. The caliph, according to the Sunnis, should be a descendent from the Prophet's tribe.[140]

Shi'a movements challenged the authority of the first three caliphs. They believed that 'Ali ibn Abi Talib was solely the legitimate and appointed imam successor of the Prophet.[141] The division stemmed from a political dispute between the Shi'a (party or faction) of Ali, who was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Sunnis, who opposed the Shi'a view that the caliphate was divine in nature. The Sunnis view the caliphate as a constitutional office. The person assuming this office is selected by leaders of the community and through an acclamation or bay-a of the general public. The Sunnis base their identification with the Sunna, which are the precedents set by Muhammad, and their respect for the "Golden Age" of Islam under the first four caliphs (successors of Muhammad).[142]

The dispute initially occurred in 661 when Ali's first son, Hasan, gave up his claim to the caliphate to Mu'awiya, the governor of Damascus. Mu'awiya created the Umayyad dynasty, and his son, Yazid, assumed the caliphate. Ali's son, Husain, challenged Yazid's claim, and the subsequent clashes resulted in the massacre of Husain

---

[140]Ibid., 61.

[141]Ibid.

[142]The differing views of the caliphate between the Sunnis and the Shi'as came from a discussion with Dr. Mahmud A. Faksh on 22 February 1997. The discussion of the Sunna and "Golden Age" came from Bill and Sprinborg, 54.

and many of his followers. From that point, the supporters of Ali's line of succession

became a religious sect, called Shi'a. What began as a dispute concerning the succession

of the caliphate, expanded to include disputes over ritual, legal and theological matters.

The division gradually took on ethnic and geographical qualities. Most Shi'as reside in

Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, the Eastern Province of Saudi

Arabia, as well as large communities in Lebanon, North Yemen, and Syria.[143]

With the domination of the Umayyads, the Shi'a went underground and remained

in a secretive, but active status. It not only provided a means of political dissent, it

continued the local beliefs and practices that were contrary to the Sunni ways. Many

non-Arabs of Iraq, Syria, and Persia were followers of this secretive sect, which was like

a popular cult.[144] There are four sub-sects within Shi'ism. They are the Isma'ils

(Seveners), the Nusairis (Alawis), the Imam Shi'ites (Twelvers), and the Zaidis. For

purposes of this study, I will focus on the Alawis, who live today in northern Syria, and in

areas of Lebanon and Turkey. Alawis are rural, and their practices are steeped in secrecy

and an esoteric interpretation of the Quran.[145] In fact, some Sunni and Shi'a do not even

accept Alawis as Muslims because of Alawi beliefs and rituals stemming from their

esoteric interpretation.[146]

---

[143]The historical discussion on the roots of the split are from Peretz, 33, and the discussion on the expanding nature of the division is from, Bill and Springborg, 54-55.

[144]Bates and Rassam, 60-62.

[145]Ibid., 67-68. Dr. Faksh clarified the four sub-sects and areas in which Alawis live. Peretz, 33 clarified the name of the Twelvers.

[146]Eickelman, 275.

135

The rise of the Alawis in the regime, which I explain later, only exacerbates this source of friction. As mentioned earlier, the Sunni majority regard Alawis as non-Muslim. Ahmad ibm Taymiya (1268-1328), a highly influential Sunni writer, claims "...that the Nusayris are more infidel than Jews or Christians, even more infidel than many polytheists.... They are always the worst enemies of the Muslims."[147] Perhaps this disdain is a result of the secretive nature of the Alawi sect. Their religious books are kept hidden, and only a select few are allowed to read them. They practice religious dissimulation (taqiya) which allows them to hide their true intent and beliefs.[148] Additionally, governments historically have had trouble subduing the Alawis. It was not until 1850 that the Alawis came under Ottoman control. This control led to Sunni economic inroads and to an Alawi underclass. The Alawis, poorly educated, lacking political and military strength, frequently worked on the Sunni farms. Alawis even sold their own daughters.[149] Reverend Samuel Lyde in 1860 wrote that "the state of (Alawi) society is a perfect hell on earth."[150]

This description of the roots of the Sunni - Alawi division in Syria partially explains the strong identities of the members of each group based on differences in religion and kinship. Regional and class divisions further reinforced this ethnic division. As the next sections will show, the artificial creation of the Syrian state and its political

---

[147]Daniel Pipes, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria," Middle Eastern Studies, 25, no. 4 (October 1989): 434.

[148]Ibid., 431, 433.

[149]Ibid., 435-437.

development only helped to cement these identities. Let us now turn to the history of the creation of Syria.

Background to the Creation of the Modern State

According to James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, "The more artificial the country, the more difficult are the challenges of nation- and state-building."[151] The British and French created states in the region of the Middle East known as the Fertile Crescent, based on British and French divide-and-rule desires. Consequently, national sentiment and identities of the people did not coincide with state boundaries. To the peoples of the Middle East, the idea of a nation was synonymous with their ethnic groups. The new state boundaries imposed by the French and British did not accommodate the Middle Eastern view of a nation, and, therefore, state boundaries and ethnic groups were not coterminous.[152]

According to Daniel Pipes, "Not only does Syria have no history as a state, but its residents historically did not consider themselves as a Syrian nation." The geography of the area contributed to this sentiment. It is an area that has experienced many conquering armies. Its mountainous terrain serves to isolate its residents and offers a refuge for the

---

[150]Ibid., 437

[151]Springborg and Bill, 39

[152]Ibid.

137

oppressed. Additionally, its religious holiness makes it an area of pilgrimmage. All these factors contribute to the region's great ethnic diversity[153]

This great diversity has made a tremendous impact on public life in Syria. Historically, each community has enjoyed strong internal bonds and has lived separately from other communities. Communities only cooperated based on specific commercial or political interests, but, in general, communities did not cooperate. They did not share any sense of common identity as Syrians. People living in Syria "directed their first loyalties to the family; then came other genealogical relations, as well as religious, ethnic, regional, linguistic, ecological, and class ties."[154]

The idea of nationalism in Syria came in the 19th century from Europe with the Middle East Christians who viewed nationalism as a tool to increase their power.[155] From 1516 to 1918, Syria was a small region within the Ottoman Empire. The rulers of the Empire divided Syria into several administrative districts. After 1864, these districts became three vilayets, known as Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut; the Jerusalem province; and the mutasarrifiya of Mount Lebanon. Except for the Maronites around Mount Lebanon, these regions were not significant in any way besides their administrative

---

[153]Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16.

[154]The discussion of the diversity of communities and the quotation is from Pipes, Greater Syria, 18.

[155]Ibid., 21.

138

function; they held little political significance, and people, as well as communications and goods, moved freely throughout the region.[156]

After World War I, the British controlled most of the region, the French occupied the Mediterranean coast, and Amir Faisal's Arab army controlled the interior, namely Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. France justified its claims to all of northern Syria by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, while Amir Faisal justified his claim of the area on the basis of the Husein-McMahon correspondence.[157] Faisal and France were on a collision course.[158]

The French have a record of discouraging democracy in the Middle East. They deposed King Faisal, who was popular with his people, and replaced him with a puppet government in 1920. In 1925, the French put down a revolt against their installed

---

[156]Ibid., 16.

[157]The Sykes-Picot Agreement stemmed from a series of notes exchanged among the governments of Britain, France, and Russia from 1915-1916. These notes explained the future status of the Ottoman Arab lands. France was promised the Syrian coast north of the city of Tyre, the Ottoman province of Adana, a majority of Cilicia. Additionally France would create an independent Arab zone under French protection, which included Syria and northern Iraq, as well as the Mosul's oil fields. The Husein-McMahon Agreement stemmed from a series of exchanged letters between Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner for Egypt and the sherif. The Agreement formed a military alliance based on a vague political understanding. The Allies wanted to prevent a delay in the Arab uprising against the Ottomans, so the details of the Agreement were to be finalized at a later date. Great Britain agreed to Arab independence in the regions from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, eastward to Iran and the Persian Gulf. Great Britain retained supremacy in Aden. The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the regions in Syria west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo were excluded from the agreement because the British believed that these areas were not purely Arabic, a claim the sherif disputed. This information about the Sykes-Picot Agreement is from Peretz, 98 and the information about the Husein-McMahon Agreement is from Peretz, 139.

[158]Ibid., 397-398.

government. Additionally, they exacerbated the ethnic tensions by employing divide and

rule tactics as a means of discouraging any nationalist sentiment.[159]

France employed this tactic of divide and rule during its almost two decades of

control under the French mandate. The French carved up Syria into five regions: The

Territory of the Alawites, the independent government of the Jabal Druze, the State of

Aleppo, the State of Damascus, and the State of Greater Lebanon. In 1925, Damascus

and Aleppo united to form the State of Syria, and the Alawite and Druze states were

consolidated in 1937 and again in 1942. The seeds of separatism, which were sowed and

nurtured could not quickly dissolve. Opposition arose even after the French treaty,

though never ratified, offered an attempt to reintegrate Syria along nationalist demands.

Brigadier Longrigg, who studied this period observes:

> The failure to make good the 1936 decision in favor of unity in Syria was due to the
> strength of local autonomist feeling which during sixteen years, an unhappy policy of
> planned fragmentation had allowed - or encouraged - to build up: to the resulting
> lack of confidence between these minorities and the main body of Syrian opinion: to
> the provocation on the spot by French officials with convinced localist preferences:
> and to the absence of firm French backing, at all levels, for the policy which their
> own new decisions and statutes implied. To these causes of failure must be added a
> lack of tact in the Syrian officials directly concerned.[160]

Hudson suggests that there is less tension among the different communities, at least as far

as the mid-1970s, but he came to this conclusion before Asad's big crack-down on his

opposition in the late 1970s and his brutal attack on his own country's village of Hama.[161]

---

[159]Springborg and Bill, 230.

[160]Hudson, 255.

[161]Ibid., 255-256.

The point here is that Syria's political history is a story of political division.

Post - World War II and Independence

Both Great Britain and France's admission to the United Nations signaled their recognition of the end of the mandate. Both countries evacuated Syria on April 17, 1946, which established Syrian self-government.[162] Syria had free elections in 1943, and Shukri al-Kuwatli, from the Nationalist Bloc Party, was the first Syrian President. However, the whole political structure collapsed by 1949. There were many factors contributing to this collapse, including defeat in the Palestinian War, rising dissension among the leaders, rising cost of living, and general dissatisfaction. This situation set the stage for an army coup and military domination in politics for the next five years.[163]

Hudson explains that Syrian politics was family politics, including the early nationalists who struggled against French rule. The early nationalists after World War II included the Jabiris, Kikhias, and Qudsis of Aleppo; the Azms, Barazis, and Kaylanis of Hama; the Atasis of Homs; the Asalis, Haffars, Mardams, and Quwatlis of Damascus. These leaders' failure to establish a stable regime after the French withdrawal stemmed from their narrow support base. They were unable to build national constituencies or even among themselves, even with the increasing threat to their position as a ruling class. The significance of kinship to politics proved detrimental to opposition groups, as well. Hudson suggests that the limited success of some of these groups in the 1940s and early

---

[162]Philip K. Hitti, <u>Syria: A Short History</u> (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1959), 249-250.

[163]Peretz, 406-407.

141

1950s was perhaps due to their ability to exploit kinship, ethnic, sectarian and regional identities, rather than overcome them.[164] This approach is in contrast to the constitutional compact in 1943 among ethnic groups in Lebanon, as mentioned earlier.

Horowitz explains that post-war Syrian politics did not originally center on ethnicity. However, he claims that

> Gradually, ethnic affiliation became the servant of ideological, organizational, and personal rivalries. Once deployed in these struggles, however, ethnicity itself became the struggle....Once politics had become both military and ethnic, the ethnic group most favorably placed in the armed forces found itself able to defeat all other contenders. In the process, the ethnic 'complexion of the officer corps' and of the regime was transformed.[165]

The Rise of the Alawis: The Military and the Party

I will examine the rise of the Alawis by demonstrating how this ethnic group used its power in the military, the Ba'th Party, and later the Presidency to establish its political hold in the Syrian regime, by exclusively becoming the regime's sole political elite. Please refer to table 2 at the end of this chapter, which demonstrates the extent of Alawi dominance in key political positions, thus revealing the ethnic nature of the political elite. Some scholars believe that the Alawis are politically powerful primarily due to their dominance in the military.[166] It is important to note, however, that there are competing views on the nature of Syrian politics. The first school of thought is that violence and instability of Syria is

---

[164]Hudson, 253-254.

[165]Horowitz, 492.

[166]Bates and Rassam, 67-68.

142

...the product of a unique cultural environment, in which 'primordial loyalties' and tribal ethics predominate. It portrays the Baathist regime as little more than an Alawi cabal, which holds power by virtue of religious solidarity and command of the military. [The other school of thought claims that Syrian politics is a result of]...struggles to establish or resist state authority, and to consolidate or attenuate the power of ruling elites.[167]

The latter is common to most Third World states.[168] However, as this section will show, for Syria, one can only understand its political development in an ethnic context.

How did such a minority catapult itself to power, even though the majority of the population views it with such disdain? To understand the Alawi rise in power, we must examine the institutions of the Ba'th Party and the military, because the Alawi rise to power occurred through these institutions. The Ba'th Party's secular, socialist ideology attracted minorities from the rural area, for both political and economic reasons. Politically, the Party's secular ideology posed a threat to the Sunni-dominated political system. Economically, the socialist ideology was appealing to the poverty-stricken rural areas, as opposed to the more affluent urban areas.[169] Alawis constituted the core of the Ba'th Secret Military Committee in 1959. This committee attracted disaffected officers who played a key role in the March 1963 military coup. Membership of the Party allowed the Alawis to act as Ba'thists, rather than Alawis. These military officers further advanced Alawis in the military by regulating admission to the military academy,

---

[167]A review by Yahya Sadowski on Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant by Richard A. Hinnebusch in Middle East Journal, 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 341.

[168]Ibid.

[169]Mahmud Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A Dominant Political Force," Middle Eastern Studies, 20, no. 2 (April 1984): 140-141.

143

shuffling command posts, and gaining control of key military units such as the air squadrons, missile detachments, armored brigades, intelligence and counterintelligence units.[170]

Let us take a further look into the Ba'th (Resurection) Party. It emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a response to the divisive political forces of that time. Specifically, it presented a challenge to the dominating ruling urban families and their followers. A new emerging educated class, who came from the less-powerful classes in society and from communities, other than the Sunni community, found the Party attractive and meaningful. These followers, as mentioned earlier, primarily came from the Alawis, Druze, and Christians.[171]

> Its origins lay in intellectual debates about the identity of the Syrians, and their relations with other Arabic speaking communities: a debate which was more urgent in Syria than elsewhere, because the frontiers drawn by Britain and France in their own interests corresponded less than in most Middle Eastern countries to natural and historical divisions.[172]

The Ba'th Party offered new governments a means to assert an ideological umbrella in the midst of competing loyalties and identities. Both Syria and Iraq saw Ba'thist ideology as a means to legitimate themselves by elevating the ideals of Arab nationalism and unity above all other competing group sentiments. The concept of al-qawmiyyat al-Arabiyya, which refers to loyalty to the Arab nation, was ideally, in

---

[170]Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance," The Middle East Journal, 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 343.

[171]Hourani, 404.

[172]Ibid. 404.

144

Ba'thism, supreme over watanivva, which refers to loyalty to a particular state. Ba'thist terminology for Arab states is aqtar or iqlim, which refer to regions, not states. The term nation refers to the Arab world as a whole, but this terminology now has little meaning in practice. Since the mid-to-late 1970s, the leaders of both Iraq and Syria have increasingly emphasized their particular state, rather than the Arab nation.[173] Syrian leaders have emphasized "Greater Syria, a historical-geographical unit centered on today's Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. In short wataniyya is displacing qawmiyya in Ba'thist ideology."[174] The significance of the Ba'th Party, however, is that it provided a vehicle for mobilizing the minorities against the ruling Sunnis, who monopolized political, as well as economic power. As I will discuss in the next section, the Party continues to help mobilize the public, based on Asad's agenda. Whether or not it will continue to serve Asad and the Alawis' needs is an interesting consideration and beyond the scope of this paper.

The Alawis rose to power as political elites in three stages. The first stage occurred during the French mandate from 1920 to 1946. As previously mentioned, the French used divide and rule methods to ensure their control. Consequently, the French recruited minorities for the military as a way of keeping the nationalist forces in check. Sunnis did not cooperate with the French and refused to enlist. Additionally, the Alawis gained legal autonomy in their region. The second stage occurred during Sunni dominance from 1946 to 1963. While the Sunnis did not want a strong military involved

---

[173]Springborg and Bill, 39-40.

145

with domestic affairs, the Alawis gained a foothold in the military and party through the Ba'th Secret Military Committee described above. Also, minorities could not afford the fee required for military exemption, although for them, military life did offer a great deal in terms of social advancement. Military life, in general, appealed more to those in the rural area than in the urban centers.[175] The combined effect of all these factors was that Sunnis entered the military as individuals, whereas Alawis entered as a sect.[176]

The history of Syrian politics is a story of ethnic strife. The political development of Syria is marked by the ability of some minorities to displace the Sunni civilian elite, until finally the Alawis became the dominant ruling political elite. In the 1940s and 1950s, Syria had a parliamentary regime, with the Sunnis dominating. The major parties were the National Party, which represented primarily Damascus, and the People's Party based in the North in the vicinity of Aleppo and Homs. There were 18 coups from 1949 to 1970. The leaders of the first coup were Kurds, and the leader was Husni Za'im. Some Druze officers assassinated Za'im in August of 1949, and they established a civilian regime dominated by the People's Party. This regime was overthrown in December of that same year by Kurdish officers led by Adib Shishakli. He instituted civilian rule for two years, before he retook his power and became an autocrat. A Druze officer overthrew Shishakli in 1954.[177]

---

[174]Ibid., 40.

[175]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 242-243.

[176]Pipes, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria," 437-441.

[177]Horowitz, 492-493.

146

The coup of 1954 set a precedent for Syrian politics. First, the military and politicians learned to plot the overthrow and the establishment of regimes. Second, the Kurds were eliminated from the officer corps. Akram Hourani became the leader of the Arab Socialist Party and later the Ba'th Party. The military plotted with the Ba'th Party, until it finally took over the Party. As I mentioned earlier, the Ba'th Party attracted Druze and Alawi, but not the Sunni. The Sunni were more attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Nassar. The Ba'th's supporters came from officers and students. Theoretically, the Ba'th favored the Arab union with Egypt.[178] "But experience of partnership with Nasser, beginning in 1958, and the special reservations Druze and Alawis had about smothering Syria in a Sunni Egyptian embrace soon led these officers to conspire against the union."[179]

Finally, in 1963 the Ba'th Party became the dominating force in the regime. The Ba'th Military Committee eliminated all competing factions, until it consisted of "minority among minorities, the Ba'th officers became masters of Syria."[180] The Committee continued purges of Sunni officers:

> To fill their vacancies, the Military Committee recalled to active service all Ba'thist reserve officers and all officers with whom it was connected by family, clan, or sectarian relations. This brought an influx of Alawi, Druze, and Isma'ili officers, since both traditional army recruitment and Ba'th party membership drew largely on rural areas where these minorities live. The committee's enemies inevitably accused

---

[178]Ibid., 493-494.

[179]Ibid., 494.

[180]Horowitz cites Petran in Ibid.

147

it of sectarian discrimination in promotions and transfers, and in the acceptance of students in the Military Academy and of officers and NCOs in the party.[181]

The Sunnis also lost positions in the civil service, and they were replaced by Alawis. The Sunnis reacted, at times, violently. They looked down on the Alawis' backward ways, and they sided with Nassar, who did not consider Alawis and Druze as Arabs. In 1966, two leading generals, Salah Jadid and Hafez Asad, maneuvered to win over their enemies' supporters. This alliance soon experienced its cracks between Druze and Alawis, and under the leadership of both Asad and Jadid, the Alawis dominated. Asad assumed control over the army, whereas Jadid was leader of the party. Finally, in 1970, Asad emerged as the sole leader.[182]

Asad's emergence as leader marked the height of the third stage of the Alawi rise to power. The Alawis consolidated their power during the Ba'th coup d'etat of March 1963, the February 1966 coup, and Asad's coup in November 1970.[183] Asad's rise to power and take-over in 1970 "...culminated the Alawi rise to power in Syria."[184] But to understand Syria since Asad's rise to power, it is necessary to understand Asad. He is the consummate political animal who turns seemingly bad situations to his advantage. His intense desire to survive gives him an acute political instinct. He knows how to get

---

[181]Horowitz cites Petran in Ibid., 494-495.

[182]Ibid., 495-496.

[183]Pipes, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria," 443-446.

[184]Ibid., 446.

148

people of varied backgrounds to work together, as well as playing different factions off one another. The Syrian regime reflects Asad's very personal leadership style.[185]

Hafiz al-Asad: An Alawi Monopoly of the Presidency, Military, and Party

Asad, unlike his predecessor Salah Jadid, has never shared power. Once he assumed power, he realized full authority. He was briefly the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, before he formed his new presidential system in 1971. The 1973 Permanent Constitution authorized sweeping powers for the presidency to include legislative and military authority, as well as executive powers. Asad exercises his unlimited control of the country through the presidency, cabinet, the bureaucracy, the military, and the Council of People. He is also the leader of the Ba'th Party, as well as of the National Progressive Front, which is a coalition of the Ba'th Party and three left-wing and national parties or groups. He uses his advisors as another channel of influence. These advisors help wield power through the political, military, security, and bureaucratic systems. An unofficial group, the Jama'a (Company), is a critical tool for Asad's power. The Jama'a helps to safeguard the regime against enemies by meeting domestic and foreign policy challenges. Members of the Jama'a are loyal to Asad, although there have been rifts among members, such as between Rif'at Asad (Asad's younger brother) and Mustafa Tlas, the Defense Minister. The Jama'a consists of elite units designed to protect the heart of the regime, such as the presidential palace, airports, radio and television stations, etc. The high profile units are the Defence Companies and

---

[185]Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle For The Middle East (Berkeley: University of California

Special Forces stationed near Damascus. Asad's brother commands one of these units.[186]

As commander of the army, Asad has selected his primary officers for key positions. The criteria for selection are personal, Alawi, and Ba'ath friends of Asad and relatives. While there are some Sunnis filling key positions, their loyalty is unquestionably to Asad. Syria's minority-rule is clear when we consider the fact that the proportion of Alawis in these key positions greatly exceeds the proportion of the Alawi population.[187]

Asad rules with two guiding concepts. First, he does not allow challenges to his rule. Second, he seeks a popular consensus for his policies, that is he does not want an apathetic public.[188] When he first assumed control, he set out to broaden support for his regime. He held parliamentary and presidential elections, granted permits to parties to work with the Ba'th Party, and instituted economic liberalization.[189] Asad's economic policies reflect his political maneuverings in an attempt to placate competing groups. Initially, the policy of economic liberalization benefited high ranking officers in the Ba'th Party and military, as well as the Damascene import-export merchants by consolidating political power and stimulating the commercial and industrial economic sectors. This economic relaxation also benefited independent farmers who took advantage of cash

---

Press, 1988), 172, 178.

[186]Ma'oz, 27-28.

[187]Ibid., 28.

[188]Seale, 172.

[189]Yosef Olmert, "Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in Syria: The Assad Regime," Middle East Review, 20, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 19.

150

crops. A new class of "nouveaux riches" farmers emerged, creating a schism with the old

landowning elite, who in turn supported dissident urban forces fighting the regime.[190]

Moreover, this economic liberalization hurt the public sector. The regime

dismantled state farms, leaving the peasant's federation and other state affiliated

associations vulnerable to market forces. This move alienated the peasants from the

regime and reduced the regime's influence in rural areas. Aware of these problems, Asad

introduced a bonus system for public employees, pay raises, and increased autonomy at

the local level. Taxes imposed on private enterprises paid for these changes.

Additionally, Asad called a series of emergency congresses of workers, students and

peasants. Each group created a paramilitary brigade to defend the regime. These

brigades were only part of the military and security build-up against the Islamic

fundamentalists.[191]

Asad continues to manipulate and take advantage of the power position of the

economic classes as a tool towards consolidating and securing his own power. Asad's

regime is a "presidential monarchy presiding over three main institutions of rule - the

Syrian Army, the Ba'th Party and the state bureaucracy."[192] Lawson claims that societal

shifts were just a lucky phenomenon for the Asad regime, but I contend that Asad's

---

[190]Fred H. Lawson, "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade," Journal of South Asian and Middle Studies 14, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 1-6.

[191]Ibid., 5-7.

[192]Ibid., 20.

ability to use those shifts to his political advantage characterize his regime.[193] Political

cunning, not luck, marks the Asad regime. When he is not using his praetorian guard to

impose his will, he does try to gain a consensus, that is build his legitimacy, namely in

the eyes of the Sunnis.

Asad not only handles class divisions, but he is acutely aware of the perception of

Alawi power domination. Asad has tried to mask Alawi dominance in several ways. His

statements stress the importance of the nation and the importance of its people. He tried

to establish institutions to increase participation. In 1973 and 1977, the people elected

their first National Council (parliament). He has down-played the role of the Ba'th Party,

although it is a major tool for mobilizing support. He has tried to establish ties with the

middle class and has given special attention with improving the quality of life of the

lower classes. Additionally, he has tried to appease the Sunnis by, for example, changing

the secular format for the oath of office to a religious one. He also has stressed Arabism

and Syrian patriotism as the bases for a common identity among Syrians.[194]

Additionally, he responded to protests in 1973 concerning the constitution's

omission regarding the requirement for a Muslim president. Asad corrected this

omission, only to be confronted with the question of whether an Alawi was a Muslim.

He answered this question by appealing to a prominent Shi'i cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr,

who declared that the Alawis were Muslims.[195] He did have non-Alawi high officials in

---

[193]Ibid., 2.

[194]Ma'oz, 29-30.

[195]Seale, 173.

152

his regime. His first three prime ministers were Sunni, but the clannish character of

those in power was evident.[196] Hanna Batatu describes this clannish nature, especially

conspicuous during the military build-up from 1979-1983:

> ...that the ruling element consists at its core of a close kinship group which draws
> strength simultaneously, but in decreasing intensity, from a tribe, a sect-class, and an
> ecologic-cultural division of the people.[197]

This build-up was a response to internal (Muslim Brotherhood) and external

(Lebanon and Camp David Accords) reasons. Perhaps it also reflected the domination of

Alawis in the ruling coalition.[198] During that time, the military and security forces

mushroomed. From 1979-1983, Syria was the leading weapons importer of the Third

World. The number of soldiers in the regular army increased from 200,000 in 1979 to

300,000 in 1984. The reserves increased from 100,000 to 270,000 in that same time

period.[199] Rifaat al-Asad, Asad's brother, commanded the 50,000-man Defense

Companies. These units possessed the finest equipment, their own intelligence services,

their own uniforms, better pay than the other services, and engaged in smuggling

operations. They took part in the bloody destruction of Hama in 1982. These forces, led

by Rifaat, were feared and hated by Alawis and non-Alawis alike.[200]

---

[196]Seale, 182 and Batatu, 331.

[197]Batatu, 331.

[198]Lawson, "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade," 6-8.

[199]Ibid., 8.

[200]Alasdair Drysdale, "The Succession Question in Syria," The Middle East Journal, 39, no. 2
(Spring 1985): 248.

The Alawi officers held several key military commands, notably the Chief of

Staff for the Air Force, the command of three armored divisions, and command of the

Special Units.[201] During Asad's illness, much infighting arose among the high ranking

Alawi officers. Three factions developed: Rifaat al-Asad's Defense Companies and Jamil

al-Asad's Alawi Black shirt organization; Special units, Chiefs of Military Intelligence

and Air Force intelligence, the Third Armored Division, and the Presidential Guard; and

the Regular Army's Chief of Staff, Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense.[202] Asad

dealt with this infighting and jockeying for power in a number of ways.

First, Asad appointed each leader of the factions as a Vice-President. The duties

of the Vice President remained intentionally vague, leaving Asad some flexibility as to

the fate of these new appointees.[203] Asad removed the autonomy of the security force

and subordinated them to the Regular Army, demoted officers who used these forces for

their own political purposes, broke up the smuggling operations, and dissolved their

intelligence services.[204] Additionally, Rifaat and other threatening officers were sent to

Moscow and Geneva. Rifaat did not return with the others but stayed in exile for a

period of time before his eventual return. There is still much speculation as to the terms

---

[201]Lawson, "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade," 8.

[202]Ibid., 12.

[203]Drysdale, 249.

[204]Lawson, "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade," 12-13.

154

of his exile and its purpose.[205] In the end, Asad had to take the necessary steps to diffuse the infighting as well as the dangerous growth of the armed services.

Asad has managed to handle every challenge to his regime. Lawson sees the future as one of stability for the Asad regime, especially in light of the economic progress in the last few years. Fred H. Lawson claims that

> ...developments in the Syrian economy over the last several years generally reinforced the collective position of the social forces that constitute the al-Asad coalition, leaving them better able to resolve conflicts of interest among themselves and to fend off actual or potential challenges from their primary opponents.[206]

Raymond A. Hinnebusch optimistically views the future of Syria, with the possibility of democratization. He bases his argument on evidence of a growing civil society in Syria, spurred by a growing bourgeoisie. If Asad's successor nurtures and encourages these developments, then, according to Hinnebusch, democratization is possible. The question concerning succession, however, still remains.[207] Hinnebusch recognizes the criticality of the struggle for succession, as he claims that, "The test of civil society in the shorter term may come with the inevitable succession struggle."[208]

The question on Syria's future is interesting, but it, too, is beyond the scope of this paper. The future direction of Syria's domestic politics, however, I would argue will impact on its future foreign policy. I will show this link for the past in chapters five and

---

[205]Drysdale, 250-257.

[206]Fred H. Lawson, "Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in Contemporary Syria," Middle East Journal, 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 51.

[207]Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria, Middle East Journal, 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 256-257.

[208]Ibid., 256.

155

seven, which may serve as a springboard for future research on future cases. For this

study, we must focus on Asad's regime in light of the ethnic divisions in Syrian society.

Asad is a clever politician who is able to manipulate the situation to his

advantage.[209] "He used a combination of kin and sectarian solidarity, Leninist party

loyalty, and bureaucratic command to concentrate power in a presidential monarchy,

while a praetorian guard commanded by Alawi clansmen shielded him from

challenges."[210] He has spent a tremendous amount of resources on the military, which

employs one-fifth the labor force.[211] "In deploying Alawi asabiyya in its primitive power

accumulation, it stimulated primordial identities and de-legitimized itself in the eyes of

many Sunnis."[212] Additionally, "Overlapping communal and class cleavages sharply

bifurcated the regime and opposition, allowing for little compromise or civility between

them; opposition took violent forms while the regime was unrestrained by law in its

repression."[213]

Even with Asad's determined effort to diffuse ethnic divisions, they have not been

successful. Moshe Ma'oz claims that

> Indeed, it appears that the appointment of Sunni Muslim personalities to senior
> positions in the Syrian government does not alter the fact or the awareness of the
> majority of the population that Alawi army officers control the centres of power in
> the country. Similarly, the public gestures and tributes which have been made by

---

[209]See Seale, 169-184.

[210]Hinnebusch, "State and Civil Society in Syria," 246.

[211]Ibid.

[212]Both the idea about the military and the quote is from Ibid.

[213]Ibid.

156

Assad towards Muslim ulama and Islamic values have apparently failed to satisfy the misgivings in conservative circles lest Islam be divorced from the Syrian state and society.[214]

Asad cannot escape the fact that the people in Syria have ethnic loyalties that do not coincide with the state. His minority-rule regime exacerbates this situation and causes him, at times, to rely on his praetorian guard for stability.

Conclusion

There are a number of ways to approach the study of Syria. Yahya Sadowski mentions two approaches, explained earlier. I agree with those scholars who argue that Syria can only be understood in an ethnic context. I recognize other variables that serve to constrain its leaders, such as economic variables and regional instabilities, but Asad has been forced to address the ethnic divisions in his country (albeit there is much controversy on how he has addressed those issues). Also, I focused my discussion on Asad because he is the leader during each of my cases. So far, he has been able to meet challenges to his regime. In the following chapters, I will examine how he used foreign policy to address a critical domestic challenge - ethnic divisiveness.

My discussion of the people, the history of Syria's state formation, and its political development all point to the fact that Syria is an extremely divided country. Ethnic loyalties are strong, because group members share a common religion, kinship, and language. Additionally, these components of ethnicity are further strengthened or reinforced through region and class. The artificial creation of the state further

---

[214]Ma'oz, 31-32.

157

exacerbated ethnic divisiveness because state boundaries were made without considering the ethnic dimension of the people. Finally, and most importantly, Syria's political development occurred along ethnic lines, and the Alawis emerged as the wielders of political power by capturing the institutions of the military, Party, and Presidency; therefore, according to Horowitz, it is a state indicative of ethnic divisiveness. Consequently, ethnic loyalties supersede state loyalties.

The above description of Syrian political development does address the challenge of Islamic extremism. The danger of this challenge, is that unlike Egypt, it is conducted in the context of a country that does not have a sense of a strong national identity. Extremist groups pose a greater danger in this context because they can serve as a wedge to further divide members of a society who lack a strong national bond. If these groups incite the Sunni majority, then they will pose a great danger to Asad's Alawi-dominated regime. In this situation, extremist groups who manipulate ethnicity for political gain pose a great danger.[215] In Egypt, where ethnicity and nationality coincide, these groups are not afforded the ethnic dimension in their quest for power.

For the future, we must continue to evaluate Syria's political development, to include the effects of Islamic fundamentalism as well as other forces, on the loyalties of the people toward their ethnic group vice the state. This analysis will become extremely interesting after Asad and the ensuing succession struggle. For this paper, we have established, based on Horowitz's criteria, that Syria during the 1970s and 1980s, the time-

158

frame for my cases, was an ethnically divided state. In the following chapters, we will

examine how Egypt's ethnic homogeneity and Syria's ethnic divisiveness were variables

in their respective foreign policies, specifically in their choices in state alignment.

[215]For a discussion on political ethnicity see Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York: Columbia University, 1981), 4-5 and 248 and for political entrepreneurship and for ethnicity see pages 87-96. Also, see chapter 2 in which I discuss Rothschild's theory of ethnopolitics.

159

TABLE 2

PROVISIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF SYRIAN NOMENKLATURA[216]

Name	Functions	*Criteria 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Hafiz al-Asad	President								
Bashtar al-Asad	Officer in Presidential Guard	x	x	x	x	x		x	
Rif'at al-Asad	Vice President	x	x	x	x			x	x
Muhammad Nasif	Chief of Internal Security		x	x	x	x		x	
Ghazi Kan'an	Head of Intelligence Service in Lebanon		x	x	x	x		x	
Shaqif Fayyad	Division Commander		x	x	x				
'Adnan al-Asad	Brigade Commander	x	x	x	x			x	
'Ali Aslan	Division Commander			x	x	x		x	x
'Ali Duba	Chief of Army Intelligence Service				x	x		x	x
'Ali Haydar	Chief of Special Forces				x	x		x	x
Ibrahim Safi	Division Commander				x	x		x	x
Muhammad al-Khuli	Chief of Air Force				x		x	x	x
Jamil al-Asad	Vice President of al-Majlis al-Milli	x	x	x	x				
Hikmat al-Shihabi	Army Chief of Staff					x		x	x
'Adnan Makhluf	Chief of Presidential Guard		x		x			x	
Ibrahim al-Huwayji	Chief of Air Force Intelligence				x		x	x	
Muhammad Salman	Minister of Information			x	x				x
'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam	Vice President					x			x
Faruq al-Shar'	Foreign Minister					x			x
Mustafa Talas	Defense Minister							x	x
Husan Turkmani	Division Commander							x	x
Majid Sa'id	Chief of External Security					x		x	
Muhammad Ghubbash	Governor of Damascus				x				x
Mahmud al-Zu'bi	Prime Minister								x
[Muhammad] Zuhayr Mashariqah	Vice President								x
'Abdallah al-Ahmar	Secretary General of the Ba'th Party								x
Muhammad Harba	Interior Minister								x

[216]This table is taken from "Power and 'Alawi Cohesiveness," FBIS, NES-95-191-S, 3 October 1995, 15-17.

160

TABLE 2 Continued

*Criteria

1. Direct family ties with the President

2. Collateral family ties with the President

3. Membership in the President's tribe or confederation

4. Membership in the Alawi community

5. Regular and frequent access to the President

6. Membership in the Air Force

7. Membership in the Army

8. Membership in the central committee of the Ba'th Party

CHAPTER 4

COLD WAR CASE - EGYPT

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between ethnic

divisiveness and foreign policy. I will examine four indicators - elite attitudes, foreign

aid, trade, and treaties and agreements - in light of five issues - security, territory, status,

human resources, and nonhuman resources (see chapter one's table1). These indicators

will help us determine the significance of ethnic divisiveness to foreign policy decisions.

Specifically, I will look at alignment decisions and the effect of a loss of a state's

legitimacy based on ethnic divisiveness. This chapter will examine Egypt's realignment

with the United States in the late 1970s, while chapter five will examine Syria's decision

to sign a treaty with the Soviets in 1980. These Cold War era cases are interesting

because the Camp David Accords affected Syria's decision to reaffirm its relationship

with the Soviets. My focus will be the internal factor, ethnic homogeneity and ethnic

divisiveness, for Egypt and Syria's decisions, respectively.

The most challenging indicator is elite attitudes. I will use opinion polls of

students and noted intellectuals' opinions as indications of elite attitudes. While I will

focus on Sadat, I will expand my elite category to include prominent government

officials, intellectuals, students, and commentators. I do this for three reasons. First, we

162

may never know exactly what a leader is actually thinking or what is motivating him. Even memoirs or interviews may not reflect the true thoughts of the individual. By examining other key members of society, we may better understand the thoughts and motivations of its leaders. In Holsti and Sullivan's discussion of the socialization of political elites, they explain the significance of examining cultural factors: "They may... be viewed as background factors which have contributed to the political 'education' of present leaders, and which provide at least latent support for current foreign policies."[1] I will use this idea in my analysis of elite attitudes based on the attitudes of certain members of society from which these leaders came. Second, I extend the notion of elites to these elements of society because of the availability of that data. Finally, I use expert opinions and analyses to help understand the motivations and thoughts of leaders. The most valuable opinions are from those experts who worked with the leaders in some capacity. The sources for my data on elite attitudes include speeches, memoirs, student opinion polls, and noted experts' observations and analyses.

After a brief recounting of the case, I will discuss the realignment story based on the indicators noted earlier. By using this framework, I feel that we may better analyze these cases in terms of the linkage between the domestic and foreign policy realms. The tradeoff is that we might lose some meaning of the whole story if it is not told in total. By briefly recounting the story before fully discussing it using the framework, I believe that the tradeoff does not diminish our analysis. My conclusion will attempt to put

---

[1]Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan, "National-International Linkages: France and China as Nonconforming Alliance Members," in Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 151

163

everything back together, but analysis, at times, requires us to break the whole into its components, i.e. indicators and issues. We must remember, therefore, that the components are related, and only when we put them back together, do they tell the story. I will follow this organization for both my Cold War era and post-Cold War era cases. Finally, we will explore these cases for any differences or similarities which may shed light on the significance of ethnic divisiveness to alignment decisions in the Cold War versus post-Cold War contexts. Now, let us begin with Egypt's realignment decision during the Cold War time-frame.

Background to Egypt's Alignment Change

From 1955 to 1973, Egypt was the largest non-communist recipient of Soviet economic and military assistance. However, at the peak of its support from the Soviets, Egypt turned to the United States. According to Steven David, in order to understand the realignment, we must understand the following: Sadat's decision to maintain the Soviet alignment following his rise to power in 1970; his formalization of the alignment in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972, and the partial rapprochement with the Soviets in 1973. Additionally, we need to examine the reasons behind the 1973 war.[2]

At first, Nassar claimed that he had neither Eastern nor Western leanings. This would soon change when the West refused to sell Egypt arms unconditionally. Czechoslovakia agreed to sell arms, and it was the first time a Soviet bloc nation had

---

[2]Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 55.

164

made such an agreement with an Arab nation.[3] For Arab nations, this was viewed as a

move away from Western influence and the reminder of colonialism. With the Soviet

Union's lack of colonial past in the region and the United States' refusal to fund the

Aswan Dam, Nassar chose the Soviets as an ally. The Soviets, in turn, welcomed

Nassar's anti-West rhetoric and wanted influence in the region. Consequently, they

agreed to sell arms to Egypt in the Spring of 1955. This was the first major arms deal for

the Soviets with a Third World country. The Soviet-Egyptian alignment deepened to

include economic and political assistance. After Egypt's 1967 defeat, the alignment

further strengthened, and the Soviets supplied Egypt with more arms, while Egypt gave

the Soviets naval and air bases. Soviet pilots and air defense crews directly participated

in the fighting during the War of Attrition in 1969-1970 in a demonstration of Soviet

commitment, which was the first time Soviet forces participated in a Third World

conflict in substantial numbers. While there were still cracks in the alignment, for

example Nassar was angry that the Soviets would not supply offensive weapons needed

to win back the Sinai, it was overall mutual dependence that marked this relationship.[4]

The United States thought Sadat would not rule for long. Kissinger said that

Sadat "...was an interim figure who would not last more than a few weeks." (Later he

retracted that claim and called that earlier prediction as "among my wildest

misjudgments.") According to David, Sadat initially maintained alignment with the

Soviets because the American-Israeli alliance posed a great threat, and internally Sadat

---

[3] The Middle East, 8th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), 198.

[4] David, 56-57.

needed the support of his military. Also Egypt faced great economic hardship. Since the

mid-1960s, the growth rate averaged 4% annually. The 1967 War made this worse

because of the revenue lost from the Suez Canal, Sinai oil fields, and tourism. Saudi and

Kuwaiti grants could not fully compensate for this loss. Economic problems stimulated

student, intellectual, and journalist unrest. The Soviet alignment ensured that assistance

would continue.[5]

Internally, Sadat faced a challenge to his rule from Ali Sabri, the Vice President,

who led a group of Leftists in the Arab Socialist Union, the primary political party.

Sadat represented a moderate position, which Ali Sabri believed was too divergent from

Nassarist policies. Sadat responded by not only purging the government of the leftist

supporters of Ali Sabri, but also by successfully removing those members of the military

who were extreme Rightists.[6] Ironically, in the midst of the Ali Sabri affair, Sadat signed

the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets on May 27, 1971. The treaty

was perhaps perplexing, because Sadat was suspicious that the Soviets might have

supported the Sabri affair. He tended to view the Soviets as a threat.[7]

While the Americans had thoughts of approaching Sadat, Kissinger argued that

"no Arab leader, however moderate, could accede to Israel's demands and survive in the

climate of humiliation, radicalism, and Soviet influence of the period." For Sadat, the

---

[5]The quotations are found on Ibid., 57, and the reasons for Egypt's alignment are from Ibid., 58-59.

[6]Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Praeger: New York, 1988), 241, and David, 60-63.

[7]David, 63-64.

Soviets still provided the means to deal with the Israeli threat, as well as with the domestic economy. Still, it is not clear who initiated the Treaty. According to Sadat, it was a Soviet initiative. In any case, the treaty reflected a tenuous relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union.[8]

Expulsion of Soviets

In 1972, Sadat took a dramatic step by expelling the Soviets from his country. Between 15,000 and 20,000 technicians and instructors left, as well as Soviet pilots and two hundred aircraft. Additionally, the Soviets lost their exclusive use of six airfields. The Soviets' quick compliance with Sadat's demand reflected their lack of control and influence. Sadat felt certain that the Soviets would not resist his demand because they feared losing influence in other Third World countries, and if they were to invade, then they would face Egyptian resistance. Although earlier it had appeared that Sadat had depended on Soviet assistance, it was evident in 1972 that he retained a great deal of autonomy regarding his relations with the Soviets.[9]

Why did Sadat expel the Soviets? A prominent view is that he expelled them to actually further the alignment. He demonstrated his autonomy and signaled to the Soviets that they would have to meet his demand for offensive arms in order for the Soviets to remain in Egypt. Sadat did make a last effort to secure such weapons before announcing his decision. While this is an important factor, there were also domestic considerations. David suggests that Sadat was concerned to appease his own military,

---

[8]The quotation is from Ibid., 65 and the discussion on the treaty is from Ibid., 65-67

[9]Ibid., 76

167

which was primarily anti-Soviet.[10] Raymond A. Hinnebusch agrees that Sadat

recognized the importance of the military for his success. However, Sadat still managed

to reform the military and change its role of political player to professional fighting

force.[11] I will elaborate on this point when I discuss the October 1973 war. Additionally,

the role of the military in politics is debatable. Robert Springborg claims that "empirical

and theoretical reevaluation of the role of the Egyptian military in politics suggests that it

was less profound than previously thought." Sahrough Akhavi claims that "The notion of

praetorian solidarities binding a military elite together is simply not an accurate

description of the Egyptian political system."[12] My point is that while the military may

have been a key player which Sadat wanted to appease, it was not so politically powerful

as to prevent Sadat from purging elements of it from his political elite, as described in

chapter three, nor could it prevent Sadat from overseeing real military reform, which I

will explain in the next section.

Another domestic consideration for the expulsion was that it paved the way for

other sources of aid from Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Western investment. This economic

imperative will become evident as a key factor in Sadat's decisions in the following

sections of this chapter and in chapter six. Additionally, the decision was extremely

---

[10]Ibid., 76-78.

[11]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 125.

[12]Both quotations are taken from Robert Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," in Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 147.

168

popular with the Egyptian people.[13] "The elite and the masses rejoiced in the prospect of getting back at the Soviets, while hopes were raised that the years of international inaction had at last come to an end."[14]

Sadat's decision occurred without any evidence of a changed external environment. The Israeli threat did not change, the level of Soviet aid was constant, and the United States remained a staunch Israeli ally. While the expulsion brought temporary domestic support for Sadat, he still faced many domestic challenges. There were still dissatisfied members of the military, student protests, and a continued economic slump. The oil-rich Arab nations withheld assistance until Sadat showed more aggressive intentions towards Israel. Sadat did send Hafez Ismail to Washington to see if there was a possibility of American diplomatic support for Egypt's desire to peacefully remove Israel from the Sinai. Ismail left Washington convinced that the United States stood firmly behind Israel.[15]

The October War

Egypt turned to the Soviets, and this time the Soviets responded with offensive weapons. Why did Sadat decide to go to war? According to David, Sadat went to war because both the military and the Egyptian people were impatient with the continuing stalemate, and the oil-rich Arab states demanded Egyptian action against Israel before

---

[13]David, 76-78.

[14]David, p. 78.

[15]Ibid., 78-82.

169

they provided assistance to Egypt.[16] Sadat decided to use his military in a limited manner

to support his political aims, and he viewed the 1973 war as a means to gain political

leverage. According to Colonel T.N. Dupuy,

> the disruption of war was certain to force the superpowers to turn their attention back
> to the Middle East....In essence, then, Sadat's decision to go to war was a political
> gamble designed to end a political stalemate, since for Egypt and for Sadat any
> change was likely to be better than the stalemate.[17]

Sadat based his decision to go to war on limited aims by combining force and diplomacy

in the pursuit of political objectives.[18]

Another reason Sadat was able to launch this war was due to his ability to oversee

real military reforms that created an improved fighting force. The homogeneous nature

of Egyptian society contributed to these successful reforms. According to J.C. Hurewitz,

"A major reason why neither the Iraqi nor the Syrian officers contrived to work as a team

could be found in the heterogeneous societies of these two states, which contrasted with

the relatively homogeneous society of Egypt."[19] The army was not fragmented along

religious lines. The Copts were an integrated and contributing factor to the force and

---

[16]Ibid., 81 and 84.

[17]Colonel T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A. Ret., Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1984), 388.

[18]Ibid., 602.

[19]J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 152.

170

many filled key roles in positions of responsibility.[20] This point will greatly contrast with the composition of the Syrian forces, described in chapters three and five.

Sadat's generals understood the relationship between politics and the military. General Ismail, in particular, understood this relationship and realized that while complete victory over Israel was not achievable, political gains were. Ismail ensured skillful staff planning and recognized the importance of training, discipline, and indoctrination. According to Dupuy, "The professional competence of the Egyptian planning for Operation 'Badr'...could probably not have been excelled by any other army in the world." The soldiers were ready; they were highly motivated and well trained for this operation.[21] Major General Chaim Herzog observed that

> Many of the Israeli commanders noted a marked improvement in the standard of fighting of the Arab forces, and particularly of the Egyptian infantry....In all the battles in which the Israelis came up against the Egyptian forces in previously prepared positions fighting a set-piece battle, the Egyptian forces fought well....Because of the emphasis that had been placed on the intellectual ability of the officers and men, the Israeli forces faced an Egyptian Army better led at the tactical level than any they had known before. Added to this was a marked increase in the standard of discipline and outward smartness, which very naturally reflected itself also in the execution of orders on the battlefield.[22]

Also, Herzog claims that the Egyptians did well strategically and made great strides in their military intelligence.[23] Sadat trusted his military leaders with good military

---

[20]George W. Gawrych, "Jihad in the Twentieth Century," in Book of Readings: Modern Military History of the Middle East, ed. Combat Studies Institutes (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 5.

[21]The idea about the relationship between the military and politics is taken from Dupuy, 389-390; the quotation is taken from Dupuy, 393, and the description of the soldiers is from Dupuy, 394.

[22]Major General Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, October 1973: The Fateful Implications of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1975), 273.

[23]Ibid., 274-275.

171

intelligence, which was, and still is, not the case in Syria, as we will see. While David

argues, as mentioned earlier, that there was dissatisfaction within the military, it was not

critical enough to disrupt Sadat's ability to encourage real military reform without fear of

reprisals. Consequently, on the battlefield, his forces performed well.

During the course of the War, Sadat once again became disenchanted with the

Soviets. They evacuated their civilians from Egypt, which demonstrated their lack of

confidence in Egypt. They requested a cease-fire based on Asad's request, and not on

Sadat's. There was a delay in Soviet arms deliveries, and the United States

technologically outpaced Soviet support for Egypt with U.S. support for Israel.[24]

After initial success, Sadat faced the threat of the destruction of his Third Army.

The Soviets failed to ensure Israel's compliance with a cease fire, so Sadat turned to the

United States. The Americans had leverage over the Israelis and were able to save the

Third Army. The October War was a turning point for the Americans also. They

realized that their past policy of undisputed Israeli superiority as a deterrent for conflict

needed adjustment. Now they had to be receptive to Egyptian interests as well in order to

better deter conflict.[25] Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr., a senior diplomat who worked Middle

East issues remarked that, "Even I was skeptical of Sadat's sincerity. We didn't take him

seriously enough as an institution until the 1973 war."[26] Apparently, Sadat's decision to

---

[24]David, 84-86.

[25]Ibid., 86-91.

[26]Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 167.

172

go to war grabbed the attention of the superpower that could help him. His political

gamble paid off.

Meanwhile, according to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, relations between Egypt

and the Soviet Union deteriorated for three reasons. First, Egypt felt that the Soviets

were not providing enough arms as compared to what Israel was receiving from the

United States. Second, there was personal animosity between Sadat and the Soviet

leaders. Finally, the Soviets felt that they were not included in the Middle East issues.

Consequently, Sadat reached the following conclusions:

1. The United States the only power that could make Israel withdraw.
   According to Sadat, "that man [Kissinger] is the only person who can
   order that woman [Golda Meir] to get out - and be obeyed."[27]

2. The United States had to be convinced that Soviet influence in the
   region was insignificant.

3. The October War was the last war with Israel.

4. Egypt needed a Marshall Plan that could only be funded by the U.S.
   government and private investment, as well as money from Arab oil-
   producing states.

5. As a result, two new alliances would emerge: regionally, the Tehran-
   Riyadh-Cairo axis replaced Cairo-Damascus-PLO axis, and globally,
   the United States and Western Europe replaced the Soviet Union and
   the Third World.[28]

In March, 1976, Sadat abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with

the Soviets. He ended all Soviet naval privileges in Egyptian naval ports, repudiated his

$11 billion dollar debt to the Soviet Union, and publicly criticized Soviet influence in the

---

[27]Heikal, 725-726.

[28]Ibid., 726-727.

173

Third World. According to David, Sadat was able to do this because Western, especially

American aid, more than made up for the lost Soviet aid. Additionally, he received aid

from oil-rich Arab countries. By November 1977, Sadat surprised everyone with his visit

to Jerusalem, and a year later he signed the Camp David Accords. The formal peace

treaty occurred in 1979.[29]

It was Sadat's journey to Israel and the events leading up to the 1979 treaty that

seemed most risky for Sadat. Why did he choose such a risky move? According to

David, the United States saw the importance of economic assistance as the key for

Sadat's popular approval. Consequently, by the fall of 1985, the United States had

poured more economic assistance into Egypt than the Soviets had in its twenty years of

assistance to Egypt. In five years, the United States became Egypt's principal provider of

arms, trade, aid, and food.[30]

Let us now examine the motivations of Sadat's realignment decision focusing on

his historic Jerusalem visit, the Camp David Accords, and finally the treaty signed in

1979. Sadat himself understood the risks involved with this decision. In his speech to

the Israeli Knesset, he said,

> But to be absolutely frank with you, I took this decision after long thought, knowing
> that it constitutes a great risk, for God Almighty has made it my fate to assume
> responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian people, to share in the responsibility of the
> Arab nation, the main duty of which, dictated by responsibility, is to exploit all and
> every means in a bid to save my Egyptian Arab people and the pan-Arab nation from

---

[29]David, 91-95.

[30]Ibid., 95-96.

174

the horrors of new suffering and destructive wars, the dimensions of which are forseen only by God Himself.[31]

Why was Sadat able to make this decision? Did the homogeneous nature of the Egyptian people provide enough of a reservoir of legitimacy to enable Sadat to take risks?

According to Ali E. Hillal Dessouki,

> Sadat used to contrast Egypt's deep-seated unity with the sectarian, familial, and communal fragmentation of most Arab countries. According to Sadat, this unity allowed Egypt to pursue a purposeful foreign policy and to make hard decisions (e.g. peace with Israel) impossible for most Arab countries because of their domestic fragmentation.[32]

My task is to determine the truth of this statement.

Indicator: Elite Attitudes

Let us examine elite attitudes as defined earlier in light of the issue areas described in chapter one's table 1. We will attempt to understand the motivations for Sadat's decision to realign. For example, we will ask whether Sadat and other elites were concerned about internal versus external security, or perhaps both. Additionally, we will explore these attitudes in the contexts of the domestic, regional, and international levels. Heikal explains that "After 1973, Egypt's foreign policy appears to have been formulated largely on the basis of assumptions that the Egyptian decision-maker drew from his reading of certain variables he saw on the internal, regional and global fronts."[33] Our

---

[31]Anwar Sadat in a speech to the Israeli Knesset on Novemeber 20, 1977 in William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1986), 346.

[32]Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 160.

[33]Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 56, no 4 (July 1978): 724.

framework allows us to explore these different contexts. As noted earlier, I derived these data from speeches, memoirs, polls, FBIS, and other such documents. The key to this analysis on Egypt, our null set, will be its comparison to the analysis on Syria, which will follow. If my hypotheses are correct, then we will not see ethnicity as a factor driving foreign policy, although we will see other domestic factors having an influence on this particular case.

Issue: Security and Territory

I will combine the issues of security and territory because of their inter-relationship in this area of the world. The issue of security focuses on military aid, bases, weapons, military actions, boundaries etc.[34] Sadat explains that at the heart of the Middle East question is the Palestinian problem. He explains that his peace strategy recognizes the State of Israel, and that "A peace agreement should provide for the establishment of a Palestinian State on the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip, and Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967... [thereby] ending the state of war...."[35] He continues to state that, "We cannot have any bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people or over one inch of the Arab territories seized in 1967. Only thus can a permanent and just peace be achieved."[36]

---

[34]Holsti and Sullivan, 169.

[35]Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 297.

[36]Ibid., 298.

176

In an interview, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs of Egypt, echoed Sadat's view that the Palestinian issue was a key factor for peace. When asked if peace could exist without a resolution on the Palestinian issue, Boutros-Ghali replied, "No, absolutely not. There will be no peace in the Middle East without a solution to the Palestinian problem." He continued to claim that the agreement with Israel is not a bilateral agreement, but instead an all-inclusive agreement for the region. When asked about the possibility of war in the Middle East, Boutros-Ghali said, "I don't think war in the military sense is possible, but you can easily imagine other forms of tension, such as the use of the oil weapon by the Arab powers in an attempt to get certain concessions necessary for maintaining the peace process." Additionally, he added that "I think we can say that there'll never be a war between Egypt and Israel again."[37]

An editorial of the Al-Ahram newspaper, praised President Reagan for continuing the peace process as laid out in the Camp David Accords. The editorial claimed that Reagan's message of retaining the Camp David framework had three meanings. First, it was a sign that the United States realized the importance of peace and stability in the Middle East and its tie to world peace and security. Second, Reagan understood that the gains of the peace talks will continue without delay. Finally, the peace process was a result of the United States recognizing its vital interests in the region and commitment to peace.[38] The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasa 'Ali also indicated the importance of stability and security as reasons for Egyptian and American

---

[37]"Minister of State Ghali Interviewed in Paris," Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS) (16 October 1979): D2-D4.

177

cooperation. He claimed that the Egyptian military facilities used by the United States are a means for ensuring peace and stability in the region. Additionally, the facilities allowed the United States to build modern Egyptian forces so that Egypt may defend its territory and contribute to the region's security and stability.[39]

Globally, the United States seemed to be the only power who could deliver peace. According to Kissinger, "the Soviets can give you arms and this means war, but only the United States can give you back your occupied territories and this means peace."[40] Peace appears to have been a motivating factor for this agreement. Was peace pursued for the purpose of security or were there other reasons for peace? According to Marc R. Cooper, the Egyptians add the following to the phrase stated by Kissinger: "and the Soviets cannot give you economic development."[41] We will discuss the economic issue later.

Issue: Status

Holsti and Sullivan's meaning for this issue included diplomatic recognition, consular and diplomatic relations, status of representatives, etc.[42] The meaning referred to the international realm. I will extend the idea of status to the domestic and regional realms. In other words, did Sadat make decisions based on his desire to gain status internationally, regionally, and/or domestically? This domestic or internal status

---

[38]"Al-Ahram Praises Reagan Support of Camp David," FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): D1-D2.

[39]"Ali Denies Coordination With U.S., Israel," FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): D3.

[40]Heikal, 725.

[41]Marc N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 252.

[42]Holsti and Sullivan, 169.

178

incorporates our discussion on legitimacy based on national identity. Remember, however, we limited our discussion on legitimacy based on this link. Legitimacy, a key factor of this "domestic status," is a key ingredient for the regime, and when ethnic loyalties coincide with national loyalties, then that sense of a shared political community and values is a great commodity for the regime. Was this commodity responsible for Sadat "to pursue a purposeful foreign policy"? We will find that there are other domestic considerations, primarily the economy, that may also have an effect on Sadat's domestic or internal status.

As early as 1970-1971, Sadat felt that he had the support of the Egyptian people. He explains that the United States failed to recognize this point. He said that he "enjoyed the support of my entire people, and that I was capable of saying and doing things no other Arab leader had yet dared to do for the past twenty-two years."[43] Sadat recounts U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' surprise to Egypt's peace initiative in 1971. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's reply to the peace initiative echoed the prior Secretary's surprise when he said that he admired Sadat's courage: "He is a man who, for the first time in your part of the world...has taken steps never before attempted by any other Arab leader."[44] Sadat's reply to such surprise was, "You are dealing with a people more than 7,000 years old. Isn't it about time you know the Egyptian people?"[45]

---

[43]Sadat, 281.

[44]Ibid., 288.

[45]Ibid., 281

179

It was clear that Sadat did risk a great deal of status on the regional level with his steps towards realignment with the West, and in particular with Israel. President Jimmy Carter discussed Sadat's risks of alienation in the Arab world, as he recounts a meeting with the Shah of Iran:

> That same day I had my first meeting with the Shah of Iran. I urged him to support Sadat, which he did, but he warned me not to expect the Saudi Arabians to favor the visit. I did what I could to get foreign leaders to refrain from criticism until the results of Sadat's visit could be assessed. However, it became apparent that Sadat's announcement had made him very vulnerable. His greatest danger came from the accusation that he would seek only bilateral Israeli-Egyptian agreement - that Sadat would betray his Arab brothers and abandon the Palestinian cause merely to get back the Egyptian territory in the Sinai. Vituperative attacks on the Egyptian President continued to mount, in spite of repeated assurances from Egypt, Israel, and ourselves that a comprehensive peace was our goal.[46]

Carter's description of Sadat confirms Sadat's willingness to take risks: "It soon became apparent that he was charming and frank, and also a very strong and courageous leader who would not shrink from making difficult political decisions. He was extraordinarily inclined toward boldness and seemed impatient with those who were more timid or cautious."[47] Additionally, he felt that Sadat was unlike other Arab leaders.

> The more I dealt with Arab leaders, the more disparity I discovered between their private assurances and their public comments. They would privately put forward their ideas for peace and encourage us in any reasonable approach. However, the peer pressure among them was tremendous. None of them - apart from Sadat - was willing to get out in front and publicly admit a willingness to deal with Israel.[48]

---

[46]Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 296-297.

[47]Ibid., 282.

[48]Ibid., 286.

180

Why was Sadat different? Why did he feel that he could risk his status among many of

the Arab leaders?

I find this especially interesting in light of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal's view that

the Arab system greatly influences any Arab leader's decisions. He specifically believes

this is true for Egypt's leaders:

> Before making a decision, the decision-maker must assess how it will be received not
> only in his own country, where he is vested with official authority, but by the rest of
> the Arab world where he, like it or not, is expected to live up to a kind of moral
> authority that he automatically represents. Together with his ability to attune his
> decisions to the mood of the whole region, this moral authority is what gives any
> Arab ruler, especially in Egypt with its central role in the Arab system, stature and
> importance.[49]

Based on Heikal's view, then, we are left with the same question: why did Sadat risk his

status in the Arab region in order to realign with the West, and even more dramatically

seek peace with Israel?

Let us examine some of the elite attitudes towards the Arab world to better

resolve this question. According to Hinnebusch, "By the late seventies a radical

cosmopolitanism and an unprecedented anti-Arabism dominated elite circles. Egypt's

close foreign policy alliance with the US was one expression of the new mood."[50] Many

elites embraced the Western view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that it was a psychological

problem, and dismissed the Arab one, which viewed the struggle as a residue of Western

imperialism. They took pride in the West's approval of Egypt's peace initiatives, which

proved, as Sadat himself claimed, that unlike other Arabs, Egyptians were civilized.

---

[49]Heikal, 727.

[50]Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, 116.

181

Tawfiq al-Hakim, Egypt's foremost playwright, echoed this view, as he claimed that

Egypt and Israel were linked as civilized islands in a sea of barbarism. Sadat further

distinguished Egyptians from the rest of the Arab world through his efforts for

democracy, because Egyptians could claim that they did not share the instability and

repressive characteristics of the rest of the Arab world.[51] This point is debatable as

chapter three suggested, as well as the following sections, particularly those dealing with

the economy. However, it is important to note how the elites felt about their regime,

especially vis a vis other Arab regimes.

It appears that there was a strong sense of Egyptian nationalism that was separate

from the Arab world. Among elites, there was a strong anti-Arab sentiment. They

viewed the Arabs as the cause for Egypt's problems: Egypt had sacrificed both blood and

the economy fighting for them, but they had never shown any gratitude. "The signing of

the separate peace with Israel was, of course, the most decisive and concrete

manifestation of the low priority given by the elite to Egypt's role in the Arab world." Of

course, not everyone agreed with this view. Some elites did put primacy of Egypt's role

in the Arab world. This faction believed that "The break with the Arab states was viewed

as transitory since the other Arab leaders had no practical alternative to the course set by

Egypt and because, while Egypt could do without them, the Arab world could not do

without its heart."[52] Others saw normalization between Israel and Egypt as a means for

Zionists to pave the way for Israeli domination of Egypt, while the dean of the Egyptian

---

[51]Ibid., 116-117.

[52]The quotations and ideas are from Ibid., 117.

182

Lawyers Association stated that, "The Arab lawyers, with the Egyptian lawyers in the forefront, will maintain their solid stand in rejecting any cooperation under the occupation [occupation here refers to Israeli control of previously Arab held land to include Jerusalem]."[53] While not all elites favored Sadat's policy, it does appear that generally he did have a great deal of support.

Tables 3 and 4 support this view. The tables below reflect answers to a survey given to 145 students at the American University at Cairo between 1977 and 1978. They reflect elite perspectives because, in contrast to students at national universities, they come from the highest stratum of Egyptian society. They tend to reflect their parents' opinions and not some student subculture's opinions. As Raymond Hinnebusch explains that, "This method is not technically rigorous but in the absence of a research climate tolerant of opinion surveys, it was adopted as a plausible substitute." Additionally, students are probably more honest about their opinions than their parents. While scientific sampling was not possible, Hinnebusch concludes that the "...responses seem congruent enough with what is known about the group studied to be taken as suggestive indicators of attitudes."[54]

---

[53]The warning about Zionism comes from "Ash-Sha'B Fears Zionist Influence," FBIS (30 January 1980): D7 and the quotation is from "Lawyer Denounces Normalization," FBIS (30 January 1980): D8.

[54]The quotations and explanations of the survey data are found in an endnote in Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, 307.

183

TABLE 3

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES[55]

Question	Agree		Disagree		Mixed Feelings		No Opinion		N/A
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	N
1. Which best describes your view of Egypt's proper strategy toward Israel?									
a. Egypt should join the rejectionists and continue to struggle against Israel because she is an illegitimate intrusion by foreigners into the Arab world.	7.9	11							
b. Egypt should make peace with Israel only on condition that she returns all the occupied Arab territories, including the Golan Heights of Syria and permits creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan.	60.0	84							
c. Egypt should make peace with Israel if Israel returns all Egyptian territory, but it doesn't matter about Syrian or Palestinian lands.	29.3	41							
d. Egypt should make peace with Israel even if Israel won't return all Egyptian lands.	2.9	4							
e. NA		5							
2. President Sadat's visit to Israel was a good thing.	64.3	92	10.5	15	21.0	36	4.2	6	2
3. Egyptians and Israelis can live in peace if only they overcome the psychological barriers between them, since there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest or principle between them.	27.5	39	38.7	55	25.4	36	8.5	12	3
4. President Sadat should continue his negotiations strategy more with the other Arab states.	44.7	63	24.8	35	22.0	31	8.5	12	4
5. Egypt can do without the Arabs who have only caused trouble for her.	23.9	34	38.7	55	33.1	47	4.2	6	3
6. It was a mistake for President Sadat to fight with the Russians.	22.0	31	51.1	72	16.3	23	10.6	15	4

[55]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 232.

184

TABLE 3 Continued

Question	Agree		Disagree		Mixed Feelings		No Opinion		N/A
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	N
7. It is silly for Egypt to rely on the Americans, friends of Israel.	16.3	22	50.4	68	27.4	37	5.9	8	10
8. What position do you think Sadat should take toward the great powers?									
a. Strongly pro-USSR	0.7	1							
b. Non-aligned but leaning toward the USSR	2.9	4							
c. Absolute non-alignment and neutrality	42.1	59							
d. Non-aligned but leaning toward the USA	50.7	71							
e. Strongly pro-USA	3.6	5							
f. N/A		5							

185

TABLE 4

ETHNIC BACKGROUND AND FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES[56]

Ethnic Background	Trip to Jerusalem			Silly to Rely on U.S.		
	Agree(%)	Disagree (%)	N	Agree(%)	Disagree (%)	N
Egyptian Only	69.7	6.1	66	15.6	45.3	64
European Blood	60.0	6.7	15	7.1	50.0	14
Arab Blood	38.1	33.3	21	36.8	36.8	19
Turkish Blood	78.6	0.0	28	4.0	68.8	25

Note that % of mixed feelings and no opinion are omitted

---

[56]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 233.

186

Based on the above tables, it appears that generally, the responses supported

peace with Israel, as well as Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Even ethnic Arabs supported his

trip to Jerusalem, although their support was the lowest among the other groups.

Interestingly, there was great support for Sadat's policy on the international level, as most

respondents supported Egypt's break with the Soviet Union and his turn to the West.

International status for Sadat seems to have been an important influence on his decisions.

Even before the peace process, Sadat explained the importance of international status

behind his decision to expel the Soviets:

> I wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place - in its natural position as a friendly
> country, no more, no less. The Soviets had thought at one time that they had Egypt in
> their pocket, and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian.
> I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to
> tell the whole world that we are our own masters. Whoever wished to talk to us
> should come over and do it, rather than approach the Soviet Union.[57]

Generally, it appears that elites supported Sadat's policy of peace, although there

were some reservations to his dealings with the Arab world. Even this point, however,

did not attain totally overwhelming responses.[58] The opposition's criticisms of his trip to

Jerusalem paled in the face of mass enthusiasm. Sadat was welcomed home with

jubilation. All the state institutions, including the military, bureaucracy, and the media

praised Sadat's bold visit. Arab leaders who chastised him only served to increase Sadat's

status and increase the anti-war sentiment in Egypt. Al-Ahram answered Sadat's critics

by claiming that without Egypt, there was no Arab world. The October magazine called

---

[57]Shaheen Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign Policy (Wakefield: Longwood
Academic, 1992), 171.

[58]Please note that my observations do coincide with those from Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics
Under Sadat, 233 and 235.

187

Mu'ammar Kaddafy of Libya and Houari Boumedienne of Algeria "mice and monkeys

dwarfed by Sadat's presence."[59] Sadat was hailed as the "master of decision" even though

only a few months before there were riots over price increases.[60]

President Carter, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Sadat's observations

indicate widespread support for Sadat's realignment decision. Although we should be

wary of the possibility of staged events, their observations corroborate the evidence

presented earlier. President Carter describes his visit to Egypt:

> The remainder of our visit was delightful, designed to let the Egyptians and the rest of
> the world know the closeness between us, the ties between our nations, and the
> overwhelming support of the Egyptian people for the peace process. We particularly
> enjoyed a trip from Cairo to Alexandria, moving slowly through the beautiful farming
> regions of the Nile delta on a fine old train built in 1870. Our car was completely
> open on both sides, and we felt that we were right in the midst of the hundreds of
> thousands of people along the way. There were no apparent worries about security.
> In Alexandria we were welcomed by the largest and most enthusiastic crowds I have
> ever seen. As I told Sadat, describing my reception would be one time a politician
> would not have to exaggerate.[61]

Prime Minister Menachem Begin had a similar experience during his trip to Egypt. He

told Carter that:

> I had a wonderful visit to Cairo! The people of Egypt opened their hearts to me. In
> the morning, tens of thousands lined the streets on both sides, and cheered and
> waved, and took me to their hearts. I am very moved. I left my car for a while, to the
> disturbance of the Egyptian secret service, and went into the crowd, which was
> crying, 'We like you, we love you!' It was absolutely wonderful. Yesterday's
> reception was at the Qubba Palace. The evening was a 'thousand nights into one.'[62]

---

[59]Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles For Egypt's Political Soul (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990), 181-182.

[60]Ibid., 182.

[61]Carter, 418-419.

[62]Ibid., 428.

Sadat, himself, described the popular support at his homecoming after his trip to

Jerusalem. "On my return nearly 5 million Cairenes were out to welcome me, staging an

unprecedented demonstration of support."[63] Sadat seems to have had internal support for

his realignment decision based on a legitimacy derived from a strong national identity as

he claimed:

> that the Egyptian people differ from many other peoples, even within the Arab world. We have recovered our pride and self-confidence after the October 1973 battle, just as our armed forces did. We are no longer motivated by 'complexes' - whether defeatist 'inferiority' ones or those born out of suspicion and hate....With the fighting over, we harbored nothing but respect for one another [Israel and Egypt]. Our civilized people know this; it is what induced 5 million citizens to come out to greet me on my return, and the armed forces to salute me in an impressive and quite unprecedented manner.[64]

It does seem as if there was a reservoir of internal status, and in this case based on

a legitimacy linked to national identity, which enabled Sadat to take some risks regarding

his status on the regional level. Thomas Lippman supports this view as he claims that

> Sadat wanted to seize the moment. He was not crippled by the domestic weaknesses that hindered other Arab leaders - Egypt was not a precarious artificial state with an imposed monarchy, like Jordan, nor a pit of unrest run by a despised minority, like Syria - and he had reestablished Egypt's freedom of action by breaking with the Soviet Union and attacking Israel in 1973.[65]

Internationally, he was able to cut ties with the Soviets and lean towards the West,

because, again, he had support from home. I think we will find in the next section,

however, that the hope for prosperity was a driving force for such leanings.

---

[63]Sadat, 310.

[64]Ibid., 312.

[65]Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser: Sadat Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 9-10.

Issue: Human and Nonhuman Resources

According to Holsti and Sullivan, the issues of human and nonhuman resources include cultural activities, training, travel, education, etc. (human resources), as well as trade, foreign aid, transportation, and other nonmilitary goods (nonhuman resources).[66] I combined these two issues because the literature tends to discuss them together. We will determine whether or not elite attitudes reflect these issues as important for the realignment decision.

According to Thomas Lippman, Sadat went to Jerusalem because Egypt was economically desperate. The economy shaped Sadat's agenda, and he recognized that he inherited an economy that was 'below zero'. He viewed a peace with Israel, private enterprise, and an influx of Western capital and technology as instruments of an economic revival that he believed necessary for the dignity and stability of the regime. Some critics point out that Sadat's economic reforms did not bring prosperity to the masses, only to the few parasites. One must look at the dire conditions Sadat inherited. It was clear that Sadat and the government wanted a more even distribution of wealth. The "Planning for Economic Development" summary of the ministry's development plan for 1978-1982 states that:

> political wisdom and simple justice call for the alleviation of the burdens of the masses. They deserve respite, for they have given much when Egypt has required it of them, socially, politically and militarily. Political wisdom further recognizes the inherent danger in allowing the standard of living of the majority to deteriorate, when they can see around them luxurious consumption and special privileges. It is only human that they should feel discontent, fear and envy.

---

[66]Holsti and Sullivan, 169.

190

The summary reflects the awareness of the government to the political implications of the economic situation.[67]

Using foreign policy as a tool for economic gain was not a new phenomenon to Sadat. He learned this technique from Nasser. Both leaders realized that Egypt could not develop without external help. Economics was an influential variable for the decision to launch the October War. Sadat suggests the primacy of the economy in a speech he gave to his National Security Council on September 30, 1973:

> let me tell you that our economy has fallen below zero. We have commitments (to the banks, and so on) which we should but cannot meet by the end of the year. In three month's time, by, say, 1974, we shan't have enough money for bread in the pantry! I cannot ask the Arabs for a single dollar more; they say they have been paying us the aid in lieu of the lost [Suez] Canal revenue, although we didn't, or wouldn't fight.[68]

Marc N. Cooper also claims that the economy played a key role for Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem. According to Cooper, "Mid-1977 begins to look a great deal like mid-1973. The economy was under a severe strain and going nowhere. There was nothing left to be tried in the polity."[69] Additionally, the regime was faced with mounting criticism from within, strains in the military, an Israeli threat, and superpowers who were unwilling to break the deadlock. Consequently, for Sadat all this meant that, "It was back to the well of foreign affairs; one more effort to pull off the international miracle that will solve the domestic problems and ensure the legitimacy of the regime.

---

[67]The ideas and quotations are from Lippman, 90 and 91.

[68]R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 34-35.

[69]Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 250.

191

This is the key link between the domestic and foreign situations."[70] Cooper outlines a

three-legged strategy as the basis for Egypt's realignment. First, the moderates had to

show the radicals that their view of the solidarity of Israeli and American interests was

wrong. In other words, American and Egyptian interests can coincide and create a

stability to ensure that the material gains from the October War would not be sacrificed

in a future war. Second, Egypt wanted a non-hostile environment in which to receive

American and moderate Arab aid that would allow its economy to flourish. Finally, it

was clear that Arab dollars would not be enough for Egypt to acquire the essential

material, expertise, factories, and food; Egypt needed American aid.[71] While Cooper's

three-legged strategy includes both internal and external security factors, it seems that

they all hinged on the economy. The desperate situation culminated in the food riots. A

realist perspective would support this conclusion because by ensuring peace, the external

security issue was resolved. Once security is resolved, other issues may gain precedence.

Egypt could now look at resolving other issues, i.e., the economy. Cooper claims that the

following Egyptian phrase sums up the three-legged strategy: "the Soviets can give you

war, only the Americans can give you peace, and the Soviets cannot give you economic

development."[72]

R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider also claim that the economy

took on great significance for Sadat.

---

[70]Ibid., 251. Note that here, legitimacy refers to the economic effectiveness of the regime, not the national identity link with ethnicity as we defined for this project.

[71]Ibid., 252-253.

[72]The quotation is taken from Ibid., 252.

With the termination of the war and newfound wealth from the Arab oil-producing states, a new set of priorities emerged. Regaining the rest of the Sinai and the liberation of the other occupied territories were relegated to a secondary or tertiary objective, while an intense, new emphasis was placed on economic and social development....The realignment was necessary, however, if Egypt was to tap U.S. and European investment capital and secure unencumbered access to Western technology. Similarly, initiating the policy of infitah to the West, shortly after the end of the October War, had the advantage of sustaining the Egyptian people's hopes for economic improvement based on external resources. In this way Sadat's abrupt realignment with the United States and its allies was associated with the prospect of economic prosperity. A similar association was established between Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and the prospect of near-term economic abundance, as well as with the Camp David Accords.[73]

Egypt realized that although the Soviets could provide arms, they could not provide the capital or the technology to revive Egypt's dismal economy. Egypt realigned on the regional level as well in order to gain economic benefits. The Cairo-Riyadh-Tehran axis replaced the Cairo-Damascus-PLO axis that was in place since the October War. American aid to Egypt increased from $250 million in 1974-1975 to $750 million in 1975-1976, and exceeded $1 billion in 1976-1977. This aid represented more economic assistance than any country had received from the United States since the Marshall Plan.[74] The United States provided enough aid to offset the loss of $300 million to $400 millon in Arab economic commitments.[75]

Not everyone felt that Sadat was taking the correct steps economically by realigning with the United States. The journal Economic Aharam provided a forum for academic analysis of Egyptian economic policy. Galal Amin, a noted economist and

---

[73]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 35.

[74]Ibid., 51.

[75]Ibid., 52-53.

internationally renown, provided a critique of the Sadat era. While the popular view of

Sadat's assassination was a reflection of religious fanaticism that would threaten the

regime, Amin believed that the real danger was the Western technological approach that

guided the Sadat regime. In other words, economic rationality that guided Western

thought was not suited for Egypt.[76]

While not everyone agreed that infitah was the best policy, it does seem that most

elites favored Sadat's economic opening and privatization. Even those students whose

fathers experienced upward mobility in the public sector, favored capitalism (see tables 5

and 6). It seems to follow, then, that these elites saw the realignment with the West as an

opportunity to further their favored economic policy.

---

[76]Baker, 228-230.

TABLE 5

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES[77]

Question	Agree		Disagree		Mixed Feelings		No Opinion		N/A
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	N
1. What in your view, should Egypt's economic policy be?									
a. Increase the size of the public sector, reverse the open door policy and build socialism.	13.4	18							
b. Keep the present balance between the public and private sectors and keep the current open door policy.	37.3	50							
c. Decrease the public sector, expand the private sector, and broaden the open door policy.	49.3	66							
d. NA		11							
2. There is too much inequality in the distribution of wealth in Egypt.	77.0	111	7.0	10	12.6	18	2.8	4	3
3. The Open Door has caused the rich to get richer and the poor poorer.	50.0	71	16.9	24	25.3	36	7.7	11	3
4. Egypt never really gave socialism a chance to work.	26.5	36	27.2	37	21.3	29	25.0	34	9

---

[77]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 238.

195

TABLE 6

ECONOMIC POLICY PREFERENCE BY EMPLOYMENT[78]
SECTOR* AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

		Policy Preference (%)		
	N	Socialism	Current Infitah	More Capitalism
Public Sector + Upward Mobility	10	30.0	20.0	50.0
Private Sector + Upward Mobility	12	8.3	50.0	41.7
Public Sector + Stable Status	26	15.4	30.8	53.8
Private Sector + Stable Status	27	18.5	25.9	55.6
Public Status + Downward Mobility	12	8.3	41.7	50.0
Private Status + Downward Mobility	12	8.3	41.7	50.0

*Those reporting careers spanning the public and private sectors are excluded.

---

[78]Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 239.

196

Indicator: Foreign Aid and Trade

I combined the foreign aid and trade categories because they both will help us

understand the economic imperative in light of the issue areas described in Table 1. We

will need to determine both the quantity and quality of the aid and trade, as well as

determining the beneficiaries. Did Egypt receive military aid, and if so, was it directed

for internal or external security? Was there a particular group in society that benefited

economically from this aid and trade? I derived this data from a variety of sources, in

particular documents found in the Middle East Economic Handbook. The key to this

analysis on Egypt will be its comparison to the analysis on Syria, which will follow. The

reader should remember that Egypt is our null set. If my hypotheses are correct, we

should not see ethnicity as a factor driving foreign policy, although we will see other

domestic factors having an influence on this particular case.

Issue: Security and Territory

A legacy of the 15-year old Camp David peace accord between Egypt and Israel is

the enormous share these two countries receive of U.S. foreign aid. The current total is

$5.6 billion in U.S. military and developmental assistance each year.[79] At the time of the

realignment, the United States delivered a great amount of military assistance. The

United States compensated for Saudi Arabia's decision to withdraw financing of the

---

[79]John Lancaster and Dana Priest, "U.S. Assures Egypt on Foreign Aid: Defense Secretary Makes No Promises About Cuts After 1996," Washington Post, 9 January 1995, sec 1A, p. 8.

197

purchase of U.S. F-5E fighters with military credits that enabled Egypt to purchase F-4Es.[80]

In December 1980, Vice President Mubarak and U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown agreed to the following:

1. The M-60 tanks, which were scheduled to be delivered by the end of 1981, will be delivered immediately.

2. The completion of the Phantom program will be speeded up by the immediate delivery of the complementary equipment.

3. Some types of weapons for the army, including TOW anti-tank missiles will be increased.

4. Permission will be given for the supply of some special types of ammunition, particularly sophisticated air-to-air missiles and television guided bombs, and the supply of all equipment pertaining to paratroopers within 2 months.

5. Training programs will be speeded up and scheduled periods will be reduced in order to increase the number of pilots, technicians and air defense officers.

6. The present administration will recommend to the new administration that Egypt be treated as a friendly country when the U.S. military program for the next five years is drawn up.

7. The preparation and development of the Ra's Banas area on the Red Sea, to enable it to receive all types of aircraft, was discussed. A U.S. expert committee is expected to visit the area within a few days and prepare a report on the requirements in the area.

8. Agreement in principle was reached on the dispatch of an Egyptian military unit to the United States in the second half of next year in order to conduct joint exercises similar to those held in Egypt by U.S. and Egyptian units several weeks ago.[81]

---

[80]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 52-53.

[81]"Cairo Papers Report U.S. To Speed Arms Delivery," FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): D1.

198

Egypt benefited from the peace treaty with Israel in the area of its military

spending. From 1973-1975, Egypt spent 32 percent of its GNP on military forces. By the

late 1980s, Egypt was spending only 8-12 percent. Additionally, in 1973-1975, Egypt

spent over 50 percent of its central government expenditures on the military, but by 1986-

1988, this expenditure dropped to 22-22 percent. While Egypt's military spending

decreased, its military, in terms of hardware and personnel increased, as shown in table 7.

Even with this good trend, Egypt's economy still struggled.[82]

---

[82]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 328-329.

TABLE 7

MILITARY SPENDING TREND: EGYPT (U.S. DOLLARS - MILLIONS)[83]

	Manpower (1,000s)	Tanks	Aircraft	Defense Spending ($ millions)	Arms Imports ($ millions)	Arms Exports ($ millions)
1967	220	530	400	0.3	204	1
1973	390	1,880	620	11.4	741	14
1982	447	2,100	429	7.2	1,900	360
1988	452	2,425	517	6.1	725	170
1991	420	3,190	495	5.2	——	——

---

[83]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 322.

Issue: Status

"For two decades now America has shored up the Egyptian economy and assigned Egypt a privileged place in its Middle Eastern diplomacy."[84] Still, Egypt is concerned about American intentions towards Egypt. According to Fouad Ajami,

> These are the phantoms that Egypt has taken up sword against. The truth of Egypt's salvation, the way out for its patient and burdened population, lies where Sadat, in a moment of great clarity and intuitive shrewdness, located it. The Pan-Arabism the Egyptian state wishes to revive is a mirage. Egypt's primacy in Arab politics is a thing of the past. The gift of Egypt to other Arabs is the gift of its example and moderation and of the skill with which its custodians manage some formidable tasks that lie ahead of them: the economy that has to be privatized and reformed, the task of making livable once again a capital city now choking under the weight of urban blight and ecological degradation, the social peace that has to be vigilantly kept between its substantial Coptic minority, the opening up of more democratic space while still keeping in check the theocrats who tear asunder the country's peace and national unity.[85]

The significant point here is that economic growth is a means of attaining status, both internally and externally. Ajami does cite other variables, such as religious divisions; however as mentioned earlier, these divisions alone are not ethnic divisions. The Copts still consider themselves as Egyptians because they are the descendants of the first Egyptian Christians who were the original Pharonic inhabitants.[86] I think it is fair to say that economic growth can enhance the status of a country.

---

[84]Fouad Ajami, "The Phantoms of Egypt," U.S. News and World Report, 10 April 1995, 55.

[85]Ibid.

[86]The origins of the Copts are from Dereck Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991), 164.

201

Issue: Human Resources and Nonhuman Resources

Egypt's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 8.1

percent from 1970 to 1980. Agriculture contributed 19 percent, mining 17 percent, and

manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and services each contributed 12 to 13

percent.[87] These statistics, however, do not capture all aspects of Egypt's economic

situation.

Under Sadat, there was a great consumption boom. The infitah policy was not the

primary cause; rather, it was the coincidental occurrence of Egypt's economic opening

and the OPEC countries' price fixing capabilities. These countries experienced a surge in

economic development and its markets, which, in turn, created a manpower need. The

Egyptians fulfilled this need. More than one million Egyptians worked in these countries

and sent their earnings home. In addition to money, these workers brought back all kinds

of goods, such as stereos, toys, watches, cigarettes, etc. Those that brought back these

goods for resale were known as "suitcase millionaires." The government encouraged this

migration of workers because it not only brought in dollars, but it also reduced

unemployment.[88]

There were negative effects of this worker migration. First, many who left were

important for Egypt's struggling domestic economy. According to an Egyptian journalist

who covered economic affairs for the Middle East News Agency explained that there

were four potential purchasers of goods in Egypt. "First, thieves and smugglers. Second,

---

[87]Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia (Compton's NewMedia, Inc., 1994).

[88]Lippman, 106-107.

202

butchers. Third, doctors. And, fourth, anyone who owns an apartment." Smugglers

became rich because they evaded customs and resold goods at a high price. Butchers or

more accurately meat producers profited by using subsidized bread rather than the more

expensive hay as cattle fodder. Doctors charged high fees to private patients who wanted

to escape from the dirty, crowded public clinics. Finally, apartment owners became rich

by filling their homes with cheap, tacky furniture, known as "Louis Farouk" style and

renting them out to foreigners.[89]

There was legitimate money circulating as well. It is understandable that there

would be such a consumerist frenzy after having gone without for so long. Egypt had

been under such an austere economy during the 1960s and early 1970s. Also, spending

was an outcome driven by high inflation and low domestic interest rates. The incentive

to save was just not there.[90] The authors of the 1978 five-year plan explained that their

intentions did not support the private sector's use of the infitah to import foreign luxury

comsumer goods. They certainly did not intend "...to promote class divisions, but this

has happened....There are indications of a societal trend toward class divisions in Egypt

now, which can only mean a weakening of national solidarity"[91]

Egypt, however, did receive critical aid from a number of sources that seemed to

have helped and at least off-set any aid Egypt lost from many Arab countries as a result

---

[89]Ibid., 107-108.

[90]Ibid., 109-110.

[91]Ibid., 114

of the 1979 peace treaty.[92] The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and

the World Bank supported the infitah, although both organizations have worked with

Egypt in the past. Egypt, by 1979, was receiving $2,000 million a year in aid and

credits. The United States provided $970 million annually of which $750 million came

from the USAID and $220 million through Public Law 480 wheat shipments. The World

Bank provided $270 million of which $150 million were loans and $120 million were

credits. Finally, Japan provided $184 million, while West Germany provided $163

million. Egypt received aid from other sources as well, but now they looked to the West

rather than the Eastern bloc or the non-oil producing Arab states. While they did receive

aid from countries, such as Saudi Arabia, it was still the West that had the most money

and technology required by Egypt.[93] Why was the West offering all this aid? According

to Alan Mackie, "Thanks in large part to Egypt's pivotal role in the Arab-Israeli conflict,

its vital military and commercial position and its big domestic market, the West, Japan,

and Iran have been more willing to offer development aid."[94]

The USIAD program is significant because it represents a strong political

commitment from the United States. The World Bank offers prestige because it is an

apolitical institution. The USAID supports such programs as sewerage improvement. It

demands adherence to regulation, which helps teach business practices. The critics

---

[92]The loss of Arab aid is taken from Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia (Compton's NewMedia, Inc., 1994).

[93]Alan Mackie, "Cairo is Now Looking to Washington as a Major Source of Aid," Middle East Economic Digest, 5 January 1979, 5.

[94]Ibid., 5.

contend that such practices only serve to teach Egyptians how to work with the United

States, and not their own bureaucracy. The USAID may also help improve efficiency

within the bureaucracy, for example, by insisting that the Ministry of the Economy and

Economic Co-operation adheres to commercial rates when lending money. Finally,

USAID is encouraging private sector participation.[95]

The World Bank has helped with Egypt's progress. The program director for

Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Martijn Paijmans, said that, "Our assessment

was that after opening up the economy, we saw much better prospects for growth. Egypt

has a much stronger resources base now than it did five years ago."[96] The World Bank

provides finances for development, advice on economic and sectoral policies, and chairs

the Consultative Group for Egypt, which is a 26 member group of Egypt's creditors.

Paijmans explains that the Bank focuses on "...rural poverty, population, education and

projects that increase foreign exchange."[97] Even with all this assistance, it is not an easy

task to learn and restructure the economy. For example, Egypt ran into trouble with the

International Monetary Fund for not controlling its deficit as directed. As a result, the

Finance Minister Ali Lutfi agreed to study ways to implement sales tax, combat tax

evasion, and cut losses by public sector companies.[98]

---

[95]Ibid., 5-6.

[96]Ibid., 6.

[97]Ibid., 7.

[98]"Egypt," Middle East Economic Digest,"23 February 1979, 24-25.

205

As mentioned earlier, the major challenge Sadat faced, and Mubarak is still

facing, are the dire straits Sadat inherited. The greatest contributor to this economic

problem is the tremendous population growth Egypt has historically experienced. Please

see table 8. It is projected to reach 68 million by the year 2000. Additionally, the

population is concentrated around the Nile River Valley, which only comprises 3.6

percent of the country's total area.[99] Agriculture seems to be a non-win situation because

of the continual increase in population. Its production is limited to the only arable land

in the country, which comprises only 3 percent. Egypt must import 40 percent of its

grain, and food, in general is 30 percent of the country's imports.[100] As noted earlier with

the IMF discussion, inefficiency and corruption are major problems. Table 9 supports

the trade deficit discussed earlier, as well as the major trading partners.

---

[99]"Egypt," Middle East Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor Publications Limited, 1986), 113-114.

[100]Ibid., 120.

TABLE 8

ECONOMIC DATA: EGYPT[101]

	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983
GNP per capita (U.S. $)	250	270	310	400	420	540	600
Population (thousands)	33,690	34,864	36,289	38,253	40,401	42,672	45,084
GDP (millions of Egyptian pounds)	3,241	3,806	5,218	8,344	12,705	17,320	24,170

---

[101]World Tables, 1989-90 Edition: From the Data Files of the World Bank (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 224-225.

TABLE 9

FOREIGN TRADE BY REGION: EGYPT (1983)[102]

(Egyptian Pounds, 1,000's)

	Imports	Exports	Trade Balance
Arab Countries	256,947	103,879	-153,068
Eastern Europe	1,100,357	403,728	-696,629
Western Europe	3,239,568	934,174	-2,305,394
Asia	751,215	449,532	-301,683
Africa	27,946	16,588	-11,358
North America	1,207,577	149,695	-1,057,878
South America	44,966	----	-44,966
Central America	101,208	10	-101,198
Oceania	135,099	152	-134,947
Others	327,778	192,537	-135,241
TOTAL	7,192,657	2,250,295	-4,942,362

Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics

---

[102]"Egypt," Middle East Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor Publications Limited, 1986), 126.

Indicator: Treaties and Agreements

I have already discussed, at least indirectly, the effects of Sadat's Jerusalem visit,

Camp David Accords, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Consequently, I just

want to point to the fact that while Egypt did gain territory, security, and the prospects of

peace because of the agreement, it also saw the Sinai as a great economic opportunity.

Israel had developed roads, airfields, and tourist sites. Egypt viewed the Sinai as a great

opportunity for economic gain because of these assets, as well as the possibility of

redistributing its overpopulated areas, profiting from the oil and mineral resources of the

land, and the encouraging foreign investment through the assurance of peace.[103] While

the visit, accords, and agreement emphasized peace between historical adversaries, Sadat

also saw the potential for other gains as discussed in previous sections.

Preliminary Conclusions

Before we examine the Syrian Cold War case, let us now put the story back

together to help determine the relationship between the domestic and foreign realms.

First, it is important to realize that the issues in our framework are interrelated. For

example, the discussion in the security section concerning the Palestinian problem can be

interpreted as a means of gaining regional status. Clearly, we saw an erosion of regional

status, so it is not a great leap of faith to look at the Palestinian issue as a means for

Egypt to regain some of its status at the regional level. Another important point that was

---

[103]Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Egypt's Economy Under Sadat: Will the Peace Agreement be Followed by Prosperity?" in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1978-1979, ed. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981), 369.

209

mentioned is that once external security concerns were alleviated, Egypt was able to put primacy on trying to resolve its economic problems. If one domestic variable emerges in this case as influential in foreign policy, it is the economy. Finally, internal status, that is legitimacy based on a shared national identity, seemed to figure prominently in Sadat's willingness to take risks.

Let us look at what each indicator suggests as the factors influencing Sadat's decision to realign. The elite attitudes reveal both the motivations for the realignment decision, as well as the widespread support Sadat enjoyed. First, the elite attitude indicator suggests that while security and peace were a concern, there were also other factors influencing Sadat's decision. First, this indicator reveals that Sadat understood the legitimacy he enjoyed due to his people's shared national identity. We know this based not only on his own words, but also on other elites' attitudes. This legitimacy seemed to have given him the maneuver room to make risky decisions, particularly his realignment decision. In this case, an ethnically homogenous state was recognized by its leader and entered into his foreign policy calculations.

Second, elites shared the view that economics was a driving factor for Egypt's turn to the West. Elites supported the infitah; they wanted economic prosperity for the country and to relieve the burden of the masses. Sadat realized that he could not economically develop Egypt without external support. Unfortunately, the outcome of Sadat's economic policy based on the realignment did not necessarily match his intentions. The authors of the 1978 economic program clearly stated this point. Unfortunately, Sadat inherited such a desperate economy that even well-intentioned

210

policies could not produce good results. Consequently, widespread corruption and the lack of a strong economic foundation sparked consumerism and a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. This point brings me to the final two points concerning the economy, which are this ever-widening gap and the class divisions in society. It appears that Sadat recognized these issues. Government officials saw the political impact of the food riots, and even the Muslim Brotherhood tried to boost their appeal by offering an economic plan.[104] The divisions in society appear to be economically based, and Sadat's foreign and domestic policies attempted to mitigate those divisions.

The foreign aid and trade indicator also suggests the importance of the economy in Sadat's realignment decision. Before we discuss this issue, we must realize that Egypt received a great deal of military hardware and assistance from the United States as a result of Sadat's decision. As mentioned earlier, perhaps with this influx of military aid, Egypt no longer had to worry about an impending war. As a result, Sadat could focus on the economic issues. Egypt received a great deal of economic aid as a result of the decision. A great deal of the aid was directed at alleviating the plight of the masses, such as the U.S. food aid and projects funded by the USAID and the World Bank. As already mentioned, however, the infitah did exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor.

As mentioned earlier, Sadat was able to rely on a reservoir of legitimacy based on a shared national identity. As a result, he risked regional status, but he had support from home, and he repeatedly referred to the greatness of the Egyptian people as a tremendous

---

[104]As discussed in chapter 3, according to Gregory L. Aftandilian, Egypt's Bid For Arab Leadership: Implications For U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 56, the

211

resource. Other elites shared his view concerning the significance of this shared identity, and they supported his risky foreign policy moves, even when these moves opposed a majority of the Arab world. Legitimacy, as we defined it, is a subset of our discussion on domestic or internal status. The other component of internal status for this case was the economy, and I would argue that this was Sadat's focus for his decision to look westward, as well as his decision to seek peace with Israel. Because Egypt had an ethnically homogenous population at this time, Sadat was able to make his realignment decision even though he risked losing regional status, as well as third world status. He was able to do this because he had such wide-spread legitimacy based on a national identity free from ethnic divisions. The evidence suggests that Sadat realized this point.

Muslim Brotherhood established social welfare institutions, such as workshops, health clinics, daycare centers, etc. As a result of this work, the Brotherhood increased its popularity.

212

CHAPTER 5

COLD WAR CASE - SYRIA

Introduction

I will follow the same format for analyzing Syria's alignment decision as I did

with Egypt; I will begin with a brief background section before analyzing "the story"

using Holsti and Sullivan's framework. I found such data as interviews with elites less

available on Syria than on Egypt. In fact, most interviews are with Asad, himself. The

few Syrian high officials noted in open sources are non-Alawites, who I believe were

deliberately exposed in the press to give Asad's policies more credibility among the

largely non-Alawi population. Additionally, I found no survey data during this time-

frame concerning views on politics and society in Syria. Fortunately, some surveys were

finally conducted in the post-Cold War era, which I will present in chapter seven. I still

found a wealth of information, although my examination of elite attitudes will rely

heavily on field experts' views, combined with official interviews of Asad and some high

governmental officials.[1] This elite attitude indicator, along with the foreign aid and trade

---

[1]My search for surveys and interviews led me to conversations with Monte Palmer, Augustus Norton, Mahmud Faksh, Fred Huxley, and several analysts at Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and U.S. Information Agency who explained that the best way to analyze elite attitudes was to examine scholarly opinions. The nature of Asad's regime combined with the Cold War time-frame created an environment that made surveys and interviews too dangerous, especially those that tried to discern sectarian differences. For this case, I have taken the advice of the above scholars and analysts; therefore, I rely heavily on scholarly opinion to determine elite attitudes.

213

indicator, will show us the significance of domestic considerations, namely ethnicity, on Asad's foreign policy.

Background to the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

Asad's longevity as Syria's ruler reflects his political deftness both in the domestic and foreign policy realms. Some scholars believe that his policies are a reflection of his overwhelming concern for regional security and his deep-seated desire for independence in his decision-making process. When Asad came to power in 1970, he wanted to end Syria's regional isolation, a condition the neo-Ba'th's extremist policies' had created.[2] However, Asad's policies often regionally isolated Syria. Syria took on the role as the balancer of threat in the region. In other words, Syria ensured regional stability by balancing against external threats.[3] For example, Syria allied itself with Iran against Iraq in the Gulf War and intervened in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Leftists. The former action was to avert the threat of Iraq in the region and the latter to avoid war with Israel. This last policy happened to be quite unpopular at home.[4] These policies are just examples of Asad's many complex policies that cannot escape global, regional, and domestic causes and effects. It is important, then, that we examine the global, regional, and domestic contexts in which Asad operated so that we

---

[2]Yosef Olmert, "Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in Syria: The Assad Regime," Middle East Review, 20, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 21.

[3]The balance of threat theory is found in Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17.

[4]Olmert, 22.

214

may better understand the motives driving his foreign policy. Of course, as we describe

one context, we cannot ignore the others because, as we shall soon see, they are linked.

The Global Context: Soviet-Syrian Relations

Feelings of regional isolation appear to have been a key motivator for Syria's

alliance with the Soviet Union. Regional concerns were of great importance in Asad's

decisions concerning Syria's alliances.[5] It was the Soviets, however, who helped Syria

play the balancing role in the region. The Soviets looked at this alliance globally. Syria

offered the Soviets a foothold in the Middle East, which grew in importance when Anwar

Sadat ejected the Soviets from Egypt.[6] In 1972, Syria and Moscow completed an arms

deal that provided for the enlargement of Syrian ports to accommodate Soviet ships, the

building of air bases, and the improvement of the Soviet image in the Arab world in light

of the recent Soviet ejection from Egypt. Not only did Syria gain a more critical regional

role through increased military wares, but it also made gains on the domestic front

because the Soviets persuaded the local Communist Party in Syria to join the Ba'th Party.

However, in a bid to prove his independence in decision-making, Asad refused to sign

any type of treaty.[7]

Although the Soviets supported the Syrians in the October 1973 War, relations

were strained in the aftermath of the war. The Soviets wanted a settlement that would

---

[5]The importance of regional concerns in forming alliances is from Walt, 270.

[6]Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War II To Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 146.

215

serve Soviet interests by formalizing and legalizing Soviet presence in the Middle East, thus enhancing their superpower status. The Soviets felt that their participation as co-equals with the United States in the peace process would help them achieve their goals. Consequently, the Soviets cooperated with the United States in establishing the Geneva Peace Conference.[8] The Syrians, however, refused to participate due to the Soviets' implicit recognition of Israel and lack of support of the notion of a Greater Syria. A divergence of opinion concerning the use of military force versus negotiations resulted, with the Syrians and Soviets pressing for each option, respectively.[9]

Since the Soviets did not want their ally to fare worse than the United States' allies, the Soviets backed down. They supported Syria by endorsing Syria's War of Attrition and providing a great deal of military equipment to include coveted MIG-23s. Additionally, the Soviets granted Syria a twelve-year moratorium on repayment of its military debt. Syria wanted to build its power position based on its military, leadership of a militarily-based coordination on the Eastern front, and political leadership over Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon. The accomplishment of these goals would free Syria of dependence on Egypt. Syria realized that it needed Soviet military aid to accomplish these goals.[10]

---

[7]Galia Golan and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Soviet Union and Syria: The Limits of Cooperation," in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979), 214-215.

[8]Dina Spechler, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Problems, Policies and Prospective Trends," in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979), 337.

[9]Golan, Soviet Policies, 149.

[10]Golan and Rabinovich, 217-223.

216

Relations between the Soviets and Syrians grew warmer as a result of the

Egyptian - Israeli agreements. However, the Soviets and Syrians disagreed on diplomatic

strategies. The Syrians introduced the Palestinian issue to the U.N. Security Council, as

opposed to using the Soviet-preferred Geneva Conference as a forum. Relations further

deteriorated when Syria intervened in Lebanon against the PLO and Leftists.[11] As

mentioned earlier, Syria's motivation was to prevent a possible conflict with Israel, but

Galia Golan and Itamar Rabinovich claim that "The explanation (for this policy in

Lebanon) seems to lie in the great importance Hafiz al-Asad attached to the sovereignty

of the decision-making process in his political system."[12]

Relations once again improved in 1977 because of the temporary end of the

Lebanese conflict and, domestically, the need of the Ba'th Party to change its

conservative image.[13] By 1979, it was the Syrians who wanted a bilateral treaty with the

Soviets. Asad was experiencing domestic problems with the Muslim Brotherhood. More

importantly, the American intention to sign a defensive pact with Israel threatened Syria.

The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty signed in March 1979 pushed the Soviets and Syrians

towards a large-scale arms deal. Syria's determination for a bilateral treaty continued and

manifested itself through Syria's regionally unpopular support for the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in 1980. Finally, on 8 October 1980, the Soviets relented, and the Soviet-

---

[11]Ibid., 223-226.

[12]Ibid., 226.

[13]Ibid., 228.

Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. However, different

interpretations of this treaty would lead to more problems.[14]

Efraim Karsh calls the relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union a

"marriage of convenience."[15] He further claims that

> the Soviet-Syrian interrelationship should be portrayed in terms of a mutually
> beneficial strategic interdependence between two allies: a relationship favoring each
> partner in accordance with the vicissitudes of regional and global affairs.[16]

Syrian policy occurred on two levels: policies tended to have an independent character

tempered by Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab relations and, secondly, policies based on

cooperation occurred only when Soviet and Syrian interests converged.[17] Surely, the

Lebanon intervention, attacks on the PLO, support of Iran in the Gulf War, and

preference towards a military solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict show Syrian defiance

towards the Soviets.[18] Once again, Asad based his policies on the security interests of

Syria even if they antagonized his strongest ally. However, when he was most

threatened, regionally, either by Israel or other Arab countries such as Egypt or Iraq, he

relied especially on the Soviets. Syria's desire to balance against regional threats for

security purposes seemed to be the primary rationale for Syria's alliances.

---

[14]Efraim Karsh, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Soviet Union and Asad's Syria," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 11, no. 4 (December 1989): 15-20.

[15]Ibid., 1.

[16]Ibid., 21.

[17]Golan and Rabinovich, 228.

[18]John P. Hannah, "At Arms Length: Soviet-Syrian Relations in the Gorbachev Era," The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 18 (Washington D. C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), 7-8.

The Regional Context

The significance of Camp David on Syria is unmistakable. Egypt's decision to seek relations with the West served to initially move many of the Arab states into the Syrian camp. Syria received diplomatic support through the Steadfastness Front, which included Libya, Algeria, and Democratic Yemen. Syria and Jordan established an alliance in 1975 as a means to reject the westward-looking Egyptians. Syria also established a 'strategic alliance' with the PLO. Even Syria and Iraq temporarily aligned, and at the 1978 Baghdad Conference, they spearheaded Egypt's ostracism in the Arab world, while promoting Arab financial support for Syria's military buildup.[19]

Syria's policy was soon in disarray. Its alliance with Iraq collapsed over the Iran-Iraq war: Syria's support for Iran ended the alliance, as well as causing a major Arab army to be diverted from the Israeli front. King Hussein defied Syria's wishes when he aligned with Iraq and pursued peace initiatives regarding the West Bank. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States turned their attention to the threat of Iranian expansionism, and the Arab-Israeli issue assumed a second priority for them. Consequently, Syria's alliance with Iran alienated these oil states whose political and financial support Syria needed. Interestingly, Syria turned its back on its role as leader of the Arab cause and strongly supported Iran, who did make up the financial losses Syria had from the Arab states. Meanwhile, Syria found itself engaged in a protracted struggle with Israeli-backed Maronite forces in Lebanon. By 1980, Syria was regionally isolated, bankrupt

---

[19]Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 401-402.

diplomatically, and seemed to be all alone in the event of an Israeli attack. Asad also

faced internal rebellion, and he was convinced that the United States could not offer him

anything. Asad now turned to the Soviets for new arms and guarantees as stipulated with

a Soviet friendship treaty, which it signed in 1980. Asad saw Israel's 1981 'annexation' of

the Golan as the end of a chance for settlement, and Asad was afraid that the Golan

would be left out of further Arab-Israeli negotiations. Under these conditions, Asad felt

political settlement with Israel was possible only if the Arabs gained a more favorable

balance of forces and Syria achieved military parity with Israel. Syrian policy in the

1980s rejected the U.S.-sponsored peace process.[20]

The Domestic Context: Trouble at Home

Syria's main asset, as opposed to Egypt's pre-eminence and Saudi Arabia's wealth,

is its penchant for mischief. Syria derives its power from its proximity to Israel, its

Soviet ties, its army, and its presence in Lebanon and hold on the PLO. However, one

cannot measure Syria's power without examining its trouble at home. Since the mid-

1970s, the base of the Syrian regime has greatly narrowed, causing the regime to be more

repressive. Near civil war describes the state of some of Syria's key cities, and the

regime spends a great deal of its efforts in maintaining power. In the long run, it is

questionable whether such a regime can survive. Heavy artillery on a country's own

cities cannot be the modus operandi for long.[21]

---

[20]Ibid.

[21]Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Road," in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate, ed. Tawfic E. Farah (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 125.

Asad was dealing with a Sunni majority that had begun to demonstrate a cohesive

determination to rid itself of Alawi domination. Sunni resentment was undeniable.

Interestingly, the Sunnis often oppose the regime on non-religious issues, even though the

opposition is based on its desire to return Syria to Sunni rule. Conservative Sunnis lead

the opposition, while the Sunni Sheikhs and the Muslim Brotherhood play prominent

roles in the anti-regime demonstrations. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in

1928, has long appealed to certain Syrian Sunni groups. Asad identified the Muslim

Brotherhood as the scapegoat for rising opposition to Alawi rule after the Aleppo school

massacre. Yet, there are other anti-Alawi groups and fundamentalist Sunni groups

besides the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has ties to many like-minded groups,

but it is also split into four factions. Still, majority Sunni opposition to Alawi rule

resulted in support for the Brotherhood, including support from secular Syrians.[22]

R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider claim that:

> More recently, the sectarian conflict between Alawis and Sunnis have impinged
> directly and importantly on Syrian foreign policy, and [the] separation of domestic
> from foreign policies is arbitrary and misleading, in that foreign issues frequently are
> of domestic significance.[23]

John C. Campbell also claims that domestic unrest contributed to Asad's foreign policy,

specifically, his decision to sign the 1980 treaty with the Soviet Union. According to

Campbell,

> As for Syria, the regime of Hafez al-Assad, weakened by opposition at home and
> close to war with Israel in Lebanon, felt more need for the Soviet connection and

---

[22]R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Policies
(New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982), 257.

[23]Ibid., 261 and 271.

finally agreed, after years of procrastination, to conclude a security treaty with the Soviet Union on the model of the existing Soviet-Iraqi treaty.[24]

Clearly, Asad was balancing many competing and complicated interests.

McLaurin lists the objectives of the Syrian regime. The first two of them are: Israel's

return of the Golan Heights, and the second is the maintenance of the regime to include

popular support for the regime. McLaurin observes that

> It is unlikely that the unpopular Alawi minority can continue to control Syria indefinitely. It is even more unlikely that Hafez Assad, given the level of domestic opposition that has developed over the past few years, fails to recognize this fact. He is an astute political leader who mastered the complex political machinations traditional in the country....Assad recognizes the end of Alawi leadership is near.[25]

McLaurin further claims that "Separation of domestic from foreign policies is arbitrary

and misleading, in that foreign issues are frequently of domestic significance."[26] As we

shall see, domestic issues are frequently of foreign significance.

Our task is to explore this link between the domestic and foreign policy realms.

Specifically, we will see how the ethnic divisiveness which literally exploded in the

streets of several Syrian cities threatened the regime and contributed to Asad's decision to

sign the 1980 treaty. Did the ethnic divisiveness of Syrian society decrease Asad's

legitimacy, thus constraining his foreign policy decisions and actions? We will begin our

analysis by looking at the indicator, elite attitudes in terms of the issues of security and

territory, status, and human and nonhuman resources.

---

[24]John C. Campbell, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Current History, 80, no. 462 (January 1981): 42.

[25]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 271; for a complete list of all the objectives, see McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 270.

[26]Ibid., 271.

222

Indicator: Elite Attitudes

As mentioned earlier, I derived elite attitudes primarily from leading experts in the field, as well as from interviews (namely from Asad), official statements, and observations from world leaders. Based on this indicator, alone it appears that Asad's decision was motivated both by external and internal concerns. The primary evidence for this initial finding is based on the following: First, Asad justifies his actions towards other states based on his belief of their potential to cause trouble within his regime. Second, there is a tremendous coincidence of timing between the signing of the treaty and the violent domestic unrest in Syria. We will also see that, for Asad, there are external security concerns, but in order for us to understand the full reason for his signing the treaty with the Soviet Union, we must examine the relationship between the domestic and foreign realms.

Issue: Security and Territory

Elite attitudes provide us with some indication of the importance internal and external security had on Asad's decision to sign the treaty. Let us begin by examining how he and other high officials viewed Syria's foreign policy with other states as a consequence of domestic unrest.

Asad explains his view towards Israel and the United States in terms of their part in his regime's internal situation. Asad explains that

> We regret to say that the United States and Israel were able to find some agents in our country during the recent stage. We regret to say that the United States and Israel were able to use many of those who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and to exploit some other Arab parties to serve their interests. Those agents and parties committed numerous acts of sabotage and assassination, something which opposes our national, moral and pan-Arab values and traditions and, most of all, contradicts our religious

223

teachings. Such acts are unprecedented in our history. When the objectives of sabotage became clear to our people, ...when it became clear that all this constituted a serious threat to Syria's firmness and confrontation against the aggression and a threat to the Arab interests and national aspirations and when the link between these agents and some other parties abroad was completely disclosed, our people -- in their various forces, parties and popular organizations -- hurried to strike at this misguided group which has linked itself to the foreigners.[27]

Asad does see Israel and the United States as the forces behind the domestic unrest at home. Whether or not he truly believes that these nations are instigating this unrest, it does seem that the internal situation is a factor for Asad's foreign policy, at least in terms of how he views other states.

Asad repeats this theme in many of his speeches and interviews. According to Patrick Seale, "The war against the terrorists convinced Asad that he was wrestling not just with internal dissent but with a large scale conspiracy."[28] Asad explains that

We were not just dealing with killers inside Syria, but with those who masterminded their plans. The plot thickened after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and many foreign intelligence services became involved. Those who took part in Camp David used the Muslim Brothers against us.[29]

Asad felt that this conspiracy to unseat him included Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and the United States. He saw himself as the victim of a "terrible alliance of external and internal enemies."[30] As mentioned earlier, it is not just the Muslim Brotherhood that is unhappy with the regime. We will further explore this discontent in the status section.

---

[27]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): H17.

[28]Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkely: University of California Press, 1988), 334.

[29]Ibid., 335.

[30]Ibid., 334-335

224

He accused Iraq of inciting Syria's internal dissent. Asad said, "The hangman of Iraq was not content to kill tens of thousands of his own people. He came to Syria to carry out his favorite hobbies of killing, assassination and sabotage. That man has been sending arms for the criminals in Syria ever since he took power." He also recounted,

> We told the Americans that we had proof and they asked us to produce it, which we did. They denied giving the Muslim Brothers this equipment. "All right, then", we said, "here are the serial numbers. Perhaps you can tell us to whom you did sell it." The Americans refused to say. Finally I said to them, 'Your involvement is clear and nothing can prove your innocence, but I'm prepared to let the matter rest'.[31]

At a meeting of the Progressive National Front (PNF) with Asad as Chairman, discussion focused on "crimes committed by the agent Muslim Brotherhood gang against the sons of Hamah in implementation of the imperialist and Zionist schemes which are hostile to Syria and to the Arab nation."[32]

In an interview, Asad accused Jordan of harboring saboteurs. He identified the Muslim Brotherhood as responsible, but he claimed that Syria's internal dissent is externally driven by the United States and supporters of the Camp David Accords. Asad claimed that

> At any rate, what is the aim behind all this? We do not need to exert any great effort to know the aim. Syria is against the Camp David accords, separate solutions and As-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Syria is also against the clear U.S. - Israeli policy in the region which, if achieved, would place the entire Arab region under Israeli hegemony.[33]

Asad told King Husayn,

---

[31]Ibid., 336.

[32]"Progressive National Front Meets Under Al-Asad," FBIS, NES (17 March 1982): H1.

[33]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): H2.

These incidents [acts of violence in Syria] are annoying us in Syria. However, we are not worried because they constitute no danger to us. In light of the nature of our regime, the national apprehension of the masses, and the nature of the popular and party organizations here in Syria, we can absorb and overcome such developments. We shall liquidate the Muslim Brotherhood gang in Syria because this is a gang which has been condemned throughout history and is rejected by our masses because it is a suspicious gang. Yet, how can we deal with those who collaborated with this gang? With those who were behind the murdering of innocent people in our country? We in Syria, as I mentioned before, can endure such crises.[34]

In 1980, Syria massed 35,000 troops along Jordanian border to destroy Muslim

Brotherhood sanctuaries. Saudi mediation ended the confrontation, but other such

conflicts with Jordan followed. In 1985, King Hussein read a letter apologizing for his

harboring of the Muslim Brotherhood.[35]

Several scholars' examination of Syrian policy towards Lebanon highlight the

blurred boundaries between the domestic and foreign realms. According to Mahmud

Faksh, Syria's role in Lebanon is based on three concerns: the unity and independence of

Lebanon, the two countries' special relationship, and Syria's national security.[36] A

fractured Lebanon could threaten "Syria itself because of the mosaic nature of its

population."[37] Faksh continues to state that, "Indeed, the Syrian fear of possible spillover

is rational in light of the nature of the makeup of the Syrian populace and the regime's

---

[34]Ibid., H3.

[35]Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), 68-72.

[36]Mahmud A. Faksh, "Syria's Role and Objectives in Lebanon," Mediterranean Quarterly 3, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 82.

[37]Ibid., 84.

226

own base in a religious minority group, the Alawites."[38] Alasdair Drysdale concurs and

explains the domestic ramifications of Asad's Lebanese policy:

> This action [Syria's sending of troops into Lebanon in 1976] was deeply unpopular
> with the Sunni majority in Syria....To the regime's most incorrigible critics, it was
> further proof that the Alawis were not Muslim at all.....With a civil war raging next
> door, refugees streaming into Damascus, and soldiers returning from tours of duty, it
> was only a matter of time before some of Lebanon's sectarianism would be
> transmitted to Syria.[39]

Asad acknowledges the special relationship between Lebanon and Syria and why

they do not have embassies:

> The contacts between the two countries are beyond the resources of any embassy.
> Anyway, this is a reality which appeared when the two countries gained their
> independence. I do not see any reason for thinking of another form of relationship.
> Naturally, this is a symbol of the warm fraternal relations between the two
> countries.[40]

Press commentary in Syria reflects this special relationship. One article refers to

Lebanon as "Fraternal Lebanon." Another article explains that "Lebanon will not be

outside the pan-Arab framework politically or socially. This makes Syria a sister of

Lebanon: Its prosperity stems from Lebanon's prosperity and its security stems from

Lebanon's security."[41] One has to wonder if these "warm fraternal or sisterly relations"

are really another way of acknowledging the two country's shared regime instabilities

based on ethnic divisions and minority rule.

---

[38]Ibid., 87.

[39]Alasdair Drysadale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," Current History, 80, no. 462 (January
1981): 33.

[40]"Damascus Radio Carries Al-Asad's Der Spiegel Interview," FBIS, NES (30 August 1979): H2.

[41]The first quotation is taken from "Al-Ba'th: Syrian Presence in Lebanon Necessary," FBIS, NES
(19 November 1982): H2. The second quotation is taken from FBIS, "Tishrin Scores Lack of Arab
Support For Lebanon," FBIS, NES (4 Jan 1983): H1.

227

Umar F. Abd-Allah explains Asad's superpower relations as a means to ensure his power at home. "The chief purpose of the Soviet-Syrian 'friendship pact' was to strengthen Asad's position in Syria in the face of mounting popular opposition, not to further the struggle against Zionism."[42] According to the Action Committee for the Liberation of Syria, the pact was primarily a military alliance, and "the purpose of the agreement was to protect Asad from the wrath of the Syrian people."[43] The Syrian representative to the United Nations, Hammud ash-Shufi claimed that Syria's reception of both French and Soviet aid, "is like a war against the Syrian people to oppress and humiliate them, to absolutely annihilate their role in the Arab world, while providing the full benefit to Israel in Lebanon just as it is used to contain the Palestinian resistance."[44] Asad's regime could not survive without outside support due to its minority rule and subsequent lack of popular support. Asad's actions in Lebanon are merely in the name of the superpowers, which has helped Asad gain their support.[45]

According to Abd Allah, the Lebanese intervention allowed Asad to focus his attention at home. The red-line agreement, which was the clear demarkation of the Syrian and Israeli perimeter in Lebanon, ensured the safety of the Jawlan front (Golan Heights) and allowed Asad to send the Defense Squadrons and the Special Elite Units of the Syrian armed forces, to the major Syrian cities in order to suppress popular unrest.

---

[42]Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 75.

[43]Ibid., 76.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid., 77.

228

Asad did not use these elite units, essential to government security and regime stability, in Lebanon. Instead, he relied on his predominantly non-Alawi secondary units in Lebanon, under predominantly Alawi leadership. Furthermore, Asad wanted to control the internal affairs of Lebanon. Maronite-dominated Lebanon mirrored his own Alawi-dominated regime. The overthrow of this Lebanese microcosm of Syria could only spell doom for his own regime.[46]

Asad's ever-changing policies in Lebanon reflect internal and external security concerns. First, he supported his traditional allies, that is the leftist Palestinians and Muslim factions versus the rightest Maronites. He then switched sides and supported the Maronites because he was afraid of Lebanon's partition. Why did he have this fear? First, the partition of Lebanon could influence Syrian cohesion in its sectarian state. Second, he did not want the Maronite forces going to the Israelis for help. Third, Asad had personal ties to Lebanon's president, Sulayman Franjiyyah. Fourth, his Alawi-minority rule understood and experienced Sunnite hostilities. Finally, Asad's perception was that leftist leaders such as Kamal Junblatt "were engaged in sectarian vendettas." Asad did not want a radical Lebanon that would provide Israel with an excuse to attack.[47] Asad's Lebanese policies reflect his internal, as well as external security concerns.

According to Fouad Ajami, Asad holds the Palestinian issue hostage. He secured that power through his intervention in Lebanon. Consequently, Asad has linked the

---

[46]Ibid., 78.

[47]Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 74-76; the quotation is on p. 76.

229

Palestinian claim to the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Syria's claim to the Golan.[48] For

Asad, the Palestinian issue is complex, having links to both his internal and external

security concerns. He explains that

> The conspirators against the Palestinian question tried to strike inside Syria by using
> the murderous gangs which have been liquidated by our people. Syria has always
> understood that the target has been Palestine, which they tried to reach through Syria.
> Syria will not permit and will not keep silent on this. Syria, whose destiny has been
> linked with that of the Palestinian question, was and will be the heart, the mind, the
> shield and the sword of the issue against all conspirators.[49]

According to one Syrian merchant, the centrality of the Palestinian issue is clear:

"Settle the Palestinian question and the whole conflict will lose its energy...all of us

Syrians feel that way privately." He continued this thought: "Of course there will be a

period for a shakedown within the Arab world as many people have built careers on the

old war with Israel." John Edwin Mroz claims for some Syrians, this shakedown would

be destabilizing for the Syrian regime. Additionally, other Syrians express concern over

Israel's ability to stir up internal strife to destabilize the established regimes. According

to a senior Syrian diplomat, the Syrian leadership have the following concerns: 1.

developing close ties among Israel, United States, and Egypt 2. economic well-being 3.

the Palestinian issue.[50] The Palestinian cause is again given great importance by 'Abd al-

Halim Khaddam, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, who explains that the

---

[48]Ajami, "The Arab Road," 126.

[49]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," H19.

[50]John Edwin Mroz, Beyond Security: Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israelis (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 79.

condition for peace are a return of all occupied lands, recognition of Palestinian rights and their right to return to their land and establish an independent state.[51]

During Asad's meeting with President Jimmy Carter on May 9, 1977, Asad agreed that there were three issues: borders, Palestinian rights, and the prerequisites to peace. The centrality of the Palestinian issue was clear as he explained his position to Carter and the importance of evacuation of all occupied territories. Without full evacuation, the conflict would persist. Beyond this point, however, his position on the Palestinian issue was evasive. He did favor a demilitarized zone, as long as no armies were close to Damascus.[52] Perhaps he was not only fearful of foreign armies, but also he was concerned about having his own regular forces close to the capital.

The complexity of the Palestinian issue is highlighted in the following passage as Asad asserts

> that we in Syria will not allow anyone to attack the natural rights of the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to which the right of representing the Palestinian people and the right to negotiate over all that relates to this right should be confined. At a time when we are working to put an end to the Jordanian regime's involvement in the acts of sabotage inside Syria, we are also working to put an end to other aspirations, the aspirations of the Jordanian regime, in particular, to supplant the leaders of the Palestinian people. In my assessmant, the two matters are linked. Stopping the acts of sabotage in Syria and standing by the Palestinian people or preventing others from attacking these rights do complement each other. We know that had the others achieved an agreement with us to act together to cancel the PLO's role, the acts of sabotage would have ended or rather would never have taken place in Syria.[53]

---

[51]"FRG Foreign Minister, Economic Delegation Visit," FBIS, NES (28 August 1979): H1.

[52]William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 56-58.

[53]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," H5.

231

Here, Asad acknowledges the fragile links between his domestic and foreign well-being.

These links appear in Asad's views on Israel. Mroz explains five reasons why Syrians believe Israel would attack:

1. Israeli response to a perceived threat would precipitate an attack.

2. Escalation of the Lebanese war could lead to direct confrontation between Israeli and Syrian soldiers.

3. Israel may attack in order to further the expansionist desires of the Zionists.

4. Israel may attack as a means of securing U.S. assistance.

5. Finally, Mroz claims that Israel's attack may be "A direct attempt to exploit internal problems within Syria...with the goal of overthrowing the government and establishing a conservative government more friendly to Israel."[54] Mroz claims that Syrians do consider Israel a threat, not only because of its ability to militarily confront Syria, but also its ability to instigate regime instability.

Asad explains that he signed the treaty because of the external threat:

Egypt departed [from the Arab fold]; Israel's military capabilities are increasing; some Arab countries support As-Sadat; U.S. bases are increasing in the region; and the Arab efforts--even if serious--are not able to achieve the balance which will enable them to defend the Arab nation in the face of these developments in the near future. At the same time Israel threatens and bullies. And signs appear that some other Arabs are marching toward a new Camp David. As a result of this the way to the greater Israel does not appear to be impossible....In light of these developments from this standpoint, we had to look hard for sources of strength to help us face this great and dangerous Zionist advance....In strengthening the existing relations with the USSR, we found the strength we were looking for.[55]

As we have seen, however, Asad's domestic and foreign policies are so

intertwined that we must examine both. Even Asad himself talks about the domestic-

---

[54]Mroz, 74.

[55]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," H15.

232

foreign connection. According to John F. Devlin, the treaty reflected Asad's internal and external security concerns: "Serious domestic troubles, near isolation in the Arab world, and the need to ensure a flow of arms all played their part [in Syria's signing of the treaty]."[56]

Martha Neff Kessler explains the conditions in which Asad had to make a choice concerning the treaty:

> as the 1980s began, Assad, beleaguered at home and without a convincing plan for either regaining the Golan or protecting against Syria's exposure to Israel on the ceasefire line or in Lebanon, turned to the Soviet Union. Two events highlighted (at least temporarily) the constriction of Assad's previous independence from Moscow - Syria's refusal to join almost all other Arab nations in denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980 and Syrian willingness after nearly a decade of resistance to conclude a formal Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty, signed in October 1980.[57]

Drysdale concurs that Syria's internal security problems were a significant factor for Asad's decision to sign the treaty:

> Another consequence of the Syrian regime's internal problems, its regional isolation, and its frustration over the Arab-Israeli dispute has been the forging of even closer ties with the Soviet Union....The signing of a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October, 1980, a goal long sought by the Soviet Union, merely codified and formalized the existing relationship.[58]

Kessler claims that the treaty was actually a warning for both Syria's domestic and foreign enemies. "The treaty also served as a deterrent at a time when Damascus felt especially vulnerable. Politically, it was a warning to Assad's regional and domestic

---

[56]John F. Devlin, Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 114.

[57]Martha Neff Kessler, Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 108-109.

[58]Drysadale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," 38.

enemies that he had a backer possibly prepared to help ward off continued pressures on the regime."[59] As we have established, these pressures were a result of Syria's ethnic divisiveness. The next section will highlight this point.

Issue: Status

As we have already seen in the above section, Asad did recognize internal threats, based on the ethnic divisions and his minority rule, as well as external threats of other states. He walks a tightrope as he balances competing interests and justifies his policies to a global, regional, and domestic audience. So far, Asad's clever balancing is a result of careful calculation and caution. According to Yahya Sadowski, Syria has been "balancing relations with the USSR by an 'opening' to the West, supporting the Palestinians while not provoking an Israeli assault, and proceeding with the socialist transformation at home while steadily strengthening ties to the monarchies of the Arab Gulf." As a result, Asad's first focus is maintaining rather than gaining power. According to Shlomo Avineri, "Syria is at the moment a status quo power, despite its belligerent and radical public image."[60] Asad's first instinct, therefore is defensive, not expansionist.

Let us examine how Asad manipulates external and internal status, and specifically how the lack of legitimacy, which is a key component of internal status, may have contributed to Asad's decision to sign the treaty with the Soviet Union. We will focus on the events that took place within the regime leading up to and following the

---

[59]Kessler, 109.

treaty. We will also examine how Asad justified this treaty to his global, regional, and domestic audiences.

Let us not forget that Asad is not an easy man to understand. President Carter's diary of May 9, 1977 says the following of a meeting with Asad:

> It was a very interesting and enjoyable experience. There was a lot of good humor between us, and I found him to be very constructive in his attitude and somewhat flexible in dealing with some of the more crucial items involving peace, the Palestinians, the refugee problem, and borders. He said that a year or two ago it would have been suicide in his country to talk about peace with the Israelis, but they have come a long way and were willing to cooperate.[61]

Carter later observes that "This was the man who would soon sabotage the Geneva peace talks by refusing to attend under any reasonable circumstances, and who would still later, do everything possible to prevent the Camp David accords from being fulfilled." Carter observes that only Sadat was willing to admit that he could cooperate with Israel. He felt the other Arab leaders, Asad included, were constrained by factors, namely shaky regimes, which prevented them from publicly admitting their willingness to cooperate with Israel.[62]

Raymond Hinnebusch agrees that "A 'public mood' does seem to define certain bounds outside which decision-makers dare not tread without risk to their legitimacy." He claims that this point is especially significant in a regime in which its minority (Alawi) dominated elite are vulnerable to attack and its opponents question the regime's

---

[60]Both these quotations are from Ajami, "The Arab Road," 125-126.

[61]Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 286.

[62]The quotation and the comments which followed are from Ibid.

235

Arabism.[63] Asad does seek public consensus on issues, and public opinion does

constrain regime options. According to Patrick Seale, Asad governs with two principles

in mind: "first was that he would allow no challenge to his rule, the second that wide

popular backing for his policies were nevertheless necessary."[64] It appears then that Asad

is aware of the importance of legitimacy and formulates policy with this in mind.

Until Camp David, the regime did attempt to satisfy a strong pro-Egyptian

public sentiment. The regime, under the Ba'th Party lost the Golan Heights, and it feels a

special responsibility to recover it without compromise. This issue remains, in large part,

due to the some 100,000 Syrians expelled from the area, who remain a permanent

constituency keeping the issue on the regime agenda. Syrian opinion sympathizes with

the Palestinian cause. Regime policy on core issues such as the Israeli conflict and

international alignments, largely reflects public opinion. According to Raymond

Hinnebusch, the commercial bourgeoisie would have liked to follow Sadat's course,

which would have opened the possibilities to greater prosperity and a lesser role for the

military and government in society. This segment of society also opposed the Soviet

alliance because of its conflict to its religious ideals and material interests. As mentioned

in chapter three and later emphasized through data available in the post-Cold War era,

this commercial bourgeoisie reflect primarily the Sunni population in Syria.[65] However,

---

[63]Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies," 391.

[64]Seale, 172.

[65]This analysis is fleshed out in chapter 7, but I believe that the correlation holds true during this time-frame for two reasons. First, chapter three discusses the Sunnis as the economic elite and, second, I do not see evidence of a great socioeconomic change from the Cold War to post-Cold War eras.

236

nonalignment seems to be the dominant trend in public opinion, yet the public considers ties with the Soviets to be indispensable.[66] As one Syrian merchant said, "our fears are as much over subversion by the Soviets or Americans or other Arabs, particularly the Iraqis, as they are about the Israelis....We all know the Israeli intentions, so it makes it easier to know how to deal with them...."[67] There was not a strong positive sentiment towards the Soviet Union vis a vis the United States. Prior to 1980, we see that Asad tries to assert his independence as much as possible in his "marriage of convenience" with the Soviets, as mentioned earlier.

Asad's use of the carrot and the stick as means to gain support of the population for his regime reflects his desire to legitimize and stabilize his regime. His actions and policies reflect his acknowledgment that his legitimacy and stability rely heavily on his ability to either mitigate or oppress ethnic divisiveness. For example, Asad publicly discharges Alawis who perform poorly, and he appoints non-Alawis to high-visibility positions; however, Alawis still hold the key positions. Asad takes steps to blur ethnic distinction, i.e. he changed the presidential oath, highlights his activities with the Islamic community, and encourages Islam leadership to portray Alawis as Muslims.[68] While Asad's work to improve relations with the majority Sunni sect has been somewhat successful, the tensions and periodic eruptions of violence demonstrate that the conflict is deep-rooted. The culminating event reflecting the ethnic divisions was the massacre of

---

[66]Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," 391.

[67]Mroz, 72.

[68]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 257.

237

the young army cadets at the Artillery School near Aleppo in June, 1979 by a fanatically

religious army captain. The captain was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his

actions resulted in a series of governmental reprisals.[69]

Asad is acutely aware of the perception of Alawi power domination.

Consequently, he responded to protests in 1973 concerning the constitution's omission

regarding the requirement for a Muslim president. Asad corrected this omission, only to

be confronted with the question of whether an Alawi was a Muslim. He answered this

question by appealing to a prominent Shi'i cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr, who declared that

the Alawis were Muslims.[70] He did have non-Alawi high officials in his regime. His

first three prime ministers were Sunni, but the clannish character of those in power was

evident.[71] Hanna Batatu describes this clannish nature, especially conspicuous during the

military build-up from 1979-1983:

> the ruling element consists at its core of a close kinship group which draws strength
> simultaneously, but in decreasing intensity, from a tribe, a sect-class, and an ecologic-
> cultural division of the people.[72]

Alasdair Drysdale claims that "the more threatened and vulnerable the regime, the

more it is cemented by primordial loyalties and the less it is united by a sense of

ideological mission."[73] Alawis do benefit from the regime's power structure, especially

---

[69]Mroz, 72.

[70]Seale, 173.

[71]Ibid., 182 and Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance," The Middle East Journal, 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 343.

[72]Batatu, 331.

[73]Drysdale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," 33.

238

through favoritism to one another. Of course, not every Alawi engages in such activity, but even the innocent Alawis are tainted by this behavior. The regime became more repressive as discontent mounted, which in turn, bred more discontent. Although Asad initially liberalized political life, he undermined the Party and gave more power to the military. To many Syrians during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 20,000-man Special Defense Forces led by Rifa't al-Asad, the President's brother, was a symbol of the illegitimacy of the regime. These forces, primarily Alawi in composition, are equipped with its own intelligence apparatus and the most modern equipment available. Moreover, it gave Rifa't al-Asad, who is known for his corruption and cruelty, a seemingly unchallenged power base. Rifa't al-Asad had once said that, "We are prepared to exterminate a million citizens in order to ensure the safety and defend the revolution."[74] The President tolerated his brother's behavior because it was these Defense Forces that provided the regime with vital protection.[75]

Syria's intervention in Lebanon sparked the first widespread indications of organized opposition to the Asad regime, when a series of bombings and assassinations struck prominent supporters of the regime. Nearly all these victims were Alawi.[76] In March 1980, massive demonstrations broke out in Aleppo, Hama, and Hums, where citizens not affiliated with brotherhood took to the streets to protest the violence, the lack of civil liberties, and the decreasing prospects for democracy. The regime would not

---

[74]Derek Hopwood, Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 64.

[75]Drysdale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," 33.

[76]Ibid., 34.

have lasted long if these large-scale demonstrations had continued. It was the regime's

military superiority which quelled these demonstrations.[77] The attack on the 60 artillery

academy cadets in June, 1979, in Aleppo and these subsequent demonstrations led to the

regime's dispatching 10,000 of its best troops. Two hundred Syrians lost their lives in

this confrontation.[78] The Voice of Lebanon reported that

> Our correspondent reports that three Soviet embassy officials were killed last
> Saturday when gunmen opened fire on them near the Aleppo Club. The Muslim
> Brotherhood issued a statement denying responsibility after having been accused by
> Syrian intelligence of having committed the incident. Our correspondent also reports
> that intelligence units in Latakia, Aleppo and Tartus have raided and blown up liquor
> stores. Curfew is still in force in Latakia, Aleppo and Tartus from 0600 to 1800.[79]

During this civil war, Asad also used patronage in its most extreme form: "In the heat of

the civil war, the regime risked the crassest abuses of patronage in an effort to improve

its security."[80]

The peak of the instabilities based on the population's resentment of Asad's

minority rule came in 1982. Early that year, Asad assaulted the city of Hama. Prior to

Asad's assault, the Muslim Brotherhood had killed the governor and several hundred

other officials. Asad's forces were 12,000-strong, and after three weeks of fighting with

artillery, tanks, and helicopters, 30,000 Sunnis lost their lives. One government official

---

[77]Yahya M. Sadowski, "Ba'thist Ethics and the Spirit of State Capitalism: Patronage and the Party in Contemporary Syria," in Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 177.

[78]Drysadale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," 34.

[79]"(Clandestine) Voice of Lebanon," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H2.

[80]Sadowski, 177.

240

claimed that "the city was reduced to the status of a village."[81] Pipes explains that

although the Muslim Brotherhood was defeated, the Sunni danger did not go away. In

other words, the illegitimacy of Asad's minority rule was ever-present, and Asad felt that

he needed at this point to increase his body guards to a 12,000 strong force.[82]

The timing of this domestic unrest and Asad's signing of the treaty is not pure

coincidence. In my view, Asad ran out of carrots as a means to gain consensus, and

instead, he resorted to repression. The treaty, as we will see in the next indicator section,

provided Asad with the means, i.e., sticks, to deal with this lack of legitimacy. Perhaps

his Lebanese foreign policy is what caused his carrot bankruptcy, and thus he resorted to

repression. Or perhaps, he ran out of economic carrots when further economic

liberalization challenged the existing Syrian social fabric and power structure. In any

case, the motivation behind the treaty might have stemmed from challenges Asad's

minority-ruled regime faced from the majority Sunni population.

How did external status affect Asad's decision to sign the treaty? As we saw in

the previous section, by 1980 Syria was regionally isolated. The Soviets understood the

diminishing status of Syria at this time. By the late 1970s, the Soviets were not pursuing

a bilateral treaty with Syria due to Syria's weakened domestic and regional status. As

Efraim Karsh claims, "A treaty with a confident and strong Syria that was playing a

leading role in the Arab world was one thing, but an accord with an isolated leader, who

---

[81]Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 182.

[82]Ibid., 183.

241

faced imminent threat of overthrow, was a completely different matter."[83] From 1979

onward, Syria pursued the treaty and supported Soviet causes, to include the unpopular

invasion of Afghanistan. The two countries, however, interpreted the treaty differently;

for Syria, the treaty was a means to redress a strategic imbalance due to Egypt's

abandonment (Asad's view) of the Arab cause. The Soviet Union viewed the treaty in

terms of crisis management, stressing its international, not bilateral, nature.[84] In any

case, it was not just the Syrians who recognized the fact that by 1979-1980, Syria had lost

a great deal of status both regionally, domestically, and perhaps globally. It would seem

that a treaty with a superpower could only enhance one's overall status.

Asad seemed eager to explain the regional benefits of this treaty as he stressed its

importance for Arabs, not just for Syrians:

> Thus, we consider this an Arab not a Syrian matter. That is, this treaty constitutes a
> source of strength as Arabs and not only as Syrians....The treaty stresses the increase
> of Syria's military capability, support for Syria and the Arabs in their just struggle
> against occupation, for the Palestinian question and the continued struggle against
> imperialism, Zionism and racism and support for Syria's policy and its position in the
> nonaligned movement and for other such stands.[85]

He further claims that the treaty is "an Arab and not a Syrian matter. That is, this treaty

constitutes a source of our strength as Arabs and not only as Syrians. A proof of the

importance of this treaty is the Israeli, U.S. and Egyptian attack."[86]

---

[83]Efraim Karsh, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Soviet Union and Asad's Syria," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 11, no. 4 (December 1980): 16.

[84]Ibid., 17-19.

[85]"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper," H16.

[86]Ibid.

Prior descriptions of high level Soviet visits to Syria stressed their regional

importance. The Damascus Domestic Service described a Soviet visit to Syria in terms

of its regional and international importance:

> This visit [of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko] comes at the invitation of the
> Syrian political leadership. This invitation clearly shows that the Soviet role in
> supporting and backing the Arab right is unlimited, since this role has strengthened
> the Arab position in the Middle East conflict and has provided the means for
> maintaining steadfastness and continuing the comprehensive battle of
> liberation....Indeed, Gromyko's visit to Damascus cannot be separated from the
> general framework of the extensive, effective Syrian move in the Arab and
> international arenas, a move aimed at entrenching the pan-Arab Confrontation and
> Steadfastness Front—which rejects the Camp David accords and the separate peace
> treaty—and strengthening the Arab nation's positions of attack while confronting the
> most savage Zionist-imperialist plots at this stage.[87]

For Asad, the treaty was an indication of Syria's increasing status both regionally and

globally.

Asad's ability to mix and match ideologies as a means for gaining support is not

surprising. For example, when Asad wanted to justify his actions in Lebanon he claimed

in an article, "Behind the News," in Tishrin, that

> Fraternal Lebanon is resisting the joint U.S. - Israeli pressure for normalization and
> subsequent capitulation...Syria's national stand today is a true translation of the will
> of the Arab people everywhere. The Arab masses cannot remain silent when a knife
> is being held at the throat of the Arab nation. The first Arab duty requires extending
> support to Lebanon, which is confronting the invaders and their schemes with deeds,
> not with words. It also requires backing up Syria's steadfastness. This is the first step
> on a long, difficult road that will eventually lead to the victory of Arab rights.[88]

The Damascus Domestic Service reported that Syria

> responded to Lebanon's request because of Syria's commitment to Arabism is its
> destiny, principle and creed. Now that our Arab people in Lebanon are suffering

---

[87]"Damascus Domestic Service," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H3.

[88]"Tishrin Scores Lack of Arab Support For Lebanon," FBIS, NES (4 January 1983): H1.

243

from the Zionist occupiers' injustice and viciousness, the principle and creed of pan-Arab Ba'th aspirations make the Syrian Arab forces presence in Lebanon more necessary than ever before.[89]

It is interesting that Asad stresses Arabism in this case. One must wonder how he justified his support of the Maronite Christians? Of course, Asad even found a way to explain his support of the Maronites. He claimed that his intervention on the side of the Maronites was to preserve the Arab cause in the face of misguided adherents.[90]

He also understood the importance of Islam as a legitimizing force. He assured the Arab Muslim states, as well as the Muslims in Syria that his alliance with the atheistic state of the USSR did not reflect a commitment to its values.[91] Additionally, he emphasized Islam as the justification for his support for Iran vis a vis his Arab neighbor, Iraq. Asad congratulates Iran's Bani-Sadr:

> I would like to express my confidence that the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with the common struggle against imperialism and Zionism that we are waging together for the sake of the issues of all peoples, will become, even stronger. I would like to express my confidence that the Iranian Islamic Revolution's support for the Arab issues and the holy Palestinian issue, support which we highly appreciate, will remain one of the foundations of Iranian policy.[92]

Asad responds to his support of Iran, and is asked whether Iran reproaches him for his treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood.

> Why should Khomeyni reproach us because of that? Islam is one thing and the Muslim Brotherhood is another. The Muslim Brotherhood is nothing but a party

---

[89]"Al-Ba'th: Syrian Presence in Lebanon Necessary," FBIS, NES (19 November 1982): H2.

[90]Michael C. Hudson, The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 267.

[91]Hopwood, 76.

[92]"Al-Asad Congratulates Iran's Bani-Sadr," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H5.

bearing that name...We will permit none to speak alone in the name of Islam, and most of all not the Muslim Brotherhood.[93]

It will be interesting to see if these relations will remain stable in the context of the on-going peace process (but that is another dissertation). In any case, he is well aware of the importance of status evidenced by his careful use of ideology as a means to rally support, both internally and externally.

It appears that Asad is well aware of and concerned about his regime's internal and external status. He views the treaty as a means to gain regional and global recognition. However, internally, his illegitimacy breeds further dissension. Drysdale tells us that

> Syria's 'illegitimacy' has had at least two major consequences. First, supra-and sub-national political loyalties have often been stronger than national loyalties, and this has impeded national unity. Second, there has seldom been a clear distinction between the foreign and domestic....[94]

Perhaps then, Asad is looking to use the treaty with the Soviets as a means to gain consensus at home. Interestingly, he seems to only use non-Alawis in the press. The primary high officials named are the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam; Ba'th Party assistant secretary general, 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, and the deputy commander - in - chief of the army and the armed forces and defense minister, Gen Mustafa Talas. The press links many of the Soviet visits to the Ba'th party, and specifically to 'Abdallah al-Ahmar.[95] Perhaps using non-Alawis to punctuate Syrian

---

[93]"Yugoslav Paper Rilindja Interviews President Al-Asad," FBIS, NES (29 August 1979): H4-H5.

[94]Drysadale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," 35.

[95]See "Ba'th Party Delegation to Visit GDR, USSR," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H2; FBIS, "Ba'th Moroccan Socialist Party Delegations Hold Talks," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H2; "Ba'th

245

foreign policy, Asad hopes to gain some domestic, Sunni support for those policies. As

mentioned in chapter three, Asad does use his non-Alawi officials as a means to bolster

Sunni support for his regime. Perhaps also, by associating the Ba'th Party with a

superpower, the U.S.S.R., Asad hoped to bolster the Party's status. The decision to sign

the treaty appears to have been influenced by both external, as well as internal events,

and clearly, those internal events, or the internal dissension fueled by Syrian ethnic

divisions, played a key role in that decision.

Issue: Human and Nonhuman Resources

The elite attitudes described above indicate that the Alawis in charge of security

and the armed forces received the most benefits from the treaty. Economic liberalization

did not blossom with Syria's partnership with the communist U.S.S.R.; therefore, it

appears that the economic elite or the Sunnis were not the key beneficiaries. In fact,

many Sunnis died as a result of the increased military hardware as a result of the treaty.

As explained above, Asad ruthlessly used this equipment on his own Sunni population.

The beneficiaries of human and nonhuman resources from the treaty will be more evident

in the following sections.

Official Receives Visiting Soviet Delegation," FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H4; FBIS, "Defense Minister Meets with USSR Deputy Minister," FBIS, NES (17 March 1982): H1; "Foreign Minister Khaddam Returns From Iran," FBIS, NES (17 March 1982): H1; "Damascus Reports Khaddam's Cyprus Speech," FBIS, NES (20 July 1982): H2, and "FRG Foreign Minister, Economic Delegation Meet," FBIS, NES (28 August 1979): H1.

Indicator: Foreign Aid and Trade

As with my earlier case, I combined the foreign aid and trade categories because they will help us understand the economic imperative, or lack thereof, in light of the issue areas described in chapter one's table 1. This indicator will focus more on military aid than on economic aid because as we have already discussed, Asad's focus was on the military, and as this next section will show, the treaty focused on military aid. We must determine if that military aid was directed for internal and/or external security. Was there a particular group in society that benefited from this aid? My data for this section come from a variety of sources and documents. If my hypotheses are correct, we will see ethnic divisiveness as a factor driving Asad's decision to sign the treaty. It is important to note how Asad deals with the domestic unrest, which we have established as a manifestation of the Alawi-Sunni divide.

Issue: Security and Territory

As Asad faced internal opposition, as well as a declining regional position in the late 1970s, i.e., with his adversarial position vis a vis Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the PLO, to include Syria's involvement in Lebanon, Asad sought Soviet aid during his visit to Moscow in October 1979. At that time, the Soviets forgave $500 million of Syria's debt and the two countries reached their largest arms deal to date. As a result, Syria received approximately 1,400 tanks (including advanced T-72s), 200 combat aircraft (including Mig-25s), 2,000b armored vehicles, and 1,700 artillery pieces. In order to demonstrate

247

its goodwill towards the Soviets, Syria agreed to support the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, which was a very unpopular stand in the Arab world.[96]

Syria's military build-up from 1979-1983 was a response to internal (Muslim

Brotherhood) and external (Lebanon and Camp David Accords) reasons. Perhaps it also

reflected the domination of Alawis in the ruling coalition.[97] During that time, the

military and security forces mushroomed. From 1979-1983, Syria was the leading

weapons importer of the Third World. The number of soldiers in the regular army

increased from 200,000 in 1979 to 300,000 in 1984. The reserves increased from

100,000 to 270,000 in that same time period.[98] Rif'at al-Asad, Asad's brother,

commanded the 50,000-man Defense Companies. These units possessed the finest

equipment, their own intelligence services, their own uniforms, better pay than the other

services, and engaged in smuggling operations.[99] It was Rif'at's forces, however, that

took part in the bloody destruction of Hama in 1982, which caused them to be feared and

hated by Alawis and non-Alawis alike.[100]

After 1980, one of Rif'at al-Asad's more powerful lieutenants, 'Adnan Makhluf (an

Alawi), assumed command of a newly formed Presidential Guard consisting of 10,000

elite troops stationed in central Damascus. In addition, such covert organizations as

---

[96]Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 157.

[97]Fred H. Lawson, "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 14, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 6-8.

[98]Ibid., p. 8.

[99]Alasdair Drysdale, "The Succession Question in Syria," The Middle East Journal, 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 248.

[100]Ibid.

248

Military Intelligence (al-Mukhabarat al-'Askariyyah), Air Force Intelligence (Mukhabarat al-Quwwah al-Jawiyyah), and Political Security (al-Amn al-Siyassi) broadened the scope of their operations. Military Intelligence infiltrated political associations banned by the regime, including medical and engineering professions, as well as the diplomatic service.[101]

According to Anthony H. Cordesman, "Syrian intelligence seems biased toward peacetime political problems rather than toward the support of combat operations. The transfer of technical intelligence to operational units remains poor...."[102] This point greatly contrasts with Sadat's trusted use of his military intelligence for operational purposes in the 1973 war. Asad seems to only trust such intelligence with his Alawi praetorian guard.

Black Shirt units formed in the Alawi regions of Latakia and Tartus, which were state sanctioned private organizations led by Asad's brother, Jamil. This larger use of military and paramilitary forces at home coincided with the massive build-up of the Syrian armed forces in the late 1970s, following the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel. Syria's number of main battle tanks went from 2300 to 4050, and its helicopters from 56 to 148. Syria was leading third world country in weapons importing, and by 1979, Syria spent $4.7 billion on the military which was 16% of GDP. In 1984, military spending reached 16.7% GDP.[103] During this year, military spending reached 24

---

[101]Lawson, 7.

[102]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 278.

[103]Lawson, 8.

249

billion Syrian pounds, which was the value of the entire Syrian GDP in 1980. This military build-up made the military the most dynamic, if not the largest, sector of the Syrian economy.[104]

The military hardware found its way to both those forces dealing with internal security, i.e. Rifa't al-Asad's units, as well as the regular armed forces. This military build-up of both these types of forces indicates an external, as well as internal security concern. During this time of military build-up, there was a marked increase of the regime's use of the state security forces to suppress domestic uprisings. For example, in March 1980, commandos belonging to the Special Units (al-Wahdat al Khassah) surrounded the northern town of Jisr al-Shughur and forcibly suppressed demonstrations directed against local headquarters of the Ba'th Party and the People's Army. Furthermore, the Special Units used its helicopter-borne paratroopers in Hamah in late April 1981 hunting for a team of Mujahidin (holy warriors) that ambushed a checkpoint outside the city. In order to perform these missions, the Special Units were doubled in size during the early 1980s, reaching a peak of almost 8000 in 1982-83.[105] As we have already discussed, other such operations occurred within Syria between 1979 and culminating in1982 with the massacre in Hama.

As mentioned earlier, Syria and the USSR had different interpretations of the treaty. Syria considered the treaty as a Soviet guarantee for Syria's security, and the Soviets viewed the treaty as a crisis management tool and downplayed any bilateral traits.

---

[104]Ibid., 11.

[105]Ibid., 7.

250

The treaty was tested twice within the following six months. In November 1980, Syria

threatened to invade Jordan to destroy Muslim Brotherhood sanctuaries; however,

Moscow feared that hostilities would provoke an Israeli intervention, so Moscow worked

hard to contain the crisis. In April 1981, a missile crisis in Lebanon threatened a Syrian-

Israeli confrontation, which the Soviets did not want. As the Syrians soon found out,

however, the Soviets would not match the U.S. aid provided to the Israelis. While the

United States signed a Memorandum of Strategic Understanding in November 1981, the

Soviets rejected Syrian requests to respond in kind.[106]

It took the confrontation in Lebanon to spur the massive military build-up

between 1982-1984. The Soviets provided Syria with 800 T-72 tanks, 160 fighter aircraft

which included MIG-23s and MIG-27s, SAM-5s, SAM-6s, SAM-9s, SSC-1 and SS-21

missiles, APCs, guns, and rocket launchers (please see table 10 for a summary of military

hardware build-up). Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev, favored closer military

ties with Syria and provided it with weapons never before available to Third World

countries. With this technologically advanced weaponry, however, came an increase of

required Soviet advisor presence and less autonomy for the Syrians. Consequently, Syria

could no longer consider initiating hostilities. Under Chernenko and Gorbachev,

relations became even more tense.[107] We will explore this changing relationship in the

next chapter.

---

[106]Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 157-158.

[107]Ibid., 159-161.

251

<u>Issue: Status</u>

According to Fouad Ajami, "Syria's main asset, in contrast to Egyptian pre-eminence and Saudi wealth, is its capacity for mischief. Its location in relation to Israel, its Soviet connection, its army, and its presence in Lebanon and therefore its hold on the PLO give Syria a measure of power."[108] For Syria, this treaty provided the means for it to achieve mischief, and, thus, enhance its power.

As discussed earlier, Syria wanted to achieve strategic parity with Israel. Asad realized that he needed the superpowers, but with the United States firmly in the Israeli camp cemented by the Camp David Accords, he had to look towards the Soviets. When he was asked if the superpowers were necessary to have peace, Asad said, "Nobody can ignore the big powers. For this reason I would like to see not only the big powers participate in this solution but the whole world."[109] Unattributed commentary from Damascus Domestic Service on Asad's visit to Moscow reported the following: "Arab considerations with regard to this visit lie in freeing the region from the grip of the Camp David accords and bolstering Syria's defense capabilities in order to achieve a strategic balance."[110]

Perhaps Asad's ties with the Soviets at this time helped to achieve some international status because he had lost status on a regional level. His quest for strategic parity had its ups and downs, and he realized he could not gain parity through a regional

---

[108]Ajami, 125.

[109]"Yugoslav Paper Rilindja Interviews President Al-Asad," H9.

[110]"Damascus Radio on Significance of Al-Asad's Visit to Moscow," FBIS, NES (16 October 1979): H1.

coalition. In 1978 Syria did attempt to build an Iraqi-Syrian alliance to counterbalance

Israel. This endeavor eventually failed. Other events such as the end of Iraqi-Syrian

unity in 1979, Syrian support for the unpopular Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and

Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 which led to Saudi Arabian requests for U.S. assistance, all

contributed to Syria's view of an ever-expanding U.S. sponsored peace process. As a

result, Syria rejected the idea of an Arab coalition to balance Israel and, instead, sought

strategic parity by itself and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the

Soviet Union.[111]

One may argue that Asad's bolstering of his internal security forces secured some

status for himself because he was able to, albeit cruelly, repress the domestic uprisings.

Once the domestic uprisings ceased, he perhaps was in a better position to deal with

other states both in the regional and global contexts.

Issue: Human and Nonhuman Resources

Syria's relationship with the Soviets is primarily based on its need for military

wares. Asad's emphasis on the military build-up beginning in the late 1970s has caused

him to set aside many developmental projects. Asad, however, from 1970 to 1976 did

improve the economy with his limited privatization.[112] The 1970s had a vast

improvement of growth rate as compared to the 1960s. Syria, which had been an

agriculturally based economy until 1970, by 1973 had an economy in which the

---

[111]Nadav Safran, "Dimensions of the Middle East Problem," in Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, ed. Roy C. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 410-411.

[112]Valerie Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria, and Israel (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), 144-148.

253

commercial, mining and manufacturing sectors took the lead. While the growth rate in

the 1960s was 5.7 percent, it increased to 9 percent during the 1970s. The reasons for

this increase were, as mentioned earlier, the privatization and the increase in oil

production and exports. It is important to note that the growth rate was far from

consistent on an annual basis. Trade increased from 20 percent of the GDP in 1970 to

23.7 percent in 1977-1980. Mining and industry increased from 12.6 percent in 1963 to

18 percent in 1980. Interestingly, the state sector also increased, from 10.2 percent in

1963 to 16 percent in 1970-1980.[113]

The growth of the economy in the 1970s may be partly due to Asad's economic

policy, a Syrian version of infitah, which expanded the scope of the bourgeoisie and

merchant class in particular. As compared to its Egyptian counterpart, however, Syria's

open-door policy remained limited. In Syria, the state still had the key role in industry

and foreign trade even as it opened the country to the world market. In other words,

Syrian infitah was actually a tremendous program of public economic investment. The

October War and the political and economic changes following the war provided the

financing for this program. Syria did well financially because of the Arab petrodollar

assistance and profits due to the rise in oil prices. Also, Syria took advantage of the

readily available cheap credit during the 1970s from the international money market.[114]

---

[113]Kais Firro, "The Syrian Economy Under the Assad Regime," in Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 44-45.

[114]Volker Perthes, "The Syrian Economy in the 1980s," Middle East Journal, 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 37-38.

254

This combination of inegalitarianism and authoritarianism was not accidental; rather, it reflected the political, social, and economic interests of the dominant social forces. These dominating forces included alliance among the top of the civil and military bureaucracy, as well as with the new, and parts of the old, commercial bourgeoisie. It was this alliance of the old and new elites that helps explain the limits Asad placed on the liberalization program. Too much liberalization would have led to greater political reform and greater popular participation. Instead, Asad limited privatization of public resources, so as to favor the commercial bourgeoisie, while the rest of society bore the burdens of an ineffective economy.[115] As we discussed in chapter three and in the previous indicator section, this limited liberalization was a carrot for Asad to use broaden his support among Sunnis.

According to Kais Firro,

There is no one conclusion that can be drawn from this study of the Syrian economy over the years of the Assad regime. The country's economic performance between 1970 and 1984 has been both positive and negative. In terms of economic growth, agricultural development, the establishment of new industries and oil revenues, the Syrian economy has made relative progress. These achievements, though, were counterbalanced by balance of payments difficulties, budget deficits, and certain other negative performances, throwing the country into a period of recession, particularly in the past four years [1980-1984].[116]

By 1976, Syria began to suffer from balance of payments deficit, which seemed to have stemmed from the West's abrupt withholding of aid, a bad harvest, and a decrease of oil revenues.[117] However, by the end of the decade, Asad could still feel satisfied with an

---

[115]Ibid., 56.

[116]Firro, 65.

[117]Ibid., 59 and 62.

255

economy that had a growth rate of the GDP of 8 percent over the previous ten years, and

Syria's economy was beginning the new decade of the 1980s with twice the volume it had

in 1970.[118]

Syria has been dependent on aid from the oil-rich Arab states, although this aid

has not been consistent. The Arab states at the Bagdad Conference in 1978 pledged

$1,850 million per year for ten years for Syria's military effort; however, the recession

and the Arab states' disapproval of Asad's support for Iran vis a vis Iraq resulted in a

lower amount of aid. In 1983, due to Syria's role in terrorism and its 1980 friendship

treaty, the United States halted all aid to Syria. The European Community and individual

European states also reduced their aid for Syria. Due to Syria's slow rate of

developmental projects, multilateral institutions have withheld aid. The USSR followed

up its friendship treaty with an agreement to increase bilateral trade to approximately

$2,600 million for five years ending in 1985, which was renewed for another five years in

1985. The Soviets were involved with Syria's transport, oil, phosphate, agriculture, and

power generation industries and the search for water reserves. In 1980, socialist

countries accounted for 16.1 percent of Syria's exports, and, in 1986, they accounted for

46.4 percent of the exports. However, Syria's exports did decline between 1980 and 1986

due to both a decline in oil prices and volume of exports. There was also a decline in the

value of imports from 1981's 19,781 million Syrian pounds to 1985's 15,570 million

Syrian pounds. In 1986 the value of imports declined by 31.9 percent to 10,611 million

---

[118]Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1979-1980, eds. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel
Dishon (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981), 780.

Syrian pounds.[119] Please see table 12 for further breakdown of Syria's imports and

exports by country.

Syria's focus on military development reflected the regime's reliance on the army

"as the single most important source of legitimacy and to the high level of military

involvement in Syrian domestic politics. There was , however, a price paid for the

government's increased military spending: a relative decline in welfare spending."[120]

Estimates put Syria's military spending at 50 percent of its central government budget.

Military growth stifled any economic expansion. During the 1980s, military spending

was 8-23 percent of the GNP and 35-70 percent of the central government's

expenditures.[121] It was only due to Soviet military assistance and Kuwaiti aid that Syria

could sustain high levels of imports during the early 1980s.[122]

Syria, however, always relied on external aid, even during the limited

liberalization in the 1970s. This reliance grew somewhat more apparent when Syria had

to rely on itself. The decline in Arab aid from about US $1.3 - 1.8 billion a year between

1979 and 1983 to US $600 - 700 million in subsequent years significantly affected the

Syrian economy. Although Iran tried to compensate for the loss of Arab aid, it could not

equal the Arab countries' reduced financial support. Even during the height of Arab aid

---

[119]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995), 848 and 854.

[120]Zeev Ma'oz, "The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984,"in Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 74.

[121]Cordesman, 260.

[122]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995, 260-261.

in the early 1980s, Syria still suffered from an unsatisfactory output of its state industries, their high dependency on imported material, the increased need for agricultural imports, and the ever-widening gap in Syria's trade balance. The economic strategies developed during the 1970s depended on foreign aid. According to Volker Perthes, "When from 1983 on it was forced to rely partly on its own resources, Syria's economy revealed its structural deficits."[123]

From 1970 to 1982, Syria exhibited one of the highest population growth rates (3.4 percent) increasing from 6.3 million to 9.66 million, respectively.[124] Please see table 11. Even with this population burden, Asad still invested heavily in the military vis a vis developmental projects. Who benefited from this practice? As we have seen,

> the Syrian army remains the guarantor of the Assad regime....[and there is a] pervasive presence of Alawis throughout the armed services. They occupy key positions in every major element of the army, and constitute the true command and control network, bypassing (when necessary) the official unit commanders. Although the army has been infrequently used for domestic purposes [except from 1979-1982], it retains a primary capability for regime security.[125]

The treaty benefited the regime's survival and those people interested in that survival, namely the Alawis and those Sunnis who had been co-opted. The economic effects of the treaty cannot be specifically determined other than to note that the economy declined in the 1980s after the signing of the treaty. While no leader wants a downturn in his or her economy, the treaty seemed to indicate a focus on the health of the military, rather than the economy. Tables 10 and 11 indicate the beginnings of this trend, as punctuated

---

[123]Perthes, "The Syrian Economy in the 1980s," 57.

[124]Firro, 37.

[125]McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 284.

258

by the preceding discussion. According to R.D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis W.

Snider, any developmental projects during this time were for the benefit of the Alawis:

> With Syria under Alawi control, disproportionate attention was paid to their welfare
> - internal investment and foreign assistance projects were heavily oriented toward the
> improvement of the Alawi area around Latakia, and a disproportionate number of
> Alawis constituted the bulk of Syrian students permitted to study overseas. Alawis
> continue to follow military careers in large numbers, and under Assad they continue
> to hold virtually all real power in the country. The special forces, defense companies,
> and intelligence arms of the military are predominantly Alawi as is the
> mukhabarat.[126]

Chapter seven will show an Asad with an eye on the economy. While it is difficult to

assess the Syrian economy, as mentioned earlier, it appears that there was a decline; this

downturn in the Syrian economy during the 1980s may have caused Asad to refocus his

efforts as the Persian Gulf War approached. This is a matter for chapter seven.

---

[126]Ibid., 256-257.

TABLE 10

TRENDS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DOLLARS: SYRIA[127]

(U.S. Dollars)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Main Battle Tanks		2600			3990		4100
Combat Aircraft		389			450		503
Arms Imports (in current $)	120	0	3200		2600		2200
Military Expenditure		1463	1936	1959	2289	3340	3462

[127]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 256.

260

TABLE 11

ECONOMIC DATA: SYRIA[128]

	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983	1984
GNP per capita (U.S. $)	390	460	890	1,010	1,240	1,660	1,640	1,580
Population (thousands)	6,475	6,942	7,438	7,959	8,510	9,101	9,745	10,091
GDP (billions of Syrian pounds)	8.04	9.95	20.60	27.01	38.97	65.78	73.29	75.34

---

[128]The Middle East and North Africa, 1987 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 769.

261

TABLE 12

PRINCIPLE TRADING PARTNERS: SYRIA[129]

(Syrian Pounds, millions)

	Imports				Exports		
	1982	1983	1984		1982	1983	1984
Belgium	284.5	291.5	326.1	Austria	.4	113.5	0.7
China, PRC	292.2	272.9	14.3	France	773.1	769.2	876.8
Czechoslovakia	354.4	324.7	212.5	GDR	118.2	123.3	83.3
France	920.7	1,355.7	824.2	Germany	135.6	84.3	146.0
GDR	271.9	394.9	685.0	Greece	314.1	70.5	89.9
Germany	916.0	1,511.9	947.7	Iran	161.5	402.9	163.7
Greece	270.5	294.3	223.6	Italy	2,461.2	1,212.5	1,438.2
Iran	3,094.0	4,661.5	3,664.8	Jordan	89.5	133.9	78.0
Iraq	1,159.4	0.1	0.0	NE	174.2	68.3	4.1
Italy	956.2	1,293.2	773.0	RA	1,667.1	2,240.8	2,053.3
Japan	710.2	1,198.2	749.4	SA	134.4	115.3	138.7
Netherlands(NE)	365.4	449.2	455.5	Spain	13.1	274.4	240.2
Romania(RA)	441.6	332.0	409.0	USSR	898.6	811.2	837.6
Saudi Arabia(SA)	983.0	26.1	34.5				
Spain	425.6	363.9	431.3				
USSR	315.9	471.4	558.2				
United Kingdom	351.4	424.7	478.7				
USA	646.4	779.2	556.6				
TOTAL (incl others)	15,757.2	17,828.7	16,154.5		7,953.6	7,547.5	7,274.8

---

[129]The Middle East and North Africa, 1987 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 769.

262

Indicator: Treaty and Agreements

I have already discussed this indicator in terms of the issues of security and territory, as well as human and nonhuman resources. The treaty and the agreements which followed were primarily military in nature.

Preliminary Conclusions

As with the Egyptian case, we must realize that the issues in our framework are interrelated. Syria's involvement in Lebanon is as complex as any policy could ever get, and it highlights the interrelationship of the issues. As we have seen, this complexity is a result of the interconnection among the issues described here, namely that of security, territory, and status. It also involves relations with states within the region, as well as the superpowers. Finally, Asad's Lebanese policy also involves domestic considerations. What does all this mean for Asad's foreign policy calculations? As cited earlier, Yahya Sadowski remarked that Syria has been

> balancing relations with the USSR by an 'opening' to the West, supporting the Palestinians while not provoking an Israeli assault, and proceeding with the 'socialist transformation' at home while steadily strengthening ties to the monarchies of the Arab Gulf.

Shlomo Avineri claimed that, "Syria is at the moment a status quo power, despite its belligerent and radical public image."[130] Basically, compared to Sadat, Asad follows a much more constrained and cautious foreign policy. He cannot afford to take risks, because, unlike Sadat he does not enjoy a wealth of legitimacy due to the ethnically divided nature of his state.

---

[130]Both quotations are from Ajami, "The Arab Road," 125-126.

263

My research shows that Asad, indeed, must consider the effects of these ethnic

divisions as he plans his foreign policy moves. The elite attitudes demonstrate for us

how Asad's actions towards other states reflect his motives for undermining his enemies

at home, i.e., his actions towards Jordan were based on destroying Muslim Brotherhood

sanctuaries. The timing of the treaty and the tremendous unrest at home, culminating

with the massacre at Hama is not a coincidence. Clearly, Asad could not ignore and did

not ignore his internal enemies. Perhaps the treaty with a superpower could help him

gain legitimacy on a global level to help make up for the legitimacy he was losing at

home. We saw that Asad takes great pains in justifying his actions to his global, regional,

and domestic audiences. He uses a mixture of carrots and sticks to build support for his

regime. He does want a public consensus; this matters to him, but he will not tolerate

challenges to his regime's survival.

The foreign aid and trade indicator demonstrated the treaty's role in not only

building his regular forces, but more importantly strengthening his security forces - his

praetorian guard. When T-72s, helicopters, and artillery pieces are making their way to

the forces earmarked for regime security, then, in my view, there is evidence that the

leadership is concerned about its survival. The treaty ensured that Asad could

successfully thwart the challenges to his minority-ruled regime. Additionally, the

Alawis as a sect control the military, so it was mainly members of that sect who benefited

from the treaty.

The treaty focused on military wares, not economic tools. Developmental

projects were put on hold, and we saw a glimpse of the downturn the economy will take

264

in the 1980s; however, as Kais Firro claims, "There is no one conclusion that can be drawn from this study of the Syrian economy over the years of the Assad regime."[131] The key point, however, is twofold. First, the Syrian economic situation was not as pressing as the Egyptian economic situation described in the last chapter. For Asad, the economy did not pose a threat, but Asad still felt his regime under fire because of the ethnic divisions in his country. Consequently, he took action in the foreign policy realm to quell that threat. Second, it is interesting that while his economy was sound, as compared with Egypt's economy, it did not mitigate the ethnic divisions even when he tried to liberalize the economy. The ethnic divisions still came to the fore. Sadat, however, in the midst of a crumbling economy was still able to rely on the sense of national unity stemming from ethnic homogeneity to pursue bold foreign policy. While we cannot hold the economic variable constant for these two countries for the purposes of analysis, I think these Cold War era cases reveal the criticality of ethnic divisions versus ethnic homogeneity. One leader, Sadat, was able to rely on a reservoir of legitimacy due to ethnic homogeneity even while facing grave economic conditions, as he pursued purposeful foreign policy decisions. The other leader, Asad, who did not face such grave economic conditions, still had to address the problems of a Sunni majority in his minority, Alawi-ruled regime. Asad's lack of legitimacy due to ethnic strife seems to have led him towards a policy of caution and careful calculation that helped him address his internal security concerns. The economy did not seem to play a key part in his alignment with the Soviets. Will the economic factor become more prominent in the post-Cold War era for Asad? Chapter

---

[131] Firro, 65.

seven will help us determine this point when we examine Syria's alignment decision concerning the Persian Gulf War.

While the data on Syria were not as plentiful as those on Egypt, the combination of primarily observations and analyses from field experts, as well as some interviews and press releases reveal that while Asad did have external security concerns, he also had to worry about regime survival because of the ethnic divisions that precluded a national loyalty in the midst of his minority ruled regime. He is a clever ruler and, so far, has been able to maneuver within the tight constraints placed on him. In chapter seven, we will analyze his alignment decision without the cold war era framework. Will the post-cold war era framework lessen or increase these constraints?

CHAPTER 6

POST-COLD WAR CASE - EGYPT

Introduction

We will now turn to Egypt's post-Cold War alignment, that is its alignment with

the Persian Gulf War coalition. I want to make three points before we begin this case.

First, this case is difficult to present because it is essentially our null set case. In other

words, as we try to answer hypothesis #7, we will be examining how the lack of ethnic

divisiveness (or, rather the positive effect of ethnic homogeneity) influenced Mubarak's

pro-coalition alignment decision. What will become clear, however, is how another

domestic variable, the state of the Egyptian economy, influenced Mubarak's foreign

policy behavior. While Mubarak's pro-coalition alignment was not as surprising as

Sadat's realignment decision discussed in chapter four, Mubarak nevertheless took a pro-

U.S. stance in the midst of an opposition that was anti-West and in the face of short term

economic costs that would be felt throughout the population. Even in the face of such a

seemingly unpopular decision, Mubarak had relatively strong support among his elite,

the opposition parties, and the people. His cooperative approach towards the United

States, and to some extent towards Israel, was much different than Asad's antagonistic

approach towards both the United States and Israel. We will examine these differences.

Second, we will reference the peace process, as we will do for chapter seven's Syrian

267

case, not only because of its immediacy after the crisis, but also because the Egyptian leadership, throughout the crisis, looked beyond it and planned for the post-Gulf War period. Finally, we will also begin our examination of the systemic variable for this decision, described in hypothesis #5.

Background

In 1981, Mubarak outlined his guiding principles for both domestic and foreign policy, and we will see their interrelationship throughout this case. Specifically, the economy seems to be linked with almost every aspect of Egyptian policy. When Mubarak assumed the presidency in 1981, he wanted to provide economic benefits to the poor. He wanted the continuation of the infitah, but with the focus on production, not consumption. Food subsidies, the root cause of the food riots, would remain. Politically, he wanted to uphold the peace with Israel, while keeping the door open to other Arab states. Derek Hopwood explains that

> Sadat's death was a warning to Egypt to "cleanse itself of the plague of religious extremism." This could only be achieved with social justice. "Egypt is for all society - not a privileged few or the chosen elite...." Opposition parties would be allowed but opposition should be about "differences not conflict, without creating confusion; it should be an exchange of views not an exchange of accusations."[1]

Mubarak, as we will see, could not talk about domestic policy without talking about foreign policy, and vice versa. Let's first turn to foreign policy by examining its regional and global contexts.

---

[1]Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1990 (Oxford: HarperCollinsAcademic, 1991), 184

Mubarak's main success in the first five years was restoring balance in Egypt's foreign policy. He restored ties with the Soviets, and he gradually worked his way back into the Arab world. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war did much to pull Egypt into the Arab camp because of Mubarak's support of the Arab state of Iraq. The war deflected attention from Egypt's treaty with Israel, and Egypt made the case that there were other threats to the Arab region, besides Israel. Mubarak's assistance to Iraq with military aid and civilian workers was important for Egypt's acceptance in the Arab world because it was Iraq that had hosted the Arab summit in 1978 and led the Arab boycott of Egypt. Also, Egypt advocated a renewal of ties with the PLO and supported an international peace conference, which brought it in line with the Arab consensus.[2] In January 1984, Egypt was readmitted to the Islamic Conference Organization. In November 1987, Iraq and Morocco restored ties with Egypt, and in 1989, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia gave his approval to Egypt by visiting Cairo. In May 1989, at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca, Mubarak said, "The Arab people of Egypt are very happy in the unification of the ranks after separation." The Arab League headquarters returned to Cairo, and ties with Syria resumed.[3]

This feat was not without its challenges. Egypt lost regional status when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, which led to Egypt's withdrawal of its ambassador from Tel Aviv. The Egyptian Foreign Minister claimed that any Israeli action towards another Arab country affected Israeli and Egyptian normalization. The Minister's remark about

---

[2]Gregory Aftandilian, Political Change in the Arab World: A Report on the Deliberations of a Meetings Program Conference at the Council of Foreign Relations, 24 April 1992, 27-28.

the invasion was that "Normalization was no longer normal." Moreover, the strategic

pact between Israel and the United States further made this time period for Mubarak, "a

catastrophe for him and a humiliation before other Arabs."[4]

With the massacres of Palestinians by Christian Lebanese unhindered by Israeli

forces, Egypt's relations with the United States were ninety percent frozen. A cold peace

followed. Israel's continued settlement in the occupied territories, repression of the

Palestinian infitada on the West Bank and in Gaza, and the influx of Soviet Jews angered

Mubarak. When the Palestinian National Council in November 1988 decided to

announce the establishment of a Palestinian state revealing a guarded recognition of

Israel, Mubarak called for a peace conference with the PLO, the United States, and Israel.

While the United States did talk with the PLO, Israel would not follow suit. Again,

Mubarak was embarrassed by Israel's actions. Hopwood contends that "all these Israeli

actions embarrassed Mubarak, although to date, despite opposition and external Arab

pressure, he has refused to go back on the peace treaty."[5] Perhaps, this refusal reflects a

certain amount of risk Mubarak accepted in order to reap, as we will soon see, economic

benefits from the United States.

Harold H. Saunders believes that Mubarak realized that he would have more

influence with the United States and Israel if he had a greater leadership role in the

region. This added influence could compensate for Egypt's lack of military power

---

[3]Hopwood, 192.

[4]Ibid., 190.

[5]Ibid., 191.

270

relative to Israel by making it a key leader of a wider political base for an eventual peace

in the region. The Egyptians, by the mid-1980s, realized that they needed this broader

political base to be an effective player in regional negotiations. Egypt had failed to

negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians during the post-Camp David era. Saunders claims

that the Egyptians "recognized the need to build the Arab negotiating group with

Jordanians and Palestinians that we Americans failed to assemble after Camp David. By

late 1984, they had made progress in paving the way for their own reentry to the Arab

world." Mubarak was a key player in the [King] Hussein-Arafat negotiations, and he

helped to bring the United States back to the negotiation table with the Jordanian-

Palestinian delegation.[6]

On the global level, the Cold War era came to a close. The collapse of the Soviet

Union was not viewed favorably among Arab governments for three primary reasons.

First, the Arabs viewed the Soviet Union as a supporter of Arabs in general and

Palestinians in particular. Second, the Soviet Union allowed pro-West governments that

had ties with it to project a non-alignment stand. Third, the Cold War rivalry benefitted

many Arab governments by "allowing individual states the room to maneuver politically

in regional and world politics."[7] Finally, as a result of the above points, many Arab

leaders see the need for regional cooperation because

> The emergence of the United States as the sole superpower has elicited fears in the
> Arab world that a new 'Victorian' age is dawning, a reference to the late nineteenth
> century, when Britain was the dominant naval power and Muslims began to lose their

___

[6]Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
(Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), 103-104.

[7]Aftandilian, 16.

271

independence. One fear is that, in the absence of the USSR, the Arab world will be forced to follow the dictates of the United States; on the other hand, some Arabs fear that the West, without constantly worrying about Soviet competition, will pay less attention to their concerns.[8]

The end of the Cold War has contributed to a new sense of "pragmatism" for the Arab states in their dealings concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute. According to Gregory Aftandilian, this pragmatism may be a good sign for the current peace process. Aftandilian claims, however, that

> A more salient development, which has occurred over the past several years, is the ideological change in the Arab world. Pan-Arabism and secular Arab nationalism have been replaced by a narrower State nationalism on the one hand, and by an Islamic nationalism, which transcends state and ethnic boundaries, on the other hand.....It remains to be seen how Arab governments deal with these economic and political challenges. Will they try to crush political challenges to the status quo or try to accommodate them?[9]

Additionally, Aftandilian argues that besides the perception that the end of the Cold War does not bode well for the region, the idea of 'Western cultural imperialism' evolved into the view that, primarily among Islamists, "...[what] is driving U.S. policy in the region...is a deep-seated Western prejudice towards Arabs and Muslims."

Additionally, "Disparate Egyptian opposition parties are divided on a host of issues, but opposition to U.S. policies is what often brings them together."[10] It is Egypt's interest not to be seen as dependent on the U.S., but

> In the coming years Egypt will still value its close ties to the United States, not only to maintain present levels of economic and military aid, but to demonstrate its importance to the Arabs. With only one superpower now in existence, Cairo is

---

[8]Ibid., 17.

[9]Ibid., 15-16.

[10]These quotations are found in Ibid., 69-70 and 68.

272

pushing the idea that the Arabs need a country like Egypt (with its close U.S. ties) to convey Arab concerns and influence Washington's actions.[11]

It is interesting to me that faced with an opposition with an anti-Western sentiment, Mubarak was able to take a firm pro-American stand. The opposition, in fact, strongly supported Mubarak's words and deeds at the beginning of the conflict. We will examine this situation in the status section.

While Mubarak seemed to be faced with the dilemma of whether to oppose Iraq in the midst of his attempts to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, in my view, there was not much of a true dilemma here. It did mean that Egypt's opposing Iraq would make it side against an Arab county just as Egypt was trying reassert itself within the Arab community; however, failing to side with the coalition would anger the Gulf Arabs, weaken relations with the United States, and invite further Iraqi aggression. Egypt proved instrumental to the coalition, especially when Mubarak said that he would not withdraw if Israel did retaliate against Iraq.[12] Such a statement is a clear example of Egypt's boldness in foreign policy as opposed to Syria's cautious approach, as we will see in chapter seven.

Mubarak hosted a meeting of the Arab League on 10 August 1990, eight days after the invasion. The meeting concluded by having most of the Arab countries condemning Saddam. Egyptian troops were in Saudi Arabia the next day. Egypt worked to gain broad Arab support for the anti-Iraq coalition. Egypt sent 30,000 troops and 400

---

[11]Ibid., 81.

[12]The Middle East (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 204-205.

273

tanks as part of the coalition, more than any other Arab state.[13] Military cooperation

continued between the United States and Egypt after the war, and the United States

promised Egypt preferential treatment regarding Egypt's receipt of sophisticated military

equipment. By 1991, Egypt's debt was reduced from $50 billion to $36 billion. Mubarak

also hoped for increased aid and investment from the Gulf countries, but the GCC

countries did not deliver on what was promised. "Nevertheless, Egyptian prestige in the

Arab world rose dramatically because of its leadership during the Gulf war. In March

1991 the Arab League transferred its headquarters back to its original location in

Cairo."[14]

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait angered Mubarak on a personal level because Saddam

had assured Mubarak that he would not invade. On a strategic level, the invasion

threatened Saudi control of oil reserves from which Egypt anticipated benefits from its

revenues. Iraq's bellicose rhetoric concerning Israel threatened Egypt's lead in building a

moderate consensus in the region. "Moreover, the Egyptians perceived Saddam Hussein

as trying to usurp Arab leadership by portraying himself as the Arab strongman, and they

believed that no other state other than Egypt had the right to claim the leadership

mantle."[15] The Gulf crisis posed an opportunity for Egypt to take the leadership role in

---

[13]According to Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 256, Syria contributed an armored division to the Persian Gulf War, which according to Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Arab Isreal-Syria Peace Agreement, Report of a Washington Institute Study Group, p. 83. claims that Syria has a total of five armored divisions. It seems, then, that the Syrian contribution could not have been to far behind in Egypt's contribution in terms of numbers of personnel and tanks.

[14]The Middle East (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 204-205.

[15]Aftandilian, 28-29.

the Arab world. "Mubarak's strong leadership in forming the anti-Iraq Arab coalition, and the strenuous efforts by Egypt's religious and intellectual establishment to counter Iraqi propoganda, therefore, helped to scuttle Saddam Hussein's plans to turn most of the Arab world to his side."[16]

It appears that Mubarak's immediate objective for his Persian Gulf alignment was to bolster his status both internationally and regionally. In my view, he felt he needed this status in order to secure economic benefits. He realized, as we will see, the dire economic straits Egypt was in, and the only way to improve the economic situation was to secure benefits from the region and the world. It is this economic imperative that drives his policies, both in the domestic and foreign realms. We will find that the economic situation is the root of Egypt's domestic unrest, as opposed to the ethnic divisions as the root of Syria's domestic unrest, which for Egypt, makes finding an answer to Egypt's economic woes that much more critical. Egypt's pro-coalition stand was a means to find that economic answer. We will see, as Fouad Ajami argues, that

> The most important foreign policy dilemma for Egypt is the incongruity between the country's objectives and its capabilities, between its roles and its resources, or, put more bluntly, between its aspirations for power and the reality of its poverty....there can be no doubt as to the 'primacy of economics,' as a shaper of the country's foreign policy in recent years.[17]

---

[16]Ibid., 29-30.

[17]Nazih N. Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), 291.

275

Indicator: Elite Attitudes

I will rely heavily on elite attitudes as an indicator for the issues of security and territory, status, and human and nonhuman resources. Generally, I will use expert analyses of elite views, but I will also examine some recent studies conducted in Egypt that may help us understand the reasons behind Mubarak's alignment decision. We will explore these attitudes in the contexts of the domestic, regional, and international levels. Again, the key to this analysis of Egypt will be its comparison to the analysis with Syria, as well as a comparison to the analyses of our Cold War era cases conducted in the previous chapters.

Security and Territory

Egypt emerged from the war as the strongest Arab military power in the region. Mubarak wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the Gulf states, as well be the main effort in the GCC security plan. The Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Tantawi in March 1992 said, "the Arab countries should depend on their own security. They should coordinate among themselves to compensate for any shortage in their military capabilities....Assistance from some friendly countries could be used whenever necessary and only for a limited time." Moreover, he stated that "any threat to the Arab national security or the Gulf security reflects on the Egyptian security. That necessitates coordination between Egyptian, Gulf, and Arab security systems." Additionally, he explained that Egypt's response to the Iraqi invasion was based on the idea that "Egyptian

276

national security is not only linked to Arab national security, but it is one of its main

supports."[18]

Egyptian leaders do identify a lack of regional strategic balance with Israel having

the greatest military power as a threat to national security. It is important to point out

that these leaders do not feel a direct threat from Israel, but they do feel that a military

imbalance is just an unhealthy state of being. It gives Israel more latitude to take

reckless actions, such as its 1982 Lebanese invasion. Additionally, these leaders identify

Israel's nuclear capability as a regional threat. According to Edward B. Atkeson, after

the Gulf crisis, Egypt looked "primarily to the U.S./C.I.S.-sponsored peace process for

[solutions] to most of its difficulties with Israel. Egyptian leaders are enthusiastic about

the concept of a 'new world order,' and embrace the notion that the age of naked force is

over."[19]

It is also evident that Egypt is concerned about the regional balance of power

beyond the Arab-Israeli issue. For Egypt, Iran posed a threat to the balance in the region.

Egypt's support for Iraq during its 1980-1988 war with Iran confirms Egypt's position

concerning Iran. Moreover, in an interview with U.S. News and World Report, Mubarak

said, "I do not trust the Iranians. More than once they asked to restore diplomatic

relations, but I turned down this request."[20] Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah,

---

[18]Aftandilian, 30-32.

[19]Edward B. Atkeson, A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-1996 (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 36 and quotation on 37.

[20]"Mubarak Discusses Peace Process, Domestic Issues," FBIS, NES (10 April 1990): 9 (quotation) and 10.

277

the Assistant to the President, also stressed the need for an Arab security arrangement in the post-Gulf War period. In an interview, Abu Ghazalah was concerned about looking beyond the Gulf crisis to ensure a balance in the region, namely keeping a check on Iran.[21]

Interestingly, Mubarak was asked of any possible link between Iran and the fundamentalists inside Egypt. His reply was that "as for fundamentalists, we have some in Egypt, and we cannot say that the media have exaggerated in depicting this phenomenon. We know well where they are, what their names are, and how many there are. We are in full control as far as they are concerned." He further explained that the law forbids religious-based parties, therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a legitimate political party.[22] It appears that the fundamentalists may pose a security threat to Mubarak, but he plays this threat down. As we will see in the following sections, however, the root cause of any domestic unrest is the dire economic situation. In fact, it seems that the Gulf War alignment served to secure stability in the region so that Egypt could look forward to the peace process and economic benefits stemming from its regional and international status.

Mubarak suggested the primacy of economics over security based on his comments concerning the Damascus Declaration on Gulf Security: "To tell you the truth, I am not very interested in it because it does not make much difference to me. When I need something I talk to them. I talk to them when I am in an economic squeeze. They

---

[21]"Abu-Ghazalah on Expected Scenario, Gulf Security," FBIS, NES, (17 January 1991): 5.

[22]"Mubarak Discusses Peace Process, Domestic Issues," 9 (quotation) and 10.

278

do not hesitate to help us."[23] Additionally, 'Abd-al-Majid, the Deputy Prime Minister

and Foreign Minister in his talk with the Consultative Council's Foreign Relations

Committee, stated: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Our region needs peace and the

consecration of resources for construction and development for the sake of a better future

for all our peoples."[24]

We shall see, during the Gulf crisis, Egypt played a proactive role in setting the

stage for the peace process, in the hopes of gaining economic benefits and diffusing any

threat posed by fundamentalist groups, who could only exploit class divisions and not

non-existent ethnic divisions. For Egypt, security in terms of the peace process was, and

still is, a means for obtaining economic benefits. Mary Morris suggests that the long

term prognosis for the peace process

> is that the rewards of a more stable and rational regional environment will sap the
> power of radical groups, especially if economic conditions improve both within
> Egypt and across the region. With resolution of the Arab-Israeli dilemma - and the
> removal of excuses for tackling endemic political, economic and social problems of
> individual states - such improvement will at least be possible.[25]

Mubarak saw the peace process as an opportunity to resolve many regional problems. He

wanted broad participation, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the European

Community, and the United Nations. President Mubarak clearly expressed his desire to

---

[23]"Mubarak Speaks at Alexandria University Event," FBIS, NES (20 July 1992): 10.

[24]"Abd-al-Majid Issues Statement on Gulf War 17 Jan," FBIS, NES (18 January 1991): 10.

[25]The quotation and Mubarak's views on the peace process are from Morris, 7-8.

organize the peace conference. He said: "We are ready to help and ready to be very

active with all parties in order to achieve peace."[26]

Egypt saw the peace process as a means to gain status both in the international

and regional communities. Consequently, Egypt would have a say on prioritizing agendas

for both communities in a way that would benefit Egypt. According to Boutros Boutros-

Ghali, "It is no exaggeration to say that Egypt's main concern during the end of the 1980s

has been the economic plight of the Third World and the ever-increasing burden of

interest on debts" which has risen to threaten development and deterioration.[27] In an

address to university students, Mubarak commented on the peace process: "We are

helping as much as we can because our position and Egypt's status in the region are basic

and pivotal. We can help and we were the ones to help convene the Madrid conference.

We cannot abandon our role because this constantly highlights Egypt's importance."[28]

While the Gulf crisis did not immediately seem to pose external threats to Egypt,

there was a great deal at stake for Egypt at home. Primarily, it seems that the Gulf War

provided an opportunity for Egypt to unequivocally assert itself in the regional and

international communities in a quest to secure economic benefits at home. Security, in

the classical sense, became a means for regional peace and stability, which in turn, could

lead to prosperity. This is what Egypt craved the most. According to Stephen Pellitiere,

---

[26]"Mubarak Comments on Peace Conference, Gulf War," FBIS, NES (20 May 1991): 4-5.

[27]Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "Egyptian Diplomacy: East - West Detente and North - South Dialogue," in Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes, ed. Charles Tripp (London: Routledge, 1993), 146.

[28]"Mubarak Speaks at Alexandria University Event," 10.

280

"Egypt's security problem must be seen in context of its economic plight."[29] The

following sections will develop the linkage of all these issues in greater detail, but for

now, in terms of the issues of security and territory,[30] they were stepping stones for the

eventual peace process: a process from which Egypt anticipated greater status and

prosperity.

Status

As we have already discussed in the background section, Egypt was working its

way back into the Arab fold. The Gulf crisis solidified its efforts as the key leader in the

region. Additionally, Egypt maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States,

which enhanced Egypt's leverage within the region. Finally, Mubarak initially gained a

great deal of support among his elites, opposition parties, and the people for his

alignment decision. As with the issue of security, status became a means for economic

gain. Here we will focus on the issue of status on all levels. Additionally, we will

examine Mubarak's internal status as motivation for his alignment decision. As we saw

with Sadat, Mubarak's internal threat that had the potential to erode his internal status

was the dire economic situation at home. This is what the fundamentalist groups, namely

the Muslim Brotherhood, tried to exploit. However, what we will find is that Mubarak

also enjoyed a wealth of legitimacy due to Egypt's ethnic homogeneity and strong

national identity. In fact, this legitimacy greatly weathered the prospect of economic

---

[29]Stephen C. Pellitiere, Shar'ia Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1995), 1.

[30]Egypt already had the Sinai, so for Egypt territory was not an issue. It was only an issue in terms of Egypt's support of Palestinian rights.

281

crises, and once again proved to be the more powerful variable when it comes to the issue of internal status. Finally, we will find that the peace process serves as an umbrella for all issues, and Egypt saw it as an opportunity to further its status on all levels.

Let us first examine how Egypt saw the Gulf alignment as a means for increasing its international status. Egypt saw the importance of international status in terms of the peace process. An Egyptian source, commenting on Rabin's visit to Cairo, explained the significance of Egyptian-Israeli relations in facilitating regional peace. The source explained that "Egypt will stress during...these talks the bases it believes can establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region, bases that stem from the resolutions of international justice and legitimacy that the international community passed."[31]

Egypt wanted to take advantage of international forums to help resolve key issues in the region. When asked about the possibility of an international conference, Boutros-Ghali responded: "We certainly think that immediately after the war a new peace process must be started, especially on the Palestinian problem."[32] It appears that Egypt was able to look beyond the Gulf crisis and plan for Egypt's continual engagement in the international and regional arenas. Boutros-Ghali explained that Egypt's intention is to find an answer to the Palestinian problem once the Gulf crisis is over. Moreover, he advocates the use of an international forum as a means to address this regional issue.[33]

---

[31]"Secretary Baker, Israel's Rabin to Pay Visits," FBIS, NES (20 July 1992): 11.

[32]"Butrus Ghali Views Nonaligned Initiative," FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 7.

[33]"Palestine Issue to Draw Attention After War," FBIS, NES (31 January 1991): 5.

282

From the U.S. perspective, Egypt's actions before, during, and after the Gulf crisis bolstered Egypt's international status, primarily by Egypt's continued close ties through diplomatic channels with the United States. These ties helped to secure benefits for Egypt by linking Egypt's actions in the region to economic rewards. For example, Boutros Ghali described the three objectives of a visit to the United States by Dr. 'Atif Sidqi, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; and Dr. 'Atif Muhammad 'Ubayad, minister of cabinet affairs and minister of state for administrative development. First, the visit aimed to discuss bilateral relations. The second objective was to discuss the post-Gulf war situation. Finally, the two countries were to discuss economic relations, as well as Egypt's efforts with the IMF and the World Bank to reform the economy.[34]

A report prepared by Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, links the importance of Egypt's international role to its regional and domestic status. An article noted that the report highlighted the world community's appreciation for Egypt's civilized role, its abidance by international legitimacy, and its vanguard Arab role; for President Mubarak and his principled and responsible stance in support of right and justice; and for the efforts to reform the Egyptian economy in light of democratic practices aimed to preserve stability. The report also outlined the timetable agreed upon to sign the final agreement with the IMF in light of the serious steps taken by Egypt concerning economic reform.[35]

---

[34]"Ghali Holds Press Conference on Gulf, Arab Ties," FBIS, NES (28 January 1991): 7.

[35]"Ministerial Group discusses Gulf War Developments," FBIS, NES (5 February 1991): 4.

283

Boutros-Ghali explained how the Gulf crisis highlighted the importance of the region to the West, as well as demonstrating that it is in Egypt's best interests to broaden its perspective beyond the Nile. The crisis exposed a hostility to the West that may be dangerous if exploited. He applauded the efforts of the United Nations as a viable international mechanism for addressing regional issues.[36] Egypt followed up on its international diplomatic efforts by organizing and hosting the world's first 'anti-terrorism' summit on 13 March in support of the peace process. Steve Negus explains that this deed was "an enormous diplomatic coup for President Hosni Mubarak.....The summit is a new lease of life for Egypt's supply of foreign aid - Egyptian diplomats openly admit that as their diplomatic utility wanes, the money will start to dry up."[37] Again, we see the link between international status and economic benefits.

Egypt continues to build upon its status in the current peace process, both on the international and regional levels. According to Farwaz A. Gerges, Egypt is an instrumental player. "Alienating Cairo will irreparably damage the cause of peace in the region. Egypt holds the key to the Arab world. Without its consent and active participation, Arab-Israeli peace agreements will remain just so much ink on paper."[38] We will see that Egypt continues to parlay this status into economic benefits.

As discussed above, Egypt used its international status to help bolster its regional status. Egypt also took action to bolster its regional status directly, which did not

---

[36]"Ghali Examines Gulf Crisis, Palestinian Issue," FBIS, NES (19 December 1990): 6.

[37]Steve Negus, "Mubarak's Diplomatic Coup," Middle East Insight, 15 March 1996, 8.

[38]Farwaz A. Gerges, "Egyptian - Israeli Relations Turn Sour," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 78.

284

necessarily conflict with Egypt's international outlook. For example, Dr. Usamah al-Baz, Egyptian Foreign Ministry first under secretary and director of the president's office for political affairs explained that the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian coordination is not a "tripartite axis in the sense of a warlike grouping or a bloc that is separate from other Arab parties." Instead, it is seeking a solution to the crisis. This regional effort did not conflict with the broader international coalition. Dr. Usamah al-Baz claimed that foreign intervention, "for which Iraq's rulers alone are responsible" was necessary because without it, the crisis would have become more critical, and the region would have had worse experiences than without a foreign presence.[39]

Throughout the conflict, Egypt did look for regional tools to fix regional problems. We have already mentioned Egypt's deliberate actions to reassert itself in the Arab fold as it made amends with countries, such as Syria. The press in Cairo reported that "on the topic of Egyptian-Syrian relations, President Mubarak stressed that there is full agreement between him and President Hafiz al-Asad and also between Egyptian and Syrian stands on Arab issues in general and the Gulf crisis in particular."[40] The Defense Minister, General Yusuf Sabri Abu-Talib, emphasized the importance of the region to the Egyptian soldier. The article reported that General Abu-Talib

> Praised the role of the Egyptian soldier throughout history and said the Egyptian soldier never saw his role as concerning Egypt alone. His role always extended into the region around him. There are many examples throughout history that prove this

---

[39]"Al-Baz Discusses Tripartite Efforts For Peace," FBIS, NES (19 December 1990): 5.

[40]"Says Egyptian Forces Will Not Enter Iraq," FBIS, NES (31 January 1991): 4.

point. He said that the role of the Egyptian soldier has always been free of schemes. It has always stemmed from the principles and values Egypt believes in.[41]

Mubarak, while speaking to a group of writers and intellectuals, linked Egypt with the region. The article explained that

> The president asserted that the Egyptian stand is guided by its Arab and pan-Arab principles. Therefore, he said, the Egyptian decision to stand by Kuwait and legitimacy was guided by its principled stand....[in response to renowned writer Yusuf Idris's comment concerning the importance of Egypt's dignity], President Mubarak affirmed that he always keeps in mind Egypt's dignity, prestige, and weight, as well as the dignity of each Egyptian on his own land. He noted in this respect that the Arab nation appreciates the role played by Egypt and the Egyptians.[42]

As a result of linking Egyptian national status with regional status, Mubarak simultaneously increased both, thereby reaping economic benefits and solidifying the regime at home.

Mary Morris claims that Egypt gained a great deal from its participation in the coalition, including military and economic benefits. However, the increased status and potential increase of status for the future on all levels is the critical outcome for Egypt. Morris states that

> Egypt emerged from the Gulf War as one of the big 'winners' and expected to reap both military and economic benefits from its participation in the coalition against Saddam Hussein. As a result of its leadership among the Arab allies, Egypt regained stature, reassuming its role of moderator in the Arab world. It now anticipates a pivotal role in regional affairs, including security initiatives. Egypt's enhanced status is evident in the reconstituted Arab League's move back to Cairo, the attendance of all 21 member states at the March1991 meeting, the election of Ismet Abdul-Meguid,

---

[41]"Abu-Talib: Troops Not Subjected to 'Animosity'" FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 8.

[42]"Views War, Israel's Involvement," FBIS, NES (9 January 1991): 1-3. One of the writers commented on the devastation on tourism and how long can Egypt endure this devastation; other concerns were food supply, lack of arable land.

286

Egypt's foreign minister, as the League's new secretary general, and the election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary General of the United Nations.[43]

Morris further claims that Egypt can parlay this increased regional and international stature into domestic stature because the success of the peace process would bolster the acceptance of a moderate regime throughout the region. "Accordingly, the Mubarak government has moved the peace process to the top of its foreign policy agenda. The success of the talks would enhance Egypt's credibility as a regional leader and underscore the success of moderate politics in the Middle East."[44]

The problem is that if the peace process fails, Morris believes that Egypt would lose its standing in the region, as well as its leadership of moderates in the Middle East. Such a failure would renew the radical fundamentalist charge that Mubarak had sold out to the West, which may precipitate a rise of radicalism in the region. Morris contends that

> Mubarak runs a political risk, as do other Arab regimes that participate in crafting peace with Israel. Radical political and religious groups can be expected to vent their rage at perceived compromises. Indeed, Egypt has already paid a price of this nature, with the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat by radical Islamists in the Egyptian military. The prognosis for the long-term, however, is that the rewards of a more stable and rational regional environment will sap the power of radical groups, especially if economic conditions improve both within Egypt and across the region. With resolution of the Arab-Israeli dilemma - and the removal of excuses for tackling endemic political, economic and social problems of individual states - such improvement will at least be possible.[45]

---

[43]Mary E. Morris, New Political Realities and the Gulf: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (Santa Monica: Rand, 1993), 7.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid., 7-8.

On a domestic level, Mubarak, I believe, felt that he could count on support for his decision, even in the midst of threats of Islamic fundamentalism. Admittedly, Mubarak did not avoid all problems, but relative to other Arab countries, namely Syria, he had great support, especially when he first made the decision to play an active role in the coalition. Let us begin examining legitimacy, a key component of domestic or internal status by examining elites, to include opposition parties and the public-at-large. We will also specifically address the Muslim Brotherhood because it is the most prominent Islamic group. Finally, I will address the prospects for democracy in the context of legitimacy for Mubarak.

On an institutional level, Mubarak enjoyed support for his decision. The People's Assembly approved a draft resolution that declared

> its full support for His excellency President Muhammad Husni Mubarak in all his efforts and steps to tackle the crisis in order to achieve peace, avert bloodshed, prevent the outbreak of hostilities, safeguard legitimacy, repulse aggression, and liberate the State of Kuwait. Likewise, the Assembly declares its support and backing for his excellency the president in all the steps and measures that he might take in this regard. Second, the assembly endorses the farsighted policy being pursued by the government on the Arab and international scene in this regard.[46]

Opposition parties also declared their support for Mubarak. In my view, this is extraordinary due to the anticipated economic hardship caused by the Gulf crisis. Egypt would lose money on foregone remittances, Suez Canal revenue, tourism, loss of bank deposits in Kuwait and Iraq, developmental assistance from Kuwait, and trade with Iraq. The estimated loss was 9 billion dollars. There was some hope that some of this burden would be offset by sending workers to Libya and the GCC states, money from oil-rich

---

[46]"People's Assembly Declares Support for Gulf Policy," FBIS, NES (28 January 1991): 9.

288

regimes, emergency funds from the West and Japan, and significant debt forgiveness.[47]

With all this economic burden to bear, the public and opposition groups supported the

regime even at a time of an unsettled domestic political situation. Ann Lesch explains

that

> Nonetheless, virtually all non-governmental politicians denounced the Iraqi invasion. The general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, termed the invasion 'Terrifying' and urged Muslim leaders to convince Iraq to withdraw its forces before Israel and the West could exploit the situation to their benefit. [note how the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria used this opportunity to denounce the regime] The liberal secular Wafd Party's editor sounded more hawkish than the government when he declared that Saddam had committed a 'barbaric crime,' and 'treacherously stabbed Egypt in the back.'[48]

The Wafd Party approved of Mubarak's decision because of its pan-Arab basis and "its

belief in the unity of Arab national security." In a statement following the Iraqi

aggression against Kuwait, Wafd leader Fua'd Siraj-al-Din announced that the party

supported Mubarak based on the following principles:[49] First, Iraq's aggression was

against a fraternal Arab state. Second, the Egyptian forces were not the aggressive,

invading force, but instead they went to defend at the request of the United Arab

Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Egypt is responding to its duty as outlined in the

Collective Defense Pact signed by member states of the Arab League.[50] On the other

end of the political spectrum, the left-wing Tagammu Party also condemned the

---

[47]Ann M. Lesch, "Contrating Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," The Middle East Journal, 14, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 39.

[48]Ibid., 39-40.

[49]Wafd Party Stance on Gulf War Involvement Explained," FBIS, NES (1 February 1991): 8.

[50]Ibid.

occupation of one Arab country by another and called for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal.

Lesch states that "Such unanimity across the political spectrum was unprecedented."[51]

Finally, the elites declared their support for Mubarak's decision. According to

Ann Lesch,

> Egyptian officials maintained that the basic principles of their policy were the
> renunciation of force to resolve Arab differences, nonintervention in the domestic
> politics of Arab countries, and the need to settle Arab differences within an Arab
> framework. Egypt, therefore, rejected Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait and
> called for a peaceful solution under the auspices of the Arab League.[52]

Furthermore, Aftandilian explains that the Egyptian elite wants a lead role in the peace

process in order to enhance Egypt's status. "Egyptian leaders believe such a role will

enhance Egypt's importance in both regional and international affairs, resulting in

economic and political benefits."[53] Mubarak says that Egypt must be a key player in the

peace process "because our position and Egypt's status in the region are basic and

pivotal....We cannot abandon our role because this constantly highlights our

importance."[54]

Egyptian elites have strong positive views of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Three

quarters had positive views of the United States, Germany and Japan (see tables 13 - 15)

based on a June 10-July 4 1991 survey of 202 Egyptian business executives conducted by

RadaResearch, an Egyptian marketing research firm. Although the response trend is

---

[51]Lesch, 40.

[52]Ibid., 38.

[53]Aftandilian, 33.

[54]Ibid., 34.

rather predictable for this sample, its intensity is not. The U.S.I.A. report continues to

highlight the significance of the survey results because "so many of these Egyptians give

three Gulf states the highest possible rating on a five-point scale - and that virtually none

of them do the same for any of the other regional countries in question."[55] In my view,

this favorable rating reflects economic expectations from these Gulf countries, which

supports the economic imperative of this alignment decision.

---

[55]"Egypt's Elite Rate U.S., GCC States High; Iraq and Libya Low," Research Memorandum
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency), 1-2.

TABLE 13

EGYPTIAN ELITE VIEWS OF MIDEAST STATES (JUNE 1991)[56]

Elite Views of	% Very Favorable	% Fairly Favorable	% Neutral	% Fairly Unfavorable	% Very Unfavorable
Saudi Arabia	67		13	7	2
U.A.E.	69	13	8	6	1
Kuwait	64	1	11	8	12
Syria	0	26	44	20	10
Jordan	0	21	18	18	16
Iraq	0	4	34	37	25
Libya	0	8	37	38	17
Iran	0	20	38	19	22

---

[56]"Egypt's Elite Rate U.S., GCC States High; Iraq and Libya Low," Research Memorandum (Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency), 1.

292

TABLE 14

EGYPTIAN ELITE VIEWS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES (JUNE 1991)[57]

"What is your overall impression of the following countries, on a 5-point scale, where 5 means very favorable and 1 means very unfavorable:"

(Number of cases - 202)

	% Very Favorable	% Fairly Favorable	% Neither/Nor	% Fairly Unfavorable	% Very Unfavorable
U.S.	75	16	5	2	1
U.K.	51	35	11	2	-
France	47	40	9	1	1
Germany	66	24	5	3	-
Japan	65	19	10	2	2
USSR	17	48	10	14	10

[57]"Egypt's Elite Rate U.S., GCC States High; Iraq and Libya Low," Research Memorandum (Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency), 5.

293

TABLE 15

EXPECTATION OF U.S. AID TO EGYPT (JUNE 1991)[58]

"Thinking about the future, do you expect that U.S. help to Egypt will be more, less, or remain the same in the following areas:"

(Number of cases-202)

%	Financial	Economic	Military
Increase	17	50	24
Remain the Same	35	43	68
Decrease	48	6	8

---

[58]"Egypt's Elite Rate U.S., GCC States High; Iraq and Libya Low," Research Memorandum (Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency), 5.

294

David Pollock conducted surveys in Morocco and Egypt, and he found that during the Fall of 1990, both Egyptians and Moroccans were more sympathetic with Kuwait than with Iraq. Furthermore, there was overwhelming support for economic sanctions against Iraq in Egypt and strong support for these sanctions in Morocco. "The 'street' in both Cairo and Casablanca mostly rejected Saddam's claims to be acting on behalf of Islam, the Arabs, the have-not Arabs, or even just the Palestinians."[59] However, "if it came to war,...these two Arab publics parted ways: in Egypt, a plurality was prepared to back - and to participate - in hostilities against Iraq if necessary." The closer you are to Saddam the less you like him.[60]

Pollock did find a difference between the street or mass opinion and elite opinion. "The elite, on the whole, seems clearly to have a 'moderate' foreign policy orientation." which differs from street opinion.[61] Pollock explains that "while there are no current polling data from that country, results from 1991 showed signs of sharply diverging views between the elite and the street: the former generally supported broad moves toward peace with Israel; the latter were noticeably more noncommittal, at best." In a survey taken in Cairo and Alexandria just before the Madrid Conference, fifty percent of those with more than a secondary education believed that the peace talks with Israel were acceptable to Islam. However, only twenty-five percent of Egyptians with intermediate

---

[59]David Pollock, "The Arab Street"?: Public Opinion in the Arab World," The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 32 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 32.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid., 57-58.

295

or secondary education concurred with that moderate view, while two-thirds of those

with just primary or less education felt 'strongly' that these peace talks were not

acceptable to Islam. Additionally, on the issue concerning Egypt's further participation

in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, two-thirds of those with at least an intermediate education

said yes, yet fewer than a third of the less-educated urban "masses" agreed, even after

more than ten years of formal peace with Israel. Although this survey is barely within

statistical validity (500 sampled), the gap is extremely wide between the street and the

elites. While this gap only affected policy on the margins, it affects the quality of

peace.[62]

The question, then, is does this gap present a problem for the regime or internal

status. In a relative, that is in the regional context, sense, I do not believe it is a critical

problem for three reasons. First, the people have a patrimonial view towards politics.

According to Ayubi, "By political and legal tradition, both the State and the

President/Boss (rayyes) are invested with much power and respect. One result is that

both in domestic and external matters, 'regime' and 'policy' are often presented and/or

perceived of as one and the same thing. The political instinct of most Egyptians would

be first to support the state and then to find out why!"[63] Remember that Asad did not

seem to have this immediate support from his people, and he had to devote a great deal

of effort to build a consensus (This will be true for the post-Cold War era too as we will

see in the next chapter). Ayubi explains that

---

[62]Ibid., 58.

[63]Ayubi, 312.

296

Thus, for example, the signs of popular support for Sadat on his return from his surprise visit to Jerusalem in 1977 were partly expressive hopes of an end to war and hardship, but they were also a reflection of the sentiment that somehow the State and the leader must have had some very good reasons for what they had done. Other Arabs have repeatedly expressed surprise at the way many Egyptians will take criticism of certain policy options of a certain Egyptian leader as an attack on Egypt herself. And the leadership has used the same inclination for its own benefit often by implying that a disagreement with one of the policies of the President is almost tantamount to national treason.[64]

Furthermore, Ayubi explains that "Another aspect of this veneration of the State is the linkage some Egyptians establish between the strength of the State domestically and its strength externally."[65] This linkage helps to explain the importance at a domestic level for Mubarak to increase his standing on the regional and world stages. Finally, Derek Hopwood observes that even with "Sadat's mistakes the fact that the transfer of power was so smooth showed a great stability in the system."[66] Again, this point supports the view that the "street" still had great respect for authority and its leaders, even in the midst of great adversity.

Second, Egypt has dealt with the issue of religion and politics in the past, so it is important to consider the context in which Egyptian politics is operating. Paul Salem explains that secularism was a key factor in the pre-1952 period of the Egyptian nationalist movement, led by the Wafd party and writings of Ahmad Lutfi Sayyid, Taha Husayn and others. A separation of religion from politics was necessary to deter Muslim-Christian (Coptic) tensions in Egypt and, "to foment a unifying nationalism, as well as in

---

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid., 313.

[66]Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-90, 184.

order to move closer to the European model of polity, economy and society that the Wafd and the social strata it represented held in high regard."[67]

Later, Arab Communists and Marxists emphasized the idea of secularism and blamed religion for the ills of Arab society. "What is more, because of their identification with the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, they were openly identified by their opponents as secularists or, in some cases, atheists. They clashed openly with Islamist parties in Egypt and other countries...."[68] Ideas of class struggle, socialism, anti-imperialism found its way to Arab nationalist thought. "Communist and Marxist thought, therefore, which... [is rooted in] a profoundly secular outlook, has had more of an influence in the Arab world than a quick current survey of political parties would suggest."[69] Consequently, "the collapse of the Soviet Union and the redefinition of Europe is also showing signs of affecting Arab political culture....with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West is no longer providing alternative ideological formulations and appears to many in the Arab public increasingly as a monolithic, dominant, Christian and aggressive entity."[70]

While Mubarak took a firm stand against Iraq and recognized the Gulf states' right to ask for U.S. support, he did create some distance with the United States, perhaps realizing some groups' perception of the West. Perhaps with the post-Cold War era and

---

[67]Paul Salem, "The Rise and Fall of Secularism in the Arab World," Middle East Policy, 4, no. 3 (March 1996): 151-152.

[68]Ibid., 152.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., 160.

298

the lack of a counter-ideology to the West, anti-secularism I believe, seemed to be more

prominent, but was it really? Even in this context, Mubarak seemed able to override this

sentiment. At times, Egypt even praised the United States for its diplomatic efforts,

which seemed to be much different than Asad's bellicose rhetoric towards the United

States. An editorial commented that

> Washington's offer to hold a dialogue with Iraq and the support expressed for this
> offer by other capitals shows that the United States has finally managed to lead the
> chorus of the anti-Saddam coalition without allowing for any discordant voice to be
> heard, and that it can project a defiant front on behalf of the international community
> in its separate talks with Iraq.[71]

Additionally, Lesch explains that he frankly talked about those short-term economic

sacrifices Egypt was making, in terms of lost trade, bank deposits, and remittances from

Kuwait and Iraq, as well as lost revenue from the Suez Canal and tourism, as a result of

his decision.[72] Even with this economic hardship at the micro-economic level, Mubarak

still had support.

Again, admitting these economic woes is risky for Mubarak because

acknowledging his inability to fix them opens a door for his opposition. Stephen

Pelletiere explains that

> In the past, religious forces in Egypt have garnered wide public support by exploiting
> economic grievances. This sort of thing is always possible where discontent is
> extant. One could argue that this is the situation Egypt is moving toward....all of this
> betokens trouble arising from the strained economic situation and the perception - on
> the part of the public - that Mubarak is either unwilling or unable to provide a
> remedy....The real danger is that, while Egyptians are known to be long suffering,

---

[71]"Editorial Analyzes Gulf War, Peace Prospects," FBIS, NES (19 December 1990): 7.

[72]Ann M. Lesch, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Egypt," in Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East, ed. David Garnham and Mark Tessler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 236-237.

299

there are limits to their intolerance; when the limit is reached, they sometimes explode.[73]

Perhaps, the post-Cold War era erroneously highlighted this anti-secularist view.

Third, the opposition did not pose a unified bloc. As mentioned earlier, opposition leaders favored Mubarak's initial anti-Iraq stand, but divisions among the opposition arose with the U.S. presence.[74] There were some demonstrations against the regime. For example, a group of journalists staged a sit-in protesting U.S. action in the Gulf: "Today's issue of AL-SHA'B reports that the State Security Prosecution Office yesterday began interrogating Naji al-Shiyahbi, a member of the Labor Party's Executive Committee, on charges of printing leaflets entitled: 'No to the Gulf war'"[75] Another report claimed that "On Sunday, students burned three effigies: one of U.S. President George Bush, one of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and one that was faceless."[76]

Generally, it does not appear that the prominent opposition Islamic group, the Muslim Brotherhood, resorts to such tactics. According to Stephen Pelletiere, there are two different approaches by anti-governmental groups. One approach adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood, is basically peaceful; the wealthy and well-connected Brothers are attempting to use the system, namely the ballot box to gain power. The other approach, used by groups of anarchists, is one of violence. Pelletiere does not think the

---

[73]Pelletiere, 23.

[74]Lesch, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Egypt," 237.

[75]"Journalists Stage Sit-In to Protest Gulf War," FBIS, NES (1 February 1991): 9.

[76]"University Demonstrations Continue; City Calm, Protestors Kept Off Streets", FBIS, NES (26 February 1991): 4.

300

Brotherhood encourages violence. "The psychology of the 'shooters' (as one U.S.

Embassy official described the radicals) is so at variance with that of the Brotherhood

leaders, it seems unlikely there would be a link. Whatever else, the leaders of the

Brotherhood are men of property, who respect authority as exemplified by the ulama

[religious leaders]. They would hardly countenance the kind of anarchic behavior that

the 'shooters' carry on."[77]

In fact, both groups fear and loathe each other. It appears that the shooters do not

have widespread support, and they are only supported by their home communities in the

Upper Egypt area. Pelletiere admits that it is hard to characterize the anarchists in Cairo.

"At the same time, they do not appear to have struck a responsive chord in the wider

polity, [and], it is hard to envision how, in its present stage, this sort of behavior poses a

threat to Mubarak."[78]

According to Robert Kaplan, the Brotherhood does have a following, but it is due

to the Brotherhood's ability to provide basic services for the people. "Many Egyptians

see the Brotherhood as a benevolent neighborhood force, operating clinics, welfare

organizations, schools and hospitals."[79] The Brotherhood in Egypt appears to be trying to

exploit class divisions, not ethnic divisions as we saw happening in Syria. Kaplan

explains that "the issue I slowly began to realize was less the Brotherhood than

modernity and the contradictions associated with it. Egypt is rapidly changing. There

---

[77]Pelletiere, 21-22.

[78]Ibid., 22-23.

[79]Robert D. Kaplan, "Eaten From Within," Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 6 (November 1994): 28.

301

are not only more slums but also more cordless phones, Mercedes Benzes, and boutiques....Not just the poor but the wealthier classes, too, are impatient for better government."[80]

Finally, while there were increased clashes of Copts and Muslims in 1990, they were limited to the Upper Nile. These clashes were not a new phenomenon.[81] Although, this is not a good thing for Mubarak, there are several factors, in my view, that differentiate these clashes from the Sunni unrest in Syria. First, and I believe most importantly, unlike the Sunnis who comprise three-quarters of the Syrian population, the Copts are only six percent of the Egyptian population.[82] Second, Egypt's sense of nationalism is a strong unifying factor. George W. Gawrych points out that in the modernist state of Egypt, patriotism and nationalism are more influential than Islam. For example, the Egyptian army developed along national, not Islamic lines. There is compulsory national service for all Egyptians, and several Copts have moved into positions of responsibility. The highest religious leader in Egypt in 1973, Shaykh al-Azhar, declared that

> al-Jihad is an obligation for all, without distinction between Muslims and Christians. It is the duty of all who live under the sky of Egypt, the motherland of all...Being martyred for the sake of the motherland gives access to Paradise. This is confirmed by divine laws that have been revealed to the People of the Book.[83]

---

[80]Ibid., 34.

[81]Pelletiere, 17.

[82]The Middle East (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 348 and 194.

[83]George W. Gawrych, "Jihad in the Twentieth Century," in Book of Readings: Modern Military History of the Middle East, ed. George W. Gawrych (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 5-6.

302

Gawrych explains that "the integration of Christians into the armed forces reflects a

moderation in the Egyptian practice of war. Egyptians have tended to depict their

struggle with Israel in more national and ideological than religious terms."[84]

Undoubtedly, there are Muslim-Coptic tensions, however the critical issue facing

all Egyptians is the challenge of democratization in the midst of enormous economic

challenges. It is Mubarak's dilemma of how much democracy he may introduce in an

unstable economic context. Mona Makram-Ebeid's claims that the 1995 elections

revealed that

> While there is no doubt that political participation has flourished as the state's control
> system has diminished, it is also clear that the interests articulated by different groups
> were not expressed by the various opposition parties; hence the number of candidates
> running independently and the lack of linkage between a citizen-level politics and
> national decision making. What we are witnessing instead is an uneasy co-existence
> of multiple institutions backed by contesting legitimacy formulas, without a
> consensus regarding the rights and obligations of each. What has occurred is a
> pluralization of public space, yet it has been liberal neither in intent nor outcome.[85]

I believe Makram-Ebeid's point is correct concerning the undemocratic nature of the

regime, however, I do feel that her criticisms are harsh. Instead, I believe we need to

examine Mubarak's efforts within the regional and economic context in which he is

operating. Morris explains that Mubarak has said that he does intend to make

constitutional changes when the economic picture has stabilized. She cites Mubarak as

saying, that "No one has the right to claim [he has] a mandate from the people. I live

---

[84]Ibid., 6.

[85]Mona Makram-Ebeid, "Egypt's 1995 Elections: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? "Middle East Policy, 4, no. 3 (March 1996): 135.

303

with the pulse of the street, and its basic demand is to get out of the economic crisis we

have confronted and to set right the accumulated problems of the past."[86]

It is not an easy task to transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic

one. Makram-Ebeid does acknowledge the difficulties of such a transition as she says

that

> Reforms of the political system that go beyond guaranteeing stability - the main
> objective - would enhance the democratic experiment. The role of political parties
> and other institutions of civil society appears to be strengthening democratic
> values....the transition from authoritarian to democratic politics is laden with
> difficulties, and the process can be temporarily reversed when widespread violence
> causes instability.[87]

The point is that setbacks along the democratic process do not necessarily mean that the

leader does not intend for a democratic outcome. In fact, Mubarak's heightened concern

for the country's economic health can be considered a stepping stone for democracy.

Morris claims that

> As leader of the moderate, status quo, nations, Egypt is likely to continue along a
> progressively democratic path. However, the country faces massive economic and
> bureaucratic problems, aggravated by a mushrooming population, a stagnant
> economy, and high unemployment and inflation rates. From the political perspective,
> Egypt also faces potential challenges from its growing number of fundamentalists,
> most of whom are denied legitimate participation in Egypt's political life. While
> there is little evidence of immediate instability in Egypt, the ingredients for it are
> nonetheless at hand.[88]

I believe that the main ingredient for instability is the exploitation of these economic

problems by the opposition groups.

---

[86]Morris, 10.

[87]Makram-Ebeid, 136.

[88]Morris, 8.

304

Ann Lesch believes that Mubarak's alignment decision benefitted him in several

ways, to include increasing status on all levels. She explains that

> The government was able to ride out the protests, given the divisions within the
> opposition and given the brevity of the ground war. In the aftermath, Egypt's only
> serious Arab rival was destroyed and Egypt claimed diplomatic success when the
> U.S. initiated comprehensive negotiations among Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and
> the Palestinians. Egypt's centrality was symbolized by the appointment of the former
> foreign minister as secretary - general of the Arab League and the selection of an
> Egyptian diplomat as secretary - general of the United Nations. Egypt's debt was
> slashed and relatively favorable terms were negotiated with the International
> Monetary Fund. Thus, Mubarak emerged from the Gulf crisis with unchallenged
> supremacy on the home front. The opposition parties were virtually shut out of the
> parliament and uncertain as to what approach to adopt to recoup their losses.[89]

Robert Springborg agrees with this assessment and believes that Mubarak's international

and regional diplomacy will help him at home.

> The tactics of lecturing Americans in Washington about their disregard of Arab,
> particularly Palestinian, interests, combined with a rejection in the Middle East of
> radical Arabism and aggressive Zionism, has established for Egypt a clear role as a
> champion of moderation. Moreover, connections in Washington, Jerusalem,
> European and Arab capitals, and even in the Communist bloc, enhance Egypt's
> standing as a key middleman. Mubarak has, in a relatively short time, converted
> many of Sadat's foreign policy liabilities into net assets. While he has not yet
> converted this foreign policy capital into a significant legitimating factor at the
> domestic level, it seems likely that he will be able to do so in the not so distant
> future.[90]

---

[89]Lesch, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Egypt," 240.

[90]Robert Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," in Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 159.

Domestically, Springborg is optimistic about the Mubarak regime because "As Ajami has noted, Egyptians by and large abhor violence and pride themselves on having a stable, reasonably civil culture."[91]

While we may argue over the normative aspect of insufficient democracy in Egypt, it is still apparent that Mubarak was able to rely on support for his decision, at least initially, from the elites, opposition, and society. His increased international and regional status helped him on the domestic front. Again, we should not judge Mubarak with a Western bias. Fouad Ajami observes that "Contempt for the government there is aplenty in Egypt today, but the political and cultural continuity of the place has not ruptured....Most important, unlike the shallow roots of the Algerian state - a post-colonial entity that rose in the 1960s - central authority in Egypt reaches back millenia."[92] As we have touched on already, it is this increase in status which Mubarak hoped to parlay into economic benefits. It is the sickly health of the economy that most threatens the regime. It is this failing which encourages anti-government sentiment and is the greatest challenge to Egypt's chance for democracy.

Human and Nonhuman Resources

For this section, we will try to determine the beneficiaries of human and nonhuman resources. This is a critical issue because it does appear that the primary objective for Egypt in its decision to align with the coalition was to gain economic

---

[91]Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 238.

[92]Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 5 (September/October 1995), 76.

benefits. While we will assess economic benefits of the alignment, we must also remember that the outcome does not necessarily reflect intentions. For example, we will see that there were some developmental projects promised as a result of Egypt's alignment, but Egypt still faces a tremendous gap in wealth between the haves and the have-nots. In this case, the intention was to bring some benefits to the majority of the population, however, the outcome may not have had an effect on this wide gap.

It does appear from the beginning of the crisis that Egypt saw an opportunity to achieve economic benefits. There is also evidence that the purpose of these benefits was to reduce the economic burden of the masses. For example, 'Abd-al-Majid, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in his statement on the Gulf War to the Consultative Council's Foreign Relations Committee, said: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Our region needs peace and the consecration of resources for construction and development or the sake of a better future for all our peoples."[93] The fact they stressed developmental projects reflects his desire to lessen the economic plight of the majority of Egyptians. Boutros-Ghali also saw the importance of the alignment to Egypt's future. When asked about the postwar situation in the Middle East, he responded that

> It will be a unique opportunity for the Arab world to create a new impetus in favor of a general awareness and a renewal of Arab solidarity. The postwar period in the Arab world should correspond to the postwar period in Europe which gave rise to the Marshall Plan and the EEC. We have a similar opportunity 50 years later. In addition, in the past 45 years, Europe has never been willing to help the integration of the Arab world. Now, Europe and the United States realize that it is in their interest

---

[93]"Abd-al-Majid Issues Statement on Gulf War 17 Jan," FBIS, NES (18 January 1991): 10.

307

to encourage a minimum of solidarity in this Arab world to prevent this Balkanization, these contradictions which weaken this region.[94]

Notice how Boutros Ghali has put the Arab region and Egyptian interests on the international agenda, as discussed in the last section.

Egypt has crafted its foreign policy along economic interests in the past. In fact, in late 1980s, Egypt improved its relations with Libya in order to gain opportunities for Egyptian workers, as well as acquire technical expertise and products. So far this alliance produced such benefits as increased trade, Libya's acceptance of many Egyptian workers, and political cooperation, namely Libya's opposition to Iraq's invasion.[95] As chapter four demonstrated, the basis for U.S.-Egyptian ties are U.S. security and economic assistance for Egypt, which expanded greatly after 1979. In fiscal year 1993, FMS (Foreign Military Sales) grants were $1.3 billion and $815 million in Economic Support Fund grants.[96]

Robert Springborg says that "at the regional level it is also the economic rather than the military dimension that is increasingly seen as exerting the greatest influence on Egyptian decision making." He explains that Egypt

> is being drawn inexorably into the rapidly specializing regional economy. For Egypt this is occurring on unfavorable terms. With the Arab center of economic gravity now in the Gulf, Egypt's allotted role is that of labor exporter, not industrial power.....According to this logic, the regional imperative is of greater political moment than the global one because of the immediate involvement of some many expatriate Egyptians living in neighboring states and because of the unique salience of regional politics for regime legitimacy in the Arab world. In sum, regional

---

[94]"Butrus Ghali Views Nonaligned Initiative," FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 6-7.

[95]Aftandilian, 71

[96]"Egypt," Background Notes, U.S. State Department, 5, no. 7 (August 1994): 6.

imperatives of a political, economic, and military nature have imposed a strait jacket on Egypt, one that constrains not only regional but also domestic choices. Policies of a radical political and economic nature are simply not compatible with Egypt's role in the Middle East, or so the argument goes.[97]

The significance of Springborg's observation is that it provides some explanation of Egypt's economic malaise. Even in the regional context, Egypt is falling behind. On the global level, one may argue that Egypt is just becoming a more dependent country, which would again explain the constant economic problems facing Egypt. According to an Israeli expert, however, this dependence can be reversed because "The revocability of the process ensues from its two inevitable attributes: the fact that growing dependence creates, in any society imbued with a nationalist spirit, its own antidotes; and the fact that the efforts of the assisting power are bound to frustrate the assisted society...."[98] In the meanwhile, Egypt continues with the problem of increasing foreign earnings and is in constant dialogue with the IMF and World Bank. The problem is that the IMF establishes conditions, such as economic reform, liberalization, lifting or reduction of subsidies, promotion of private sector, which Egypt favors in principle, but they are all hard to do in practice. Moreover, Mubarak remembers the food riots under Sadat.[99]

The unfortunate situation that Egypt finds itself in is that any economic progress pales in comparison to the alarming population growth, which grows one person per 30 seconds or 1.25 million people per year. By 2000, estimates have Egypt at 70 million. Cairo grows at 300,000 per year. The fertility rate per mother is 5 children, which is

---

[97]Robert Springborg, "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt," 140.

[98]Shimon Shamir as cited in Ayubi, 342.

[99]Hopwood, 193

309

ironically an increase due to better medical care. There is not enough housing, and unemployment is at 20 percent. The end of the Iraq-Iran war made the situation worse when Iraqi soldiers returned to take jobs held by Egyptians. After August 1990, this situation worsened again when many of the Egyptian workers in Iraq and Kuwait came home penniless. Additionally, Egypt experienced reduced aid from Kuwait and trade with Iraq, as well as declining revenues from tourism and the Suez Canal. Egypt lost $9 billion that year. Later, Egypt's role in the coalition led to $14 billion of debt canceled, with additional help promised.[100] It is this state of economic affairs that I feel most inhibits economic improvements for Egypt. It is also the reason why I believe that the outcome of economic reforms or programs do not necessarily match intentions. It is an enormous challenge for Mubarak. As Derek Hopwood says, "Whatever the answers may be, the future development of Egypt presents a challenge which will tax to the utmost the ability and wisdom of its leaders."[101]

It is without question, however, that the Egyptian economy was in shambles at the start of the Gulf crisis, however, the crisis did provide Egypt with economic possibilities. Tim Niblock believes that Egypt may have been the only Arab country to have economically benefitted from the war. Fifteen billion dollars of a $50 billion debt Egypt owed to foreign debtors in July 1990, has been forgiven, including $7 billion in military debt to the United States, and the rest of the debts to the Gulf states. Niblock acknowledges, however, that even with the forgiven debts, Egypt's losses may still not be

---

[100]Ibid., 193-194.

[101]Ibid., 197

310

overcome. Egypt still suffered from losses after the war because there was a sharp decline of remittances from Egyptian workers in the Gulf, as well as reduced earnings from tourism. These two sources of revenue lost $5 billion in the first three months after the invasion of Kuwait. Niblock concludes, however, that the close ties forged between Egypt and the Gulf states will most likely benefit Egypt in the long term.[102]

President Mubarak, in January of 1991 acknowledged Egypt's uneasy economic situation, but he also felt that his reforms were of some benefit. He explained that the cancellation of Egypt's military debt relieved Egypt's financial difficulties during December and January, which enabled Egypt to secure basic necessities. Mubarak admitted that Egypt faced financial difficulties as a result of the war, but the article concludes that, "in the long run only right will prevail."[103]

According to Carlyle Murphy, Egypt began to realign its political system and private sector because the fall of communism gave great impetus to global trade with an increase of opportunities for economic development and integration, especially with the beginnings of a reconciliation of Arab-Israeli relations. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the domestic threat of militant Islam gave greater urgency to the Mubarak regime to address social and economic problems with the tools of the private sector, namely its knowledge, technology, and capital. The conditions of unemployment, inflation, poor schooling, and lack of housing are bases of the popular resentment which feeds radical Islam. Additionally, Egypt felt that the United States would probably begin reducing

---

[102]Tim Niblock, "Arab Losses, First World Gains,"in Beyond the Gulf War: The Middle East and the New World Order, ed. John Gittings (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1991), 83.

311

Egypt's annual aid package of $2.1 billion because of the growing domestic demand in

the United States to cut back on all foreign aid. Consequently, Egypt felt it needed to tap

its own private sector for increased production.[104]

So with these reforms and financial rewards of its coalition alignment, who did

benefit? According to Murphy, Egypt's slow retreat from socialism mainly benefitted

large businesses and the

> politically plugged-in upper classes, whose success is evident in the growing number
> of chic stores and luxury cars in Cairo....By contrast, the majority of Egyptians have
> seen their standard of living deteriorate as a result of other economic reforms the
> government has made under pressure from the World Bank and the International
> Monetary Fund.[105]

Unfortunately, there is a perception among the well-to-do businessmen and ordinary

people that official corruption has increased. Murphy observes that Egyptians openly and

honestly complain about alleged activities of senior government officials, who alter the

rules to leave a less than level playing field in the business community.[106] As mentioned

earlier, making political and economic changes is not an easy task, but I think it is

noteworthy that Egyptians do feel that they can openly complain about their government,

which is not the case in Syria. This point is significant because without honest

---

[103]"Says Egyptian Forces Will Not Enter Iraq," FBIS, NES (31 January 1991): 4.

[104]Caryle Murphy, "The Business of Political Change in Egypt," Current History, 94, no. 588
(January 1995): 19.

[105]Ibid.

[106]Ibid.

312

expression, change cannot happen because no one knows what to fix. In Egypt, at least

there is a start point for change.[107]

Some of the economic frustration is due to rising expectations created by Nasser's

rhetoric, the oil boom, American largesse, Sadat's infitah, and the disappointing decade

of the 1980s. The post-1991 Gulf War further aggravated this disappointment because

although the economy now reflects a dramatic improvement in its macro-economic

performance, it has suffered a sharp decrease in its micro-economic performance.

Unfortunately for Mubarak, on the individual level, it is the micro-economic

performance that influences attitudes and perceptions. Cassandra explains further that

"while economists are persuaded by data on balance of payments, levels of indebtedness,

budget deficits, and other macroeconomic indicators, such data mean little to ordinary

people concerned about the scarcity of jobs, low wages, high prices, and inadequate

profits."[108]

The success at this macro-level is a result of the aid Egypt received after the Gulf

war, including the May 1991 stabilization package agreed to with the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). This aid decreased Egypt's 1990 foreign debt of $50 billion to

$26 billion by 1994. Fiscal reform reduced the budget deficit from 20 percent of Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 to approximately 3 percent in 1993, and inflation fell

---

[107]The ability for self-examination was an important step for Egypt after the 1967 war. Egypt acknowledged its military's short-comings and was able tom take steps to correct them. This was not the case in Syria after the 1967 war. Consequently, Egypt's military was a more trained military than Syria's military for the 1973 war.

[108]Casandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," Middle East Journal, 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 11.

from 25 percent in 1991 to less than 10 percent in 1993. Furthermore, Egypt's foreign

currency reserves increased from $2.7 billion to almost $12 billion in 1993.[109]

For Mubarak, the poor micro-economic performance has led to two politically

relevant results, which are growing unemployment and a widening income gap between

the rich and the poor. Cassandra notes that because it is primarily the unemployed who

have been arrested for committing terrorist acts, some relief to joblessness would appear

to be a precondition for addressing political violence. Unfortunately, unemployment is

steadily rising, reaching between 17 and 20 percent by 1993, while the 1994 numbers of

unemployed Egyptians were between 1.5 and 2 million.[110] As Cassadra notes, "The

perception that the government is insufficiently sensitive to the plight of the jobless, and

unable or unwilling to do much about underlying causes of unemployment, contributes to

the widening gap between ruler and ruled."[111]

Mubarak must demonstrate governmental effectiveness in the economic realm in

order to address rising discontent in the political realm. As Mary Morris observes, "The

Egyptian economy is probably the most serious threat to the government's stability."[112]

Andrew Album concurs: "For it is economic progress, rather than military crackdowns,

---

[109]Ibid.

[110]Quotation as cited in Casandra, 12 taken from Said El-Nagger, "Politics and Economic Reform in Egypt," (Paper presented to the nineteenth annual symposium of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgrtown University, Washington, D.C., 7 - 8 April 1994).

[111]Casandra, 13.

[112]Morris, 10.

314

which will ultimately ensure the long term survival of his regime and give it the support to see off the threat of Islamic militancy."[113]

Mubarak is trying to address Egypt's economy, and there is some cause for optimism. Admittedly, there are many observers that criticize Mubarak for being too slow on implementing reforms and lacking a market oriented strategy.[114] I think we must remember that Egypt is dealing with a population that produces 1 child every 27 seconds and 1 million new Egyptians per 10 months. It has seen the problems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in their transitions, so Mubarak has some cause to proceed gradually with reforms.[115] In the face of these challenges, Mubarak has been taking steps to slow down economic decline. For example, the economic restructuring progress under the first two stages of the IMF and World Bank reforms has surprised critics. Between 1990 and 1992, inflation decreased from 24 percent about 12 percent, and Egypt cut its budget deficit from more than 20 percent of gross national product to 4.7 percent. Additionally, its foreign currency reserves rose to $17 billion, and the exchange rate remained stable.[116] Even with these results, Mubarak's gradual approach to economic reform seems justified. Mubarak's stated goals are economic reform, security, social

---

[113]Andrew Album, "Egypt Faces its Moment of Economic Truth," Business and Finance of The Middle East (July/August 1995): 29.

[114]Casandra, 14.

[115]Morris, 11-12.

[116]"Caution is the Watchword," Business and Finance, December 1993, 29.

315

justice, unemployment, improved education, a decreased population growth, and a pared down state bureaucracy.[117]

Of significance is Mubarak's nomination of Ismail Hassan as the new governor of the Central Bank. He is a former chairman of the Bank of Alexandria and Misr American International Bank, who is widely respected in financial circles. Mubarak created a new ministerial post in charge of the public sector and administrative development for Atef Obeid, who has been the point person for the privatization program. Mubarak is trying to increase the momentum for reform by granting responsibility directly to Obeid. Other significant appointments are Mohmoud Mohammad Hahmoud, the former head of the Misr International Bank, as economy minister, and Ibrahim Fawzi Abdul Wahed as minister for industry in place of Mohammad Abdel Wahab who has not been a champion of wholesale privatization.[118]

Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif Sidqi described some of the economic reforms, to include plans to abolish subsidies gradually, except for the subsidy on basic commodities. [In an earlier report he said that the IMF and World Bank wanted the full abolishment of subsidies, but Egypt insisted that this be done gradually.[119]] He explained that the state will compensate its citizens by other measures, such as increasing their income and salaries. He noted that the state had been subsidizing more than 150 commodities, but economic reform has made subsidies unfeasible. The prime minister said that the state

---

[117]Ibid.

[118]Ibid., 30.

[119]"Prime Minister Discusses Economic Measures, Reforms, FBIS, NES (3 December 1992): 16

316

would increase its employees and civil servants' salaries by up to 100 percent to face the increase in prices. He also expressed the state's goal to help landlords by relooking the law to try and increase revenue from property. For farmers, the state will attempt market pricing, except for cotton, which will be liberalized next year. He explained that the implementation of these reforms are designed protect those citizens' of low-income.[120]

Other indications of some reform success occurred when the Egyptian delegation headed by Dr. Kamal al-Janzuri, deputy prime minister and planning minister, reached an agreement with the two financial institutions under which Egypt received a loan of $150 million, as well as 15 percent of its foreign debts written off. Dr. Tubar of the National Democratic Party's economic committee said that the IMF and the World Bank officials were convinced that the economic reform program was a success and that the economy achieved good results.[121]

Mubarak himself explains his concerns with economic reform, stating that "the economy was suffering from chronic ailments" that could have led to "a total collapse" if he had not decided to develop and implement the reform program "at the right time". He said:

> Our target will be to continue to liberate the economy; to develop and further liberate the public investments authority; to deal seriously with the enormous population increase; to work out a comprehensive program to supplement the economic reform program in order to increase production, both in terms of quality and quantity, and to enhance people's abilities and skills; and to take care of low-income groups during the reform periods.[122]

---

[120]"Sidqi on Economic Liberalization, Subsidies," FBIS, NES (2 December 1992): 24-25.

[121]"IMF Cancels 15 Percent of Foreign Debt," FBIS, NES (16 October 1992): 12.

[122]"Mubarak Explains Reasons for Economic Reform," FBIS, NES (16 September 1992): 13.

317

The article reported that Mubarak "stressed the need for cohesion and solidarity among all members of Egyptian society to maintain stability, overcome hatred, and develop gratitude among the low-income groups."[123]

Another indication that Mubarak felt a sense of support and legitimacy from his people is that he frankly talked about the problems Egypt faced. At an Alexandria University anniversary celebration Mubarak explains,

> We need to talk frankly about our internal affairs, the economic situation, peace process, our international relations with the East, the West, Africa, and Arab countries, because all these things are linked in one chain. One cannot carry out economic reform in Egypt without having strong and good relations with the outside world, because you simply need them. We need to have good relations with the entire world so we can overcome the crisis we are in the process of surmounting.[124]

As mentioned earlier, I believe that it is a good sign when leaders and citizens can honestly assess regime performance, and Egypt does this. From a Western, liberal perspective, admittedly Egypt does not compare in this arena, however, in the regional context, I believe it does.

Mubarak also explains how he has tried to protect ordinary Egyptians as Egypt implements reforms. "When we started the five-year plan in 1982, many economists told me during our meetings: Mr. President, the situation requires a courageous step. What sort of courageous step? They said: Cancel subsidies, cancel free education, lay off 25 percent of the government's employees. Oh no!"[125] Here, Mubarak explains his dilemma of quick reform versus protecting the people from great hardships.

---

[123]Ibid.

[124]"Mubarak Speaks at Alexandria University Event," 7-8.

[125]Ibid., 8.

318

He continues to explain his rationale for not reducing the Army:

> The Egyptian army supports every citizen; it backs the Egyptian people. The Egyptian Army secures the country's existence. It is not an aggressive army that seeks to occupy other areas. The feeling that no one can attack our country fills us with pride and strength....Who makes up the Army but our sons. If you were to reduce the Army, what would you really be doing? You would be dismissing your own sons. People have sons and brothers in the Army. These sons would have nothing to do outside the Army and would become unemployed. What would you do then? What would you do then? The Army employs people and gives them jobs. They earn their income to survive. If you were to discharge people from the Army, you would weaken it. Our self-esteem would drop.[126]

Finally, Mubarak explains the danger of reform and admits the burden it places on all Egyptians.

> We have initiated economic reforms and have made great progress. I have said on more than one occasion...that economic reform places a great burden on us all. We do not want to delay economic reform until things are destroyed, people cannot find anything to eat, and we reach a stage of collapse. That is exactly what happened in Russia.[127]

Mubarak talks about the importance of investment, but that entails stability. "Without stability, tourism and investment will go away. How can we live when we are multiplying at such a dreadful rate? Imagine; our population has increased by 14 million since 1982, equal to the population of the Gulf states."[128]

In sum, the coalition alignment provided an economic opportunity for Egypt. The actual beneficiaries appear to be big business and the upper classes. I do believe, however, that the intention of the economic reforms and aid is for the overall improvement of the economy that would be felt throughout the population.

---

[126]Ibid.

[127]Ibid.

[128]Ibid., 9

319

Unfortunately, economic reform cannot proceed too quickly without causing great

hardships for most Egyptians, as the preceding discussion on subsidies indicates. The

problem is that Egypt is facing such great odds for improvement just by trying to keep up

with its alarming population growth rate. Additionally, Mubarak recognizes that the

source of domestic unrest is the economy, and so do Mubarak's oppositon. The Muslim

Brotherhood seeks to exploit this class differential in Egypt. Mubarak's task is to

provide economic benefits for his people so that they do not look elsewhere for help,

namely the Islamic groups. What is remarkable, is that in the midst of such bad

economic conditions and with the prospect of short-term micro-economic problems

caused by the Gulf crisis, Mubarak still had great support at home. The challenge for

Mubarak is to prevent a downward spiral of ineffectiveness because in the long term such

ineffectiveness may eventually erode the regime's internal status.

Indicator: Foreign Aid and Trade

As with our Syrian case, I will combine the issues for this indicator because they

are so interrelated, and also, as before, I have already covered this indicator in my

previous section. Again, there are differing interpretations of the hard data, such as the

effectiveness of Mubarak's economic reforms. In my view, the difficulty in analyzing

this indicator is that the outcome does not indicate the policy intentions for reasons

already discussed. Here, I present hard data in the form of tables, but we must remember

that a positive macro-economic performance does not reach the individual, consequently,

good macro-economic performance does not diminish discontent as would an increase at

320

the micro-economic level. I will still attempt to answer the question of who is benefiting here.

Issues: Security, Territory, Human, and Nonhuman Resources

Egypt was able to benefit from the peace treaty with Israel concerning its military spending. From 1973-1975, Egypt was spending 32 percent of its GNP on military forces; however, by the late 1980s, its spending dropped to 8-12 percent. Also, in 1973-1975, Egypt was spending over 50 percent of its central government's expenditures on the military, but by 1986-1988, this expenditure dropped to 20-22 percent. Even with this drop in military spending, Egypt's economy still struggled.[129] According to Edward Atkeson, "Egypt has no apparent ambition for expanding its forces, but seeks to modernize through gradual transition to Western equipment."[130] Perhaps the economy prevented Egypt from thinking about expanding its forces.

Luckily, Egypt has been able to modernize its military with help from the United States. President Bush asked Congress in September 1990 to forgive Egypt's debt of $6.7 billion, which was approved in December 1990. Not only did this debt forgiveness ease Egypt's economic strain, it also helped with modernizing Egypt's forces. This debt servicing for past FMS loans would help with scheduled payments for the subsequent five years.[131]

---

[129]Cordesman, 328-329.

[130]Atkeson, 37.

[131]Cordesman, 328.

321

Egypt needed such modernization assistance especially because of the challenge

it has faced through the 1980s of integrating U.S. equipment with Soviet equipment and

doctrine. Egypt made significant progress on this conversion, especially since 1985 when

all of the FMS financing, which from 1987-1992 was an annual $1,300 million, was in

the form of grant aid. The debt forgiveness described above was also instrumental.

Consequently, Egypt has bought a great amount of U.S. equipment. By late 1991, Egypt

operated 1,550 U.S.-made tanks, 1,361 other armored vehicles, and 532 TOW launchers.

Air defense forces had 72 improved Hawk launchers and 8 TPS-63 2D radars. The Air

Force had 144 U.S.-made combat aircraft and 101 other Western-made combat

aircraft.[132] Please refer to table 16.

---

[132]Ibid., 331.

TABLE 16

MILITARY SPENDING TREND: EGYPT (U.S. Dollars)[133]

	Manpower (1,000s)	Tanks	Aircraft	Defense Spending ($millions)	Arms Imports ($millions)	Arms Exports ($millions)
1967	220	530	400	0.3	204	1
1973	390	1,880	620	11.4	741	14
1982	447	2,100	429	7.2	1,900	360
1988	452	2,425	517	6.1	725	170
1991	420	3,190	495	5.2	----	----

---

[133]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 322.

323

It appears that militarily, Egypt's coalition position allowed it to keep pace, if not improve its technological edge of its arsenal with U.S. assistance. While it does appear that the Army itself benefited from the alignment decision, I believe the Army offered Egypt two main benefits. First, a respectable military helped to provide Egypt with enough clout to be a key player in the region. As noted earlier, such status earned Egypt economic benefits. Second, the Army offered employment, as noted earlier by Mubarak, himself. The economy could not absorb a great influx of unemployed soldiers. Again, there is a tie-in to the economic imperative.

Let us now look at the human and nonhuman resource issue. Please refer to tables 17 - 19. The tables support our earlier assessment, that the macro-economic level of performance is better than the micro-economic level. Consequently, the ordinary citizen is not likely to feel as if he or she is benefitting from any of the economic rewards Egypt received for its participation in the Gulf War. Similarly, Mubarak's reforms in the face of such dire statistics concerning unemployment and population growth rates have a hard time even measuring on a richter scale. The tables are rather deceiving because, as described earlier, the intentions to help all Egyptians do not match the outcome, which is either little effect for many, but great effect for the privileged upper class few.

324

TABLE 17

ECONOMIC DATA FOR EGYPT 1992-1993[134]

Per Capita GDP (U.S. $)	715	Annual GDP Growth Rate	2.4%
Population (thousands)	56,400	Annual Popul Growth Rate	2.2%
GDP (billions of U.S. $)	40.3		

---

[134]The Middle East and North Africa, 1987 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 769.

325

TABLE 18

COST OF LIVING: EGYPT[135]

(Consumer Price Index base: 1980 = 100)

	1988	1989	1990
Food	373.8	473.3	548.3
Fuel and Light	133.5	137.2	n.a.
Clothing	274.3	315.3	374.1
Rent	122.4	128.7	150.0
All Items (incl others)	337.1	408.8	477.3

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics

---

[135]The Middle East and North Africa, 1987 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 769.

326

TABLE 19

PRINCIPLE TRADING PARTNERS: EGYPT[136]

(Egyptian Pounds, millions)

	Imports				Exports		
	1989	1990	1991		1989	1990	1991
Australia	428.2	1,038.0	858.4	Belgium	140.8	164.8	162.8
Austria	128.0	216.6	284.2	Czech.	92.5	153.5	8.8
Belgium	363.9	468.5	502.7	France	408.0	278.4	695.3
China, PRC	133.0	276.9	n.a.	Germany	296.8	386.0	439.2
Czechoslovakia	160.2	249.9	338.3	Greece	131.3	104.5	448.2
France	920.7	1,355.7	824.2	Israel	364.8	451.5	1,186.8
Germany	1,613.4	2,621.0	2,631.0	Italy	792.8	849.3	1,743.8
Greece	169.5	174.3	182.9	Japan	206.2	189.0	165.1
Japan	642.6	923.6	1,026.0	Romania	7.7	75.2	399.3
Romania	496.5	256.0	210.3	SA	169.8	206.2	366.1
Saudi Arabia(SA)	102.1	205.9	433.8	Sudan	47.1	55.8	81.8
USSR	576.6	733.0	458.3	USSR	764.4	1,097.5	745.8
USA	2,930.7	3,502.9	4,056.7	USA	288.9	596.7	894.7
TOTAL (incl others)	16,623.6	24,823.2	25,216.3		5,734.7	6,953.8	11,764.7

---

[136]The Middle East and North Africa, 1987 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 769.

327

Conclusion

As I mentioned in the introduction, Egypt is a difficult case because it is our null set case. Consequently, we are showing the significance of a lack of ethnic divisiveness on the Persian Gulf War alignment decision. I believe, however, that there are significant indications of legitimacy enjoyed by Mubarak as a result of ethnic homogeneity. In other words, the fact that he had great support for his initial coalition stance in the face of tremendous economic woes combined with a growing anti-West sentiment in the region is significant and is linked to Egypt's ethnic homogeneity. The idea that the Egyptian people will support the State and ask questions later provides the Egyptian leader with some room to maneuver in foreign policy. This contrasts with Asad, who is constantly trying to build a consensus before he makes a move. Ironically, the seemingly absolute ruler, Asad, seems to operate with tighter constraints, as we will see again in the next chapter, than does Mubarak in the foreign policy realm. I will discuss this point in greater detail in my concluding chapter. For now, let us assess what we have gained from this case study.

First, the economic imperative seems to weave its way through the other issues. Security and status seem to be the means by which Egypt gains economic benefits. Admittedly, Egypt had some external security concerns with Israel, even with the treaty, and with the threat of Iranian hegemony in the region. However, it was evident that Egypt was more concerned with the post-war security arrangement than the immediate external threats, especially in terms of laying the groundwork for the peace process. Numerous Egyptian officials saw the peace process as an opportunity for Egypt to build

328

economically. Boutros-Ghali even called for a Marshall Plan for the region. Stephen Pellitier's view that "Egypt's security problem must be seen in context of its economic plight." is evident in this case.[137]

Also, Egypt seemed to have ensured a continuation of its military capabilities through its alignment because of continued U.S. assistance. Although Egypt does not seem to be harboring offensive designs or anticipating war with Israel, they do see a respectable military as essential for providing diplomatic clout. The issue of security for Egypt meant ensuring Egypt remained a key regional and international player in the peace process and aligning with the coalition allowed Egypt to do just that.

Increased regional and international status is valuable for Egypt because it can convert this status into economic benefits. The coalition alignment allowed Egypt to increase its status in both the regional and international communities, and both communities rewarded Egypt with economic benefits. These benefits, combined with the rise in Mubarak's stature helped to increase his status at home. What is remarkable is that Mubarak had great support from both his political supporters and opposition parties. Also, the Egyptian people expressed support, even in the face of short-term economic hardships that would be felt throughout the population. This point is significant, and I believe it is directly related to the Egyptian sense of national identity based on its ethnic homogeneity. It is this reservoir of legitimacy, resulting from this ethnic homogeneity, that allows for regime stability in the face of economic non-performance.

---

[137]Pellitiere, 1.

329

When we did look at the beneficiaries of the economic reforms and aid from the war, it was apparent that the majority of Egyptians were not the recipients. There are several reasons for this outcome. First, Egypt is facing almost insurmountable odds because of its skyrocketing population growth rate. Second, economic reforms at too quick a pace would cause tremendous hardships on the ordinary Egyptian, which makes reforms difficult to implement. Third, macro-economic performance has increased as a result of the economic benefits from the coalition alignment, however, these benefits have yet to be felt at the micro-economic level. All these factors contribute to the mismatch between policy intentions and policy outcomes.

It is important, though, that we recognize the intention of the alignment decision in terms of economic benefits and reforms. That intention is to raise the standard of living for the average Egyptian. As mentioned earlier, the economy is at the root of Egypt's security, and we have discussed this point in terms of the Islamic opposition. In Egypt, the Islamic opposition does not have ethnic divisions to exploit, but rather the danger is the opposition's exploitation of class divisions. Again, we see the economic imperative for the regime itself. It is amazing to me that Mubarak feels comfortable to openly acknowledge this problem and not feel threatened. I think this is a healthy sign for Egypt's future, not only in the economic realm, but also in the political arena as it continues its path towards democracy.

It does appear that the post-Cold War era affects behavior in several ways. First, I agree with some of the scholars' views presented here that pragmatism has become the guiding "ideology" for policy. The end of the Cold War did provide less room for

330

maneuver; no longer can third world states play the superpowers off one another. In fact, reminiscent of Kenneth Waltz, there appears to be more uncertainty concerning the reliability of U.S. assistance in the absence of a comparable rival. Consequently, it appears that states have to look elsewhere for support, namely the region and themselves. For this reason, it does appear that in the post-Cold War era, domestic variables are coming to the fore. For Egypt, that variable is the economy.

The other variable that Egypt has been able to tap is the seemingly intangible, but highly significant variable of legitimacy based on its ethnic homogeneity. Fouad Ajami observes that:

> Egyptians who know their country so well have a way of reciting its troubles, then insisting that the old resilient country shall prevail. As an outsider who has followed the twists of the country's history and who approaches the place with nothing but awe for its civility amid great troubles, I suspect they are right. The country is too wise, too knowing, too tolerant to succumb to a reign of theocratic zeal. Competing truths, whole civilizations have been assimilated and brokered here; it is hard to see Cairo, possessed of the culture that comes to great, knowing cities turning its back on all that.[138]

It is this intangible variable of legitimacy based on ethnic homogeneity and subsequent strong sense of national identity that allows Egypt's leaders to take some risks because they can count on their people's support. Sadat did this, and Mubarak, in the face of an anti-West opposition and an economic crisis, chose to take a bold pro-U.S. stance, and his people cheered.

---

[138]Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," 88.

CHAPTER 7

POST-COLD WAR ERA CASE - SYRIA

Introduction

Let us now examine Syrian alignment, namely its Persian Gulf War alignment, in

the present post-Cold War era. While hypothesis #7 is still our primary focus, we now

may test hypothesis #5. In other words, we will determine how ethnic divisiveness in

Syria affected its alignment, as well as how significant this domestic variable was in the

Cold War versus post-Cold War eras. Two key points need mentioning: First, my

discussion of the motivation for the alignment will include some reference to the current

peace process, an outcome of the War, and because of the window of opportunity it

offered for the collection of survey data. Second, Asad continues to perform his

balancing act among many interests as a means to ensure stability of his Alawi, minority -

ruled regime. I will elaborate on this last point throughout this section. Generally, I find

that while Syria's alignment with the West appears like a radical departure, it really

reflects Asad's cautious and calculating nature. The changes associated with this

alignment, such as the liberalization of the economy, are conducted incrementally.

Background

The 1980s saw the passing of the Cold War era. Gorbachev initiated his "new

thinking", which in the Middle East meant normalizing ties with Israel, creating close ties

332

with pro-West Arabs, calling for moderation within the PLO, criticizing Syria's role in Lebanon, dropping the amount of Soviet arms to Syria, and calling for diplomatic, not military, means to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This new thinking occurred as a result of the Soviets' internal focus, a desire to reverse past ineffective policies, and a desire to improve relations in the West. These new policies worsened relations between Syria and the Soviet Union, especially in 1987 when Gorbachev refused Syria's request for strategic parity with Israel. What caused this Soviet "new thinking" and the resultant changes in Soviet Middle East policies?[1]

Although much has been written on the reasons for the Soviet decline as a superpower, we will focus on three points. First, the United States' insistence on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) broadened the definition of national power. Technology, not just numbers of missiles, defined power. The Soviets realized that, although they could quantitatively compete with the United States, they were unprepared to qualitatively compete on an entirely new, technological level.[2] Secondly, the Soviets were experiencing severe economic hardships which made it impossible for them to even maintain their military strength, much less compete on economic fronts. Finally, attempts at democratization throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself contributed to the Soviet Union's political instability. The Persian Gulf War

---

[1] John P. Hannah, "At Arms Length: Soviet - Syrian Relations in the Gorbachev Era, " The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 41 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), xi-12.

[2] This idea about technology and SDI is taken from Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience (New York: Random House, 1987), 277-278 and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 182.

333

confirmed what was already occurring: the decline of the Soviet Union as a world power and the United States' emergence as the sole world leader.

Syria's reasons for her initial participation as part of the coalition were based on Asad's promise to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to help defend his territory, the prevention of the destruction of the holy places, the prevention of further fragmentation of the "Arab nation," and the belief that Arab forces would replace foreign forces. Asad denounced the Iraqi invasion because Iraq violated the basic codes of inter-Arab relations while also exposing the region to foreign intervention.[3] Asad further claimed that Hussein involved the Arabs with a peripheral issue, just as he had done in his war with Iran, and that his focus should have been on Israel instead.[4]

Iraq's invasion also posed direct problems for Syria. Iraq's actions threatened some of Syria's resources, challenged Syria's commitment to Arab nationalism, threatened its own security and that of Lebanon, and increased the potential of Israeli involvement. Its participation reflected its concern for security. "Only if its needs and strategic interest against Iraq or Israel are at stake will it become a player in the Gulf, searching for friends who share its strategic conception of the world."[5] Syria also looked forward to some concrete and immediate benefits, to include funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), aid from the European Community (EC), and renewed

---

[3]Ann Mosley Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," The Middle East Journal, 14, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 41.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Bruce Stanley, "Drawing from the Well: Syria in the Persian Gulf," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 14, no. 2 (Winter 1990): 63-64.

334

support from the Soviet Union. Perhaps Syria could look forward to American

technological support, removal of Saddam Hussein, increased prestige, restoration of the

Golan Heights, and a Palestinian solution. Syria realized that it would have more input to

long-range Middle East plans as a member of the coalition, rather than as a member of

the Iraqi-Jordanian-PLO alliance.[6]

Domestically, however, many groups disagreed with Asad's position. They based

their opposition on the presence of foreign troops and the perception of Hussein as an

Arab hero and pro-Palestinian. Even some Ba'th and military officers questioned Asad's

alliance with the West. Asad would need some of those potential benefits realized to

keep his detractors at bay.[7] Syria's blatant pro-West stance as a member of the coalition

challenged long-standing anti-West and anti-Israeli sentiment. Could Asad afford to

discard what seemed to be unifying sentiments in his society?

To answer this question, it is first necessary to fully understand the significance of

the Persian Gulf War in the global post-Cold War era. This war was the first post-Cold

War era war.[8] Specifically, "for the first time in recent history, a Middle East war has

been fought with the two superpowers on the same side, no longer engaged in zero-sum

struggles."[9] The Cold War "rules of the game" were no longer in place. These rules were

implicitly acknowledged by the superpowers and served to deter a superpower war and

---

[6]Lesch, 42-43.

[7]Ibid., 43.

[8]Hermann Frederick Eitts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects," The Middle East Journal, 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 7.

maintain stability. These rules included a respect for each other's spheres of influence,

avoidance of direct confrontation, use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort, preference

for "predictable anomalies over unpredictable rationality"[10] (examples of anomalies

include the division of Germany and Korea), and the refusal to undermine each other's

leadership.[11]

Client states realized the significance of these missing "rules of the game."

Traditional verities about the character of the old international order were shattered.
Radical Third world leaders, the Ortegas ..., the Saddams, Qaddafis and the Assads,
long accustomed to the economic and military benefits of playing East against West,
quickly recognized they would no longer loom as high on the international horizon.[12]

Perhaps if the Soviet Union had still been a superpower in August 1990, it would have

prevented Iraq from invading Kuwait in order to avoid escalation and possible

superpower confrontation. The Persian Gulf War, due in some degree to the demise of

the Cold War rules, created the need for other "rules" to help stabilize the situation.

These rules included an active role for the United Nations, cooperation between

the United States and the Soviet Union, and international cooperation.[13] The United

States showed that technology on the battlefield is a critical component for victory. The

United States proved its position as world leader due to its military, diplomatic, political

---

[9]Geoffrey Kemp, "The Middle East Arms Race: Can it be Controlled?" The Middle East Journal, 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 443.

[10]John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace," International Security, 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 132.

[11]Ibid., 132-140.

[12]Graham E. Fuller, "Moscow and the Gulf War," Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 64.

[13]Robin Wright, "Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis," The Middle East Journal, 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 29.

and economic powers.[14] Power is now the "political ability to change political environments and to build, guide, and sustain coalitions and relationships necessary to accomplish tasks that no one nation can accomplish alone."[15] Globally, the Persian Gulf War highlighted the critical elements of national power, as well as the power of collective security in the form of the United Nations and the international coalition.

Regionally, the Gulf War produced shifts in alliances, revealed a lack of cohesion among the political leftists and religious rightists, as well as disunity among the Arabs.[16] We have not seen internal changes in either Iraq or Kuwait. Hussein still rules Iraq and the Emir rules Kuwait. The Kurds are still in desperate straits, and the gap between the haves and the have-nots remains. For Syria, the end of the war marked the end of Syria's regional isolation, established its consolidated hold over Lebanon, created closer ties to the West and the United States, and acquired subsidies from the gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.[17] More significantly, we see Syria initiating a peace process to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I believe that Syria's aggressive pursuit of a diplomatic settlement is not out of character. Asad is, once again, using the best means available to accomplish his goals. The Soviet Union, even before the war, refused to help Syria establish strategic parity with Israel. In fact, the Soviet Union's historical inability to influence Israel gravely

---

[14]Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 24.

[15]Harold H. Saunders, "Political Settlement and the Gulf Crisis," Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues, 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 6.

[16]Lesch, 48.

[17]Peter W. Rodman, "Middle East Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 5.

limited its effectiveness in playing a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[18] Only the

United States had that ability, which explains why "Mr. Gromyko (never had) the

freedom to shuttle between confrontation parties enjoyed by Dr. Kissinger or Mr.

Vance."[19] Additionally, Syria's economy in the 1980s suffered, especially while it tried

to build up its military.[20] Asad realistically turned to those new elements of power that

proved themselves during the war, namely the diplomatic, political, economic and

technological elements. As a result, we see Asad becoming a major player in the Middle

East through his peace initiative. Additionally, through his new alliances, Asad is

receiving aid to bolster his economy, and perhaps he will now be able to divert funds

from the military to other sectors of the economy by reducing both Israel and Iraq as

regional threats.

We must not forget, however, that Asad is not afraid to antagonize his allies. His

policies reflect his overriding concern for security and determination for independent

decision-making. Asad's independence seems critical for his desired image as a leader

who does not answer to foreigners, especially non-Arabs. Historically, he has made

several policy decisions that clearly opposed Soviet interests. However, he showed great

loyalty to the Soviet Union when he truly needed its aid. Asad uses those available tools

that best suit his interests. His loyalty is to the security of his regime. Now that the

---

[18]Peter Mangold, "The Soviet Record in the Middle East," in Crisis Management and the Superpowers in the Middle East, ed. Gregory Treverton (Westmead: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1981), 91.

[19]Ibid., 91-92.

[20]Yosef Olmert, "Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in Syria: Tha Assad Regime," Middle East Review, 20, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 20.

Soviets can no longer offer the required aid due to their own demise, Asad must look elsewhere for support. Currently, he sees the West as the best source of support to help him acquire power economically, diplomatically and technologically.

While Asad has been able to broaden his base of support beyond the Party and the military, it is still the Ba'th Party that centrally controls the Syrian education system. This type of control has hurt the quality of education, especially since it hinders initiative and flexibility. Additionally, the society rewards those students who become graduate civil servants, not skilled non-graduate technicians. Promotions occur through patronage and corruption, party membership or Alawi loyalty.[21]

> The problem is that effective policies and reform would flourish best in a more liberal, less ideologically determined atmosphere and with more incentives for private initiative. Strict adherence to central planning and a controlled public sector, together with a lack of political freedom, hinder, rather than encourage this progress.[22]

Although Syria will be able to advance somewhat technologically and economically by its westward looking policies, unless reforms occur internally, Syria will never achieve parity with Israel, nor reach its potential as a nation and society.[23]

However, Syria faces the challenge of transitioning from a socialist to a modern capitalist economy as it opens to the world, a challenge that a peace with Israel would bring. Such a transition would precipitate societal dislocations and upheavals, such as those which caused such havoc in the former states of the Soviet Union and the countries

---

[21]Delwin A. Roy and Thomas Naff, "Ba'thist Ideology, Economic Development and Educational Strategy," Middle Eastern Studies, 25, no. 4 (October 1989): 471-477.

[22]The idea concerning parity is taken from Ibid., 476.

[23]Ibid., 479.

of the former Eastern Europe. Such change would threaten the stability of the Asad

regime. Moreover, Syria would have to halt its U.S. alleged drug trade, which would, no

doubt, antagonize some of its most powerful citizens who are the chief beneficiaries of

this trade.[24]

Robert Lifton's meeting with Asad explains the constraints facing this seemingly

absolute ruler:

> As I sat listening to him talk about the constraints upon him, I remember being told
> by an Arab leader of the limitations on Assad because he is a minority Alawite in a
> country dominated by Sunnis. Mubarak, too, told us about rejectionist factions in
> Syria limiting Assad's options. Moreover, it is no secret that there has been internal
> dissension in Syria that recently led to Assad firing four of his top military and
> intelligence commanders....What is clear, and should be borne in mind by those
> concerned with the process, is that while the world thinks of Assad as having absolute
> power and therefore free to make peace on any terms he chooses, he does not see
> himself that way.[25]

Raymond Hinnebusch describes the importance for Asad to maintain his regime's

autonomy as he attempts to create foreign policy in the midst of the dramatic changes

ushered in by the post-bipolar and peace eras. Asad is attempting to maximize autonomy

and stability by broadening the regime's internal bases of support. In essence

> He continues to seek, with every bit of leverage at his disposal, to extract a settlement
> from Israel that would minimize the damage to the regime's legitimacy in the
> transition to peace, while simultaneously trying to alter the bases of this legitimacy.
> Thus, Asad is 'omni-balancing' between the elements of his internal coalition and
> between this coalition and the external arena.[26]

---

[24]Robert K. Lifton, "Talking with Assad: A Visit to the Middle East in Transition," Middle East
Insight (September/October 1994): 10.

[25]Ibid., 10-11.

[26]Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival," Middle East
Policy, 3, no. 4 (April 1995): 75.

340

Our task is to determine the significance of ethnicity as a variable affecting Asad's foreign policy calculation, namely his Persian Gulf War alignment. Perhaps understanding his motivation for this alignment will help us better understand his motivation for the current peace process.

Indicator: Elite Attitudes

I will rely heavily on elite attitudes as an indicator for the issues of security and territory, status, and human and nonhuman resources. Generally, I will use expert analyses of the elite views, but I will also examine the recent surveys conducted in Syria, as well as in those other Arab countries that may help us understand some of the differing views based on sectarian or ethnic groupings. Particularly, I found a striking correlation between Sunni professionals and students in Lebanon with Syrian professionals. Because urban businessmen are generally Sunni in Syria, I believe that Lebanese Sunni responses to surveys are an indicator of Sunni sentiment in Syria.

Issue: Security and Territory

Security, both externally and internally, was a priority for Asad in the events leading up to, during, and after the Persian Gulf War. Asad saw the war as an opportunity to regain lost territories, but he never wavered in his belief that Israel was a major threat. Additionally, Asad continued to ensure the survival of his regime, and I will show how his Alawite minority rule influenced his alignment decision. First, let us look at the external threats which influenced Asad's decision concerning state alignment.

341

During the build-up to the war and the actual war, Syria clearly articulated its

view that Israel remained the real threat. According to a highly informed source in

Damascus,

> Though Syria and Washington agree in their insistence on Iraq's withdrawal from
> Kuwait, Syria does not accept that the United States use this crisis as a pretext to
> consolidate Israel's military capability and weaken Iraq's capability. The highly
> informed source added that, although feeling indignant about the mistakes committed
> by Iraq in Israel's favor, Syria continues to realize that a potential Arab-Israeli war
> must place it on the side of Iraq, which is seen as Syria's strategic depth in the
> absence of Egypt, which signed the Camp David accord with Israel, to face the
> Zionist enemy, which has never abandoned its aggressive intentions.[27]

Additionally, a Syrian radio commentary explained the fallacy of the pro-Iraqi supporters

who claim that Iraq's actions are supportive of the Palestinians. The commentary

explains that Iraq has only served to distract the Arab world from its real threat, Israel.

> Gentlemen: The latest thing invented by the intellect of those who are trying to
> justify and defend the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is the proposition that this action will
> help liberate Palestine from the yoke of the Zionists and save the Arab homeland
> from the evil aggressive claws. Therefore, according to the logic of those people, the
> invasion should be viewed as an act of national liberation that should be welcomed
> and supported. We do not know how the occupation of Kuwait can become the basis
> for liberating Palestine. We have never heard of an enemy being defeated through
> seizing a brother's land, destroying his existence, and displacing him....the Arabs are
> not stronger after the invasion; on the contrary, they have weakened and retreated.
> The Arabs' strength is not now mobilized toward Palestine, but toward the Gulf to
> protect Arab countries there and curb the Iraqi threats against them.....What is worse
> still is that Israel has capitalized on the Iraqi statements to build up its military
> arsenal and supply it with various kinds of the most modern weapons....Someone who
> really wants to fight Israel - not through suspect statements - does not obstinately seek
> to undermine the basic anti-Zionist Arab force; that is Syria.[28]

Syria saw the Persian Gulf War as a means for obtaining security and territory by

aligning against Iraq. Syria was able to pursue its desire to expand its influence in

---

[27]"Nation Opposes U.S. Attempt to Weaken Iraq," FBIS, NES (29 October 1990): 53.

Lebanon via military means as a consequence for its pro-coalition stance. It was able to do this without the threat of international censure. It was understood that in return for Syria's participation in the U.S.-led multinational force, the United States exerted some pressure on Israel not to intervene in Lebanon, thus securing Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. Consequently, the Ta'if Agreement became completely Syrianized with the blessing of both Saudi Arabia and the United States.[29]

Additionally, Syria used this opportunity to address the occupied territories. Syria did not automatically favor the format of an international conference designed to address the Arab-Israeli conflict in the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. After a visit with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in early April 1991, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara restated his government's position that the United Nations should play "a significant role" in such a conference, and that Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the bases for any negotiations. On the eve of the initial meetings in Madrid, Syrian officials announced that unless there was clear progress on the resolution of the occupied territories, they would not participate in follow-up talks with Israel on other regional, environmental and economic issues.[30] A Damascus station commentary reminded its audience that

---

[28]"Radio Commentary," FBIS, NES (12 October 1990): 50-51.

[29]Fida Nasrallah, "Syria After Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 135-136.

[30]Fred H. Lawson, "Domestic Pressures and the Peace Process: Fillip or Hindrance?" in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 140-141.

343

The enemy of the nation in occupied Palestine has not changed. Moreover, the danger this enemy poses to our pan-Arab existence surpasses all dangers and its ambitions in our land and wealth are above all other ambitions. This enemy does not discriminate between the oil of Iraq and that of Kuwait, nor between Syrian or Egyptian soil. Why, then, are we ignoring this inarguable fact, and replacing the battle of pan-Arab existence with the Zionist enemy by an illusory war with the brother, whose victim this time was Kuwait.[31]

Here, the commentary links the issue of the occupied territories with the Zionist threat and pan-Arabism.

This linkage reflects Asad's external and internal security concerns. Harold H. Saunders explains that "For President Assad the top priority in his definition of the problem is organizing his neighborhood in a way that is secure for Syria and for his regime. Each decision he makes must be understood in light of his aim to establish Syria's influence over the course of events."[32] Asad's objectives for the peace process which followed the war provide some insights for his motivation for aligning with the coalition. These objectives were the following: recovery of the Golan; consolidate power in the Levant, especially Lebanon; obtain U.S. aid, trade, and technology, and ensure that nothing threatens the regime.[33] It appears that internal, as well as external security concerns have entered into Asad's peace process equation. These two concerns are also linked, and this point will become more clear in the status section.

---

[31]"'Illusory War' Replacing Fight Against Israel," FBIS, NES (30 August 1990): 48.

[32]Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institutes for Public Policy Research, 1985), 86.

[33]Dore Gold, "The Syrian - Israeli Track - Taking the Final Step: What Sacrifices Will Assad Make to Get Back the Golan?," Middle East Insight (September/October 1994), 15.

344

The importance of reclaiming territory, namely the Golan, has continued to assume great significance in the peace process. According to Muhammad Muslih, "the return of the Golan to Syria is pivotal to a solution of the Israeli-Syrian conflict, and, indeed, a sine qua non for peace between the two countries."[34] The Golan has external security value and has been an area of dispute since the armistice in 1949. Its strategic value stems from its high ground, with an average altitude of 1000 meters, and its wealth of regional water sources.[35] For Syria, the Golan is especially important because Syria has no natural boundaries, and its loss of its superpower patron together with Israel's superior economy and military make the Golan even more significant.[36] We will find that the return of the Golan, for Asad, will be a personal, as well as a public coup, both regionally and internationally. The security of his regime is somewhat dependent on the external security and territorial issues, which have the potential to gain him domestic status thereby bolstering his regime legitimacy and stability. We will explore these ideas in the status section.

In my view, a look at the peace process will help us understand elite attitudes concerning the decision to align with the West. According to Hilal Khashan, political developments, rather than steadfast religious beliefs for those Sunnis who were self-defined religious moderates, play a critical role concerning attitudes towards key

---

[34]Muhammad Muslih, "The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations," Middle East Journal, 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 611.

[35]Ibid., 613-614 and 621.

[36]Ibid., 626

345

international issues, such as the peace with Israel.[37] In my view, this observation

indicates that perhaps the international system's change was a key variable for these self-

defined religious moderates. This also suggests, based on our definition of ethnicity of

which religion is a component, that perhaps these Sunnis felt less ethnic loyalty than

those Sunnis who felt highly religious. However, this observation is based on questions

concerning peace with Israel. Ethnic loyalty may change when asked in the context of

the Asad regime. I will explore this notion in the status section. Tables 20 and 21 reveal

that those Sunnis in Lebanon and professionals in Syria (note the correlation here among

between Sunnis in Lebanon and Syrian professionals) who consider themselves as

moderates feel more inclined towards a peace with Israel. Lebanese Sunni students, who

define themselves as moderately religious, increased their support between 1993 and

1994 for peace from 31 percent to 71 percent, while Syrian professionals increased their

support from 29 percent to 67 percent. Additionally, Lebanese Sunni professionals who

define themselves as moderately religious increased their support from 34 to 68

percent.[38] On a domestic level, perhaps these people forsee economic rewards for

establishing peace with Israel. Such a peace may instigate more of a true economic

opening that would enhance business, in which the Sunnis in Syria have a stake. We will

explore this point more fully in the human and nonhuman resources section.

Another interesting trend is that other surveys conducted in urban Jordan and

Lebanon described the Arab-Israeli conflict as national, not religious, in nature. "The

---

[37]Hilal Khashan, "Partner or Pariah: Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan,"
Policy Papers, No. 41 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 13.

346

pragmatism this engenders may be similar to that encountered in surveys among Arab

Muslims in the Persian Gulf, where the public predominantly characterized peace talks

with Israel as at least 'somewhat un-Islamic' but nonetheless gave those talks some

lukewarm support."[39] Additionally, in 1994, 64 percent of Lebanese surveyed viewed the

Palestinian issue (the region's most critical political conflict) as a national, not religious,

conflict.[40] This is an interesting phenomenon because it confirms Dr. Mahmud Faksh's

view that the Persian Gulf War validated national boundaries. Perhaps when assessing an

external threat or issue, nationalism is taking on a more prominent role. However, when

assessing internal threats, perhaps ethnicity plays a prominent role, especially in a

minority-ruled regime.

---

[38]Ibid., 14-15.

[39]Ibid., 13.

[40]Fred Huxley, "The Arabs," in In the Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other, ed. David Pollock and Elaine El Assal (Washington D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, 1996), 7.

TABLE 20

DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AMONG LEBANESE, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN 1993 (% Support) [41]

	N	Degree of Religiosity								
		High			Medium			Low		
Groups		yes	no	unsure	yes	no	unsure	yes	no	unsure
Lebanese Shi'a Students (Beirut)	150	0	100	0	50	37	12	85	0	15
Lebanese Shi'a Professionals (Beirut)	100	0	100	0	38	54	8	80	10	10
Lebanese Sunni Students (Beirut)	150	11	82	7	31	54	15	73	14	14
Lebanese Sunni Professionals (Beirut)	100	14	86	0	34	56	10	82	14	5
Syrian Professionals (Damascus)	150	9	79	12	29	49	22	71	8	21
Syrian Laborers (Beirut)	100	28	41	31	68	29	2	60	7	33
Palestinian Professionals (Beirut)	100	9	82	9	21	58	21	56	17	28
Palestinian Professionals (Amman)	150	2	93	5	22	42	36	71	12	17

[41]Hilal Khashan, "Partner or Pariah: Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan," Policy Papers, No. 41 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 14.

348

TABLE 21

DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AMONG LEBANESE, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN 1994 (% Support)[42]

| Groups | N | Degree of Religiosity | | | | | | | | |
| | | High | | | Medium | | | Low | | |
		yes	no	unsure	yes	no	unsure	yes	no	unsure
Lebanese Shi'a Students (Beirut)	125	5	89	7	82	14	4	87	10	3
Lebanese Shi'a Professionals (Beirut)	85	15	74	11	75	25	0	88	12	0
Lebanese Sunni Students (Beirut)	125	12	85	3	71	22	7	82	18	0
Lebanese Sunni Professionals (Beirut)	85	18	77	5	68	30	3	100	0	0
Syrian Professionals (Damascus)	245	18	79	4	67	25	7	73	14	14
Jordanian Professionals (Amman)*	150	14	81	5	97	3	0	100	0	0
Palestinian Professionals (Beirut)	90	5	86	8	14	81	5	70	30	0
Palestinian Professionals (Amman)	150	22	73	5	90	5	5	100	0	0

*Sample not included in 1993 poll

[42]Hilal Khashan, "Partner or Pariah: Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan," Policy Papers, No. 41 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 15.

It is important to differentiate between peace and normalization. While peace may be somewhat acceptable, normalization may not be as readily welcomed. "Many Arabs perceive the diplomatic process as an act of force majeure, but believe they can resist normalization at the individual and societal levels."[43] An indication that political developments affect attitudes regarding normalization seem validated by two polls conducted in 1993 when 63% of Lebanese surveyed favored normalization, yet in 1995 when talks stalled, six in ten were opposed to it.[44] See Tables 22 and 23, which reveal that support among Lebanese Sunnis and Syrian professionals for the peace talks rose between 1993 and 1994/95 among moderate religious Sunnis. However, when it came to policies that stressed positive ties with the West, only one in ten Lebanese surveyed felt such a policy was a priority issue.[45]

---

[43]Khashan, 26.

[44]Huxley, 8.

[45]Ibid., 13 and 15. Also, see David Pollock, The Arab Street? Public Opinion in the Arab World (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 52 which claims that two-thirds of the Lebanese surveyed (mix of Sunnis and Christians) supported the peace process, and a narrower majority supported normalization.

350

TABLE 22

TREND OF "MEDIUM" RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL AMONG LEBANESE, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN 1993
(% Support) [46]

		N	Support Peace Talks	Oppose Peace Talks
Lebanese Shi'is:	Students	150	50	37
	Professionals	100	38	54
Lebanese Sunnis:	Students	150	31	54
	Professionals	100	34	56
Syrians:	Beirut Laborers	100	68	29
	Damascus Professionals	150	29	49
Palestinians:	Beirut Professionals	100	21	58
	Amman Professionals	150	22	42

---

[46]Fred Huxley, "The Arabs," in In the Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other, ed. David Pollock and Elaine El Assal (Washington D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, 1996), 13.

351

TABLE 23

TREND OF "MEDIUM" RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL
AMONG LEBANESE, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN 1994/1995
(% Support)[47]

			Support Peace Talks	Oppose Peace Talks
Lebanese Shi'is:	Students	125	82	14
	Professionals	85	75	25
Lebanese Sunnis:	Students	125	71	22
	Professionals	85	68	30
Syrians:	Professionals	245	67	25
Jordanians:	Professionals	150	97	3
Palestinians:	Beirut Professionals	90	14	81
	Amman Professionals	90	90	5

---

[47]Fred Huxley, "The Arabs," in In the Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other, ed. David Pollock and Elaine El Assal (Washington D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, 1996), 13.

352

Additionally, there are indications that not all of Syria's elite even support the peace process. The Syrian columnist, Khayri Hama states, "The conflict with the Zionist enemy has never been a border issue nor an interstate conflict but rather a total confrontation concerning the survival of our nationalism...against threats posed by the Israeli entity."[48] Additionally, In'am Ra'd, secretary of the Syrian Socialist National Party claims that Israel would economically and militarily dominate the "new Middle East".[49] The Union of Syrian Writers opposed the membership of a well-known poet because he supported "normalization with the Zionist enemy."[50] While the Arab publics and some elites may envision a cold peace, it appears, however, that a warm peace is not a short-term prospect. This sentiment is consistent with the sentiments expressed by some of the Arab officers attending the Command and General Staff College with me.

While there may be varying levels of support for peace and normalization among the elite, Asad seems to use these varying views to his advantage. For example, it appears that Asad cleverly uses his top officials to move cautiously and incrementally, while still leaving his options open in this peace process. Chief of Staff Shihabi, according to Moshe Maoz, is a key player in the peace process because he is Sunni, and 60 percent of the population is Sunni (he lends legitimacy to the peace process). Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara (non-Alawi) projects a cosmopolitan image, and Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam (non-Alawi) is the tough guy. Long time allies of Asad, Ali

---

[48]Khashan, 19.

[49]Ibid., 21.

[50]Ibid., 26.

353

Duba (Alawi) and Muhammad Nasif (Alawi) coordinate the intelligence services.

Mustafa Tlas (non-Alawi), the defense minister is seen as a "buffoon". Shara's role is to

cultivate relations with Israel and the West, while Khaddam is reassuring Iran. Khaddam

responded to a question concerning Syria's minimal efforts towards building relations

with Israel, "Our people are ready. They (the Israelis) are bombing South Lebanon,

beating Palestinians. It's not up to us to win them over. We're clear about what we want

- a pullout to the lines of June 4, 1967. When the last Israeli soldier leaves occupied

territory, we'll start talking about normalization."[51]

Many observers, to include politicians from both sides of the Knesset, and

academics all agree that Asad has made a pragmatic, "strategic decision" to make peace -

'not in his heart, but in his head." Moshe Maoz claims that with the breakup of the Soviet

Union, Asad realizes that he can only retrieve the Golan through negotiations. Maoz

claims that "apart from the Golan, he wants Israel out of southern Lebanon and

confirmation of his rule there, and he wants investment and high-tech from the U.S. to

develop his economy. It's not that he is seeking peace, but if that's the price he has to

pay, so be it."[52]

Daniel Pipes agrees with this assessment. He concludes:

While Assad shares with other authoritarian leaders the goal of personal and regime
survival, he stands apart from most of them in his willingness to resort to extreme
means to achieve his ends. To keep himself and his fellow Alawis in power, he could

---

[51]David Horovitz, "Portrait of the Enemy," The Jerusalem Report, 6, no 6 (July 27 1995): 27.

[52]Ibid.

354

do anything from destroy a Syrian city (as he did to Hama in 1982) to reverse a lifetime of anti-Zionism and sign a peace treaty with Israel.[53]

This motivation reflects his decision to align with the West. He saw it as an opportunity to gain stability, and one may argue internal security for his regime.

Asad does seem to have genuine external security concerns, namely his belief that Israel is a threat. He has stated his desire to reclaim the Golan, as well as his desire to influence Lebanon. Asad saw the coalition as a means to derive territorial concessions, as well as an opportunity to defeat his historical enemy, Iraq, and gain the upperhand vis a vis Israel. Additionally, Asad's desire for internal security, and, thus his need to build domestic consensus for his policy is reflected in the surveys which favor peace, and in some cases, normalization with Israel. We will explore this idea more fully in the next two sections because the idea of regime security and stability greatly overlaps Asad's quest for legitimacy for his minority-ruled regime.

Issue: Status

The task for this section is to determine how international versus regional versus domestic status affected Asad's alignment decision. Again, we will find some interaction among all three levels of status. The key will be to determine, especially for domestic status, if ethnicity played a role. The minority-led regime had to consider regime stability and we will see that, especially for the peace process, Asad is working rather hard to gain public consensus. In fact, he is leery of moving too fast in this process for fear of domestic unrest, namely by the Sunni majority. We will look at the Gulf War, as

---

[53]Daniel Pipes, "Syria Beyond the Peace Process," The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 40

355

well as the peace process that followed in order to see how gaining status, namely

legitimacy, was a motivating factor for Asad's decision to align with the coalition.

Herein lies the difference between Asad and Mubarak. Whereas Mubarak's focus of

internal status was on the economy, Asad's focus is on legitimacy, that is the lack

thereof.

In June 1994, about a third (35%) of the Lebanese and Jordanians surveyed chose

'showing solidarity with all other Arabs' as the first priority or second most important

national priority. Surveys on other Arab countries at the time were consistent with the

above results. However, when the option was replaced by 'promoting interests of all

oppressed Muslim peoples' as a priority, then the ranking changed. In 1993, Jordanians

and other Arab publics ranked that policy somewhat lower at 15 percent. "This

difference suggests that Arab publics generally view solidarity based on ethnicity a bit

more favorably than solidarity based on religion."[54]

This solidarity based on ethnicity seems to be most prevalent in Syria, where the

Islamic movement is widely popular among Sunnis and has experienced a greater loss of

life than similar movements in other countries. Daniel Pipes concludes that this

movement "in Syria...is more anti-Alawi and anti-Ba'th, more communal than religious.

Muslim Brethren literature, for example, hardly ever brings up the usual fundamentalist

concern for applying the sharia. Rather its goals consist of the Sunni public agenda."

Hans Gunter Lobmeyer agrees that while "the resistance against the Ba'th regime in Syria

_____

(Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 3.

[54]Huxley, 6.

356

has an Islamic label, the conflict has little - if anything - to do with Islam." The

movement does, at times, threaten the Alawis, which causes the "Alawis to associate

more with the regime, [thereby]...compelling the regime to make [ethnic] survival its top

priority."[55] It is through this lens of ethnicity that Sunnis view the regime. "The passage

of time has hardened the Sunni-Alawi divide to the point that it dominates the way

Syrians interpret domestic politics, and the way they anticipate Syria after Assad's

passing."[56]

Asad's concern for his minority-ruled regime's survival compels him to be a

pragmatist and establish a consensus among his elite and the populace.[57] Stephen Cohen

echoes this view,

> Not only does Mr. Assad seek to maintain his monopolistic control over the
> multiplicity of military and security forces, he also strives to balance rival ethnic
> groups and regional interests against one another....Middle East peace is not arriving
> through the excitement of popular upheaval and overthrow of regimes, as in Eastern
> Europe. On the contrary, peace is a central part of a calculated policy to prevent such
> upheavals and chaos. It is a strategy of change to preserve the leaders' rule and to
> reinforce it as a barrier to extremism and internecine warfare. Popular
> upheaval....would mean the eruption of ethnic and political rivalries that could tear
> the societies apart and wreak revenge against former ruling groups.[58]

This idea that Asad tries to build consensus, in other words build legitimacy or internal

status, is an important point for policy-makers. Dore Gold claims that the U.S. desire to

have Syria cut its ties with Iran, thereby contributing to dual containment is naïve: "Syria

---

[55]All the quotations are taken from Pipes, 12-13.

[56]Ibid., 11.

[57]Ibid., 13.

[58]Stephen P. Cohen, "A Not-So-Odd Mideast Couple," New York Times, 25 August 1994, sec. A,
p. 21.

needs Iran not only for Israel, but as a counter-weight to Turkey and as an instrument

against any internal fundamentalist challenge. Since Shi'ite clerics recognize the Alawis

as true Muslims, the connection with Iran affects the legitimacy of Assad's minority

government."[59]

It is this domestic consensus-building that was the impetus, I believe, for Asad to

reassert himself in regional affairs before, during, and after the Persian Gulf War by

aligning with the coalition. The best way to neutralize the threat posed by the Sunni

majority is "to take maximalist positions on all regional and international questions

related to the Arab nation issue or to Muslim problems."[60] Asad has done this in the past.

"The Alawis were always - sometimes to the point of caricature - at the head of the pack

on Arab-world causes, the last to make concessions in this domain, and even then only

after all the Sunni leaders had preceded them."[61] Volker Perthes claims that Syria's

regional status is a primary source of legitimacy for the regime on a domestic level.

Consequently, "It has been essential for the regime, particularly so since it rules in the

name of Ba'thist Arab nationalism, to demonstrate its adherence to what can be

considered a national myth, namely the conviction, that Syria is the heartland of Arab and

specially Palestinian rights."[62] We will see that Asad and other Syrian officials'

statements stress Syrian alignment with the coalition as a measure necessary to bolster

---

[59]Gold, 17.

[60]"Syria: Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness,'" in the Daily Report Supplement of Near East and South Asia, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 October 1995, 3.

[61]Ibid.

358

the Arab cause. Let us then first examine how Asad established great regional status by

taking a pro-coalition or anti-Iraqi, stand, which would greatly benefit his domestic

status.

According to Ghayth N. Armanazi, the Persian Gulf War greatly enhanced Syria's

status both in the regional and international contexts. This increase in status represented

a huge change for Asad's political, economic and strategic fortunes, which only a year

earlier were suffering due to diplomatic isolation, economic strangulation, and the

prospects of increasing vulnerability, especially because its longtime patron, the Soviet

Union, was no longer willing to support Asad's goal of strategic parity with Israel.[63]

Syria's position looked grim by the summer of 1990, and it was considered an outcast by

the other Arab countries.[64] Iraq and the PLO were championing Arab rights, not Syria.

The Bagdad-PLO axis was gaining strength and increasingly closing ranks with Amman.

This axis worried Syria, especially since a year earlier, it witnessed the inception of the

Arab Cooperation Council, an Iraqi inspired organization which incorporated Egypt and

Yemen in addition to Iraq and Jordan, but deliberately and conspicuously left out Syria.

Syria felt isolated and threatened.[65]

---

[62]Volker Perthes, Economic Change, Political Control and Decision Making in Syria (Germany:
SWP, 1994), 239.

[63]Ghayth N. Armanazi, "Syrian Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Continuity and Change in the
Post-Gulf Era," in State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1993), 112.

[64]Ibid., 113.

[65]Ibid.

Asad viewed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the 2nd August 1990 as an opportunity for Syrian leadership to preside in the region. Syrian leadership in this case supported its longtime policy towards its historical enemy, Iraq, and "Overnight, the whole edifice of the regional status quo crumbled and Syria seized the occasion to establish for itself a new position of power and influence within the nascent system."[66] It was not just Syria who saw its new leadership role. The former Egyptian Foreign Minister and Secretary General of the Arab League, Mahmoud Riyad stated,

> It is clear that the principal role in any future negotiations lies on the shoulders of Syria. Without her the conference will not convene, and without the recovery of the Golan no peace can be realised...the management of negotiations is not unlike directing a military battle, indeed it is more daunting, and the state best qualified to direct the negotiating battle is Syria.[67]

Additionally, other members of Asad's administration saw the importance of Syria's role in the Arab world, and they all stressed the importance of championing the Arab cause. Interestingly, many of these statements made by non-Alawis, such as those listed below, were, I believe, an attempt to attain support for policy among the Sunni majority. Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara sent a letter to the Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi:

> In view of accelerating developments in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the potential Israeli and foreign intervention in the region; to confirm the call made by President Hafiz al - Asad in the first hours of the invasion when he was in touch with a number of Arab leaders with a view to convening an immediate Arab summit; and in accordance with the Arab League Council's resolution issued in Cairo on 3 August 1990 recommending the holding of an emergency Arab summit, the Syrian Arab Republic requests the convening of an emergency Arab summit in Cairo, the permanent seat of the Arab League, to weigh the consequences of the Iraqi invasion

---

[66]Ibid., 114.

[67]Ibid., 112.

360

and to take whatever decisions and measures required to advance the objectives of the Arab nation and safeguard its supreme interests.[68]

Comrade 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, stressed Syria's national and pan-Arab responsibilities to defend Arab causes to regain invaded territory and to oppose foreign intervention and the Iraqi invasion.[69]

> The Central Command of the National Progressive Front (NPF) held a meeting this morning under the chairmanship of President Hafiz al-Asad. It reviewed the developments that resulted from the Iraqi forces' invasion of Kuwait and he efforts to convene an immediate emergency Arab summit to tackle the situation and avoid potential danger to the region. The Central Command supported the Syrian Arab activity and praised the personal efforts of President Hafiz al-Asad to handle the situation out of concern for pan-Arab interests.[70]

General al-Shihabi, chief of staff of the Army and Armed Forces, called the Iraqi invasion unprecedented; motivated by economics, and not by Arab interests; an excuse for foreign intervention by outside powers, and he reaffirmed Asad's efforts.[71]

Asad, however, had to weigh the pros and cons of supporting the coalition. If Saddam Hussein was perceived as the victor in this conflict, then Asad's regional and international status would have been seriously undermined, especially since he had aligned with Israel's primary patron, the United States, as well as with the conservative rulers of the Arabian Peninsula. His domestic status would have suffered also since he aligned against an Arab ruler whose sentiments of anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism were widely supported within Syria. However, Asad calculated that Saddam Hussein

---

[68]"Al-Shar' Requests Emergency Arab Summit," FBIS, NES (9 August 1990): 48.

[69]"Al-Ahmar Reasserts 'Rejection' of Iraqi Invasion," FBIS, NES (9 August 1990): 49.

[70]"NPF Supports Al-Asad Efforts in Gulf Crisis," FBIS, NES (10 August 1990): 60.

[71]"Army Chief Calls Invasion 'Unprecedented Event'," FBIS, NES (10 August 1990): 60.

would not win this conflict. Instead, Asad saw this crisis as an opportunity to contribute

to the downfall of his enemy, Saddam, as well as an opportunity to earn financial rewards

from the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula. Asad believed that the United

States would welcome Syria's position, and perhaps help Syria regain the Golan Heights.

There was a great deal at stake as a result of the conflict, but

> Most important, the crisis provided him with an opportunity to confirm Syria's move
> back to center stage within the region and to strengthen Syria's ties with Egypt and
> Saudi Arabia, two key powers, at a time when its superpower backer was disengaging
> from the Middle East and openly opposing its strategy of achieving strategic parity
> with Israel.[72]

Asad, however, did not embrace the United States with his pro-coalition stance.

In fact, Syria gave the coalition credibility because of its historical anti-West stand. Asad

used caution and restraint in his criticism of Hussein. At the Cairo Summit Conference

on 9 August, Asad stated, "It is difficult for me to imagine that any leader in this hall

arrived with the intention of leaning towards this party or that. We are all brothers. Iraq

is a brother; Kuwait is a brother...we all cherish Iraq, I have no doubt, and we all cherish

Kuwait."[73] Syrian officials wanted Syrian troops to operate separately from foreign

forces on Saudi soil, and they criticized the immense U.S. buildup, strongly opposed a

U.S. - Iraqi military confrontation, and wanted economic and diplomatic pressure to

force Saddam to find a political solution to the conflict.[74]

---

[72]Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), 92-93.

[73]Armanazi, 114-115.

[74]Lesch, 42.

Asad's stand-off approach to the United States is evident in the statements made

concerning foreign forces on Arab soil. "Syrian sources have informed the newspaper

Al-Diyar that Damsacus is sticking to its basic position that Iraq should withdraw from

Kuwait, as this will prevent foreign intervention. Syria rejects the idea of multinational

forces."[75] Additionally, "Al-Safir cites a high -ranking Syrian source as saying that Syria

will dispatch forces to Saudi Arabia, noting, however, that these will be token forces

whose purpose is to emphasize the need for Arab presence to deal with the Gulf crisis

and to affirm Arab responsibility for defending that area."[76]

Statements continued to remind the Syrian people that the country still considered

the United States as a threat.

> Current events in the region leave no room for doubt at all. The United States, who
> today calls for rejecting the aggression of one country against another and the
> occupation of its land, is the one who supported, financed, and backed the Israeli
> occupation of the Arab lands. It was the one who placed obstacles, by using the veto
> and otherwise, in front of all international efforts calling for Israel's withdrawal from
> the occupied lands, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and spreading permanent,
> just, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.[77]

At the same time, the Asad regime emphasized the regional importance of Arab unity and

Asad's leadership in the Arab world. For example, one commentary applauds Asad's

efforts at the Arab summit, and stresses the importance for Arab solidarity. It goes on to

say that:

> The Arab summit's resolution condemning the Iraqi occupation and demanding the
> return of the status quo in Kuwait plainly shows the Arab masses who is really

---

[75]"Nation Will Not Defend Iraq Against Israel," FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51.

[76]"Troops Slated for Saudi Arabia Service," FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51.

[77]"Paper Views U.S. Support of Israeli Occupation," FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51.

363

placing himself against the will of this nation and defying its charters and agreements, which organize Arab relations. Therefore, the resolution to dispatch Arab forces to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries to defend them debunks the pretexts for foreign intervention created by the Iraqi threats to these countries, keeps the risk of foreign agression on the region at bay, and prevents the region's falling under direct foreign hegemony and control.[78]

The newspaper, Al-Ba'th, with the headline, "The Dangers of the Crisis and the Prelude

To Addressing It," warns of the danger the conflict poses to the Arab world. The paper

"affirms in its editorial today that it has become clear to everybody that Iraq's invasion of

Kuwait, which created this explosive situation, has placed the entire region at the mouth

of a raging volcano whose fire and damage, if it were to erupt, might reach everywhere in

the Arab homeland and the countries surrounding it and perhaps other world arenas."[79]

Not everyone in Syria, however, was swayed by Asad and his officials' line of

argument. The controller general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 'Adnan Sa'd al-

Din, and member of the political Bureau of the National Front for the Salvation of Syria,

declared his support of Iraq against the forces of the "American-Zionist-Atlantic

invasion." 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, "called on the sons of the Syrian Arab people - officers,

soldiers, workers, students, and peasants - to assume their role to save the homeland and

liberate it from treason and sectarianism in all its forms and names so that Syria can

restore national unity, Arab unity, and Islamic jihad."[80] In other reports, there were

claims of pro-Iraqi demonstrations in Syria.

---

[78]"Commentary Applauds Arab Summit Resolutions," FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51-52.

[79]"Editorial Urges Return to Pre-Invasion Kuwait," FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 53.

[80]"Muslim Brotherhood Leader Voices Support for Iraq," FBIS, NES (30 January 1991): 48.

364

Travelers arriving in Jordan from Syria reported clear signs of high tension, but none who had visited the turbulent eastern part of the country was prepared to speak to reporters....Diplomats and intelligence sources from other Arab states confirmed the information....The sources regarded the outbreak of protests in Syria as a serious threat to al-Asad....The diplomats also saw trouble as evidence of President Husayn's growing appeal to the Arab generally in his stand against the U.S. and allied forces in the Gulf.[81]

As mentioned earlier, Asad has always tried to build a consensus among his people and elite for his policies. As shown above, he seems to have stressed the importance of his pro-Arab stance in his decision to align with the coalition, although he was not always successful in persuading everyone. He used prominent non-Alawis to publicize support for his policy, such as Mustafa Talas, the minister of defense; Hikmat al-Shihabi, army chief of staff, and Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, minister of foreign affairs.[82] Even before the conflict, there is evidence that Asad tried to initiate some political reform in the hopes of gaining internal status or legitimacy, especially in light of the international events of 1989 with the collapse in Eastern Europe.[83] This point suggests a systemic variable for Asad's behavior. Interestingly, the changes that were sponsored by the regime were a response to public discontent with the regime. It is important to note, however, that these changes were small and in no way reflected a change in the overall nature of Asad's authoritarian regime. The collapse of socialist Eastern Europe destroyed the international legitimacy which Syria previously enjoyed as a socialist regime itself. Even within the constraints of political expression in Syria, there has been some support

---

[81]"INA Reports 30 Aug," FBIS, NES (31 August 1990): 39.

[82]"Power and 'Alawi Cohesiveness," 12 describes these Sunni officials as tokens.

[83]Steven Heydeman, "Can We Get There From Here? Lessons From the Syrian Case," American-Arab Affairs, no. 36 (Spring 1991): 27.

for perestroika-like reforms, even within the ruling Ba'th party. The Party newspaper, Al-Baath, has acknowledged these sentiments. However, the collapse of Eastern Europe confronted the regime with a political challenge as well. The collapse showed that popular movements were, in fact, able to topple the ruling communist parties. The idea of presidents for life, party elites, and the single-party regime, now looked vulnerable.[84]

All this provoked a defensive response from Asad, and in his annual revolution day speech, Asad blamed the communist collapse on the United States and Israel. Less widely reported was Asad's efforts to reassert regime legitimacy. His efforts consisted of three elements: First, he called for reinstitutionalizing politics and reaffirming popular organizations. He wanted Syrians to consider political institutions more seriously, to mobilize for greater levels of political participation, and finally to decrease some of the arbitrariness of Syrian politics. Second, he renewed and strengthened corporatist links between the regime and some of the more important popular organizations, such as the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Peasant's Federation, and the Youth Federation. Essentially, this meant that professional associations and civil society came under state direction.[85] Finally, Asad limited the scope of emergency regulations. "In doing this, the

---

[84]Ibid., 27-28.

[85]Ibid., 28. While the source does not give the ethnic composition of these groups, the correlation between Lebanese Sunni professionals and Syrian Sunnis lead me to believe that the professional associations are primarily Sunni. Additionally, previous discussions in chapter three and five reveal that the Sunnis, while not politically powerful, still are the economic elites. The public sector groups and those groups which rely on the state for their economic well-being, such as trade unions, peasant and youth federations are most likely disproportionately Alawi. See Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Liberalization in Syria: The Struggle of Economic and Political Rationality," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between the Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 97-113, and this chapter pp. 42-44.

regime...coopted a plank from its critics and moved to defuse a long-standing source of

popular complaints stemming from the arbitrary application of emergency decrees."[86]

Asad in his 1990 revolution-day speech said,

restricting freedom tarnishes it, but regulating its practice makes it brighter.
Restricting freedom means dwarfing it, but regulating its practice means developing
it and making it healthy....Freedom and its regulations belong side by side. They do
not live apart...Like everything else in this universe, freedom needs order.[87]

Steven Heydeman claims that

Considering Assad's disregard for the practice of freedom, it would be easy to dismiss
these thoughts. However, Assad's attention to such topics as pluralism and freedom
in a speech marking Syria's most important political anniversary indicates how
seriously the Syrian regime is challenged by the events of 1989.[88]

This point suggests that perhaps in this post-Cold War environment, domestic variables

came to the fore. In particular, Asad, I feel was moved to address the legitimacy of his

minority-ruled regime by trying to broaden his support. Heydeman admits that "None of

these events would have registered on a Richter scale calibrated in terms of

democratization. Yet to overlook them would mean ignoring the essence of how politics

is conducted by a regime like Syria's, including the important extent to which popular

sentiments are able to shape official rhetoric and policy, and to command the attention of

the elites."[89]

---

[86]Heydeman, 28.

[87]Ibid., 29.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid., 30.

367

Finally, before we leave this section to look at the economic benefits of this alignment decision, let us examine the peace process in light of this issue of status. According to Ann Lesch, Asad wanted Syria in a strategically central position in the Middle East so that it may better influence events and resolve central issues. Asad viewed his alignment with Riyadh and Cairo as a means to a comprehensive agreement with Israel that would allow Syria to regain the Golan Heights, while resolving the Palestinian question in a manner acceptable to Syria. Lesch claims that for Asad this "triad was more appealing than the alternative alignment with Iraq, Jordan, and the PLO in which Iraq would be the dominant partner and the Palestinian movement would be beyond Syrian control."[90]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Asad saw the United States as the key to Syria's inclusion in the new regional order emerging after the Gulf War. According to Muhammad Muslih,

> Arab diplomats who are well-connected with al-Asad's inner circle explained to me that the Syrian president understood that the United States wanted Israel and the Arab states to make a lasting peace. He also understood that such peace, if it were anchored in a comprehensive settlement, including total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, would offer Syria the best chance of playing the role that befits its central position in regional politics. Thus, Syria's politics of patience in this phase should be seen not as a diplomatic technique aimed at dividing a wedge between Israel and the United States, but rather as an exercise in the service of state interest and regional peace.[91]

However, Asad is proceeding slowly with the peace process because he must also consider the effects of his negotiations at home. According to Stephen Zunes, "Those

---

[90]Lesch, 42-43.

368

with ties to the Syrian government...have insisted that a separate agreement would not help anyone....Finally, they fear that an Alawite president making a separate peace with Israel could conceivably provoke a reaction from hardline Sunnis."[92]

Ori Orr, who is chairperson of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Israeli Knessett claims that before Asad can actually make peace, he must first believe that he will be able to control the effects of western exposure to his regime because this exposure is the greatest threat to his closed, minority-led regime. Because of Asad's desire to ensure continued Alawite rule, Orr says that, "Asad fears openness could bring it to an end." Consequently, "Asad can't afford to hurry. He needs to ensure he has the people with him, and can keep them with him. That's why he's still hesitating." Asad, who modeled his regime on Nicolae Ceaucescu's Romania, is not anxious to share Ceaucescu's fate, and he well remembers the "Asadescu" grafffiti that appeared in Damascus in the fall of 1989."[93] Fathi Shikaki, the Damascus-based leader of Islamic Jihad, also believes Asad will take his time to finalize a peace. Shikaki claims that it has been implied that he would be given a year's notice before Asad gives the nod for peace because it is planned that he and several other Islamic extremists and Palestinian

---

[91]Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready," Foreign Policy, no. 96 (Fall 1994): 150-151.

[92]Stephen Zunes, "Israeli-Syrian Peace: The Long Road Ahead," Middle East Policy, 2, no. 3 (1993): 63.

[93]Horovitz, 30.

rejectionists would be turfed out. He cheerfully told the interviewer, "I haven't had the phone call yet."[94]

Asad needs to convince his people that peace will mean the return of the Golan. According to Syrian officials, the United States and Israel fail to understand this point. While Asad makes the final decision, he still must consider the Syrian public consensus, especially concerning the Golan Heights "because the Syrian public will never accept conceding any part of the Golan to Israel. Thus, al-Asad believes that for him to spell out the exact nature of peace with Israel, and sell it to his people, he needs Rabin's explicit statement on the extent of Israeli withdrawal from occupied Golan."[95] The issue for Asad is that if he lays out the Syrian position without Israel responding in kind, then his regime and his standing in the Arab world could be adversely affected.[96]

It is this need for Asad to gain a consensus that causes him to weigh very carefully the consequences of his actions. "For President Assad the top priority in his definition of the problem is organizing his neighborhood in a way that is secure for Syria and for his regime. Each decision he makes must be understood in light of his aim to establish Syria's influence over the course of events."[97] Ori Orr explains, however, that Asad is "not impulsive, no Saddam Hussein, but Hamah proves he can be decisive."[98]

---

[94]Ibid.

[95]Muslih, "Dateline," 155-156.

[96]Muslih, "Golan," 629.

[97]Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institutes for Public Policy Research, 1985), 86.

[98]Horovitz, 26.

Furthermore, Syria's unwillingness to define in advance the nature of peace has to do with Asad himself. "Unlike the late Anwar al-Sadat, the Syrian president plays his cards close to his chest because any blunder could seriously undermine his regime. He likes to move in a gradual manner in order to scrutinize the political fallout after every move he makes."[99]

It seems that the decision to align with the coalition greatly enhanced Asad's status on the regional and domestic levels, and one could argue that Asad's role in the peace process is evidence of his attaining a greater international status. Asad's greater regional status helped his status at home. As mentioned earlier, he stressed the importance of Arab unity throughout the conflict, a technique used by the Alawite leadership to gain Sunni support for its policies. Additionally, Asad primarily used his highly visible Sunni officials to publicize his coalition support, as a means to gain legitimacy at home. He has always ruled with the principle of gaining a public consensus at home. This requirement manifested itself with incremental, cautious, and careful policy - making. The bottom - line is that the Alawite regime benefitted from the coalition alignment decision. It gained greater status on all levels, and the prospects of regaining the Golan Heights contributed to this increased status. The benefits for the Alawis will become more clear in the next section.

---

[99] As cited from author's discussions with Syrian officials who did not want to be identified in Muslih, "Golan," 629.

Issue: Human and Non-Human Resources

There is great debate concerning the health of Syria's economy prior to the Gulf War. What is clear, however, is that there has been a gradual, cautious approach towards opening the economy. It is this incremental approach in the economic sphere that reinforces Asad's goal towards maintaining both external and internal security. Again, we must answer the question of who is benefitting from the alignment decision, i.e. who is receiving the majority of the human and nonhuman resources as a result of this decision, and why are they recipients?

As mentioned above, there is some debate as to the health of Asad's economy before the war. Let us look at this debate to help us understand some of the changes that took place concerning the economy. Both David Waldner and Fred Lawson believe that the Syrian economy was not dismal prior to the war, and, therefore, it was not the driving force for Asad's decision to align with the coalition. According to Waldner, Syria had already taken steps to respond to its deteriorating economy at least five years prior to the decline of Soviet support, "and that by 1990, when, it is said, Syrian foreign policy underwent fundamental transformation, the Syrian economy, although plagued by numerous problems, was vastly improved in comparison to ten years earlier."[100]

Asad began to increase liberalization, especially in the mid 1980s. The new economic strategy was articulated during the 8th Regional Congress of the Ba'ath Party. The strategy had three components. First, the state would maintain control over the

---

[100]David Waldner, "More Than Meets the Eye: Economic Influence on Contemporary Syrian Foreign Policy," Middle East Insight, 11, no. 4 (May-June 1995): 34.

"commanding heights of the economy". Second, any economic reform would not hamper

the regime's ability to use resources as a means to ensure its social support. Finally,

within the limits posed by the above imperatives, private capital would be allowed

greater latitude than in the past. The newly appointed Minister of Economy and Foreign

Trade, Muhammed al-Imadi, implemented this strategy. Some of the allowances made

for the increased latitude for private capital included the following: private exporters

retained greater sums of earned foreign exchange, which, in turn, financed further

imports; less restrictive import controls; encouraged exporting by devaluing the currency;

and a 1986 legislative decree permitted the creation of joint-stock agricultural and tourist

companies, in which the state would own 25 percent equity.[101] Syria began to experience

trade surpluses in 1989. Law 10 of May 1991 further committed the regime to economic

rationality and private sector participation. By the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall and

the Gulf War, the Syrian economy was on the upswing. "Indeed, by the early 1990s, in a

range of issues, the regime demonstrated its resolve to be more accountable to the

grievances of the private sector and the larger public."[102] Syria still has a way to go, "but

there is little or no evidence that recent Syrian foreign policy is driven by economic

concerns."[103]

---

[101]Ibid., 35-36.

[102]Ibid., 36.

[103]Ibid., 37.

Lawson agrees that the economic situation in Syria was not the primary reason for

Asad's coalition alignment. Syria's economic crisis did not threaten the regime.

According to Lawson,

> positing a direct link between Syria's domestic economic difficulties and the
> transformation of the Eastern bloc, on the one hand, and a wholesale realignment in
> the al-Asad regime's internal and external policies, on the other, appears unwarranted.
> The country's persistent economic crisis - which, in fact, became somewhat less
> pressing beginning in early 1991 - posed almost no threat to the domestic political
> position of the most powerful forces within the dominant social coalition....a
> conjunction of domestic political strength and continuing ties to the former Eastern
> bloc put the al-Asad regime in a firm position both to resist US pressure to reach
> hasty or disadvantageous settlement with Israel and to assert Syrian autonomy from
> Washington on issues that might be construed as infringing upon Arab unity or self-
> determination.[104]

Lawson acknowledges some of Syria's economic woes at the close of the 1980s.

For example, external indebtedness rose to $4.9 billion by 1988, payment on foreign

loans fell 100 milion and 210 million in arrears by 1989 and 1990 respectively; the state

had to ration hard currency because it became so scarce; oil revenues fell due to the

depressed world; bilateral and multilateral economic assistance fell from 1982 through

1987 when Syria received 500 million annually in aid disbursements, but in 1988, it

received only $80 million. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development claimed that Syria's repayments on loans exceeded new loans by $9 million

dollars per year. However, by the beginning of 1990, the balance of trade was in the

black. The Ministry of the Economy and Foreign Trade attributed this change to a 60

percent rise in non-petroleum exports in 1989, primarily consisting of private-sector

---

[104]Fred Lawson, "Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in Contemporary Syria,"
Middle East Journal, 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 48.

manufactures and private- and mixed-sector agriculture produce. Also, 1990 saw a 6

percent rise in GDP, and inflation dropped from 70 to 40 percent. The European

Community in 1991 rescinded its freeze on economic assistance and released

concessionary loans valued at $200 million. Japan announced grants worth $466 million.

Arab nations in the Persian Gulf also contributed; the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic

Development (KFAED) provided $100 million for infrastructure projects in December

1990 and earmarked future funds.[105]

By August 1991, a prominent entrepreneur from Syria claimed that the private

sector was growing at 20 percent. The World Bank and IMF sent missions to Syria to

convince Syria of its responsibility to resume payment on debt, an indication of Syria's

wellness. "Syria's domestic economic crisis, therefore, appears to have ameliorated as

the post-Cold War era opened. More important than these purely economic trends,

however, is a fundamental political point: developments in the Syrian economy over the

last several years generally reinforced the collective position of the social forces that

constitute the al-Asad coalition, leaving them better able both to resolve conflicts of

interest among themselves and to fend off actual or potential challenges from their

primary opponents."[106] This al-Asad coalition comprised the Alawis, who were in

control of the Ba'th Party, State apparatus, and the military. The opponents were

primarily the Sunnis, who, as mentioned earlier, were the economically advantaged

group.

---

[105]Ibid., 48-51.

[106]Ibid., 51.

375

Other scholars view the economic situation as being in more dire straits at the end

of the Cold War. Ghayth N. Armanazi claims that the picture for Syria in 1990 was

grim, "especially against the background of the relentless depletion of the Soviet strategic

reservoir upon which Syria depended, and the deterioration in the economic conditions of

the country as its foreign exchange reserves were eroded, factories turned idle because of

shortages of raw materials, and inflation and scarcities of essential products blighted the

Syrian consumer."[107] Muhammad Muslih seems to agree because he claims that the

"Peace with Israel will also give Syria a good chance at stimulating more economic

growth by shifting funds from the military to job-generating projects in the civilian

sector. During the 1980s, Syria indulged in arms imports that had built up close to $12

billion in military debts to the former Soviet Union alone."[108]

Alon Ben-Meir agrees with Armanazi, as he examines the peace process after the

Gulf War.

> For Asad, to contemplate peace was a culmination of a long and difficult road he had
> to travel since the end of the Cold War. In many ways, Asad now faces the same
> situation that Egypt's Sadat did in 1977. Syria's economy is struggling, and the
> prospects for economic revival without an infusion of huge amounts of hard currency
> are poor. Defense outlays still exceed 45 percent of the annual budget,
> unemployment is high, and earnings for college graduates average $75 per monthy.
> The ordinary citizen is preoccupied with survival and public discontent, though
> muted, remains pervasive. Syria which has the highest percentage of intelligentsia
> and skilled professionals among the Arab states has been stifled because of limited
> economic opportunities. [Again, these groups are disproportionately Sunni] For
> economic reasons alone, Syria desperately needs peace. There is not the slightest

---

[107]Armanazi, 114.

[108]Muslih, "Dateline," 153.

doubt that we want peace,' Asad told Patrick Seale in April 1993. 'We could not otherwise have talked about peace for the past twenty years.'[109]

Additionally, Ben-Meir takes a systemic approach to Asad's decision to align with the coalition and pursue a peace process. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union left Syria with no choice but to lean towards the United States.[110]

Whether or not Syria's economy was desperate in the summer of 1990, Syria did pursue some economic rewards for its role with the coalition. For example, one diplomatic source reported that during a Gulf states' meeting in Cairo, the Syrian and Egyptian regimes submitted a proposal that called for a regional security plan "under the two regimes' auspices in return for an annual sum of $15 billion."[111] Syria's alliance with the GCC did guarantee funds and investments for Syria's struggling economy. Additionally, its alliance meant renewed ties and aid from the European Community and support from the Soviet Union. There was potential for U.S. technology and commercial credits, if Washington removed Syria from its blacklist for supporting terrorist groups.[112] According to Sylvia Polling, "Syria has capitalized on the change of tack in its foreign policy orientation. Siding with the Western alliance against Iraq triggered a renewed commitment by the Gulf states to abundantly reward its non-Gulf Arab coalition partners." While the original pledges of 10 billion developmental dollars ultimately

---

[109]Alon Ben-Meir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle For Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, 3, no. 1 (1994): 75.

[110]Ibid.

[111]"Egypt, Syria Said to Propose Gulf Security Plan," FBIS, NES (25 February 1991): 44.

[112]Lesch, 42.

377

decreased to 6.5 billion dollars, other significant disbursements, such as debt relief and

cash payments, were made to Egypt, Morocco, and Syria. By the end of 1990, Syria

received 1.5 billion dollars in developmental aid from its Gulf coalition partners.[113]

Nabil Sukkar, who worked as an economist for the World Bank and now heads

the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment in Damascus, claims that

"Syria's new foreign alliances will no doubt play a role enhancing the market element in

the economy, but Syria is not likely to adopt doctrinaire market formulas. It will

probably attempt to strike a balance between the roles of the market and the state."[114]

Additionally, Sukkar explains that Syria requires a high growth strategy, which means a

high investment rate and efficient allocation of resources, in order to take care of its

anticipated high population growth of 3.7 per cent per annum for the next decade. An

economic opening will allow Syria to pursue this strategy.[115] Sylvia Polling concurs that

Syria requires reform for the reasons Sukkar offers. Additionally, she claims that 60

percent of the population is under twenty years old. The reforms designed in the mid-

1980s through the 1990s, however, are designed in a gradualist, incrementalist fashion so

as to avoid the upheavals experienced in the former Eastern European nations.[116]

---

[113]Sylvia Polling, "The Syrian Surprise: A New Spirit of Entrepreneurism and A Diligant Program of Economic Reforms Are Transforming the Syrian Economy," Middle East Insight (July-August 1991/993): 8.

[114]Nabil Sukkar, "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 42.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Polling, 6-7.

378

Finally, Eberhard Kienle claims that Syria recognized its need to reform its economy due to the Soviet Union's rapid decline, collapse of its markets, and recalling of Syria's military debts that were once forgotten. The pro-coalition stance provided Syria "an opportunity to side openly with the winners of the Cold War who soon won the Kuwait war as well. New, external resources could thus be attracted into the country in order to give a new impetus to economic reform."[117] He also concludes that Syria's economic policy is reactive and incremental in nature.

> In a nutshell, the style of Syria's economic-policy making could be characterized as gradualist, reactive, and personalized with some corporatist, consultative elements. These combined features are inseparably linked to Syria's authoritarian system whose prime decision-maker, considers economic questions of secondary importance, while national security and regime stability hold primacy.[118]

The economic reforms were a means to regime stability, and the decision to align with the coalition expedited these needed reforms.

While there is some debate as to the health of the 1989-1990 Syrian economy, there is agreement that Syria was pursuing some economic reform, perhaps in anticipation of future economic requirements, but I and others argue that the reforms were necessary to help build broader regime support. It was another tactic used by Asad to build his public consensus for his policy towards the Gulf War and subsequent peace process. The speech by Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu'bi to the delegation from the Syrian Arab Society in Britain reflects some of these reforms. He explained Syria's

---

[117]Eberhard Kienle, "Introduction: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 2.

[118]Perthes, Economic Change, Political Control and Decision Making in Syria, 199-200.

379

economic strategy to allow for a greater opportunity for investments. He appealed to

Syrians at home and abroad to contribute to Syria's goal of increased agricultural and

industrial advancement and trade.[119]

In a speech by Dr. Muhammad al-'Imadi, minister of economy and foreign trade,

he explains:

> The public sector is the leading and pioneering sector. Besides, it makes up 45
> percent of the gross national product. It has full control over the sector of extractive
> industries, electricity, and water. Also this sector covers approximately 87 percent of
> the services sector, 63 percent of the intermediate industries sector, 50 percent of the
> building and construction sector, 41 percent of the financial and leaseholds sector, 38
> percent of the trade sector, 28 percent of the transportation and storage sector, and 1.4
> percent of the agricultural sector. As for the private and mixed sector, this
> contributes 55 percent to the gross national product and covers 98.6 percent of the
> agricultural sector, 72 percent of the transportation sector, 62 percent of the trade
> sector, ...The mixed sector is mainly involved in the tourist sector with clear
> beginnings in the agricultural sector. The decisions made have contributed to the
> consecration of economic pluralism and also to opening up further horizons before it.
> The value of the contribution of the private and mixed sector to the gross national
> product has increased from 42.6 billion pounds in 1985 to 111 billion pounds in
> 1989. The total of the fixed capital in this sector increased from 6.519 billion to
> 15.229 billion over the same period. Its contribution to the commodity export
> operations increased from 6.373 billion in 1987 to 16.189 billion in 1989. We still
> believe that the latent capabilities of this sector are numerous. We are working and
> will continue to work to open up further horizons and further incentives for
> accommodating the savings and capabilities of this sector inside and outside.[120]

While al-Imadi talks about the virtues of economic liberalization in 1990, he

ensures that ties with former allies, such as the former Eastern European nations and

Soviet Union remain.

---

[119]"UK-Based Businessman Briefed on Economic Policy," FBIS, NES (7 November 1990): 41.

[120]"Economy Minister Speaks at Damascus Fair," FBIS, NES (5 September 1990): 45-46.
Because of the Alawi control of the State, Party, and military, I think it is fair to say that the Alawis
disproportionately control the public sector, while the economic upperclass, the Sunnis, disproportionately
control the private sector.

In the field of international trade relations, although the international economic and political changes have had a positive aspect of eliminating the causes of the cold war and removing the reasons for fear, worry, and confusion which accompanied international life in the past period, the other aspect of these changes is the constant dismissal of the developing countries' burdens of debt, decrease in production averages, problems of poverty and backwardness, population growth, and environmental affairs, as well as these countries' aspirations to set up a new economic world order that would provide them with the capability to bridge the economic and technical gap with the developed world. Our country continues to work on developing its trade exchanges and technical and development cooperation with all countries, whether industrial or developing, in addition to the developed relations with the friendly Soviet Union, the East European countries, as well as economic groupings and international organizations, which serve to meet common interests.[121]

It appears that Syria wants to gradually and carefully open the economy, but it is not quick to embrace the West or the United States. We will see this stand-offish approach towards the United States in the peace process.

King Hussein stands out as the most enthusiastic Arab leader for peace with Israel. Other Arab leaders express interest for the economic benefits of such a peace. Syria, however, seems to be unique among the other countries because of Asad's wariness of the potential effects of trade and investment with Israel. In fact, he has used the media to highlight the alleged negative aspects of economic normalization.[122] Perhaps mainly Sunnis would benefit as opposed to Alawis, and consequently, there is incremental rather than major policy outcomes. Why has Asad chosen to approach the potential economic benefits so cautiously? According to Robert Lifton, one of the critical forces to affect political action in the Middle East is the force of change. The causes for this force are the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War (which destroyed the idea of Arab unity and

---

[121]"Economy Minister Speaks at Damascus Fair," 45-50.

[122]Khashan, 30.

381

brotherhood), and the acknowledgment by Arab leaders that social and economic conditions must improve for their people or else they may suffer the fate of the former Soviet Union.[123] Asad is among such leaders, yet he, unlike the other leaders, approaches this aspect very carefully.

Perhaps he is not the only Syrian elite to suspiciously view economic normalization. The surveys conducted on Lebanese and Jordanian professionals reveal an "economic inferiority complex." Most of those surveyed feel that Israel would benefit the most from normalization. Many feel that Israel's economy is so huge in comparison to their nations' economies that competition would be one-sided. Yusuf Shibl claims that Israel's industrial output of 15 billion dollars, which contributed 25 percent of its GNP in 1992, is four times greater than Lebanon's entire GNP. Additionally, a majority of those surveyed feel that Israel would not fully cooperate with Arab countries and would not share technology. Khashan believes that these views are not a result of hard analyses, but rather they reflect stereotyping and biased attitudes - products of five decades of hostility and an absence of meaningful interaction.[124]

It appears, however, that there is evidence that the economic elite, who are predominantly Sunni, do welcome normalization. The health of the economy seems to be paramount in the minds of the professional Lebanese Sunnis. In 1994, 85 percent of

---

[123]Lifton, 8.

[124]Khashan, 30-37

Lebanese surveyed (mostly Sunni), saw economic growth as their country's top priority, even more important than religious guidance.[125]

Some anecdotal evidence suggests that the business community is ready for economic normalization. One merchant claims that "People are tired [of the conflict]". Abu'l-Huda, a businessman, says that while Asad decides on matters of war, "when the door is open, we'll be ready for business." Walid, a dealer in embroidered tablecloths told an Israeli - based journalist, "Please tell the Israelis that we have very good prices here. We want them to come." His brother added, "peace will be good for Syria and Israel together." A shopkeeper in Damascus, Bassam al-Subayni claims that "peace means more business." Travelers report that restaurants are offering menus in Hebrew, and merchants are looking forward to Isaraeli customers. Land investors are buying land on the border between Syria and Israel, thus creating a vested interest in peace.[126]

Who opposes the peace? According to Daniel Pipes, the strongest opposition comes from Ba'th Party members and the military. Viktor Posuvalyuk, the Special Russian envoy for Middle Eastern issues found "substantial centers of opposition at the highest echelons of the Syrian administration." Other elements of opposition come from fundamentalist Muslims, a weak force in Syrian politics and intellectuals who harbor Pan-Arabist ideals. However, it is the military and the Party, bastions of Alawite dominance that oppose the peace. According to a Western diplomat, "the strongest voice

---

[125]Huxley, 5.

[126]Daniel Pipes, "Syria Beyond the Peace Process," The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 40 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 118.

383

resisting peace right now comes from people in the military and security apparatus who have been making fortunes [from the confrontation with Israel]"[127]

There are two divergent opinions on whether the public or the regime is ready for peace with Israel. Western diplomats in Syria suggest that the people are more ready for peace than the regime, while other observers feel that the regime is the supporter of peace. Syrian leaders support the latter view. Vice President Khaddam says that "We can only afford a just peace that is supported by the population." Syria's Foreign Minister, Faruq al - Shara claims that "the Syrian government wants peace more than its population." Pipes feels that it is the business community which strongly supports peace, and that it is up to Asad to change the population's sentiments. Patrick Seale argues that Assad is "probably the only [Syrian leader] capable of turning around Syrian opinion and making his fellow citizens accept the strategic decision for peace with the historic enemy."[128]

It appears that it may be more critical for Asad to convince his political elites, namely his fellow-Alawites of the need for peace since it is perhaps the Sunnis who see peace as a means for not only an economic opening, but also a political opening. Perhaps Asad is once again carefully balancing several interests - that of the Sunni business community who can help the nation's economy, his fellow Alawis who have a stake in

---

[127]Ibid., 119. I linked the Alawite description based on earlier accounts of Alawite power, as well as the "Provisional Classification of Syrian Nomenclatura" found in "Syria: Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness,'" in the Daily Report Supplement of Near East and South Asia, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 October 1995, 16.

[128]Ibid., 121-122.

384

the regime, and himself who is the center of the regime's power. This careful balancing

produces incremental policy, a trademark of Asad's.

According to Khashan, "Arab governments are fragile because they lack popular

legitimacy. Thus, peace at the official level - though significant - is not sufficient. Until

Arab regimes legitimize themselves by broadening the base of national politics and

introducing liberalization and accountability, they can continue to lose ground to Islamic

fundamentalists."[129] In Syria's case, it does not want to lose ground to the Sunnis, so we

see an economic liberalization, but it is important to note that Asad will not do anything

to jeopardize his Alawite regime. Let us now examine how liberalizing the economy

safeguards Alawite power, especially since it is the business class, dominated by Sunnis,

who benefit from this liberalization.

According to Raymond Hinnebusch,

> The regime's autonomy has enabled it to shape its policies according to raison d'etat,
> that is, its own interests, not those of a dominant class. Preservation of internal
> security and the extraction of resources for the external power struggle have therefore
> taken precedence over the capital accumulation requisites of the bourgeoisie and
> these power requisites have obstructed economic liberalization.[130]

It appears, then, that the interests of the Alawite minority in power is what is holding

back the pace of economic liberalization. Hinnebusch explains that the priority of the

state is to protect its resources, which makes the public sector a key factor. Foreign

---

[129]Khashan, 46.

[130]Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Liberalization in Syria: The Struggle of Economic and Political
Rationality," in Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle
(London: British Academic Press, 1994), 99.

currency is also critical as a resource source. A second priority is to satisfy the core

elites.

> The fact that this elite is dominated by formerly propertyless minorities, especially
> 'Alawis, who use the state as a ladder of advancement, while the private economy is
> dominated by the majority of the Sunni community, gives the regime an exceptional
> stake in maintaining a large state role in the economy. The party apparatchiki and
> bureaucrats who staff the very structures of the state have ideological and material
> stakes in the state's economic role. The priority claim of the huge army on economic
> resources enjoys legitimacy as long as the conflict with Israel persists.[131]

This point suggests that those in the state bureaucracy and military view the peace

process as a threat to their power. They would not want to see money taken from the

military and state to address interests outside of their purview. This threat, however, may

not have been that apparent at the time of the decision to align with the coalition, but it

does suggest an anti-West sentiment, which perhaps led to the the pro-Arab and not pro-

West approach Asad took towards this policy decision.

Finally, Hinnebusch claims that the Asad regime had to broaden its support

among unionized workers, public employees, and small peasants by providing welfare

and economic opportunities to them. [These groups are primarily Alawi and are most

threatened when steps are taken to liberalize the economy]. The interests of the

bourgeoisie [Sunni] and the statist elites [Alawi] are in a constant dynamic balance.

Hinnebusch explains that

> economic liberalization therefore requires a mode vivendi between state and
> bourgeoisie. To liberalize means that the authoritarian-populist state has significantly
> to shift its social base toward the bourgeoisie, a task made all the harder in Syria
> because of a certain overlap between the state/private and 'Alawi/Sunni cleavages.

---

[131]Hinebusch, "Economic and Political Rationality," 99.

386

This contrasts with conservative authoritarian regimes whose social base is firmly rooted in the bourgeoisie, sectors of which typically welcome liberalization.[132]

The problem that faced, and still faces, the regime is that the state economic strategy failed to accumulate capital. The state over-bureaucratized and politicized, for example with patronage. The politics of inclusion favored mass consumption, not capital accumulation; favored import substitution which led to a crisis in a balance of payments and foreign exchange, and it relied on short run oil rents, but when the rents declined, the state could not support its size and functions. Consequently, this led to austerity, cuts in public spending, and an inability to buy contracts and jobs. The state had no choice but to turn to bourgeoisie in the mid-1980s. As a result, "the limits of the state's ability to maintain growth and create jobs needed to co-opt the growing educated middle class have made it more politically dangerous to maintain the status quo than to alter it."[133]

Even with this liberalization, however, the bourgeoisie are politically weak, because they are internally divided, have not forged alliances with other sectors, and remain outside the Alawite elite, e.g. there is little intermarriage between Alawites and Sunnis. "Therefore, the bourgeoisie currently lacks both the power and the will to push for more economic liberalization than the regime wants." Additionally, in this authoritarian regime, Asad is the decision-maker, and he is guided by raison d'etat, which leaned him towards liberalization. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, he realized that he needed a foreign policy that was not in opposition to the United States, and this meant some internal liberalization. This point, in conjunction with his economic

---

[132]Ibid., 99 and quotation on 100.

387

imperative for opening, allowed Asad to broaden regime support by co-opting a portion of the bourgeoisie.[134]

Asad however is pragmatic and cautious and will not be too far away from the elite consensus. What is that consensus? "As such, the extent of liberalization is being affected in good part by bureaucratic politics: an intra-regime struggle between liberalizing 'technos' and statist 'politicos'." Hinnebusch claims that the main actors are the economy minister, Muhammad al-'Imadi, who is the liberalizer and has the trust of the president, and 'Izz al-Din Nasir, a member of the party regional command, head of trade union confederation, and an Alawi, who opposes liberalization. Again, this balancing of interests results in an incremental economic liberalization. While al-Immadi might be the "liberalizer," in my view, he certainly will not promote any program that is not approved by Asad. In other words, no economic liberalization program will conflict with regime stability, and as mentioned earlier, it is only there as a means to ensure stability. Hinnebusch concludes that

> until the social cleavage between state and bourgeoisie is fully bridged, the 'Alawi would be threatened by any return of power to the Sunni-dominated business establishment...The regime is determined to prevent the Algerian and East European scenarios and the security forces have the firepower and personal stake in the regime's survival to defend it.[135]

Volker Perthers agrees with Hinnebusch's assessment. He claims that

> a closer look at the Syrian private sector, however, suggests as a whole and despite its enhanced economic position, Syria's business community [Sunni] is still politically

---

[133]Ibid., 110-101 and quotation on 101.

[134]Ibid., 102-105 and the quotation is on 103.

[135]Ibid., 105-106 and the quotations are found on 105 and 107.

388

weak. It is highly fragmented, both economically because of its overwhelmingly petty bourgeois structure , and as a socio-political force. Different parts of the Syrian bourgeoisie have repeatedly demonstrated that they are likely to respond positively to the regime's policies of divide-and-rule and that they will choose individual advantages rather than gamble for collective gains.[136]

In sum, the decision to join the coalition allowed for a continuation of

incremental economic reform, as long as such reforms benefitted the Alawi, minority-

ruled regime. Kienle states that Asad's

> general attitude towards the private sector has always been positive, provided the representatives of this sector stuck to their business and did not oppose his regime. Asad would neither block nor further any reform project for ideological reasons. His main concerns, are of a different nature, namely whether economic policy would support or contravene his regime's high-policy goals [i.e., security and stability]. For that reason, Asad has never favoured abandoning unnecessarily any element of state control and the means of patronage such control implies, nor introducing or envisaging farreaching changes that might be considered a challenge to parts of his political basis.[137]

Additionally, that incrementalism seems to be a product of Asad's careful, cautious

policy-making trait based on a need to build a consensus, while maintaining Alawite rule.

Indicator: Foreign Aid and Trade

In this section, I will combine the issues because they are so interrelated, and also

I have already covered a good deal of this indicator in my discussion in the previous

section. The reason for this is that there are differing interpretations of hard data, such as

the overall economic health of Syria prior to the Gulf war discussed earlier.

Consequently, this chapter on Syria spends more time in the previous section analyzing

---

[136]Volker Perthes, "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization," 60-68 and the quotation is on 68.

[137]Perthes, Economic Change, Political Control and Decision Making in Syria, 203-204.

389

the various interpretations. I will, however, attempt to answer the question of who is benefitting here.

Issues: Security, Territory, Human and Nonhuman Resources

Militarily, Syria has not seemed to suffer in its military hardware (table 24). Its arms imports declined between 1984 and 1988, mainly due to the Soviets' denial of further military credits. Syria turned to Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea. Additionally, the Soviets were more interested in helping with Syria's defensive capabilities, rather than its offensive capabilities. However, by 1990 Syria's problems with arms imports eased. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Germany, Japan, and other nations agreed to pay $2.5-3.2 billion in return for Syria's support of the coalition. In 1990, Syria used $960 million to buy military hardware. These include those arms reflected in table 25, and they reflect an offensive capability.[138]

---

[138]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 182-187 and 260-263.

390

TABLE 24

MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEFENSE SPENDING: SYRIA (U.S. Dollars)[139]

	Manpower (1,000s)	Tanks	Aircraft	Defense Spending ($ millions)	Arms Imports ($ millions)	Arms Exports ($ millions)
1967	80	430	150	313	58	0
1973	115	1,170	326	589	1,270	0
1982	300	3,990	450	1,907	2,600	120
1988	400	4,050	499	1,604	1,300	0
1991	404	4,350	650	3,330	0	0

---

[139]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 256.

391

TABLE 25

SYRIAN ARMS ORDERS AFTER IRAQI INVASION IN AUGUST 1991[140]

Country	Equipment
Czechoslovakia	250-300 T-72M1s (80-100 already delivered)
USSR	400-600 T-72s; MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and Su-24s
North Korea	30-60 Improved Scud missiles
Bulgaria	SP artillery

---

[140]Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 363. Note that these figures are not exact.

392

Not only did Asad secure arms required for security, his alignment with the

coalition secured his hold on Lebanese territory with the possibility of regaining the

Golan Heights through negotiation. The Taif agreement permitted the deployment of

Syrian forces in Lebanon to maintain security. This requirement culminated in May

1991, with the signing of a "fraternity, co-operation and co-ordination" treaty between

Lebanon and Syria. The Syrian presence ignited controversy, but its hold on Lebanon has

not diminished. By 1993, Syria had 35,000 troops in Lebanon.[141] We have already

discussed the Golan Heights imperative for the peace process. It appears that Asad's pro-

coalition alignment was motivated by security and territorial issues.

Let us now look at the human and nonhuman resource issue. Please refer to

tables 26 - 28. There is evidence that Syria was the primary economic beneficiary from

the war. Its GDP increased five percent in 1991 and it experienced a healthy trade

surplus. Aid from members of the coalition, as well as some economic reforms helped to

bolster the Syrian economy. While some funds earmarked for public sector projects were

impeded by bureaucratic procedures, and the financing of some private sector projects

was hampered by cumbersome foreign exchange rules, Syria's real economic growth

---

[141]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995: Forty-First Edition (London: Europa Publications
Limited, 1995), 846-847.

393

reached ten percent in 1993.[142] Who is benefitting by the economic rewards gained by

Syria's pro-coalition stand? Sylvia Polling maintains that Syria remains a low income

country, even with its slightly improved financial position.[143]

---

[142]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995: Forty-First Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995), 848-849.

[143]Polling, 11.

TABLE 26

ECONOMIC DATA: SYRIA IN 1993[144]

Per Capita GDP (U.S. $)	$710	Annual GDP Growth Rate	8%
Population (thousands)	14,300	Annual Popul Growth Rate	3.8%
GDP (billions of U.S. $)	10		

---

[144]Background Notes: Syria, U.S. Department of State, 5, No 13 (November 1994).

TABLE 27

COST OF LIVING DATA: SYRIA[145]

(Consumer Price Index for Damascus: base: 1980 = 100)

	1990	1991	1992
Food	795.5	823.9	851.6
Fuel and Light	493.7	544.7	766.8
Clothing	769.9	906.5	952.9
Rent	281.8	282.3	282.3
All items (incl others)	715.4	770.2	843.5

Source: ILO, Year Book of Labour Statistics.

---

[145]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995: Forty-First Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995), 859.

396

TABLE 28

PRINCIPLE TRADING PARTNERS: SYRIA[146]

(Syrian Pounds, Millions)

	Imports				Exports		
	1990	1991	1992		1990	1991	1992
Austria	454.9	495.3	482.3	Bulgaria	391.6	892.6	829.2
Belgium	883.6	1,062.6	1,240.7	Egypt	534.7	152.5	189.8
Bulgaria	437.4	866.5	1,677.4	France	6,039.4	6,811.3	6,446.0
China	463.3	632.3	1,045.7	Germany	1,110.2	1,135.1	853.2
Cuba	246.0	253.2	218.2	Italy	9,845.9	8,622.6	12,163.7
Czech	217.1	377.1	620.6	Jordan	275.0	768.4	581.7
Egypt	227.2	295.1	481.4	Kuwait	138.9	188.3	692.1
France	3,425.2	2,090.5	2,479.4	Lebanon	2,988.0	3,695.2	4,516.3
Iran	365.7	16.9	135.4	Russia	15,445.8	7,259.6	534.0
Japan	890.8	1,403.8	3,899.6	SA	3,035.4	2,238.4	1,498.1
Kuwait	275.7	2.6	38.0	UK	935.7	729.3	647.0
Lebanon	188.3	330.4	519.4	USA	405.3	208.5	273.6
Russia	766.9	417.8	825.8				
Saudi Arabia (SA)	368.6	411.6	465.1				
UK	711.7	810.8	1,154.8				
USA	2,892.8	2,907.8	2,397.1				
TOTAL (incl others)	26,936	30,794	39,178		47,281	38,501	34,719

---

[146]The Middle East and North Africa, 1995: Forty-First Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995), 860.

397

According to Fred Lawson, it was the Arab Gulf states which replaced the funding

and technical support previously provided by the former Eastern European nations and

Soviet Union. This funding was designed to revitalize the public sector. For example in

July 1991, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development agreed to provide $60.5

million to build the Idlib cotton mill; Saudi Arabia took responsibility for funding, at a

cost of approximately $500 million the al-Zara iron and steel complex.[147]

This funding provided the military, party-state officials, and public sector

managers with enough resources to enable them to maintain their ties with the nations of

the former Eastern Bloc. Additionally, this alliance allowed these officials to maintain

their positions in the face of growing wealth and influence of the country's private

commercial and industrial entrepreneurs. The revenues produced by the state's oil and

phosphate production, as well as those revenues from the illegal, drug trade with

Lebanon, facilitated the continuation of the regime's Eastern connection. Lawson claims

that "The combination of intransigence towards Israel, internal economic recovery and

continued ties to the former Eastern Bloc enabled the coalition of senior military and

security officers, Ba'th Party and central administrative officials and mangers of public

sector enterprises to retain a predominant position within the country's domestic

arena."[148] Lawson also claims that on those occasions when Syria adopted a softer line

concerning the peace process, it was a tactic to appease discontent at home by members

of the private sector. Such a soft stance "concerning the peace talks suggests that the

---

[147]Lawson, "Domestic Pressures and the Peace Process: Fillip or Hindrance?" 151.

[148]Ibid., 151 and the quotation is found on 154.

398

officer/party/state coalition [Alawi] was willing to run considerable external risks in an effort to undercut its internal challengers [Sunni]. It also indicates that the Asad regime enjoys a notable capacity to withstand outside pressure, so long as the home front remains quiescent."[149]

I already covered the many economic interpretations in the previous section, but I feel that the evidence presented in this section support Lawson's claim that the regime was the chief beneficiary. Specifically, it seems that the Alawis ensured that their coercive instrument, i.e., the army, remained vital, and the economic opening ensured broad support among the Sunni business class. While members of this group economically benefitted, it was not at the political expense of the Alawi regime.

Conclusion

There is great overlap among the issues discussed above. There is a great deal of evidence that, for Asad, there were external security and territorial factors motivating him to align with the coalition. Additionally, he did achieve a great deal of monetary aid for his pro-coalition stance. What I think is most interesting, however, is how these factors bolstered Asad's status on all levels, which thus enabled him to build legitimacy at home. Additionally, he had to proceed carefully, cautiously, and incrementally both in his alignment decision and subsequent peace process. He never embraced the United States or the West, and he stressed the regional, Arab benefits for his positions. In fact, it

---

[149]Ibid., 154.

appears that the motivating factor for Asad's policy choices is survival of his Alawi-minority regime.

On an international level, he lost a great deal of status with the collapse of his former patron, the Soviet Union. He responded to this development in several ways. He did make some changes, though small, in his own one-party regime to avoid the fate of Ceuacescu. Additionally, he continued his incremental economic opening to appease the Sunni business class, as well as bolster his economy. Finally, he did not embrace the West, but he did seek out western ties, while maintaining his ties to the former Eastern Bloc. On a systemic level, then, Asad did incrementally, change behavior and looked inwardly to bolster his status and seek resources. He also looked outwardly to achieve these traits, and he primarily looked to bolstering his status in the region as a means to achieve legitimacy or internal status, security and territory, and economic benefits.

It does appear that Asad is constantly aware of his minority status. His policy reflects his careful balancing of interests between the Alawi political elite and the Sunni economic elite. So far this balancing has worked since the Sunnis have yet to gain political elite status. Chapter three's table 2 suggests that Alawis fill positions heading the critical, coercive instruments of the state, and the Sunnis holding high-visibility positions provide a degree of legitimacy for Asad among the Sunni majority. It is Asad's primary concern that his regime stay in power, and it is the constant potential threat of a Sunni majority that affects his policy moves.

He does engage in omnibalancing, and in this case he attempted to have the Sunnis, his potential internal threat, align with the state vis a vis Iraq. He encouraged

400

Sunni support by highlighting the coalition's support for Arab rights. The coalition also suggested future economic openings with the West, as well as territorial gains. Regionally, Asad balanced against Iraq by aligning with the majority of the Arab nations. In this context, he aligned with the Sunnis. On an international level, he aligned, but did not embrace, the West. This type of alignment allowed him to emphasize his regional alignment, which was more readily acceptable. However, such an alignment benefitted the business community, which was dominated by Sunnis. Consequently, his regional and international alignments based on his pro-coalition stance broadened his domestic support among the Sunnis.

Although there was a great deal to be gained from the West, Asad approached the alignment much more cautiously than his fellow Arab leaders. He could not agree to tremendous economic opening because that would be too threatening to his fellow Alawis. As long as the Sunnis remained in the economic sphere and did not challenge his political power, then Asad could allow a gradual economic opening. In fact, if the Sunnis could bolster the economy, that would help alleviate economic pressures, while allowing Asad to continue to import military hardware to shore up his regime's coercive instruments. Any economic achievements were acceptable as long as they helped ensure regime stability.

It appears, then, that Asad aligned with the West and the Arab world as a means to bolster his regime support. In a sense, he diffused a potential threat at home through his regional and international alignment. The way in which he presented and incrementally executed this policy, suggests that he was safeguarding his Alawi power at

401

home. The coercive instruments of the state did not falter; he continued his ties to the former Eastern Bloc; he bolstered his own status on all levels; he was able to set himself up for possible territorial gains during the ongoing peace process, and he directed pro-coalition economic rewards to the public sector, which is dominated by the Alawis. Perhaps without the full support of his former Soviet patron, Asad had to pay closer attention to the potential Sunni threat and use more of the carrot, rather than stick approach in order to gain legitimacy. His pro-coalition alignment allowed him to do just that.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

What strikes me about this study is that it is one of many moving parts. The issues are extremely interrelated, and I recognize that by analyzing each issue separately some analytical points may have been lost. Nevertheless, I still believe that this study struck a good balance between telling the whole story, while analyzing the issues in order to understand our variables. I also realize that this study touched on a myriad of topics. The bad news is that due to the scope of this project, I cannot address all of these topics in depth. The good news is that this study serves as a good springboard for further studies, which I will elaborate on later. At this point, I will put together some of these moving parts in order to answer the research questions for this concluding chapter first discussed in chapter one. By answering these questions, I believe we then may address the hypotheses.

The line of logic presented here is that ethnicity feeds directly into the notion of legitimacy. This concept of legitimacy is a key ingredient to a regime's stability or as Timothy Lomperis claims, its ability to rule well.[1] A state's level of legitimacy based on a shared ethnic identity influences that state's foreign policy decisions. My focus for

---

[1]Tim Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 30-32.

403

these decisions is state alignment. The four cases presented here allow us to examine the impact of ethnic divisiveness versus ethnic homogeneity on a state's alignment decision. We were able to link this variable to foreign policy through Holsti and Sullivan's linkage politics model. Before we review the specific state alignment decisions, let us review our line of logic.

Domestic Review: The Ethnic Variable and its Link to Legitimacy

Ethnicity is not a precise term, yet it describes a powerful force when it becomes politicized. For this study I chose a balance between the all-inclusive definition and all-exclusive definition, while adapting its meaning to the region presented in this study. Consequently, I adopted Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph's definition of ethnicity based on three overlapping traits: kinship, religion, and language.[2] Based on this definition, we established the Sunni population in Syria as one ethnic group, who are ruled by the minority Alawi ethnic group. We also established the Egyptian people as a single ethnic group. This point, as presented in chapter three, enabled us to demonstrate the existence of ethnic divisiveness as defined by Donald Horowitz in Syria, and its nonexistence in Egypt.

The importance of ethnicity as a factor for legitimacy became evident in our discussion of legitimacy in chapter two; however, legitimacy is not an easy concept to measure. Because of its centrality in the field of political science, it is critical that we

---

[2]Robert J. Thompson and Joseph R. Rudolph, "Ethnic Politics and Public Policy in Western Societies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis," in Ethnicity, Politics, and Development, ed. Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronene (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1986), 27-28. See chapter one for the literature concerning the people of the Middle East.

still attempt to discover its significance on the polity and the international system. David Easton explains that "Given its long and venerable history as a central concept in political science, legitimacy has yet to receive the attention it merits in empirical research."[3] It is for this reason that I believe this study is important, if only to make a first cut at it and perhaps provide a start point for further study.

Simply put, legitimacy is the idea that the people believe that the regime is morally in the right. David Easton's definition of legitimacy for a regime is, "That it is right and proper... to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. He continues to state that "it is not unreasonable to assume that, where we consider a state of affairs morally proper or right, we are likely to view it in highly favorable terms. This positive nature in the belief in legitimacy usually carries with it the implication that we have an obligation to accept the acts of those considered legitimate to be binding on us. The converse is equally probable. With regard to those considered to rule illegitimately, we are relieved of all obligation; support is considered to be totally withdrawn or to be withdrawable."[4]

Tim Lomperis's view of legitimacy is threefold: First, it is multifaceted in its motives and, consequently, requires different appeals. Second, "there must be a normative or moral judgment in favor of the regime's right to rule... This central moral

---

[3]David Easton, "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science, 5, Part 4 (October 1975): 451.

component to legitimacy, then, is something every government or regime needs to sustain its power and long-term ability to rule. Finally, a state can rule without legitimacy, but not well. Without it, it is hard for a government to withstand serious challenges from its people to make needed changes for improvements, such as to promote economic growth or to ameliorate social tensions."[5]

Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland define legitimacy as "the extent that a polity is regarded by its members as worthy of support. This is not the same as citizens' compliance with laws and directives, but refers to a basic attitude that disposes them to comply in most circumstances... To the extent that legitimacy is low or nonexistent, people are likely to support and obey authorities only out of fear or convenience, which means that rulers must rely exclusively on coercion or risk political collapse....No polity is likely to command the loyalty of all of its citizens all the time; what is crucial for high performance is that no large or vital segment of the population remain alienated for any length of time."[6] They explain that "a polity's lack of legitimacy may itself be a grievance that inspires violent attacks on the regime. This is not to imply that high legitimacy precludes political violence , much less communal violence." They continue to explain that "another perhaps unnecessary qualification is that neither civil order nor durability is primarily determined by legitimacy; both are also affected by decisional

---

[4]Ibid.

[5]Lomperis, 32.

[6]Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, "Political Performance: A Twelve Nation Study," in Comparative Politics Series, ed. Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, vol 2, no. 01-018 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 30.

406

efficacy... notable the occurrence of severe societal strain."[7] For our Egyptian case, we saw this occurrence of civil strife, not based on the people's legitimacy for the regime, but rather based on "the severe societal strain" due to a poorly performing economy, combined with a skyrocketing population growth.

According to Michael Hudson, "the governmental system and leadership that is genuinely national, that partakes of the nation's history, that acts in accordance with the society's values, and that protects its broadest concerns is likely to be regarded as legitimate, even though particular decisions and leaders may be unpopular or unwise. A ruler, regime, or governmental process (procedures, arrangements for collective choice) that is not widely perceived as clothed in legitimacy is not able to function authoritatively."[8]

Hudson explains that Arab states experience a legitimacy problem due the lack of prerequisites for political modernity, which are authority, identity, and equality. "The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community which does not conflict with other subnational or supranational identifications."[9] This point is critical and explains why ethnicity plays such a key role for regime legitimacy. Easton claims that there are three sources of legitimacy: ideology, structure, and personal qualities. For Easton, ideology refers to a sense of the regime being morally right; structure refers to the acceptance of

---

[7]Ibid., 32.

[8]Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 2.

[9]Ibid., 4.

407

norms and governmental apparatus, and personal qualities refers to the acceptance of

leaders who fill the structural roles.[10] These sources seem to somewhat correspond to

Weber's view that legitimacy is derived from tradition, laws, and charisma. What seems

to be a critical component in all these definitions is the idea that the people have a shared

sense of community and belief that the regime has the moral right to rule.

Ethnicity helps establish this shared sense of values and community. As our

review of the ethnicity literature showed, ethnic loyalty is a powerful force. In Hudson's

explanation of the mosaic model as a tool for understanding legitimacy in a context of

social change, the role of ethnicity becomes clear. "The mosaic model emphasizes the

persistence of primordial and parochial loyalties even during rapid modernization, and in

some conditions even predicts their strengthening."[11] The impact of ethnicity is truly

great and it is for that reason that I have examined this variable. Hudson reviews Clifford

Geertz's point concerning the criticality of primordial ties, to include ethnic, religious,

racial, and linguistic ties to a state's political development. According to Milton Esman

these solidarities "are likely to touch deeper emotional levels" than any other type of

societal cleavage, and consequently, modernizing regimes have a difficult time replacing

these loyalties.[12] Finally, Augustus Richard Norton explains that the most important

element for state survival is legitimacy, meaning "that authority which rests on the shared

---

[10]Easton, "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support," 452.

[11]Hudson, 7.

[12]Hudson cites Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geetz (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 105-57 and Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict" Public Policy, 21, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 49-78, 54 in Hudson, 9.

408

cultural identity of ruler and ruled."[13] Our case studies reveal that Egypt enjoys this legitimacy based on shared identity, while Syria does not.

Granted, there are other sources of legitimacy. Hudson explains that there are some external sources, one being the "all-Arab core concerns. The legitimacy of given leaders in a given state is determined to an important extent by their fidelity of these core concerns."[14] We observed the selective use of this external source for legitimacy in our cases. Interestingly, we saw leaders who disregarded this source, e.g., Sadat's loss of regional status when he realigned with the United States and signed the treaty with Israel, and during the 1980s, Syria chose to support Iran vis a vis another Arab country. In sum, legitimacy is a key ingredient for regime stability, and when ethnic loyalties coincide with national loyalties, then that sense of a shared political community and values is a great commodity for the regime. Conversely, when these loyalties are in conflict, then the regime is in a dangerous position.

On the domestic level for Syria, ethnic divisiveness was a prominent factor in the political arena. Asad ruled, as Patrick Seale observed, with two guiding principles: he worked to gain a public consensus, and in the absence of this consensus, he relied on coercion. Additionally, we saw how dangerous the Muslim Brotherhood was in Syria, because it was able to exploit these ethnic divisions. Daniel Pipes explains that "the passage of time has hardened the Sunni-Alawi divide to the point that it dominates the

---

[13]Augustus Richard Norton, "The Security Legacy of the 1980s in the Third World," in Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 24.

[14]Hudson, 5.

409

way Syrians interpret domestic politics, and the way they anticipate Syria after Asad's

passing."[15] Moreover, Pipes explains that the Islamic movement "in Syria... is more anti-

Alawi and anti-Ba'th, more communal than religious. Muslim Brethern literature, for

example, hardly ever brings up the usual fundamentalist concern for applying the sharia.

Rather its goals consist of the Sunni public agenda."[16]

In Egypt, the Brotherhood did not have this context in which to work. While it

challenged the regime in the economic realm by providing social welfare activities, it did

not challenge the people's identity. Everyone considered themselves Egyptian. This

strong national identity and its resulting legitimacy has allowed Egypt to weather long

periods of economic malaise and Islamic fundamentalism. As Fouad Ajami noted:

> Egyptians who know their country so well have a way of reciting its troubles, then
> insisting that the old resilient country shall prevail. As an outsider who has followed
> the twists of the country's history and who approaches the place with nothing but awe
> for its civility amid great troubles, I suspect they are right. The country is too wise,
> too knowing, too tolerant to succumb to a reign of theocratic zeal. Competing truths
> and whole civilizations have been assimilated and brokered here; it is hard to see
> Cairo, that comes to great, knowing cities turning its back on all that.[17]

The leaders of both countries face tremendous domestic challenges; however, in

my view Egypt will successfully face its challenges. The legitimacy it enjoys allows its

leaders and people to assess their condition, honestly. While the fixes will not be easy,

they are at least at a valid starting point to improve conditions. Admittedly, the fixes are

---

[15]Daniel Pipes, "Syria Beyond the Peace Process," The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 40 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), 11.

[16]Ibid., 12-13.

[17]Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 5 (September/October 1995): 88.

being conducted incrementally because of the strain they place on society. Syria is also proceeding incrementally in the domestic arena as it also tries to open its economy. This is where the similarity ends, however, because both countries handle their foreign policy much differently as a direct result of their differing levels of legitimacy based on ethnicity.

State Alignment Review: Case Studies

Let us review, then the pattern of state alignment for each of the case studies. First, Syria in the Cold War era, performed omnibalancing in accordance with Steven David's definition; that is, Syria bandwagoned with the superpower in order to balance against the internal threat, the Sunni majority. It is important to understand the nature of this alignment. First, Syria had a cordial, but not warm relationship with the Soviet Union. Second, Syria did use a combination of carrots and sticks in order to deal with its internal threat; however, for this decision, it appears that Syria chose to balance against the Sunni internal threat by using the stick, such as the case in Hama. Third, Asad chose to relinquish any regional status by choosing to ensure its ties with the Soviet Union. This point is evident by examining Syria's support of the non-Arabic state of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a regionally unpopular move. Finally, the treaty focused on military wares, not on economic tools, and his economy suffered. As this case study showed, Asad had great concern for the internal threat, the Sunni majority, and he chose to face this threat using the military tools from the Soviet Union.

411

Security, on both the regional and domestic levels, seemed to be a major concern for Asad. In fact, he linked the two threats, thereby, justifying his actions on other states based on his belief of their meddling in his affairs. Asad explains that, "We were not just dealing with killers inside Syria, but those who masterminded their plans. The plot thickened after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and many foreign intelligence services became involved. Those who took part in Camp David used the Muslim Brothers against us."[18] Mahmud Faksh explains that Syria's involvement with Lebanon was "a fear of [a] possible spillover."[19] of sectarian violence. According to Alasdair Drysdale, "it was further proof that the Alawis were not Muslim at all....it was only a matter of time before some of Lebanon's sectarian violence would be transmitted to Syria."[20] Asad's focus on security overshadowed his state's economic problems. The treaty with the Soviets was primarily for military wares. According to Umar F. Abd-Allah, "the chief purpose of the Soviet-Syrian 'friendship pact' was to strengthen Asad's position in the face of mounting popular opposition,"[21] and according to the Action Committee for the Liberation of Syria, the pact was designed "to protect Asad from the wrath of the Syrian people."[22]

Syria's alignment decision benefitted a particular group, the Alawis. Not only did the treaty bolster the military which is namely in the hands of the Alawis, it also gave the

---

[18]Seale, 335.

[19]Mahmud A. Faksh, "Syria's Role and Objectives in Lebanon," Mediterranean Quarterly, 3, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 87.

[20]Alasdair Drysdale, "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime," Current History, 80, no. 462 (January 1981): 33.

[21]Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 75.

[22]Ibid., 76.

412

minority-ruled regime the tools to repress the Sunni majority. In my view, it is more than

just coincidence that the signing of the treaty and the subsequent military hardware came

just before Asad's brutal massacre of Hama. It is because of the lack of legitimacy of

Asad's minority-ruled regime that he must proceed cautiously in the foreign policy realm.

He uses a combination of carrots and sticks to deal with his internal enemies, and Hama

was an example of his use of sticks. He does, however, try to build a public consensus

for his policies, causing him to produce only incremental policy changes. While Asad's

policies may look convoluted, they are really products of Asad's cautious calculations, as

he tries to balance the many competing interests in his society. While he may at first

glance appear to be belligerent and radical, he really is, as Shlomo Avineri describes, a

status quo leader.[23]

Egypt in the Cold War era also bandwagoned with a superpower, the United

States, as well as with Israel. This realignment with these two countries was a radical

departure from Egypt's previous alignment choices since the beginning of the Cold War.

This radical realignment, as with Syria's alignment, cost Egypt its regional status, but

Egypt had great support from the people for this decision. As Thomas Lippman claimed:

> Sadat wanted to seize the moment. He was not crippled by the domestic weaknesses
> that hindered other Arab leaders - Egypt was not a precarious artificial state with an
> imposed monarchy, like Jordan, nor a pit of unrest run by a despised minority, like
> Syria - and he had established Egypt's freedom of action by breaking with the Soviet
> Union and attacking Israel in 1973.[24]

---

[23]Shlomo Avineri's view is taken from Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Road," in Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate, ed. Tawfic E. Farah (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 126.

[24]Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser: Sadat Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 9-10.

Sadat stressed an Egyptian-first credo, and he addressed Egyptian interests. As a result,

Egypt was able to address a domestic variable - its economy - by aligning itself with the

superpower that would help it address this domestic concern. This is what Syria could

not do because of Asad's preoccupation with quelling the Sunni threat.

For Egypt, security was a secondary issue. Sadat believed that the 1973 war was

the last war, and that Egypt needed peace in order focus on its main concern, providing

for its people. It does appear that Sadat wanted all of Egypt to prosper, not just a certain

group. A ministry development plan document stated that:

> political wisdom and simple justice call for the alleviation of the burdens of the
> masses. They deserve respite, for they have given much when Egypt required it of
> them, socially, politically, and militarily. Political wisdom further recognizes the
> inherent danger in allowing the standard of living of the majority to deteriorate, when
> they can see around them luxurious consumption and special privileges. It is only
> human that they should feel discontent, fear, and envy.[25]

The problem, of course, is that this intention did not reflect the outcome, and the rich

tended to get richer, while the poor, poorer. The point, however, is that Sadat was able to

address this growing domestic problem, by taking a seemingly risky approach in his

realignment decision. According to Ali E. Heikal,

> Sadat used to contrast Egypt's deep-seated unity with the sectarian, familial, and
> communal fragmentation of most Arab countries. According to Sadat, this unity
> allowed Egypt to pursue a purposeful foreign policy and to make hard decisions (e.g.
> peace with Israel) impossible for most Arab countries because of their domestic
> fragmentation.[26]

---

[25]Ibid., 91.

[26]Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in The
Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 160.

414

In the post-Cold War era, Syria's alignment behavior was still cautious and

calculating, but its alignment concerning the domestic threat changed. First, it

bandwagoned with the Sunnis in the form of offering carrots, not sticks. Asad realized

he needed Sunni support in the economic realm, as well as a means of diffusing the

potential Sunni threat. Siding with the coalition provided an opportunity for Asad to gain

some needed economic support, as well as a means to gain back status, both regionally

and internationally. It is important to note that while Asad did address some of his state's

economic concerns, security was still a primary issue, primarily the security of his

regime:

> [Asad's] general attitude towards the private sector has always been positive,
> provided the representatives of this sector stuck to their business and did not oppose
> his regime. Asad would neither block nor further any reform project for ideological
> reasons. His main concerns, are of a different nature, namely whether economic
> policy would support or contravene his regime's high policy goals [i.e., security and
> stability]. For that reason, Asad has never favoured abandoning unnecessarily any
> element of state control and the means of patronage such control implies, nor
> introducing or envisaging farreaching changes that might be considered a challenge
> to parts of his political basis.[27]

Although he balanced against a regional threat and a fellow Arab state, it was an

historical enemy. Now, Syria was eager to reenter the Arab fold, and its alignment with

the coalition allowed it do just that. Syria did bandwagon with the lone superpower, the

United States, but Syria gave it a cold embrace. Syria's motivation for stiff-arming the

United States was to appease Asad's fellow Alawis. According to Daniel Pipes, it is the

centers of Alawi power, the military and the Ba'th Party, who oppose the current peace

---

[27]Volker Perthes, Economic Change, Political Control and Decision Making in Syria, (Germany: SWP, 1994), 203-204.

415

process.[28] Consequently, Syria seems to have adopted a pragmatic approach to its

alignment behavior by carefully balancing the interests of the Sunni majority, thereby

opening its economy, while continuing its bellicose rhetoric towards the United States

and keeping the reigns on the economic opening. In sum, Asad will not do anything to

endanger the survival of his regime. As Daniel Pipes suggested:

> While Asad shares with other authoritarian leaders the goal of personal and regime survival, he stands apart from most of them in his willingness to resort to extreme means to achieve his ends. To keep himself and his fellow Alawis in power, he could do anything from destroy a Syrian city (as he did to Hama in 1982) to reverse a lifetime of anti-Zionism and sign a peace treaty with Israel.[29]

Finally, Egypt in the post-Cold War era continued its alignment with the now sole

superpower, the United States, and with Israel. The difference with this superpower

alignment from Syria's post-Cold War superpower alignment is that Mubarak chose to

take a strong pro-U.S. stance. He was able to do this because he had support from the

Egyptian people. Consequently, he was better able to address his economic situation

than was Asad. Mubarak continued Sadat's pragmatic approach to foreign policy,

perhaps even more so because he reentered Egypt into the Arab fold, while reestablishing

ties with the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Mubarak demonstrated some risk-taking by

embracing the United states in the midst of short term economic costs and regional anti-

West sentiment - two key openings for Islamicist groups. On the other hand, his regional

and international alignment allowed him to secure some economic benefits which he had

hoped to distribute throughout the population.

---

[28]Pipes, "Syria Beyond the Peace Process," 118.

[29]Ibid., 3.

416

Mubarak looked past the Gulf Crisis in hopes of establishing an arrangement that would benefit Egypt, primarily economically. All issues seemed to point towards the economic imperative. According to Stephen Pellitiere, "Egypt's security problem must be seen in context of its economic plight."[30] Status also was a means to gain economic benefits. Steve Negus explained that "Egyptian diplomats openly admit that as their diplomatic utility wanes, the money will start to dry up."[31] Boutros-Ghali felt that "the postwar period in the Arab world should correspond to the postwar period in Europe which gave rise to the Marshall Plan and the EEC. We have a similar opportunity 50 years later."[32]

One may argue that Egypt's motive for addressing its economy was to stifle the Muslim Brotherhood. I agree with this view to some extent, however, we must also remember the Egyptian people's willingness to forgo short-term economic benefits in support of Mubarak's coalition decision. Even the opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood included, supported Mubarak's decision. What seems to be a potential problem is the difference between the elite and public opinion. This gap is better addressed in a study focused on democratization. What I have uncovered, however, is an honesty in Egypt's self-assessment, by its leaders and people. Such a reassessment is an important start point on the path towards democracy. In fact, Egypt's ability to conduct honest self-assessments is what led to its effective military reforms and excellent

---

[30]Stephen C. Pellitiere, Shar'ia Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1995), 1.

[31]Steve Negus, "Mubarak's Diplomatic Coup," Middle East Insight (15 March 1996), 8.

[32]"Butrus Ghali Views Nonaligned Initiative," FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 6-7.

417

performance on the battlefield in the October 1973 War, as discussed in chapter four.

Another critical factor, and the focus of my study, is Egypt's strong sense of national

identity based on ethnic homogeneity. As noted earlier, Fouad Ajami explains this

identity by observing that, "Egyptians who know their country so well have a way of

reciting its troubles, then insisting that the old resilient country shall prevail."[33] This

sense of nationalism may be helpful for Egypt on its path to democracy, or it may signify

a political culture that seeks a more paternalistic regime or some variant thereof. This

point, I feel, is worthy of further study.

Definitions

Let us now address each definition, by first restating them:

1. If a weak state balances, then we will observe the state aligning against the threat.

2. If a weak state bandwagons, then we will observe the state aligning with the threat

My cases support Randall L. Schweller's views that balancing and bandwagoning

"are not opposite behaviors. The motivation for bandwagoning is fundamentally

different from that of balancing. Bandwagoning is commonly done in the expectation of

making gains; balancing is done for security and it always entails costs."[34] All my cases

revealed that each country viewed the superpowers as sources of gain, not as threats.

During the Cold War era, Sadat admits that the economy was the major reason for

launching the October War, and Marc Cooper claims that "Mid-1977 begins to look a

---

[33]Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 5 (September/October 1995):
88.

[34]Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,"
International Security, 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 106.

418

great deal like mid-1973. The economy was under a severe strain and going nowhere. There was nothing left to be tried in the polity." Moreover Cooper recounts an Egyptian phrase concerning Egypt's realignment: "the Soviets can give you only war, only the Americans give you peace, and the Soviets cannot give you economic development."[35] While Asad was not necessarily looking for economic gain in his decision to sign the 1980 treaty with the Soviets, he was looking for military hardware to primarily thwart ethnically-based internal threats. The Soviet-Syrian alliance is characterized by Efraim Karsh as a "marriage of convenience," which he described "in terms of a mutually beneficial strategic interdependence between two allies: a relationship favoring each partner in accordance with the vicissitudes of regional and global affairs." Other scholars described Syrian policy in terms of having an independent character, tempered by Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab relations, as well as occurring only when Soviet and Syria relations converged.[36]

The post-Cold War era cases also support Schweller's definition of bandwagoning. Again, Egypt's motivation for its Persian Gulf War alignment was economically based. Boutros-Ghali described his country's expectations from the War in terms of the Marshall Plan and EEC, which followed World War II.[37] Everything was colored by Egypt's economic imperative. Mubarak viewed the United States as a source

---

[35]See chapter four, pages 191 and 192, which cite McLaurin, Peretz, and Snider, 34-35 and Cooper, 250 and 252.

[36]See chapter five, page 218, which cites Karsh, 1 and 21, and paraphrases Golan and Rabinovich, 228.

[37]See chapter six, page 308 which cites Boutros-Ghali in "Butrus Ghali Views Nonaligned Initiative," FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 6-7

419

to address his country's economic woes. Asad's alignment with the United States and the Persian Gulf coalition also was also economically motivated, not threat-based. The problem for Asad was that his superpower benefactor had collapsed. He had no other alternative but to turn to the United States, but as I will address later, the nature of Asad's alignment with the United States was much different than the Egyptian-American alliance. The point here is that bandwagoning, for my cases, was motivated by economics, not threat. Consequently, my cases support definition one, but not definition two.

Hypotheses

3. If a state omnibalances, then we will observe it bandwagoning with the threatening superpower so as to balance against the internal threat.

4. If we are examining alignment during the Cold War era, then we should see external threats taking on more significance than internal threats.

5. If we are examining alignment during the post-Cold War era, then we should see internal threats taking on more significance than external threats.

6. If the external threat is regionally based, then the state will align differently than if the external threat is from the international system, that is the threat being a superpower.

7. If a state is ethnically divided, whereby group loyalties do not coincide with state loyalties, then that state will suffer a loss of legitimacy. Such a state will act differently towards the international system than a homogeneous state, in which group and state loyalties do coincide, thereby strengthening state legitimacy. I will measure this state

420

behavior in terms of a refined definition of balancing and bandwagoning, which I will explain below.

In order to further refine the definition of bandwagoning and balancing, let us now address hypothesis three, which is David's hypothesis concerning omnibalancing. Here again, I draw upon Schweller's view that bandwagoning and balancing are not opposite behaviors. The first part of the hypothesis is only partially corroborated by my cases. We did see both Egypt and Syria bandwagon with a superpower, but as explained above, the motivation was not threat-based. Second, I contend that only Syria bandwagoned in order to balance against internal or regional threats during both time periods. In the Cold War era case, Syria balanced against an internal threat, i.e., the Sunni population, and in the post-Cold War case, it aligned, or bandwagoned, with its internal threat, while balancing against a regional threat. The nature of the alignment with the West allowed Asad to make gains, in terms of economic benefits, as well as status, but mostly this alignment allowed him to balance the interests of his Alawi coalition and Sunni population.

So what did my cases reveal about David's omnibalancing hypothesis? First, it worked best, except for the modification of bandwagoning explained above, for the Cold War era-Syrian case. Syria bandwagoned with the Soviets to address its internal threat. Second, in the post-Cold War era, Syria both bandwagoned with the United States and the West to address both the internal threat, the Sunnis, as well as the regional threat, Iraq. Additionally, Asad did bandwagon with the Sunnis in order to gain greater regime support. Finally, Egypt did not balance against an internal threat. It did seek gains in

421

order to address its economic situation, but significantly, it did not have to address a legitimacy problem, based on ethnic divisions. This is the significant point, which leads me to hypothesis seven, as it relates to the Egypt's bold versus Syria's cautious foreign policy to which I referred in the preceding chapters.

Egypt, during both time periods was able to bandwagon with a superpower, without having to balance against an internal threat. While Egypt obviously had to consider its dire economic conditions, both Sadat and Mubarak did not have to concern themselves with their state's legitimacy and, consequently, they both enjoyed great support from their people for their foreign policy initiatives. As Nazih N. Ayubi claims, "By political and legal tradition, both the State and the President (rayyes) are invested with much power and respect. One result is that both in domestic and external matters, 'regime' and 'policy' are often presented and/or perceived of as one and the same thing. The political instinct of most Egyptians would be first to support the state and then to find out why!"[38] Consequently, when Sadat and Mubarak embarked on a foreign policy course, they knew that they enjoyed a reservoir of legitimacy. They did not have to concern themselves with building a consensus; thus, they made their alignment decisions without this constraint. They had a great deal of maneuver room, which allowed them to embark on bold, purposeful foreign policy.

Asad, on the other hand, had to balance against an internal threat. Asad did not enjoy the legitimacy that the Egyptian leaders did. During the Cold War period, Asad

---

[38]See chapter six, page 296 that cites Nazih N. Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), 312.

422

had to gain military wares in order to address his internal Sunni opposition. While he did not use the same means to address this opposition in the post-Cold War era, he still had to address their interests. He did this by embarking on an incremental, cautious policy of economic liberalization, while establishing a very cold embrace for his Western alignment. Asad could not initiate bold, purposeful foreign policy because he was constrained by the lack of legitimacy at home. He did take bold action at home when he massacred the town of Hama, but it was a last resort after he was unable to build a domestic consensus, and his alignment with the Soviets was still "a marriage of convenience" - no bold foreign policy here.

I will further address my refinement of balancing and bandwagoning in the theoretical contribution section. The point I want to make now, however, is that I did find that a state which is ethnically divided acts differently towards the international system than a homogeneous state. This difference, however, is more meaningful when described in terms of bold, purposeful behavior versus cautious, incremental behavior, rather the terms, bandwagoning and balancing. However, it is the presence of bandwagoning and balancing, as defined by Schweller, that may help us determine whether a state will embark upon bold versus cautious behavior towards the international system. Generally, I have found that a state that is ethnically divided will have to balance against or bandwagon with its internal (ethnic) threat. A homogeneous state does not have to do this, and, therefore, is less constrained from making bold, foreign policy.

This point leads me to a discussion of hypotheses four, five, and six. While these cases did not meet these hypotheses head on, they nevertheless reveal some significant

423

points, which these hypotheses suggest. First, the preceding cases suggest that in the post-Cold War era, domestic variables come to the fore. Leaders must look within for fixes. What is interesting to me and what gives us further indications of alignment behavior is when we compare Syria's alignment with its internal enemies in the post-Cold war era versus in the Cold War era. In the post-Cold war era, Asad chose to bandwagon, as opposed to his balancing behavior in the Cold War era, regarding the Sunnis. In the post-Cold War era, he bandwagoned with the Sunnis in order to build the economy and make in-roads to western technology, while bolstering Syrian diplomatic clout on the regional and international stages. Conversely, he liberalized the economy as a means of bandwagoning with the Sunnis, thus broadening support of his regime. In fact, it appears that he had to convince his own circle of fellow Alawis to accept the peace process, which was widely supported by the economically well-off Sunnis. It will be interesting to see if Asad will be able to contain this liberalization to the economic realm. Egypt, too, has continued its gradual economic liberalization and to some extent, political liberalization. The question for Egypt, is whether economically it is doing too little too late. Will it be able to continue economic reform without causing too much hardship on its people? Will such hardship, then, spill into the political realm? The good news is that perhaps the post-Cold war era, with all its uncertainties, is forcing regimes to fix themselves from within. These fixes may be easier for ethnically homogeneous states because it provides an easier context in which to deal with opposition groups. For example, currently, the Muslim Brotherhood is a greater threat in Syria because of its ability to exploit ethnic divisions, than in Egypt, where such divisions are minor.

424

Additionally, fixes which come from within will perhaps have long-term effects, as compared to band-aid fixes imposed by the international arena. There is cause for optimism in the post-Cold War era, if this is indeed a trend.

This discussion leads us to the second point: these cases suggest the greater significance of the region, rather than the international arena, concerning alignment decisions. Let us review the behavioral similarities for both Egypt and Syria. Both countries chose to leave the Arab fold during the Cold War for their respective alignment decisions. However, in the post-Cold War era, both countries made deliberate efforts to renew their regional ties and gain regional status. During the Cold War era, I believe that Egypt's national sentiment combined with the status it gained in the international arena via its ties with the United States compensated for any lost regional status. For Syria, its ties with the Soviet Union also served to compensate for any regionally lost status. Additionally, its ties with the Soviets allowed it to gain the necessary military hardware to deal with any domestic unrest, so in Asad's view, he was able to use coercion to gain internal support. The nature of this internal support is debatable, however.

Why did both states choose to turn their focus to the region in the post-Cold war era? This focus towards the region supports Waltz's view that there seems to be a degree of more uncertainty in the other-than-bipolar world. During the Cold War era, as discussed in chapter two, both countries manipulated the Cold War rivalry for their own purposes. The rivalry ensured aid in some form or another. In the post-Cold war era, assistance and even alliances are less certain. Now countries are looking to their own neighborhood for future economic, security, and cultural arrangements. While Egypt

425

already had ties with the United States, there was some uncertainty concerning future U.S. aid. The Syrians lost their superpower patron, altogether. It was necessary for both Asad and Mubarak to look regionally for assistance.

What have we learned about foreign policy trends or alignment behavior? First, it appears that ethnic homogeneity does have an impact on foreign policy. It provides a wealth of legitimacy, thereby allowing that state's leader more maneuver room in foreign policy. Consequently, that leader is able to take risks, which leaders of ethnically divided states are unable to do. Such boldness enables leaders to make strong, purposeful alignments, as opposed to tentative, cautious alignments. In other words, the ability to make bold foreign policy causes the nature of alignments, whether they are balancing or bandwagoning type alignments, to be different from those alignments stemming from a cautious, tentative foreign policy. It is this legitimacy based on ethnic homogeneity that enables leaders to make bold policy and subsequently, strong alignments. Practically, this point enables policymakers to adjust their expectations concerning the policies of ethnically divisive versus ethnically homogeneous states.

Second, it appears that the post-Cold war era promotes bandwagoning with internal enemies because there is a degree of uncertainty in the international system concerning a superpower's support. The state cannot count on support from the international system. The imperative now is to find fixes from within, which may in the long-term cause a state to better address its real concerns, such as the economy. This point is responsible for what observers call pragmatism in policy-making. Perhaps this bodes well for transitioning regimes on the road to democracy, a topic for further study.

426

Third, in the post-Cold War era, it appears that the region has become more significant than in the Cold War era. This may provide added prestige and functionality to regional organizations (again, a topic for further research).

Theoretical Contributions

I have already touched on the theoretical implications of my project in both the international relations and comparative politics fields. Without overstating this point, my cases clearly show the importance of asking both international relations and comparative politics questions when trying to understand state alignment behavior. First, however, I want to address what I feel is the most significant theoretical contribution of my work, before addressing the secondary contributions. I believe my work furthers the discussion of balancing versus bandwagoning state alignment behavior. Specifically, I have added to the critique of Stephen Walt by expanding on Randall L. Schweller's definitions of balancing and bandwagoning, while using Steven David's idea of omnibalancing by looking at these behaviors as they relate to internal and external threats. These behaviors are not opposites, as Schweller tell us, and bandwagoning is done for profit, not for security purposes. What I have discovered is that when a state does not have to balance against or bandwagon with an ethnically charged internal threat, then it can bandwagon and balance in a bold, unconstrained manner. There is more maneuver room for state alignment decisions in such states that have great legitimacy, stemming from its ethnic homogeneity. Conversely, a state that must constantly balance against or bandwagon with an ethnically charged internal threat as a means to gain legitimacy, can only conduct state alignment decisions in a cautious, incremental manner. There is no maneuver room

427

for state alignment decisions in such states that lack legitimacy due to its ethnic divisiveness, where group and state loyalties do not coincide. In sum, balancing and bandwagoning alignment behavior are not polar opposites; bandwagoning is for profit, while balancing is for security purposes, and the absence vice presence of internal bandwagoning/balancing determines bold, purposive state alignment behavior and cautious, incremental alignment behavior, respectively.

This point begs the question on what is bold, purposive behavior versus cautious, incremental behavior. Bold, purposive behavior may take the form of realignments and strong commitments to allied partners. These actions may seem risky because they are new and challenge perhaps former policies. Cautious, incremental behavior reflects more of a status quo in terms of alliances, as well as weak commitments. These actions are risk-adverse because they are not new, and the luke-warm commitments allow for balancing and bandwagoning at home should regime support not be forthcoming.

The domestic variable that causes internal bandwagoning or balancing is the lack of legitimacy, based on ethnic divisiveness. This variable is tremendously significant when examined in its positive state. When there is a great reservoir of legitimacy, stemming from a coinciding of ethnic and state loyalties, than a leader of such a state can, generally, count on great domestic support concerning state alignment decisions. What reveals the significance of this variable, i.e., the presence of great legitimacy, is that while Egypt was suffering from great economic inefficiencies, it still was able to count on great support due to its legitimacy. While one may argue that Syria's economy was in much better condition than Egypt's, Asad could not count on broad regime

428

support due to the state's lack of legitimacy. My cases suggest that legitimacy, based on ethnic homogeneity, is a more powerful variable than economic efficiency for the state in terms of gaining support for state alignment decisions. Clearly, my cases demonstrate the importance of continued research on legitimacy studies, even though it is not a tangible, easily quantifiable variable, for indeed, "the issue of support and opposition, legitimacy and illegitimacy... stands at the crux of all political study."[39]

While I feel that my biggest contribution concerns the link between the domestic variable and alignment behavior, my cases also reveal the importance of understanding the international system in which states make alignment decisions. The primacy of the region and the state became clear in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, Kenneth Waltz's claim concerning the uncertainties of a multipolar world is justified. If the rewards from the international system are unclear, then states must look inward or to their immediate neighborhood for fixes. Additionally, my cases reveal that the certainty of a hegemon to take care of the international system, as Robert Gilpin explains, is unclear. What I add to Waltz and Gilpin is an other-than-great power approach. Such an approach, as Barry Buzan and others claim, require an understanding not only of the international system, but also of the region and the state, especially since the idea of "statehood" for Third World countries is different than the Western notion. Consequently, scholars must understand the state, as well as the international system in order to further understanding of state alignment behavior.

---

[39]Lomperis cites Harry Eckstein in Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 31.

Suggested Further Research

While I have a learned a great deal from researching this project, there is a great deal yet to be done. The problem with studying this area of the world is that some data are either not available or too sensitive for publication. This point is especially an issue for the Cold War cases, specifically Syria. However, I do believe there are ways to overcome either the unavailability of data or its inaccessibility. First, it is important to take advantage of windows of opportunity for data-gathering. Such a window occurred after the Gulf War. Second, we must build bridges within the academic world, e.g. between comparativists and international relations scholars. No longer may these fields develop independently from one another, and I believe that this study is proof of their interrelationship. Third, we must build bridges between the governmental and military intelligence organizations. Each organization offers a great deal, and I believe the intelligence assessments of our nation would be tremendously enhanced with more cross-talk. I say this understanding that this in itself is a dissertation or policy review paper. Most importantly, it is critical that there is cooperation and understanding among academia, the military, and the policy-making world. I realize that this point may sound naïve, but in the course of my research, I was struck by how critical such cooperation may be in pursuit of theoretical break-throughs, policy-making, or the appropriateness of the use of force.

My recommendation is that bridges be made among these three areas because in pursuit of truth, whether in policy-making or theory, open-mindedness is paramount. While we may never rid ourselves of biases or parochialisms, we must never strive for

430

less of a goal. It is not easy to do this because all three fields have grown to cherish their organizational essences, and to a point this is necessary. It becomes a problem when it prevents cooperation and the sharing of ideas. Practically, each area offers a great deal to one another, as I found in my research.

With this in mind, other areas of further research have already been addressed, but I will restate them here. Democratization, consensus-building, ethnicity studies, etc. are all touched on here and are worthy of further study in the context of the cases presented here or in other cases. Additionally, such studies will enhance the politically important, yet empirically difficult concepts of legitimacy and ethnicity. Moreover, we need more Cold War era versus post-Cold War era cases to either validate, refute, or build upon the points presented in this study. Further use of the linkage model between domestic variables and foreign policy used here will help sharpen the model, itself. Other linkage models may also help us understand this critical link of the domestic with the foreign realms.

The policy implications concerning such topics as democratization, multilateral organizations, and the role of force versus aid, need further review and hard study. The implication here is that as regimes look inward in this post-Cold War era, the United States may want to engage in self-help type policies for these regimes. This implies that we understand the regime and the nature of its challenges. There may be some regimes who may adopt a variant of democracy, and we will need to resist the temptation to judge them against the American or even western model.

431

While the post-Cold War era may be rife with uncertainty, it may also hold for us tremendous possibilities. What this means for scholars, policy-makers, and military leaders is that understanding regions and regimes has become at least as important as understanding the international system. While the challenge is great, there is cause for much hope, not only in broadening our understanding of the world, but also in designing policies that will bring happiness and prosperity too. We are in exciting and uncertain times. Let us face this future together, sharing ideas and dreams.

WORKS CITED

Books and Articles in Edited Books

Abd-Allah, Umar F. The Islamic Struggle in Syria. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983.

Aftandilian, Gregory L. Egypt's Bid For Arab Leadership: Implications For U.S. Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.

Ajami, Fouad. "The Arab Road." In Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 115-132. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Ames, Barry. Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987.

Ansari, Hamied. Egypt: The Stalled Society. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

Armanazi, Ghayth N. "Syrian Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Continuity and Change in the Post-Gulf Era." In State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 112-119. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Atkeson, Edward B. A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-1996. U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

Ayubi, Nazih N. "Government and the State in Egypt Today." In Egypt Under Mubarak, ed. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen, 1-20. London: Routledge, 1990.

Ayubi, Nazih N. The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991.

Ayubi, Shaheen. Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign Policy, 1970-1972. Wakefield: Longwood Academic, 1992.

Baker, Raymond William. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Soul. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.

Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Barth Frederick. "Introduction." In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, ed. Frederick Barth, 10-15. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969. Quoted in Dale F. Eikelman. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 209, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989

Bates, Daniel and Amal Rassam. Peoples and Cultures in the Middle East. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983.

Bates, Robert H. "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa." In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, 152-171. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Bell, Daniel. "Ethnicity and Social Change." In Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 141-174. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Bill, James A. and Robert Sprinborg. Politics in the Middle East. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "Egyptian Diplomacy: East - West Détente and North - South Dialogue." In Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes, ed. Charles Tripp, 142-150. London: Routledge, 1993.

Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. "International Crises and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace'." In The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 85-104. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fears: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991.

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982.

Comptons's Interactive Encyclopedia. Compton's NewsMedia, Inc., 1994.

Connor, Walker. "Ethnonationalism." In Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington. Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987.

Cooper, Marc N. The Transformation of Egypt. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Cordesman, Anthony H. After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. "On the Governability of Democracies." In Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown, 283-293. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990.

David, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt." In The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 156-185. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Devlin, John F. Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Drysdale, Alasdair and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. Syria and the Middle East Peace Process. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991.

Dupuy, T.N. Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974. Fairfaxa: Hero Books, 1984.

Easton, David. "The Analysis of Political Systems." In Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown, 48-57. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990.

"Egypt." Middle East Economic Digest, 23 February 1979, 24-26.

"Egypt." Middle East Economic Handbook. London: Euromonitor Publications Limited, 1986.

Eikelman, Dale F. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989.

Firro, Kais. "The Syrian Economy Under the Asad Regime." In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, 36-68. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Fleming, William G. "Sub-Saharan Africa: Case Studies of International Attitudes and Transactions of Ghana and Uganda." In Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James N. Rosenau, 94-121. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

435

Gaddis, John Lewis. "Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International System." In The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 25-55. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

Gawrych, George W. "Jihad in the Twentieth Century." In Book of Readings: Modern Military History of the Middle East, ed. George W. Gawrych, 1-9. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. "Introduction." In Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 1-26. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Golan, Galia and Itamar Rabinovich. "The Soviet Union and Syria: The Limits of Cooperation." The Limits of Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'I, 213-231. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979.

Golan, Galia. Soviet Politics in the Middle East From World War II to Gorbachev. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Gurr, Ted Robert and Muriel McClelland, "Political Performance: A Twelve Nation Study." In Comparative Politics Series, Vol 2, Nos. 01-018, ed. Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, 395-413. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

Haddad, Wadi D. Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors. Washington D.C.: Praeger Special Studies, 1985.

Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Herzog, Chaim The War of Atonement, October 1973: The Fateful Implications of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1975.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Liberalization in Syria: The Struggle of Economic and Political Rationality." In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberard Kienle, 97-113. London: British Academic Press, 1994.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria." In The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. Jr. Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Hitti, Philip K. Syria: A Short History. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1959.

Holsti, K.J. "International Theory and War in the Third World." In The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian Job, 37-60. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.

Holsti, Ole R. and James D. Sullivan. "National - International Linkages: France and China as Nonconforming Alliance Members." In Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James N. Rosenau, 147-195. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Holsti, Ole R., Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds. Change in the International System. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.

Hopwood, Derek. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990. London: HarperCollins, 1991.

Hopwood, Derek. Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991.

Hudson, Michael C. Arab Politics: The Search For Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hurewitz, J. C. Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.

Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

437

Kanovsky, Eliyanu. "Egypt's Economy Under Sadat: Will the Peace Agreement be Followed by Prosperity?" In Middle East Contemporary Survey 1978-1979, ed. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, 353-376. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981.

Kaplan, Robert D. The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite. New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Kessler, Martha Neff. Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987.

Kienle, Eberhard. "Introduction: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace." In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle, 1-13. London: British Academic Press, 1994.

Kissinger, Henry A. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." In International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau, 261-275. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Koury, Enver M. The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.

Lawson, Fred. "Domestic Pressures and the Peace Process: Fillip or Hindrance?" In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle, 139-154. London: British Academic Press, 1994.

Legum, Colin, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, eds. Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1979-1980. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981.

Lesch, Ann M. "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Egypt." In Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East, ed. David Garnham and Mark Tessler, 223-243. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Levy, Jack. "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence." In Behavior Society and Nuclear War Volume I, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, 209-333. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Lewis, Bernard. "What is an Arab?" In Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, ed. Ailon Shiloh, 3-9. New York: Random House, 1969.

Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.

Lippman, Thomas W. Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace, and the Mirage of Prosperity. New York: Paragon House, 1989.

Lomperis, Timothy J. From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Ma'oz, Moshe. "The Emergence of Modern Syria." In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Ma'oz, Ze'ev. "The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984." In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, 69-82. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Macridis, Roy C. and Steven L. Burg. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

Mangold, Peter. "The Soviet Record in the Middle East." In Crisis Management and the Superpowers in the Middle East, ed. Gregory Treverton, 89-95. Westmead: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1981.

Mayer, Thomas. The Changing Past: Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt, 1882-1983. Gainsville, University of Florida Press, 1988.

McDermott, Anthony. Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

McLaurin, R. D., Don Peretz, and Lewis W. Snider. Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Migdal, Joel. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Morris, Mary E. New Political Realities and the Gulf: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Santa Monica: Rand, 1993.

Nasrallah, Fida. "Syria After Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics." In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle, 132-138. London: British Academic Press, 1994, 132-138.

Niblock, Tim. "Arab Losses, First World Gains." In Beyond the Gulf War: The Middle East and the New World Order, ed. John Gittings, 77-85. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1991.

439

Norton, Augustus Richard. "The Security Legacy of the 1980s in the Third World." Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, 19-33. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990.

Norton, Philip. The British Polity. New York: Longman, 1990.

Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.

Pelletiere, Stephen C. Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Challenge in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak. U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 5 April 1994.

Peretz, Don. The Middle East. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988.

Perthes, Volker. "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization. In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle, 44-71. London: British Academic Press, 1994.

Perthes, Volker. Economic Change, Political Control and Decision Making in Syria. Germany: SWP, 1994.

Pipes, Daniel. Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Posen, Barry. Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Pye, Lucian W. "Introduction." In Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, 3-26. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1986.

Rosenau, James N., ed. Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Rothschild, Joseph. Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978.

Sadowski, Yahya. "Ba'thist Ethics and the Spirit of State Capitalism: Patronage and the Party in Contemporary Syria." In Ideology and Power in the Middle East, ed. Peter

J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, 160-184. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988.

Safran, Nadav. "Dimensions of the Middle East Problem." In Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, ed. Roy C. Macridis, 374-419. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989.

Said, Abdul A. and Luiz R. Simmons. "The Ethnic Factor in World Politics." In Ethnicity in an International Context, ed. Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmons, 15-45. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976.

Saunders, Harold H. The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985.

Seale, Patrick. Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

Seale, Patrick. Asad: The Struggle For The Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Singer, J. David. "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations." In International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau, 20-29. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience. New York: Random House, 1987.

Snyder, Jack. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Spechler, Dina. "The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Problems, Policies and Prospective Trends." In The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'I, 331-365. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1979.

Speiser, E. A. "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East." In Social Forces in the Middle East, ed. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, 1-22. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955.

Springborg, Robert. "Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt." In Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, 137-159. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.

441

Springborg, Robert. Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

Sukkar, Nabil. "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform." In Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle, 26-43. London: British Academic Press, 1994.

The Middle East and North Africa, 1987. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995.

The Middle East and North Africa, 1995. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995.

Thompson Robert J. and Joseph R. Rudolph. "Ethnic Politics and Public Policy in Western Societies: A Framework For Comparative Analysis." In Ethnicity, Politics, and Development, ed. Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen, 25-63. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1986.

Thompson, Richard H. "Neo-Marxian Explanations and a Reformulation." In Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Richard H. Thompson, 141-174. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Vasquez, John A. "The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War." In The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 205-223. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Vatikiotis, P. J. The Modern History of Egypt. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Verba, Sidney. "Conclusion." In Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, 512-560. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In NeoRealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 322-346. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.

Weber, Max. "Politics As A Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 23-29. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

<u>World Tables, 1989-90 Edition: From the Data Files of the World Bank</u>. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

Yorke, Valerie. <u>Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria, and Israel</u>.
Aldershot: Gower, 1988.

<u>Government Documents, Policy Papers, Lecture, and Speech</u>

"Egypt's Elite Rate U.S., GCC States High; Iraq and Libya Low." <u>Research
Memorandum</u>. Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency, 1991.

Hannah, John P. "At Arms Length: Soviet-Syrian Relations in the Gorbachev Era." <u>The
Washington Institute Policy Papers</u>, No. 8. Washington D. C.: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 1989.

Huxley, Fred. "The Arabs." In <u>In The Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim
Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other</u>, ed. David Pollock and Elaine El
Assal, 1-16. Washington D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction, U.S.
Information Service, 1996.

Khashan, Hilal. "Partner or Pariah: Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan." <u>Policy Papers, No. 41</u>. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 1996.

Pipes, Daniel. "Syria Beyond the Peace Process." <u>The Washington Institute Policy
Papers, No. 40</u>. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1996.

Pollock, David. "The Arab Street?: Public Opinion in the Arab World." <u>The
Washington Institute Policy Paper, No. 32</u>. Washington D.C.: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 1992.

Sadat, Anwar. Speech to Israeli Knesset on November 20, 1977. Quoted in William B.
Quandt. <u>Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics</u>, 346, Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institute, 1986

Saunders, Harold. "Changing Paradigms for the 1990s." Lecture given on 3 April 1991
at Duke University.

<u>Supporting Peace: America's Role in an Arab Israel-Syria Peace Agreement</u>.
Washington D.C.: Washington Institute Study Group.

<u>The Middle East</u>. 8th ed. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994.

443

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication.
Background Notes, 5, No. 7. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
August 1994.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication.
Background Notes, 5, No. 13. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, November 1994.

Journal, Magazine, and Newspaper Articles

"Caution is the Watchword." Business and Finance, December 1993, 29.

Ajami, Fouad. "The Phantoms of Egypt." U.S. News and World Report, 10 April 1995,
55.

Ajami, Fouad. "The Sorrows of Egypt." Foreign Affairs 74, No. 5 (September/October
1995): 72-88.

Album, Andrew. "Egypt Faces its Moment of Truth." Business and Finance of the
Middle East, July/August 1995, 28-29.

Baker, Pauline, and John A. Ausink. "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a
Predictive Model." Parameters 26, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 19-31.

Batatu, Hanna. "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group
and the Causes for its Dominance." The Middle East Journal 35 (Summer, 1981):
331-344.

Beinin, Joel. "Labor, Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952-1961."
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21, No. 1 (February 1989): 71-90.

Ben-Meir, Alon. "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace." Middle East Policy 3,
No. 1 (1994): 71-83.

Brown, Nathan. "Peasants and Notables." Middle Eastern Studies 26, No. 2 (April
1990): 145-160.

Campbell, John C. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East." Current History 80, No. 462
(January 1981): 1-9 and 42-43.

Casandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt." Middle East Journal 49, No. 1 (Winter
1995): 9-27.

Casandra. "The Impending Crisis in Egypt." Middle East Journal 49, No. 1 (Winter
1995): 9-27.

Choueiri, Y. "Two Histories of Syria and the Demise of Syrian Patriotism." Middle Eastern Studies 23, No 4 (October 1987): 496-511.

Cohen, Stephen. "A Not-So-Odd Mideast Couple." New York Times, 25 August 1994, 21(A).

David, Steven R. "Explaining Third World Alignment." World Politics 43, No. 2 (January 1991): 233-256.

Deutsch, Karl. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 55, No. 3 (September 1961): 493-514.

Drysdale, Alasdair. "The Succession Question in Syria." The Middle East Journal 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985): 246-258.

Drysdale, Alasdair. "Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime." Current History 80, No. 462 (January 1981): 32-35 and 37-38.

Easton, David. "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support." British Journal of Political Science 5 No. 4 (October 1975): 435-457.

Eitts, Hermann Frederick. "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects." The Middle East Journal 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 7-22.

Faksh, Mahmud A. "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force." Middle Eastern Studies 20, No. 2 (April 1984): 133-153.

Faksh, Mahmud, A. "Syria's Role and Objectives in Lebanon." Mediterranean Quarterly 3, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 81-95.

Fuller, Graham E. "Moscow and the Gulf War." Foreign Affairs 70, No. 3 (Summer 1991): 55-76.

Furtado, Charles F. Jr. "Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine." Political Science Quarterly 109, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 81-104.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Long Peace." International Security 10, No. 4 (1986): 99-142.

Gerges, Farwaz A. "Egyptian - Israeli Relations Turn Sour." Foreign Affairs 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995): 69-78.

Gold, Dore. "The Syrian-Israeli Track - Taking the Final Step: What Sacrifices Will Asad Make to Get Back the Golan?" Middle East Insight, September/October 1994, 14-17.

445

Gordon, Joel. "The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21, No. 2 (May 1989): 193-214.

Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein. "Egyptian Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 56, No. 4 (July 1978): 714-727.

Heydeman, Steven. "Can We Get There From Here? Lessons From the Syrian Case." American-Arab Affairs 36 (Spring 1991): 27-30.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "State and Civil Society in Syria." Middle East Journal 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993): 243-257.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival." Middle East Policy 3, No. 4 (April 1995): 74-87.

Horovitz, David. "Portrait of the Enemy." The Jerusalem Report 6, No. 6 (27 July 1995): 24-30.

Hunter, F. Robert. "Self-Image and Historical Truth: Nubar Pasha and the Making of Modern Egypt." Middle Eastern Studies 26, No. 2 (April 1990): 363-375.

Karsh, Efraim. "A Marriage of Convenience: The Soviet Union and Asad's Syria." Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 11, No. 4 (December 1989): 1-26.

Kaufman, Chaim. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." International Security 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-175.

Kemp,Geoffrey. "The Middle East Arms Race: Can it be Controlled?" The Middle East Journal 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991): 441-446.

Kohli, Atul, Peter Evans, Peter Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol. "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium." World Politics 48, No. 1 (October 1995): 1-49.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." Foreign Affairs 70, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 23-33.

Labs, Eric J. "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, No. 3 (1992): 383-415.

Lancaster, John and Dana Priest. "U.S. Assures Egypt on Foreign Aid: Defense Secretary Makes No Promises About Cuts After 1996." Washington Post, 9 January 1995, 8-9.

Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky. "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case." World Politics 36, No. 4 (July 1984): 555-580.

446

Lawson, Fred H. "From Neo-Ba'th to Ba'th Nouveau: Hafiz al-Asad's Second Decade." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, No. 2 (Winter 1990): 1-22.

Lawson, Fred H. "Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in Contemporary Syria." Middle East Journal 48, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 47-64.

Lesch, Ann Mosley. "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians." The Middle East Journal 14, No. 2 (Winter 1990): 32-50.

Lifton, Robert K. "Talking with Assad: A Visit to the Middle East in Transition." Middle East Insight, September/October, 8-11.

Mackie, Alan. "Cairo is Now Looking to Washington as a Major Source of Aid." Middle East Economic Digest, 5 January 1979, 5-7.

Makram-Ebeid, Mona. "Egypt's 1995 Elections: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?" Middle East Policy 4, No. 3 (March 1996): 117-136.

Malik, Ifikhar H. "World Politics and South Asia: Beginning of an End?" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 19, No. 3 (Spring 1996): 40-70.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." American Political Science Review 78 No. 3 (September 1984): 734-749.

McIntosh, Mary, E., Martha Abele MacIver, Daniel Abele, and David B. Nolle. "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria." Social Forces 73, No. 3 (March 1995): 939-967.

Mearsheimer, John J. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." The Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, 35-50.

Murphy, Caryle. "The Business of Political Change in Egypt." Current History 94, No. 588 (January 1995): 18-22.

Muslih, Muhammad. "Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready." Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994): 145-163.

Muslih, Muhammad. "The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations." Middle East Journal 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993): 611-632.

Negus, Steve. "Mubarak's Diplomatic Coup." Middle East Insight, 15 March 1996, 8-9.

Nelan, Bruce W. "Boris Vs. Mikhail." Time, (24 March 1991), 26-31.

Newman, Saul. "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?" World Politics, 43, No. 3 (April 1991): 451-478.

Olmert, Yosef. "Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in Syria: The Assad Regime." Middle East Review 20, No. 3 (Spring 1988): 17-25.

Paskar' P. "The Soviet People - A New Social and International Community of People." Kommunist Moldavii No. 12 (December 1982): 82. Quoted in Gail Warshovsky Lapidus. "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case." World Politics 36, No. 4 (July 1984): 556.

Perthes, Volker. "The Syrian Economy in the 1980s." Middle East Journal 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 37-58.

Pincus, Joseph. "Syria: A Captive Economy." Middle East Review 12, No. 1 (Fall 1979): 49-60.

Pipes, Daniel. "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria." Middle Eastern Studies 25, No. 4 (October 1989): 429-450.

Polling, Sylvia. "The Syrian Surprise: A New Spirit of Entrepreneurism and a Diligent Program of Economic Reforms are Transforming the Syrian Economy." Middle East Insight, July/August 1993, 6-11.

Ramet, Sabrina. "Eastern Europe's Painful Transition." Current History 95, No. 599 (March 1996): 97-102.

Richter, Melvin. "Toward a Concept of Political Legitimacy: Bonopartist Dictatorship and Democratic Legitimacy." Political Theory 10, No. 2 (May 1982): 185-214.

Rodman, Peter W. "Middle East Diplomacy." Foreign Affairs 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 1-17.

Roy, Delwin A. and Thomas Naff. "Ba'thist Ideology, Economic Development and Educational Strategy." Middle Eastern Studies 25, No. 4 (October 1989): 451-480.

Sadowski, Yahya. Review of Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant, by Raymond A. Hinnebusch. In Middle East Journal 45, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 341-342.

Salem, Paul. "The Rise and Fall of Secularism in the Arab World." Middle East Policy 4, No. 3 (March 1996): 151-160.

Saunders, Harold H. "Political Settlement and the Gulf Crisis." Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues 2, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 1-16.

Schroeder, Paul. "Historical Reality vs. NeoRealist Theory." International Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994): 108-148.

Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." International Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1991): 72-107.

Stanley, Bruce. "Drawing from the Well: Syria in the Persian Gulf." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, No. 2 (Winter 1990): 45-64.

Steinmo, Sven. "Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain." World Politics 41, No. 4 (July 1989): 500-535.

Waldner, David. "More Than Meets the Eye: Economic Influence on Contemporary Syrian Foreign Policy," Middle East Insight, May/June 1995, 34-37.

Webber, Mark. "Coping With Anarchy: Ethnic Conflict and International Organizations in the Former Soviet Union." International Relations 18, No. 1 (April 1996): 1-28.

Williams, Donald C. "Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies." Comparative Politics 28, No. 2 (January 1996): 207-224.

Wright, Robin. "Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis." The Middle East Journal 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 23-29.

Zunes, Stephen. "Israeli-Syrian Peace: The Long Road Ahead." Middle East Policy 2, No. 3 (1993): 62-67.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

"(Clandestine) Voice of Lebanon." FBIS, NES (): H2.

"Abd-al-Majid Issues Statement on Gulf War 17 Jan." FBIS, NES (18 January 1991): .

"Abu-Ghazalah on Expected Scenario, Gulf Security." FBIS, NES (17 January 1991): 5.

"Abu-Talib: Troops Not Subjected to 'Animosity'." FBIS, NES (20 February 1991): 8.

"Al-Aharam Praises Reagan Support of Camp David." FBIS, NES (8 December 1980): D1-D2.

"Al-Ahmar Reasserts 'Rejection' of Iraqi Invasion." FBIS, NES (9 August 1990): 49.

"Al-Asad Congratulates Iran's Bani-Sadr." FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): H5.

449

"Al-Asad Interviewed by Kuwaiti Newspaper." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (8 December 1980): H1-H19.

"Al-Ba'th: Syrian Presence in Lebanon Necessary." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (19 November 1982): H2.

"Al-Baz Discusses Tripartite Efforts For Peace." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (19 December 1990): 5.

"Ali Denies Coordination With U.S., Israel." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (8December 1980): D3.

"Al-Shar Requests Emergency Arab Summit." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (9 August 1990): 48.

"Army Chief Calls Invasion 'Unprecedented Event'." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (10 August 1990): 60.

"Ash-Sha'B Fears Zionist Influence." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 January 1980): D7.

"Ba'th Moroccan Socialist Party delegations Hold Talks." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 January 1980): H2.

"Ba'th Official Receives Visiting Delegation." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 January 1980): H4.

"Ba'th Party Delegation to Visit GDR, USSR." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 January 1980): H2.

"Butrus Ghali Views Nonaligned Initiative." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (20 February 1991): 6-7.

"Cairo Papers Report U.S. to Speed Arms Delivery." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (8 December 1980): D1.

"Commentary Applauds Summit Resolutions." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (14 August 1990): 51-52.

"Damascus Domestic Service." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 January 1980): H3.

"Damascus Radio Carries Al-Asad's Der Spiegel Interview." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (30 August 1979): H2.

"Damascus Radio on Significance of Al-Asad's Visit to Moscow." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (16 October 1979): H1.

"Damascus Reports Khaddam's Cyprus Speech." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (20 July 1982): H2.

"Defense Minister Meets with USSR Deputy Minister." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (17 March 1982): H1.

"Economy Minister Speaks at Damascus Fair." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (5 September 1990): 45-46.

"Editorial Analyzes Gulf War, Peace Prospects." <u>FBIS</u>, NES (19 December 1990): 7.

"Editorial Urges Return to Pre-Invasion Kuwait." FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 53.

"Egypt, Syria Said to Propose Gulf Security Plan." FBIS, NES (25 February 1991): 44.

"Foreign Minister Khaddam Returns From Iran." FBIS, NES (17 March 1982): H1.

"FRG Foreign Minister, Economic Delegation Visit." FBIS, NES (28 August 1979): H1.

"Ghali Examines Gulf Crisis, Palestinian Issue." FBIS, NES (19 December 1990): 6.

"Ghali Holds Press Conference on Gulf, Arab Ties." FBIS, NES (28 January 1991): 7.

"Illusory War Replacing Fight Against Israel." FBIS, NES (30 August 1990): 48.

"IMF Cancels 15 Percent of Foreign Debt." FBIS, NES (16 October 1992): 12.

"INA Reports 30 Aug." FBIS, NES (31 August 1990): 39.

"Journalists Stage Sit-In to Protest Gulf War." FBIS, NES (1 February 1991): 9.

"Lawyer Denounces Normalization." FBIS, NES (30 January 1980): D8.

"Minister of State Ghali Interviewed in Paris." FBIS, NES (16 October 1979): D2-D4.

"Ministerial Group Discusses Gulf War developments." FBIS, NES (5 February 1991):
    4.

"Mubarak Comments on Peace Conference, Gulf War." FBIS, NES (20 May 1991): .

"Mubarak Discusses Peace Process, Domestic Issues." FBIS, NES (10 April 1990): 8-
    10.

"Mubarak Explains Reasons for Economic Reform." FBIS, NES (16 September 1992):
    12-14.

"Mubarak Speaks at Alexandria University Event." FBIS, NES (20 July 1992): 10.

"Muslim Brotherhood Leader Voices Support for Iraq." FBIS, NES (30 January 1991):
    48.

"Nation Opposes U.S. Attempt to Weaken Iraq." FBIS, NES (29 October 1990): 53.

"Nation Opposes U.S. Attempt to Weaken Iraq." FBIS, NES (29 October 1990): 53.

"Nation Will Not Defend Iraq Against Israel." FBIS, NES (14 August 1990: 51.

"NPF Supports Al-Asad Efforts in Gulf Crisis." FBIS, NES (10 August 1990): 60.

451

"Palestine Issue to Draw Attention After War." FBIS, NES (31 January 1991): 5.

"Paper Views U.S. Support of Israeli Occupation." FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51.

"People's Assembly Declares Support for Gulf Policy." FBIS, NES (28 January 1991): 9.

"Prime Minister Discusses Economic Measures, Reforms." FBIS, NES (1 December 1992): 15-16.

"Progressive National Front Meets Under Al-Asad." FBIS, NES (17 March 1982): H1.

"Radio Commentary." FBIS, NES (12 October 1990): 50-51.

"Says Egyptian Forces Will Not Enter Iraq." FBIS, NES (31 January 1991): 4.

"Secretary Baker, Israel's Rabin to Pay Visits." FBIS, NES (20 July 1992): 11.

"Sidiqi on Economic Liberalization, Subsidies." FBIS, NES (2 December 1992): 24-25.

"Syria: Impact of Wielding Power on 'Alawi Cohesiveness'." Daily Report Supplement of Near East and South Asia. FBIS, NES (3 October 1995).

"Tishrin Scores Lack of Arab Support For Lebanon." FBIS, NES (4 January 1983): H3.

"Troops Slated for Saudi Arabia Service." FBIS, NES (14 August 1990): 51.

"UK-Based Businessman Briefed on Economic Policy." FBIS, NES (7 November 1990): 41.

"University Demonstrations Continue; City Calm, Protestors Kept Off Streets." FBIS, NES (26 February 1991): 4.

"Views War, Israel's Involvement." FBIS, NES (9 January 1991): 1-3.

"Wafd Party Stance on gulf War Involvement Explained." FBIS, NES (1 February 1991): 8.

"Yugoslav Paper Rilindja Interviews Al-Asad." FBIS, NES (29 August 1979): H4-H5.

BIOGRAPHY

Cindy R. Jebb (Glazier) was born in Providence, Rhode Island on 24 November 1960. She graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1982 with a Bachelor of Science degree. She earned her Master's degree in Political Science from Duke University in 1992. Major Jebb went on to earn her Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from Duke University in 1997.

She has taught International Relations and Comparative Politics at the United States Military Academy from 1992-1995. Major Jebb organized the 1993 Student Conference on U.S. Affairs at West Point and served as a co-chair for a round table at the U.S. Naval Academy Conference on U.S. Affairs in 1993. Major Jebb received an award from the English Speaking Union and subsequently attended a conference at Oxford University. Additionally, she is a term member on the Council of Foreign Relations.

Major Jebb has had several command and staff assignments in the United States and overseas. She is currently serving as the Operations Officer for the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Ft. Meade, Maryland. She is married to Major Joel E. Jebb, and they three children, Ben, Alex, and Olivia.